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Abstract. 
This thesis is a study of epistemological, and related ontological. issues arising 
from the philosophy of the ancient Indian Buddhist thinker, Nägärjuna. 
In part A, the interpretation that Nägärjuna's philosophy is a form of scepticism is 
examined and refuted. Nägärjuna is not a sceptic, because he claims to have knowledge of 
the true nature of entities. Two readings of the notion of 'non-conceptual knowledge of 
reality' in Nägärjuna's writings are explained and assessed. Nagärjuna's statements about 
non-conceptuality are perhaps best understood-- not as advocating a non-conceptual 
knowledge of an unconceptualizable reality but rather-- as descriptions of the non- 
conceptual character of a meditative experience of a conceptualizable reality, i. e. 
emptiness (sünyata), which is the absence of svabhäva (own-being, inherent existence) of 
entities. Finally, the charge of nihilism, which is often made against Nägärjuna's thought, 
is examined. Though Nägärjuna probably intended to tread the famous Buddhist Middle 
Path between nihilism and eternalism, it is likely that-- understood in the Abhidharma 
context in which Nägärjuna was working-- an implication of emptiness is in fact nihilism, 
as Nägärjuna's opponents contended. 
Part B is dedicated to a study of the Nyäya theory of knowledge (pramäna) and two 
extensive critiques-- found in works attributed to Nägärjuna (the Vigrahavyävartan! and 
the Vaidalyaprakarana)-- of this pramana theory. The Nyäya theory of knowledge is 
essentially a species of philosophical realism, which asserts the mind-independent nature 
of many objects of knowledge. Nagärjuna's critiques are best understood as refutations of 
this Nyäya realism. For Nägärjuna there can be no knowledge of mind-independent 
objects because there are no mind-independent objects. Nagärjuna's critiques in the 
Vigrahavyävartanland the Vaidalyaprakarana are explained in detail and are subjected to 
critical scrutiny. His arguments are demonstrated to be fallacious in many respects. 
An Appendix examines adumbrations in Nägarjuna's writings of Candrakirti's 
teaching that the actual svabhäva of entities is their lack of svabhäva. 
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1. Introduction. 
1.1. The Purpose of this Thesis. 
Is Nägärjuna a sceptic? In what sense is knowledge of the ultimate truth 
(paramärthasatya) or reality (tattva) non-conceptual for Nägärjuna? Does Nägarjuna's 
understanding of the ultimate truth/reality as emptiness (sünyata) condemn him to 
nihilism? These are the principal questions which the first part of this thesis will address. 
In the second part of this thesis, I shall consider Nägärjuna's critiques, in the 
Vi grahavyävartanl and the Valdalyaprakarana, of the Nyäya theory of knowledge 
(pramäna). What is the Nyäya pramäna theory which Nägärjuna attacks? What is the 
precise purpose of Nägärjuna's critiques? Are Nägärjuna's criticisms successful, from a 
philosophical perspective? These will be my main questions in the second part of this 
thesis. 
The dominant concern of this thesis might be, broadly speaking, described as 
'epistemology'. Which is to say that, in the various studies which I have made of 
Nägärjuna's philosophy, I have tried to ascertain what, for Nägärjuna, might be the nature 
of knowledge. But the present thesis is also an examination of Nägärjuna's ontology. This 
should perhaps not be surprising. A study of the nature of knowledge is likely to be 
intimately linked to the question, 'what is there to be known? ' 
If, for example, the ultimate truth/reality is a possible object of knowledge for 
Nägarjuna, then the nature of this ultimate truth will determine the character of the 
knowledge the Mädhyamika might have of it. If the ultimate truth were ineffable and 
unconceptualizable, for instance, then knowledge of it must be of a non-conceptual and 
non-linguistic variety (whatever precisely that might mean). And if for Nägärjuna all 
entities are without svabhäva, and, hence, have conceptually constructed existence 
(prajnaptlsat), this has implications for the character of the knowledge-claims which one 
makes about these entities. Prajriaptlmätra would seem to preclude, for example, a theory 
of knowledge which describes knowledge as a matter of correspondence with a 
mind-independent state of affairs. Finally, were Nägärjuna's ontology to be found to 
entail nihilism, i. e. that no entities exist, then this would necessarily have the 
epistemological implication that there could be no knowledge of such entities. So, my 
inquiry into Nagärjuna's epistemology has an indispensable ontological component. 
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1.2. Three Readings of Nägarjuna's Epistemology. 
There are, broadly speaking, three divergent interpretations of Nägärjuna's 
epistemology. One interpretation sees Nägärjuna's philosophy as primarily an attack on 
knowledge. This attack is interpreted as a criticism of all knowledge-claims about how 
things actually are, in which case Nägärjuna might be described as a sceptic. Nägärjuna 
has no views (dish), no philosophical position (pratijna), because he claims that he knows 
nothing about things in their actual nature. A second interpretation sees Nägärjuna's 
philosophy as primarily an attack on all conceptual and expressible knowledge-claims 
about how things actually are, in which case Nägärjuna might be described as a 'mystic', 
who advocates a 'trans-rational', 'non-linguistic' gnosis. Nägärjuna has no views, no 
philosophical position, because his knowledge of things as they actually are is not of the 
type which can be formulated in propositional terms. A third interpretation understands 
Nägärjuna's philosophy as-- not an attack on knowledge, but rather-- a refutation of a 
particular (wrong) ontological assumption, viz. that entities have svabhäva (own-being, 
inherent existence). There can be knowledge of things in their actual nature and-- 
although this knowledge can have a'non-conceptual' form (involving a direct perception, 
i. e. knowledge by acquaintance, of the emptiness (sünyata) of entities, and not simply the 
factual knowledge of this emptiness)-- this knowledge can be correctly formulated in the 
proposition that 'all entities lack svabbäva'. According to this third interpretation, 
Nagärjuna's ontological critique has epistemological implications, however. It entails that 
knowledge-claims (such as those of the Abhidharmikas and Naiyäyikas) that assert the 
svabhäva of (some) entities are wrong, and knowledge-claims that assert the absence of 
svabhäva of all entities are right. Nägärjuna has no views, no philosophical position in the 
restricted sense that he does not assent to any proposition which asserts that entities have 
svabbäva. 
These three types of interpretation have had their adherents within the modem, 
(predominantly) western scholarly community. Hayes and Matilal, for example, have 
described Nägärjuna's epistemology as 'scepticism'. ' There have been numerous 
interpretations of Nagärjuna's philosophy as asserting a trans-rational reality, known only 
by a non-conceptual, inexpressible gnosis. See, for example, Inada and Bhattacharya. 2 
Other scholars-- for example, Ruegg and Williams'-- have argued that, for Nägärjuna, the 
`See Matilal (1986), pp. 47-50, Hayes (1988), pp. 53-62. 
'See Inada (1970), Bhattacharya (1990). 
'See Ruegg (1977) and (1991). Williams (manuscript 2). 
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attack is on the notion of svabhäva, not on the possibility of knowledge, or 
conceptual/expressible knowledge, of how things actually are. 
And there have clearly been proponents of the second and third interpretations, at 
least, in the Tibetan Madhyamaka tradition (traditions? ) as well. Sa skya Pandita 
(1182-125 1) writes, in the mKhaspa jugpa'i bzhagpg that the actual nature of things is 
beyond conceptual diffusion (spros pa=prapanca), and hence is not an object of language 
or the conceptual mind. ' Dreyfus notes that the Sa skya pas, most especially Go rams pa 
bSod nams seng ge (1429-1489), claim that the central teaching of Madhyamaka 
philosophy is that the actual nature of things or the ultimate truth is beyond conceptual 
diffusion. ' How things actually are is, one might say, transcendent, in the sense that it is 
inaccessible to the rational mind (but open to a non-conceptual gnosis). 
This also appears to be the position of Mi bskyod rdo rje (1507-1554), the eighth 
Karma pa, who sees the actual nature of things as quite 'other' than the conceptualizable 
world and for whom, according to Williams, 'all language becomes skill in means; it has a 
purely pedagogic purpose, it doesn't in any way reflect a position claiming doctrinal 
correctness. t6 There is knowledge of how things actually are, to be sure, but it is not a 
knowledge which is conceptual or expressible. 
By contrast, mKhas grub dGe legs dpal bzang (1385-1438) and, indeed, most dGe 
lugs pas, say that Nägärjuna (and other Indian Mädhyamikas) accept the absence of 
svabhäva of entities as the correct position, i. e. it accurately expresses how things actually 
are. What is refuted by Nagarjuna, rather than conceptual knowledge of how things 
actually are, is the view that (any) entities exist with svabhäva. There is no incompatibility 
between the conceptual knowledge of the emptiness of entities, and the non-conceptual 
(i. e. directly perceptual) knowledge of this very same emptiness in the context of 
meditation. ' 
These three interpretations admittedly require much more elucidation (not to 
mention assessment). It shall be the business of the present thesis to accomplish (or, at 
least, to contribute to) this task. 
In the present thesis, I shall be in sympathy with the third interpretation. 
Nägärjuna's philosophy is probably intended, I shall argue, as an attack on a particular 
ontological assumption, viz. that entities have svabhäva, rather than as an attack on all 
"See Jackson (1987), p. 342,398. 
`Dreyfus (1997), p. 459. 
6Williams (1983), p. 132. 
'See sTong 294-315. Cabezön (trans) (1992), pp. 257-272. See also Hopkins (1996). 
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knowledge-claims, or all conceptual knowledge-claims, about the actual nature of things. 
Which is to say that Nägärjuna thinks that there can be correct conceptual knowledge of 
reality, viz. that all entities lack svabhäva. Nägärjuna is not a sceptic, and he is not a 
proponent of a trans-rational gnosis. 
However, the word 'sympathy' needs some explanation and qualification. While I 
am sympathetic to the third interpretation in the sense that I consider that the third 
interpretation is probably closest to the philosophical position Nägärjuna himself intends 
to communicate, it does not follow that I am sympathetic to Nägärjuna's philosophical 
position. 
On the contrary, as my argument in this thesis will make clear, I believe that the 
knowledge-claim that all entities lack svabhäva entails nihilism (despite Nägärjuna's 
advocacy of the Middle Path between nihilism and eternalism). Expressed very briefly, 
this is because, understood in the Abhidharma context in which Nägärjuna functions, the 
universal absence of svabhäva means-- not simply that all entities dependently originate 
but-- that all entities have an entirely conceptually constructed existence (prajaptisa f). 
And, I shall argue, if there is nothing unconstructed out of which and by whom/which 
conceptually constructed entities can be constructed, then it is impossible that these 
conceptually constructed entities themselves can exist. 
In which case, Nagarjuna's epistemology would appear to fall into contradiction, 
for he claims to have knowledge of the ultimate truth, yet the ultimate truth of which he 
(supposedly) has knowledge entails that nothing exists, including Nagärjuna's knowledge 
of this ultimate truth. So, it would seem that the implication ofNägärjuna's critique of the 
ontology of svabhäva is, after all, the impossibility of any knowledge whatsoever. 
(Though I do not think that this is an implication which Nägärjuna himself intended. On 
the contrary, I think that he probably did mean to tread the Middle Path). 
Even if somehow Nägärjuna were to avoid the nihilistic implications of his 
position, I would find his philosophy quite implausible. It seems highly unlikely (and is 
certainly counter-intuitive) that all entities have an entirely conceptually constructed 
existence (prajnaptisat). Although I certainly believe that trees, mountains, and elephants, 
for example, are dependently originating, I do not believe that in all respects such entities 
(and, indeed, even their atomic constituents (dharma-s)) are-- as Nägärjuna contends-- 
conceptually constructed. 
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1.3. Some General Reflections on the Interpretation of 
Nägarjuna. 
In his influential book about the thought of Nagärjuna, The Central Philosophy of 
Buddhism, T. R. V. Murti writes that, 
The Mädhyamika system seems to have been perfected at one stroke by 
the genius of its founder-- Nägärjuna. There have not been many important 
changes in its philosophy since that time. ' 
With the greatest respect to Murti, this statement strikes me as very naive. I shall 
dwell on this naivity, not out of malice but, because I think that such an analysis reveals 
some dangers (to which it is easy to fall prey) to be avoided by the interpreter ofNägärjuna. 
Such an analysis will serve to highlight, then, some of the interpretative principles which 
underpin this present thesis. Let me suggest three senses in which Murti's statement is 
naive. 
(1) Murti's claim seems extraordinary that 'there have not been many important 
changes in its [i. e. the Madhyamaka] philosophy' since Nägarjuna wrote. Are we to believe 
that later Mädhyamika thinkers, such as Candrakirti, Bhävaviveka, Säntaraksita, 
Kamalasila, and so on-- not to mention the great Chinese and Tibetan Mädhyamikas-- 
simply repeated Nägärjuna's thinking, with, perhaps, some minor variations? Such an idea 
is ahistorical; it fails to recognize that the Madhyamaka tradition is very long and complex, 
with numerous, often conflicting interpretations having been made. 
Madhyamaka philosophy, of course, changed in response to numerous influences 
which were not present yet in Nägärjuna's time. One thinks, for example, of the 
developments in the Nyäya tradition, to which the Indian Mädhyamikas responded (see 
especially Bhävaviveka9), and also of the emergence of Yogäcära thought, which plays a 
very important part in later Indian Madhyamaka thought, both as an object of critiques (for 
example, in the case of Candrakirti'° and Bhävaviveka") and in attempts at synthesis (for 
example, in the case of Säntaraksita12). And one cannot imagine the thought of Tsong kha 
pa (1357-1419) without the influence of Dharmakirti13, nor would the gzhan stong 
8Murti (1960), p. 87. 
'See Eckel (1980). 
'°See MA VI, 45-97. 
"See Pij 25, translated in Eckel (1980). 
`See Ruegg (1989). 
"See Ruegg (1981), pp. 87-100. 
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Madhyamaka have occurred without the presence of the various tathägatagarbha texts. '] 
Numerous other examples of historical development and transformation could be cited. 
The Madhyamaka tradition has produced a long series of creative thinkers who responded 
to the new philosophical demands of their historical circumstances. To suggest, then, that 
there were not many important changes in Madhyamaka philosophy after the time of 
Nägärjuna is simply false. 
This point is very important in the context of the present thesis. I will be dealing 
with Madhyamaka thought at its very earliest stage of development. I intend to be careful 
not to import what are actually later concepts, terminology15, and arguments, attributing 
them naively to Nägärjuna. There is a great danger of simply reading Nägärjuna from the 
perspective of later Mädhyamikas. 
This is not to say, however, that I shall not refer to later Mädhyamikas in my 
attempts to understand Nägarjuna's thought. Such references are, I think, illuminating and 
actually often indispensable (especially given the laconic nature of Nägärjuna's 
statements). Nevertheless, it is necessary to distinguish clearly what Nägärjuna says, in 
the texts available to us, from what later (often much later) Mädhyamika commentators 
and thinkers have said about these texts. 
Some of the most important commentators to which I refer (for example, Tsong 
Kha Pa) lived over one thousand years after Nägärjuna (and in a different country, using a 
different language, etc). Even Candrakirti and Bhavaviveka lived centuries after 
Nägärjuna. One should not, and I certainly do not, expect that their thoughts are identical 
with those ofNägarjuna. In fact, one should expect that their thoughts are often somewhat 
different than those of Nägärjuna, because they are responding to different issues or have 
explicated points in a manner of which Nägärjuna never conceived. " 
(2) Murti's statement that Nägärjuna 'perfected' Madhyamaka philosophy 'at one 
stroke' is highly dubious. It is my contention-- to which surely anyone who tries to read 
Nagärjuna's texts will assent-- that, far from being 'perfect', Nägarjuna's thought, as 
"See Hookham (1991). 
"In fact, the term Mädhyamika' itself appears to be an importation. It is not used by Nägärjuna. Nägarjuna 
does however refer to The proponents of emptiness' (ünyatävädin) at VVC 69, and seems to include 
himself among their number. The author of the VaidC also seems to refer to himself as a* aun ti atä vädrn 
(stongpa nyid du smra ba). See VaidC l (quoted in chapter 6, note 8). When did the term 'Mädhyamika' 
first appear, I wonder? Note that in the PP Candrakirti does use the term Mädhyamika' to refer to his own 
school. See, for example, PP 368. 
'6For a case in point, see the appendix. Candrakirti, I argue, clearly writes of emptiness, i. e. the 
lack of 
svabhä v aof entities, as the actual svabhävaof entities. However, although there are adumbrations of this 
usage in Nägärjuna's texts, Nägärjuna himself never explicitly says that the actual svabhävaof entities 
is 
their lack of svabhä va. 
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expressed in his texts, is inchoate and obscure. So much is left unsaid that it is not 
uncommonly difficult to ascertain what Nägärjuna might mean. 
Understanding Nägärjuna's thought is thus partly a matter of appreciating that a 
range of interpretations is possible with regard to some of his puzzling proclamations. In 
not a small number of cases understanding Nägärjuna's thought means-- perhaps not so 
much arriving at the correct interpretation but rather-- noticing and being sensitive to the 
fact that a text supports more than one reading. One task of the present study will be to 
explicate some of the interpretations which Nägärjuna's texts might support. 
But-- and this is important-- this is not to say that Nägärjuna's texts support any 
reading whatsoever. On the contrary, the interpreter must, I contend, pay careful attention 
to the actual words, concepts and arguments which Nägärjuna employs, and also the 
interpreter must see these words, concepts, and arguments in their wider philosophical and 
historical context. It is this method which will ensure a considered and plausible 
interpretation ofNägärjuna, though not an indubitably correct interpretation. 
For example, that Nägärjuna intends the same thing as Wittgenstein or Derrida (or 
whoever happens to be the popular philosopher of the moment) is a highly unlikely 
interpretation (by which I do not mean that people are unlikely to make such an 
interpretation-- there are, after all, plenty of people who see in Nägärjuna a proto- 
Wittgenstein or proto-Derrida", etc-- but that they are unlikely to be representing 
Nägärjuna's thought in anything like an accurate fashion), given that Nägärjuna lived in 
(probably) the second century in India as a Buddhist monk with Abhidharma and Hindu 
realist opponents to contend with (conspicuously absent from the writings of Wittgenstein, 
Derrida, etc! ). 
This is not to say that one should eschew all comparisons between Nagärjuna's 
thought and that of thinkers who function in very different intellectual, spiritual, and 
historical circumstances. There are, I believe, universal philosophical and spiritual issues 
which recur in otherwise disparate contexts. It is just that such comparison needs to be 
done with great sensitivity to both the authentic (as opposed to superficial) similarities and 
the inevitable differences. 
That an understanding ofNägärjuna's thought will be facilitated by an appreciation 
of the Abhidharma and Nyäya philosophies is certainly true, given that these are the 
thinkers and traditions to which Nägärjuna is responding. Abhidharma and Nyäya 
"Huntington (1989) has produced one ofthe more interesting studies of this variety. 
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concepts and arguments are the language in which Nägärjuna would have been versed. 
(This is clearly evident from even a cursory examination of his texts). If one is to 
understand Nägärjuna, one must grasp this language. Thus, by paying sufficient attention 
to the philosophical context in which Nägärjuna's thought is embedded, one's 
interpretation is far more likely to represent something like what Nägärjuna had in mind. 
I am thus in disagreement with Tuck, who sees the history of scholarship 
concerning Nägärjuna's thought as'a collection of intelligent misreadings', which he says, 
'may be enough'. 18 I agree that there have been numerous misinterpretations ofNägärjuna 
(some of them intelligent, some of them not intelligent), but I think also that there is such a 
thing as careful scholarship which-- though it might not arrive at a definitive interpretation 
of Nägärjuna's philosophy-- does not misinterpret, paying as it does considerable attention 
to context, and always advancing its conclusions in a tentative way. My approach here is 
certainly in discord with that of Huntington, for whom the ideal interpreter of Nägärjuna, 
etc 'asks neither the author nor the text their intentions but simply beats the text into a shape 
which will serve his own purpose. "' (Huntington's hermeneutic theory, I might add, is 
strangely at odds with his own scholarship, which is often quite meticulous). 
In the present thesis, then, I will endeavour to follow closely arguments which 
Nägärjuna employs and, in a context-sensitive way, draw-out the possible philosophical 
content and implications of these arguments. I will not simply repeat what Nägärjuna says, 
but I will give textual (and other contextual) support for the interpretations which I make. 
(3) Even when Nägärjuna's points seem textually relatively clear, or when one has 
come to what seems like a textually plausible interpretation of obscure points, these points 
often seem philosophically doubtful, to say the least. If this is 'perfection' for Murti, then 
there has been a radical re-definition of the term, of which I am unaware! 
Murti's remark, it seems to me, in this respect betrays an unhealthy tendency in the 
study of Madhyamaka, which the present thesis will resist. Scholars of Madhyamaka, and 
ofNägärjuna especially, are often overly deferential to the object of their studies. There is 
a tendency to view Nägärjuna as a great thinker, whose thoughts are quite probably right. 
Any philosophical obscurity or apparent flaws which one might find in his thinking are 
thus usually considered to be attributable to one's inability to understand what Nägärjuna 
means, rather than to Nägärjuna's own failure as a thinker. 
While I certainly think that it is important to be receptive to what Nägärjuna says, 
"Tuck (1990), p. 100. 
"Huntington (1989), p. 8. 
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and to evaluate carefully the various ways in which what he says might be taken (rather 
than arrogantly and prematurally refuting his claims), it is my considered opinion that such 
receptivity leads, not to a resolution of the various philosophical problems which appear, 
but to an intensification of them. It one really pays attention to Nagärjuna's writings, one 
becomes aware ofjust how bizarre are some of his claims and arguments. This will become 
apparent, I trust, in the course of the present thesis. 
So, modem interpreters, for a variety of reasons, tend to view Nagärjuna as an 
authority whose thoughts or words are very likely to be true. Recent scholarship suggests, 
it may be noted, that in thinking this way one perhaps rates Nägärjuna's thought more 
highly than did Nägärjuna's contemporaries and the later Indian (non-Buddhist and 
Buddhist) tradition. It is arguable that many Indian thinkers, non-Buddhist and Buddhist 
alike, did not take Nägärjuna's ideas very seriously, because of their obvious nihilistic 
consequences or because of Nägärjuna's blatantly fallacious reasoning. 2' The modem 
interpreter (and I include here the modem practitioner) must be open to the possibility that 
Nägärjuna's philosophizing was not as meticulous as is often assumed! 
Furthermore, there is, in fact, strong evidence (textual and archeological) that 
Mahäyäna Buddhism as a whole, and not simply Madhyamaka, was a marginal and 
minority movement in India, especially before the fifth century. " It is quite likely, then, 
that many Indian Buddhists had simply never beard of Nägärjuna. Perhaps those who had 
heard of him considered him to be a member of a rather outlandish fringe-group (prone to 
sophisms and nihilism), and thus not worthy of serious refutation. 
However, Nagärjuna must have been known to and respected by at least certain 
segments of the Indian Buddhist population. There is, after all, an Indian commentarial 
tradition on his works, and a succession of thinkers in India who derive inspiration from his 
thinking, stretching for about one thousand years after his time. Further, it seems difficult 
to explain the fact that Nägärjuna's writings came to be so widely influential in China and 
Tibet unless he already had some importance (at least in certain sections of the Indian 
Buddhist community) in India itself. Nevertheless, perhaps the very lack of general 
popularity of Mahäyäna (including Madhyamaka) thought in India may have contributed 
to its success in China and Tibet. A religious movement which is not very popular in its 
home-country would be naturally disposed to seek converts elsewhere. (However, the 
issue of why Mahayana Buddhism (including Madhyamaka) became so popular outside 
20See here Williams (manuscript 2) and Hayes (1994). 
21See Schopen (1987). 
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India, given that it probably was not popular within India, admittedly is a large and difficult 
puzzle, many of the pieces of which are (perhaps irretrievably) missing). " 
Thus, perhaps the picture which emerges is of a generally unpopular movement, 
which failed to gain mainstream acceptance in India, and which inclined to foreign 
missionary activity because of its marginalization in its home-country. But even within 
this fringe-group, Nägärjuna was only one of a number of significant figures, and many 
Mahäyäna thinkers would not have accepted his position. " 
1.4. The Philosophical Study of Madhyamaka. 
It could of course be objected that my comments betray a rather rationalistic 
approach to the study of Madhyamaka thought. The thoughts of an ancient Buddhist 
master should not, the objection might run, be assessed in terms of the standards of 
philosophy (understood here as the evaluation of the validity and soundness of arguments). 
After all, the Mädhyamikas were first and foremost religious thinkers practising within a 
particular spiritual tradition. 
I entirely accept that Madhyamaka thought needs to be understood in the context of 
Buddhist practice, and that such practice has very important dimensions other than the 
philosophical (for example, meditation, ethics, ritual and worship, spiritual community). 
However, the Mädhyamikas (including Nägärjuna), at least, clearly and often employ 
arguments as part of their Buddhist practice. The precise significance of these arguments 
on the path to liberation is debatable, but that they had some importance is beyond doubt. 
According to some forms of Madhyamaka (for example the dGelugs tradition) ultimate 
truth (paramärtbasatya, don dam bdenpa) itself is accessible to rational analysis. " Other 
interpreters claim that such analysis has an essential but preparatory role in the 
apprehension of ultimate truth. 25 In either case, it seems necessary, if one is to take 
2 The reflections in this paragraph have been inspired by a lecture given by Prof. G. Schopen (University of 
Bristol, Centre for Buddhist Studies, June 5,1997). 
2'Williams (1994), p. 976, says that 'the tendency to see the history of Mahayana thought as a series of 
complementary footnotes to Nägärjuna should be firmly resisted. ' Thus, for example, there is a real 
disagreement between Madhyamaka and Yogäcära philosophy. Hayes (1994), p. 299, says '... the 
interest that modern scholars of Buddhism have in Nagarjuna may be out of proportion to the influence 
that Nägärjuna had on Buddhists themselves. ' Hayes points to the fact that there was no attempt on the 
part of the Abhidharmikas to reply to Nägärjuna's criticisms, and-- despite Nägärjuna's critique of the 
pramäna-s-- the epistemological school of Dignäga and Dharmakirti, which was very influential in later 
Indian Mahayana philosophy, made no explicit reply to his works. 
`'See, for example, Hopkins (1996), pp. 91-94, Williams (1991), p. 514. 
"This version of Madhyamaka also had its proponents in Tibet, such as Mi bskyod rdo rje. See Williams (1983). 
20 
Madhyamaka thought seriously, to assess the arguments which the Mädhyamikas present. 
Clearly, we do not know precisely what importance Nägärjuna gave to his 
arguments and his philosophical positions. But, unless he considered them to be simply 
rhetoric, they need to be properly evaluated as arguments and as statements which convey 
something about how things really are. 
I propose, then, to take Nägärjuna's truth-claims seriously. To take his truth-claims 
seriously, I believe, means to examine critically the arguments which Nägärjuna employs 
in support of these truth-claims. Perhaps unfortunately, much of what Nägärjuna says does 
not withstand the rigorous philosophical scrutiny which I am advocating (and which, in 
this thesis, I make some efforts to begin to carry-out), but I trust that one may be a little 
wiser for having made the effort. 
But it might be thought that any assessment of what constitutes a valid/sound 
argument is conditioned by one's own historical and cultural perspective. My 
methodology thus wrongly assumes a trans-historical, trans-cultural rationality in terms of 
which Madhyamaka thought maybe judged. It is incorrect, in fact arrogant, the objection 
might continue, to assess Nägarjuna's thought in terms of a rationality which is actually of 
western provenance. 
My answer to this objection, in brief, is that I do assume such a trans-historical and 
trans-cultural rationality, but that I believe that I am justified in doing so. Rationality-- and 
here I mean basic logical laws such as the principle of non-contradiction, the law of the 
excluded middle, the avoidance of fallacies such as circular reasoning, infinite regress, 
etc. -- was understood and accepted by ancient Indian philosophers. " They did not think in 
an essentially different way than the modern westerner. Assessment of their thinking by a 
modem westerner is therefore possible. ' 
"The rules of correct reasoning are a central pre-occupation of Indian philosophers. The Nyäya Sutra-s, for 
example, are largely devoted to the topic of valid inference, and to the various fallacies which can make 
inference invalid. Nägärjuna, as we shall see, is quite aware of fallacies such as circularity and infinite 
regress. For Nägärjuna's acceptance of the principles of non-contradiction and the excluded middle, see 
Ruegg (1977). 
27I am here in complete agreement with Griffiths (1986), p. xvii-xviii, who writes, concerning the methodology 
of his own book about Buddhism, that, 'the philosophizing found in this work both rests upon and 
illustrates an important general thesis about rationality. Briefly stated, this thesis is that philosophy is a 
trans-cultural human activity, which in all essentials operates within the same conventions and by the same 
norms in all cultures. These are broadly speaking, the conventions and norms which demarcate what in the 
West has sometimes been called 'rationality'... The view that the functions, nature, and limits of rationality 
are conceived similarly in all cultures has as its corollary the idea that cross-cultural assessment of 
philosophical views and arguments is possible. ' 
Presumably those who claim that rationality is itself culturally-specific wish to argue for this claim, 
and to assert that it is a (non-culturally-specific) truth. Which is to say that it is rational (in a 
non-culturally-specific way) to uphold that rationality is culturally-specific. The proponents of this sort 
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1.5. The Problem of Authorship. 
Any thesis which concentrates on the study of Nägärjuna's philosophy must 
confront the vexatious issue of authorship. Numerous texts have been attributed to 
Nägärjuna. Which texts are to be accepted as genuinely by Nägärjuna? 
All attributions of texts to Nägärjuna, it is fair to say, are more-or-less 
doubtful/probable. This is with the exception of the Mülamadhyamakakärikä which are, 
by definition one might say, by Nägärjuna. Or, perhaps it would be more accurate to say 
that who Nägärjuna was is defined by his authorship of the MMK. That is to say, the 
person (assuming, of course, that it was one person) whom we call Nägärjuna was whoever 
wrote the MMK. 
It is not my intention to become involved here in the complexities of the arguments 
for and against the attribution of individual texts to Nägärjuna. The most valuable work in 
this area has been done by Lindtner. 28 Perhaps, however, Lindtner is rather liberal in some 
cases; he attributes to Nägärjuna some texts which are probably not by Nägärjuna. 29 At 
any rate, the texts which my present text will primarily draw on are precisely those texts 
which are least controversially attributed to Nägärjuna. That is, in addition to the MMK, I 
shall rely on the Vigrabavyävartan! (and its commentary), the Sünyatäsaptati, the 
Yuktisastikä, the Catubsta va and the Ratnäval% 
I also refer often to the Vaidalyaprakarana and its commentary. The attribution of 
this text to Nägärjuna is perhaps more dubious. 30 But I have taken the liberty of using it as a 
principal source, mainly because it contains a detailed early Madhyamaka critique of the 
Nyäya theory of knowledge (pramäna). I have relaxed somewhat in this case my generally 
conservative views on the issue of authorship because there is so much useful information 
in the Vaid/VaidC on early Indian Madhyamaka epistemology, and also because the 
critique of the pramäna-s in the Vaid/VaidCbegs to be compared with the similar critique 
which occurs in the VV/VVC. 
One cannot honestly claim to know that any texts other than the MMK are 
definitely by Nägärjuna, even if they are traditionally attributed to him (although one can 
know that some-- in fact, many-- of the texts traditionally attributed to Nägärjuna are 
of relativism are thus caught in a paradox, for they must presuppose the very (non-culturally-specific) 
rationality which they aim to refute. For more discussion of this issue, see Nagel (1997). 
"Lindtner (1982). 
For example, Williams (1984) has argued convincingly that the Bodbicittavivarana, attributed by Lindtner to 
Nägärjuna, is in fact a later work. Tola and Dragonetti (1995a) have cast some doubt on the attribution 
(by Lindtner and others) of the Vaid/VaidCto Nägärjuna. 
"See Tola and Dragonetti (1995a), pp. 7-15. 
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certainly not by him). " What one can say, however, is that there is a group of early Indian 
texts which is coherent insofar as it teaches a set of ideas which came to be identified as 
Madhyamaka philosophy. Whether these texts have one or several authors it is impossible 
to say, given the paucity of extant historical records. That the texts teach a basically 
common philosophical perspective is, however, attested by their content. Insofar as this is 
a philosophical study of a particular philosophical perspective, which came to be called 
'Madhyamaka', the issue of the precise dating and authorship of these texts is of secondary 
importance, the basically shared philosophical outlook (regardless of authorship or precise 
dating) being the primary concern. For the purposes of the present thesis, then, I shall be 
content to refer to the author(s) of the MAIK, VVVVC, SS, VS, CS, R V, and Vaid/VaidC 
as'Nägärjuna'. 
"For some texts which are traditionally attributed to Nägärjuna, but which are'decidedly spurious' and other 




2. Nagarjuna and Scepticism. 
2.1. Introduction. 
It is my intention to ascertain the nature of knowledge-claims about reality (tattva, 
dharmata) or the ultimate truth (paramärthasatya), according to Nägärjuna. However, it 
might be objected at the outset that such a project is ill-founded. After all, there are various 
texts attributed to Nägärjuna which appear to state that the objective of Madhyamaka 
philosophy is to purge oneself of all pretensions to knowledge about the nature of reality. 
Thus, at VVC29 Nägärjuna declares that he does not have any thesis (na manna käcidasti 
pratijfa). YS50a-b states that the great individuals (che ba'i bdagnyid can-= mahätman), 
i. e. the enlightened persons, do not have a position (phyogs=paksa). ' And, in the MMK. 
Nägärjuna says that, 
sunyatä sarvadrstlnämproktä nihsaranamjinaih/ 
yesäm tu sünyatädrstistänasädhyänbabhäsire// 
The Victorious Ones proclaimed emptiness to be the remedy for all views. 
But those for whom emptiness is a view were declared to be incurable. 2 
(MMKXIII, 8). 
On the basis of these statements, it might be thought that Nägärjuna is a sceptic. A 
number of scholars has in fact advocated a sceptical interpretation of Ndgdduna's thought. ' 
But in order to evaluate this interpretation, it is necessary first to ascertain the precise 
nature of 'scepticism'. 
2.2. The Nature of Scepticism. 
Scepticism is characterized by not-knowing. ' Scepticism may be succinctly 
' YS50a-b, cheba'ibdagnyidcandedag/rnamslaphyogsmedrtsodpamed/ 
See here also Aryadeva's CSXVI, 25, 'Even after a long time rebuke cannot be voiced for one whom there 
is not a position-- 'exists, does not exist, exists and does not exist". (sadasatsadasacceti yasya pakso na 
vidyate/upälambhascirenäpi tasya vaktum na sakyate%). 
'Monier-Williams (1899), p. 120 lists the meanings of asädhyaas'not to be effected or completed, not proper or 
able to be accomplished; incurable, irremediable; not to be overpowered or mastered. ' 
'See, for example, Matilal (1986), pp. 47-50, Hayes (1988), pp. 53-62. See also Garfield (1995), pp. 88-89. 
'See Hankinson (1995), pp. 13-30. That the fundamental characteristic of scepticism is 'not-knowing' holds 
true, it seems to me, for modern forms of scepticism as well as for ancient, classical scepticism (about 
which I shall have more to say later). Thus, for example, Descartes' methodological doubt is sceptical 
insofar as he doubts his ability to know the external world, etc. Hume's philosophy is sceptical in that he 
does not think that there is any knowledge of anything beyond our impressions and ideas. And so on. See 
described as'lack of knowledge whether x or x'. The sceptic does not know whether x or 
-x. This is a formulation which I will repeat throughout this chapter as the common core of 
the various types of scepticism which I shall discuss. There are two components of this 
formulation which need clarification, however. What is meant here by: (i) 'x or ý-x', and 
(ii)'knowledge/know'? 
(i) xhere, and throughout this chapter, can mean 'it is the case that xexists' or'it is 
the case that xis. -x here, and throughout this chapter, can mean 'it is not the case that x 
exists' or'it is not the case that x is y. Thus, one might be a sceptic because one does not 
know whether xexists or xdoes not exist. Or else one might be a sceptic because one does 
not know whether xis yor xis not y. For example, one is sceptical concerning the existence 
and non-existence of God if one does not know whether God exists or God does not exist. 
One is sceptical concerning the benevolent quality of God if one does not know whether 
God is benevolent or God is not benevolent. In fact, then, the sceptic who does not know 
whether xis yor xis y is not sceptical about the existence or non-existence of x. Rather, 
he is sceptical about the existence ornon-existence ofyas a quality of x. 
(ii) 'Knowledge' here means, to borrow an expression from modern epistemology, 
justified true belief. ' Which is to say that to know xmust include proof that X. If I say that I 
have knowledge that God exists, for example, I mean that I have a correct belief that God 
exists, and also that the correctness of this cognition has been substantiated. To know x 
must include proof that x. If I say that I have knowledge that God does not exist, I mean 
that I have a correct belief that God does not exist, and the correctness of this cognition has 
been substantiated. 
Of course, the moot point here is precisely what is to count as proof. It might be 
argued, for example, that proof means evidence which is indubitable. But it can be 
countered that such a criterion for proof is too strict. Perhaps, then, simply good evidence 
will be a sufficient criterion for proof (But in this case, it is debatable at what point 
evidence becomes'good'). I do not want to enter into the details of this controversy, but it is 
as well to be aware that what level of justification is required for a true belief to qualify as 
here Popkin (1992), pp. 462-464. 
`See Dancy and Sosa (1992), p. 509. In Part B of this thesis I will examine Nyäya epistemology, which has a 
quite different notion of knowledge. For the Naiyäyika, knowledge (pramäna/prama) is simply the 
correct cognition of x/ x. The justification or proofof this knowledge is a separate issue. Knowledge, 
for the Naiyäyika, is knowledge regardless of whether or not it has been proved. But in the present 
chapter I am working with a conception of knowledge which includes proof/justification. According to 
this conception of knowledge, one does not know x/ x unless one's belief that x/ x has been proved to be 
correct. 
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knowledge is debatable. 
So, the sceptic's claim that he does not know whetherx or -x means that he does not 
have proof (whatever precisely he means by 'proof) that x, and he does not have proof that 
-x. Consequently, he does not have the means to determine whether a belief that x -x is 
correct or incorrect. 
2.2.1. Scepticism, Negative Dogmatism, and Positive Dogmatism. 
Scepticism must be distinguished from dogmatism', both positive and negative. 
Positive dogmatism occurs when 'it is known that x. ' For example, it is known that the 
Queen of England is rich. Negative dogmatism occurs when 'it is known that -x. ' For 
example, it is known that the moon is not made of cheese. Thus: 
Positive dogmatism: It is known that x. 
Negative dogmatism: It is known that -x. 
Scepticism: It is not known whether xor x. 
I contend, then, that any position which accepts, for some matter x, that 'it is not 
known whether xor x' is sceptical. However, not all such sceptical positions are the same. 
In fact, the rubric of genuine scepticism encompasses a number of different positions, all 
of which, however, accept the basic formulation that'it is not known whether xor x'. Let 
me explain. 
2.2.2. The Scope of Scepticism. 
Scepticism can be of varying scope or range. One might be sceptical in some 
matters, but not in others. In this case one's scepticism is'local'. Local scepticism is, then, 
compatible with (in fact, necessitates) negative and/or positive dogmatism concerning the 
matters about which one is not sceptical. For example, one might consistently uphold: 
Local scepticism: It is not known whether or not Henry is ill. 
Local positive dogmatism: It is known that the book is red. 
Local negative dogmatism: It is known that the dog is not old. ' 
6 Note that the term 'dogmatism' does not have here the pejorative sense of an arrogantly held, unsupported 
belief. 
'Of course, whether in any particular matter one is a dogmatist or a sceptic will partly depend on the criteria 
which one accepts for proof. If, for example, one accepts that only matters about which there is absolute 
certainty count as knowledge, then one is likely to be sceptical about far more than if one accepts a less 
stringent criterion for proof, such as good (though not indubitable) evidence. If I demand absolute 
certainty, then I am a sceptic about the existence of Martians; I do not know (i. e. I am not absolutely 
certain) whether Martians exist or do not exist. If I am content with good evidence, then I am a negative 
But scepticism also can have an unrestricted (often called'global") form: 
{ It is not known whetherx or -x} [where xstands for any matter whatsoever]. 
Global scepticism states, then, that there is no knowledge concerning the existence 
or non-existence of any matters (be they the qualities of entities, or the entities 
themselves). Global scepticism is, obviously, incompatible with negative and positive 
dogmatism. If {it is not known whether x or x} [where x stands for any matter 
whatsoever] it would be contradictory also to assert that, in any specific case of x, there is 
knowledge of x or knowledge of x. 
2.2.3. Undogmatic and Dogmatic Local and Global Scepticism. 
Local scepticism might be dogmatic or undogmatic. Whereas all local sceptics 
agree that, 
{It is not known whetherx or x} 
a dogmatic local sceptic asserts that: 
It is known that { it is not known whether x or -x) 
whereas an undogmatic local sceptic asserts that: 
{It is not known whetherx or x} and this is not a knowledge-claim. 
Global scepticism might also be dogmatic or undogmatic. Whereas all global 
sceptics agree that: 
{ It is not known whetherx or x) [where x stands for any matter whatsoever]. 
The dogmatic global sceptic asserts that: 
dogmatist about Martians; I know (i. e. have good evidence) that Martians do not exist. 
'See Hankinson (1995), p. 19. 
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It is known that fit is not known whether x or -x j [where x stands for any matter 
whatsoever]. 
whereas the undogmatic global sceptic asserts that: 
{ It is not known whether x or -x) [where x stands for any matter whatsoever] and 
this is not a knowledge-claim. 
Undogmatic global scepticism is consistently sceptical. The undogmatic, global 
sceptic does not even have knowledge of his total lack of knowledge. By contrast, 
dogmatic, global scepticism is inconsistently sceptical. The dogmatic global sceptic, like 
Socrates, has knowledge of his otherwise total lack of knowledge. 
2.2.4. Present Global Scepticism and the Future. 
The global sceptical statement'it is not known whether x or x [where x stands for 
any matter whatsoever]' is, of course, in the present tense. As such, present global 
scepticism can be conjoined with a variety of different positions about the future 
possibility of knowledge whether x or x [where x stands for any matter whatsoever]. 9 
Consider, for instance, the following possibilities": 
(1) (a) It is known that (it is not known whether x or -x) and (b) it is known that { it 
cannot be known whetherx or x} [where x stands for any matter whatsoever]. 
(2) (a) { It is not known whether x or -x) and (b) { it is not known whether or not it 
'Local scepticism (dogmatic or undogmatic), like global scepticism, also might be conjoined with various 
claims about the possibility of future knowledge. For example, it might be that (i) one knows that one 
does not know whether God exists or God does not exist, and one knows that one cannot know whether 
God exists or God does not exist (perhaps there is no possible way of gaining such knowledge), and (ii) 
one knows that one does not know whether there is milk in the fridge or there is not milk in the fridge, and 
one knows that one can know whether there is milk in the fridge or there is not milk in the fridge. (One 
might, for instance, gain such knowledge by looking in the fridge). 
'°There, are, of course, other possibilities, but I limit myself here to these two for the sake of clarity, as they 
correspond to Pyrrhonian scepticism and Academic scepticism, which I shall discuss shortly. There might 
be, to give but one more example, a form of present, dogmatic, global scepticism which states that: 
It is known that {it is not known whether x or -x) and it is known that {it can be known whether x or -z} 
[where x stands for any matter whatsoever]. 
Presumably, such a present, dogmatic, global scepticism must be a very temporary affair. As soon as one 
came to know one item x or -x, one's dogmatic scepticism would cease to be global. It is, in fact, a 
temporary global, dogmatic scepticism coupled with total epistemological optimism (it is known that 
nothing is known as of yet, but it is known that everything can be known). 
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can be known whetherx or x} [where x stands for any matter whatsoever]. 
Neither (a) nor (b) is a knowledge-claim. 
(1) is dogmatic, global scepticism, about both present and future matters. (2) is 
undogmatic, global scepticism about both the present and future matters. (2) is a stronger 
form of scepticism than (1), because (1)-- unlike (2)-- mitigates its scepticism by making 
the knowledge-claims that nothing is and nothing can be known. (2), by contrast, does not 
even make these knowledge-claims. It is scepticism through and through. (2) is scepticism 
par excellence. One could not be more sceptical than a proponent of (2). I shall, therefore, 
call (2)radical scepticism'. It is undogmatic, global scepticism extended into the future. 
2.3. Classical Scepticism. 
I have written so far in abstract, ahistorical terms about scepticism. But scepticism 
is an historical phenomenon as well. It has taken diverse forms in the course of western 
philosophy. Broadly speaking, there is classical scepticism and modern scepticism. 
Modern scepticism originated in the sixteenth century, with the revival of knowledge of 
and interest in classical scepticism. " I shall comment here primarily on classical western 
scepticism (with some parenthetical remarks about modern scepticism), because, I 
believe, it is here that the apparent parallels with early Indian Madhyamaka epistemology 
are most striking. 
Classical scepticism is global. Which is to say that the classical sceptic claims not 
to know anything about any phenomena as they exist in their real nature (phase]). ` He does 
not even know whether or not any phenomena have a real nature. In any matter x, the 
classical sceptic does not know whether or not x exists, nor whether or not x is y. The 
classical sceptic does not know, for example, whether or not the oak-tree he sees really 
exists, nor does he know whether or not the green oak-tree which he sees is really green. 
So, the classical sceptic maintains that one does not have any knowledge (justified 
true beliefs, in modern epistemological terms) about things as they actually are One has 
subjective impressions/experiences (phantasm) of phenomena, to be sure. The classical 
sceptic will acquiesce in these impressions. (It is this acquiesence which makes practical 
life possible for the sceptic). " But he does not claim either that these impressions 
"See Popkin (1992), p. 462. 
"See Hankinson (1995), p. 156. 
"See OP I, 19 (trans. Annas and Barnes (1994), p. 8), 'Those who say that the Sceptics reject what is apparent 
have not, I think, listened to what we say. As we said before, we do not overturn anything which leads us, 
without out willing it, to assent in accordance with a passive appearance- and these things are precisely 
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correspond to reality, or that they do not correspond to reality. He simply does not know, 
i. e. cannot adequately demonstrate, one way or the other. The classical sceptic claims not 
to have proof that any of his impressions are true or false. The classical sceptic sees the 
oak-tree and he accepts that this is his subjective experience. He acquiesces in the oak-tree 
experience. But he does not claim that his experience does or does not correspond to a real 
oak-tree. And the same principle applies to his entire experience of phenomena. 
2.3.1. Isosthenia and epoche in Classical Scepticism. 
How does the classical sceptic reach his conclusion that he has no knowledge that 
any of his impressions correspond to phenomena in their real nature? The classical 
sceptic's answer, in brief, is that, in every case, there will be conflicting knowledge-claims, 
and there will be no good reason for choosing between them. Even if one knowledge-claim 
did appear to be compelling, new evidence or circumstances might suggest otherwise in 
the future. Conflicting knowledge-claims are thus in equipollence (isostbenia), and there is 
no way to resolve the dispute. 14 In which case, there is no justification for choosing one of 
the conflicting knowledge-claim as correct, i. e. as a true apprehension of phenomena in 
their real nature. " The impossibility of choosing (with good reason) between the various 
conflicting knowledge-claims induces the sceptic to suspend judgement (epoche). 16 
The classical sceptics present a number of arguments to demonstrate the 
equipollence of opposing knowledge-claims about phenomena in their real nature. These 
arguments are summarized as the 'ten modes of Aenesidemus. ' All ten modes share a 
common logical structure. It is argued that {x appears y to a), and (x appears to b or to a at 
a different time or in different circumstances), where (I is incompatible withy). However, 
{x cannot in its real nature be both y and z}. But there is no way to know whether {x is in its 
what is apparent. ' See also OP I, 21-24, and Burnyeat (1983b), p. 117-148, Frede (1984), p 262, pp. 
255-278. 
"See OP (trans. Annas and Barnes (1994), p. 6), 'The chief constitutive principle of scepticism is the claim that 
to every account an equal account is opposed; for it is from this, we think, that we come to hold no beliefs. ' 
"Classical scepticism may be contrasted here with Cartesian scepticism. The Classical sceptic claims that he 
does not have knowledge because there is unresolved dispute in all matters. In other words, for any 
knowledge-claim, there will be equally good (or bad) evidence for opposing knowledge-claims. Thus 
there is no way to decide which of the knowledge-claims is in fact a case of knowledge. By contrast, the 
Cartesian sceptic states that he does not have knowledge in matters about which he cannot be certain. For 
the Cartesian sceptic, then, scepticism is a result-- not of equally good evidence for a knowledge-claim and 
its contrary but rather-- of lack of certainty. That is, for the Cartesian sceptic, there might be much greater 
evidence for one knowledge-claim than for the opposing knowledge-claims, but-- insofar as this evidence 
is not sufficient to make the knowledge-claim indubitable-- one does not have knowledge, and hence 
scepticism results. See Klein (1992), pp. 457-458. 
'See OP I, 10 (trans. Annas and Barnes (1994), p. 5), 'Suspension of judgement is a standstill of the intellect, 
owing to which we neither reject nor posit anything. ' See Hankinson (1995), p. 86, p. 15 5. 
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real nature y or.: } (if, indeed, it is either). Therefore, one should suspend judgement about 
the real nature of x. For example, the first mode is that the same phenomenon will appear 
differently to different animals, depending upon their biological composition. Thus, a 
bird's eyes are constructed differently than a lion's; therefore the bird will perceive 
phenomena differently than the lion. How is one to know which, if either, of these varying, 
incompatible perceptions corresponds to the perceived phenomenon in its real nature? 
That is, how is one to prove which of these perceptions (if either) is correct? The sceptic 
says that there is no such proof, and thus one should suspend judgement. The tenth mode 
states that phenomena appear differently and incompatibly to different people depending 
on their culture and values. Thus, actions which are considered good in one culture, or 
according to one system of beliefs, are deemed bad by another culture or system of beliefs. 
There is no way to ascertain which (if either) culture is right. Thus, it is, the sceptic argues, 
impossible to know whether the actions in question are good or bad in their real nature. 
Therefore, one should suspend judgement. And soon. " 
The suspension of judgement is said by the classical sceptic to have a dual 
psychological effect: (i) the cognitive repercussion that one does not make assertions 
(aphasia), i. e. does not make knowledge-claims, about phenomena in their real nature1ß, 
and (supposedly)19 (ii) the emotional and volitional repercussion that one possesses 
See Hankinson (1995), pp. 155-178 for a critical analysis of the ten modes of Aenesidemus. See also OP I, 
35-163, and Striker (1983), pp. 95-115. 
It is correct to say that the ten modes of Aenesidemus depend on the relativity of the apprehension of 
phenomena. However, it should be stressed that scepticism is not relativism. The difference between 
scepticism and relativism might be expressed as follows: 
Scepticism: {x appears y relative to a) and {x appears z relative to b or relative to a at a different time 
or in different circumstances), where {z is incompatible with y) . 
However, {x cannot in its real nature be 
both y and z). But there is no way to know whether {x in its real nature is y or z) (if, indeed, it is either). 
Therefore, one should suspend judgement about the real nature ofx. 
Relativism: {x appears as y relative to al and {x appears as z relative to b, or relative to a at a different 
time or in different circumstances), because x is, in its real nature, both {y relative to a) and {z relative to b, 
or relative to a at a different time or in different circumstances) . 
(Notice that relativism is therefore a form 
of dogmatism). 
The relativist claims to know that phenomena in their real nature are relative, whereas the sceptic 
claims that, because the appearance of phenomena is relative, therefore one cannot know their real nature. 
For example, the relativist says: A shell appears white relative to people without jaundice and yellow 
relative to people with jaundice. Therefore the real nature of the shell is relative to the perceiver (it is both 
white and yellow). The sceptic says: A shell appears white relative to people without jaundice and yellow 
relative to people with jaundice. The real nature of the shell cannot be both white and yellow. But there is 
no way to know whether the real nature ofthe shell is white or yellow (if it is either). Therefore, one should 
suspend judgement about the real nature of the shell. 
On scepticism and relativism, see Barnes (1988), pp. 1-31. Barnes argues, however, that Sextus 
Empiricus himself at times seems to confuse scepticism and relativism. 
"On aphasia, see OP I, 192-193 
'°I say 'supposedly' because it does not appear to me to be logically necessary that tranquillity follow from 
suspension of judgement. It would seem to be just as plausible that someone who knew/had the impression 
that he knew nothing about phenomena in their real nature would feel very insecure and anxious. If it is to 
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tranquillity (ataraxia). 20 It is attachment to knowledge-claims about phenomena in their 
real nature, and the inevitably disappointing search for knowledge about these phenomena 
in their real nature, which-- according to the classical sceptic-- create mental turmoil. With 
the cessation of such knowledge-claims there will be, according to the classical sceptic, a 
corresponding equanimity. ' (The mechanics of the classical sceptical method are 




Table 1. The Classical Sceptical Method. 
2.3.2. Academic and Pyrrhonian Scepticism. 
Roughly speaking22, there are two forms of classical scepticism: (1) Academic 
scepticism, and (2) Pyrrhonian scepticism. 23 Academic scepticism is dogmatic, global 
work, the sceptics' argument that ataraxia follows from epoche must be inductive rather than deductive. 
It might be that people who suspend judgement do experience tranquillity, but one cannot argue a priori 
that this is the case; one would have to examine the evidence. 
20Sextus Empiricus says that ataraxia follows epoche like a shadow follows a body. See OP I, 29. 
''Here, then, is an important difference between modern scepticism and classical scepticism. The classical 
sceptic considers his philosophy to have implications for his entire life. By contrast, the tendency in 
modern scepticism (see, for example, Hume) is to insulate one's scepticism from life as a whole. Modern 
scepticism tends to be, one might say, a merely theoretical exercise. (Hume, for example, contends that it 
would in fact be impossible to live a sceptical life. Descartes' scepticism is methodological, intended as a 
means to establish a secure foundation for science). In this respect, Nägärjuna is certainly in agreement 
with the classical sceptic rather than the modern sceptic. That is, Nägärjuna, as a practitioner of 
Buddhism, is not engaging in an insulated, merely theoretical pursuit (although, I will argue shortly, the 
way of life which he is advocating is not in fact-- despite superficial similarities-- a sceptical way of life). 
See here Burnyeat (1983b), pp. 117-148, and Burnyeat (1984), pp. 225-254. The insulation of theory 
from life as a whole is, it may be added, a (pernicious? ) tendency, not only in modern scepticism, but in 
modern philosophy in general. 
221 say'roughly speaking' because, evidently, other classical thinkers display sceptical tendencies (one need look 
no further than Socrates). But it is the Academics and the Pyrrhonians who were called sceptics and who 
had the most explicit and extreme sceptical doctrines. For a history and philosophical study of the 
precursors to classical scepticism, see Hankinson (1995), pp. 55 ff 
23For the distinction between the Pyrrhonian and Academic sceptics, see OP I, 226. See also Burnyeat (1984), 
p. 227. Pyrrhonian scepticism is named after its supposed founder, Pyrrho of Elis (c. 360-c. 270 BCE. ). 
Academic scepticism is so-called because of its association for many centuries with the Academy founded 
by Plato. Arcesilaus (c. 318-c. 243 BCE) introduced the sceptical influence to the Academy. Our chief 
source for both forms of scepticism, but especially Pyrrhonism, is the Outlines of Pyrrhonism by Sextus 
Empiricus (who lived no earlier than the end of the 2nd century CE). See Hankinson (1995), pp. 4-5. It 
should be noted that Academic scepticism is a general term for a complex philosophical school which 
existed for and developed over many hundreds of years. In what follows, my comments are general and 
would not all apply to all Academic sceptics. For the history and philosophical complexities of Academic 
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scepticism conjoined with dogmatic global scepticism about the future. Pyrrhonian 
scepticism is undogmatic, global sceptic conjoined with undogmatic, global scepticism 
about the future. That is, the Pyrrhonian sceptic is a radical sceptic. The Academic sceptic 
contends that he knows that phenomena in their real nature (if there is such a thing) are not 
and cannot be known whereas the Pyrrhonian sceptic states that: (i) phenomena in their 
real nature (if there is such a thing) are not known, and (ii) he does not know whether or not 
phenomena in their real nature can be known (he is open to the possibility that the 
phenomena in their real nature might become known in the future, but he does not know 
that this will happen). " Furthermore, the Pyrrhonian sceptic says that his statement of (i) 
and (ii) is not itself a knowledge-claim. 
The Academic sceptic, then, makes at least one knowledge-claim. He claims to 
know that phenomena are not and cannot be known in their real nature, and that it is not and 
cannot even be known whether or not they have a real nature. 
One might, however, object that this exception is arbitrary. Why should the 
Academic sceptic accept one knowledge-claim, i. e. the knowledge-claim about 
knowledge-claims, but not others? And if the Academic sceptic admits one type of 
knowledge, what is there to prevent there being other cases of knowledge? 
I think that the Academic sceptic might reply that the knowledge-claim which he 
accepts is qualitatively different from the knowledge-claims which he rejects. The 
Academic sceptic, in effect, might make a distinction between first-order knowledge of 
phenomena in their real nature, and second-order knowledge about knowledge of 
phenomena in their real nature. There is and can be, the Academic sceptic claims, no 
first-order knowledge, but there is the second-order knowledge that there is no first-order 
knowledge. 25 
Hankinson thinks that there is such a qualitative distinction. There is a clear 
scepticism, see Hankinson (1995). 
4 See Hankinson (1995), pp. 13-30. The word 'skeptikos' means an inquirer, or someone who looks, or 
examines (skopein, skeptesthai). Thus, the pure sceptic, i. e. the Pyrrhonian sceptic, has not stopped 
looking for the truth. He does not know whether or not he might find it in the future. But he has the 
impression that he has not found truth as of yet. By contrast, Academic scepticism is mitigated because the 
Academic sceptic no longer looks for the truth, as he claims to know both that the truth is and always will 
be inaccessible. See Burnyeat (1984), p. 227, Frede (1984), p. 267, Hankinson (1995), p. 13. One 
wonders, however, how seriously one can take the Pyrrhonian's claim that he is still searching for the truth. 
It is hard to conceive of any future situation in which a Pyrrhonian would be willing to accept that the truth 
had been found. 
"The Academic sceptics' distinction between first-order and second-order knowledge is made explicit, for 
example, by Aenesidemus. See Hankinson (1995), p. 122, 'Aenesidemus appears to say that there is no 
ground for holding that anything is apprehended; but he is happy to allow... that that fact at least can be 
known. I 
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difference, he argues, between knowledge-claims concerning factual matters 
(phenomena in their real nature), which transcend one's subjective experience, and a report 
of what is occurring in one's experience (the knowledge that one does not know anything 
about phenomena in their real nature). The knowledge of one's lack of knowledge is a 
matter simply of introspection, and requires only access to one's immediately available 
mental contents. 26 
I am not sure, however, that this explanation of the qualitative difference works for 
the Academic sceptic. If one knows(and does not simply have the subjective impression) 
that one does not know anything about phenomena in their real nature, surely this is not 
simply a matter of introspective awareness of mental contents? It includes, in addition, a 
truth-claim. One must think not simply that 'it feels like or is my impression that I don't 
know anything about phenomena in their real nature'; rather, one must think that 'it is in 
fact the case that I don't and cannot know anything about phenomena in their real nature. ' 
That is, one must think that'it is true-- objectively, demonstrably the case-- that I don't and 
cannot know anything about phenomena in their real nature. ' One's knowledge that one 
does not know is not simply a matter of subjective belief, but of justified (and hence 
objective) belief. 
I think that the real qualitative difference between first-order knowledge and 
second-order knowledge is a difference in wbatcountsasproof. For the Academic sceptic, 
first-order knowledge-claims would be proved only if it could be adequately shown that 
they, as opposed to conflicting first-order knowledge-claims, correspond to phenomena in 
their real nature. But, as I have explained, the Classical sceptic thinks that no such proof in 
any case is forthcoming. By contrast, the second-order knowledge-claim is proved simply 
by the lackofprooffor all first-order knowledge-claims. That is, becausethere is no proof 
that first-order knowledge-claims apprehend phenomena in their real nature, therefore the 
second-order knowledge-claim that one does not have first-order knowledge is 
established. The second-order knowledge-claim is, in modern epistemological 
terminology, a justified true belief that one does not have any justified true beliefs about 
phenomena in their real nature. Far from being arbitrary, the Academic sceptic will claim 
that this second-order knowledge is an entailment of one's lack of first-order knowledge. 
So, perhaps the Academic sceptic can, in this way, reply successfully to the charge that he 
has made an arbitrary exception to his otherwise total scepticism. 
""See Hankinson (1995), p. IT 
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The Pyrrhonian sceptic, by contrast, does not make any knowledge-claims. The 
Pyrrhonian sceptic is not prepared to admit that he knows that he does not know 
phenomena in their real nature. Nor is he prepared to admit that he knows that he does not 
know whether or not phenomena can (in the future) be known in their real nature. If it is 
objected that this is incoherent and self-refuting, the Pyrrhonian sceptic will reply that it is 
(or, rather, appears to him to be! ) not so; he is simply being consistently sceptical. His 
belief that he does not know phenomena in their real nature, and his belief that he does not 
know whether or not phenomena can be known in their real nature, are simply impressions 
(phantasm) which he is left with on the basis of his investigations. He does not claim that he 
has proof that these impressions are true, although he does acquiesce in them. 27 Which is to 
say that, the Pyrrhonian sceptic's global radical scepticism: 
(a) { It is not known whetherx or -x) and (b) { it is not known whether or not it can 
be known whetherx or -x} [wherex stands for any matter whatsoever]. Neither (a) 
nor (b) is a knowledge-claim. 
means: 
It is one's impression that { it is not known whetherx of -x and it is not known 
whether or not it can be known whether x or -x } [where x stands for any 
matter whatsoever]. 
The Pyrrhonian sceptic, then, need not make the distinction between first-order and 
second-order knowledge-claims, for he does not think that his impression that he has no 
knowledge of phenomena in their real nature, and his impression that he does not know 
whether or not he can have such knowledge, are knowledge-claims. 
Hankinson's point (which, I have argued, does not apply to the Academic sceptic), 
then, seems more plausible in the case of Pyrrhonian scepticism, where it is claimed that 
the impression one has that one does not have knowledge of phenomena in their real nature 
(and one does not know whether or not one can have such knowledge) is not a case of 
knowledge. The impression (by contrast with the knowledge) that one lacks knowledge is 
a matter simply of introspection, and requires only access to one's immediately available 
mental contents. Pyrrhonian scepticism appears, then, to be a theoretical possibility, 
although one might wonder whether it is practically realizable (or desirable). 
See Burnyeat (1983b), p. 127, Frede (1984), pp. 265-267. 
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2.4. Nägärjuna Interpreted as a Sceptic. 
Is Nägärjuna a sceptic? The passages I have quoted above from his works might 
lead one to believe so. The declaration that Nägärjuna has no views, no thesis or position 
certainly sounds like an assertion that he knows nothing at all about the how things actual IN' 
are. Understood in this way, emptiness would be a remedy (nihsaranam) for views about 
how things actually are. Emptiness would mean, then, that Nägärjuna states that he has no 
knowledge of entities in their real nature. Emptiness would be the emptiness of all 
knowledge-claims concerning how things really are. 
Nägärjuna says, as we have seen already, that those who understand emptiness, 
which is the remedy for views, itself to be a view are incurable (asädhya). 2ß This would 
mean, according to a classical sceptical interpretation, either that: 
(i) emptiness involves a second-order knowledge-claim about views about how 
things actually are, i. e. it is the knowledge that one does not have and cannot have 
knowledge of how things actually are. It is when one (mis)understands emptiness to entail 
a knowledge-claim about how things actually are (e. g. emptiness means 'there is an 
Ultimate Reality', emptiness means 'nothing exists', even emptiness means 'entities 
"'The medical image of emptiness as a remedy against the disease of views might be compared here with the 
Pyrrhonian sceptic's notion that the statement that he has no knowledge is a purgative drug which destroys 
all knowledge-claims. 
The Pyrrhonian sceptic claims that the statement that there is no knowledge is not itself a 
knowledge-claim, like the purgative drug it is flushed-out when its curative work is accomplished. See 
OP 1,206 (trans. Annas and Barnes (1994), p. 52), In the case of all the sceptical phrases, you should 
understand that we do not affirm definitely that they are true-- after all, we say that they can be destroyed 
by themselves, being cancelled along with what they are applied to, just as purgative drugs do not merely 
drain the humours from the body but drive themselves out too along with the humours. ' 
See here Candrakirti's commentary on Nagärjuna's statement, at MMK XIII, 8, that those for whom 
emptiness is a view are incurable. Candrakirti explains the meaning of Nägärjuna's statement by means 
of an analogy from the Ratnakvta sutra: If a physician (vaidyah) were to give a sick man (glänah purusah) 
a medicine (bhaisajyam) and, having cured the man's sickness, the medicine were to remain in his 
stomach (kostba), then in fact the man's illness would become more intense (gädbatataram). This is 
analagous to the situation of the man who takes emptiness, which is the remedy for all views, to be itself a 
view. PP 248-249, yasya khalu punah sunyataiva drstib, tamahamacikitsyamiti vadämi/ tadyathä 
käsyapa glänah purusah syat tasmai vaidyo bbaisajyam dadyät/ tasya tadbbaisajyam 
sarvadosänuccärya svayam kosthagatam na nihsaret/ tatkim manyase kasyapa api tu sa purusastato 
glanyänmukto bhave4 no hidam bhagavan/ gadhatararn tasya purusasya glanyam bhave4 yas va 
tadbbaisajyam sarvadosänuccärya kosthagatam na nihsared bhagavänäha-- evameva käsyapa 
sarvadrstikrtänäm sunyatä nihsaranam/ yasya kbalu punah sünyataiva drstih/ tamahamacikitsyamiti 
vadämi/iti' 
The similarity of the sceptical and the Madhyamika images is striking. (Nevertheless, I suspect that 
it would be wrong to conclude that the Mädhyamika intends his image to make a sceptical point. I think 
that the analogy does not mean that emptiness, i. e. the absence of svabhäva in all entities, is not the 
(ultimate) truth. Rather, it probably means that the merely theoretical, factual knowledge (i. e. the view) 
of emptiness (though correct), needs to be complemented by a perceptual knowledge by acquaintance of 
emptiness. Thus, those who are content merely with the view of emptiness, and are not interested in 
achieving the perceptual knowledge by acquaintance of emptiness, are incurable. See chapter 3 for more 
discussion of this point). 
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dependently originate') that one becomes incurable, or 
(ii) Nägärjuna simply has the impression that he does not know and the impression 
that he does not know whether or not he can have knowledge of how things actually are. 
That is, Nägärjuna acquiesces in this impression, but he does not claim that he knows that it 
is true. One becomes incurable when either one: (a) (mis)understands emptiness to entail 
a knowledge-claim about how things actually are (as in (i)) or (b) wrongly thinks that 
emptiness means that one knows (as opposed to having the impression) that one does not 
know how things actually are. 
Like the sceptic, this interpretation (in either of its varieties) would say, Nägärjuna 
suspends judgement (epoche). Consequently, he: (i) does not assert any knowledge-claim 
about how things actually are (aphasia), and (ii) achieves tranquillity (ataraxia),, ° free from 
the disputes and emotional turmoil which characterize the pursuit of such knowledge. One 
might perhaps construe the following passage in such a way: 
ehe ba'i bdag nyid can de dag/ 
rnams la phyogs med rtsod pa med/ 
gang rnams la niphyogs med pa/ 
de la gzhan phyogs ga la yod// 
gang yang rung ba'i gnas rnyed nas/ 
nyon mongs sbrul gdug gyo can gyis/ 
zin par gyur te gang gi seins/ 
gnas med de dag zin mi kur// 
The great individuals do not have a position [and] are without disputes. 
How can there be an opposing position for those who do not have a position? 
Through acquiring any resting-place30 one will be destroyed by the deceitful 
"Hayes (1988), p. 52 says that there is a striking parallel between the Buddhist conception of nirvana and the 
sceptics' ataraxia. See also Tola and Dragonetti (1995b), p. xxx-xxxi who say that YS42,47,50- 52, and 
58 advocate epoche whereas YS 46,49, and 58 describe the resulting ataraxia. However, Tola and 
Dragonetti say that 'the conception of reality as Voidness induces the Mädhyamika to refrain from 
emitting a judgement which may imply the affirmation or negation of something in itself or of something in 
relation to another thing. ' This is not epoche in the classical sceptical sense (i. e. universal suspension of 
judgement about the nature of reality), given that, according to Tola and Dragonetti, Nägärjuna has a 
'conception of reality as Voidness'. 
301Gnas' seems rather difficult to translate. Lindtner (1982), pp. 116-117 gives 'standpoint'. Lindtner says that 
the Sanskrit original is sthanawhich, Monier-Williams (1899), p. 1263 says, can mean'place of standing or 
staying, any place, spot, locality, abode, dwelling, house, site. ' Scherrer-Schaub (1991), p. 295 suggests 
that the Sanskrit original might be airaya. She gives various possible translations: 'Un'point d'appui', un 
'support', ou une'base'... un'endroit oü resider', une'position'. ' According to Monier-Williams (1899), p. 
158, äsraya' means'that... on which anything depends or rests... the person or thing in which any quality or 
article is inherent... seat, resting-place... depending on, resting on... ' 
It is clear that for Nägärjuna a 'gnas' is what causes the afflictions (nyon mongs). The sceptical 
interpretation would maintain that it is by having any resting-place, i. e., any knowledge-claim which is 
depended upon, that one will be destroyed by the afflictions. It is by not having any such knowledge-claim 
that one will not be so destroyed. Hence having no'gnas' is equivalent to suspending judgement. 
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poisonous snakes of the afflictions. 
Those whose minds are without a resting-place will not be destroyed. 
(YS 50-51). 
In support of the sceptical interpretation of Nägärjuna's thought, one might also 
cite the undeniable (indeed, striking) formal similarities between a number of Nägärjuna's 
arguments and those employed by classical western sceptic s. 3' For example, the classical 
western sceptic argues that any attempt to establish a knowledge-claim, i. e. to prove that 
it-- as opposed to conflicting knowledge-claims-- apprehends phenomena in their real 
nature, will entail an unestablished assumption, an infinite regress or circular reasoning.; ' 
Nägärjuna too33, in his critique of pramäna-s and prameya-s, claims that attempts to 
establish the pramäna-s will entail an unestablished assumption (if the pramäna-s are held 
to be self-evident), an infinite regress (if the pramäna-s are held to be established by other 
pramäna-s) or circularity (if the pramäna-s are held to be established by the prameya-s). 
Also, Aristocles' summary of Pyrrhonian doctrine mentions the sceptics' use of the 
'quadrilemma', which has a formal resemblance to the catuskoti. 3a Further, the sceptics 
use various arguments to refute the knowledge of causes (aetiology)35, while Nägärjuna 
also criticizes a variety of theories ofcausation. 36 In fact, one of the arguments recorded by 
Sextus Empricus resembles closely Nagärjuna's reasoning that a cause cannot precede, 
However, I would argue that a `gnas' is in fact any entity with svabhäva (in the Abhidharma sense of 
basic, unanalyzable/irreducible existence (dravyasat)) That is, a `gnas' is any entity which is depended on 
by or is the basis for entities which do not have svabhäva. Agnas is thus not a position but rather an entity 
with svabhäva. The (false) position (phyogs) that there are such entities with svabhäva is what causes the 
afflictions. It is the knowledge that there are no such entities with svabhäva which destroys the afflictions. 
In other words, I would contest the sceptical interpretation of this passage. 
My interpretation is supported by Candrakirti's commentary, which makes it clear that it is the belief 
in the svabhäva of entities which causes the afflictions. YSV 51, Whoever claims that it is suitable to 
abandon the afflictions although apprehending the svabhäva of form, etc, they cannot abandon the 
afflictions. ' (gang dag gzugs la Bogs pa'i rang bzhin dmigs kyang nyon mongspa rnams spang du rung bar 
'dodpa de dag la ni nyon mongspa rnams spang bar 'gyur ba med do.! ). But more about my critique of the 
sceptical interpretation ofNägärjuna's philosophy later. 
The purpose of these comparisons, it should be noted, is to suggest a possible philosophical similarity between 
classical scepticism and Madhyamaka philosophy. I am not here interested in the issue of historical 
influence. At any rate, speculations about historical influence appear to me to be futile, given the paucity 
(in fact, complete absence! ) of reliable evidence. 
"Infinite regress, reciprocity (circular argument), and hypothesis (unestablished assumption) are three of the 
five modes of Agrippa. See OP I, 164-177. See also Barnes (1990), pp. 204-224, Hankinson (1995), pp. 
182-188. 
"See chapter 7 and 8. 
"See Hankinson (1995), pp. 58-65. 
"The sceptical critique of theories of causation is recorded by Sextus Empiricus as the eight modes of 
Aenesidemus. See OP I, 180-186. Sextus Empiricus also, at OP 111 13-29, presents a general critique of 
notions of causation, which is intended also to bring about suspension of judgement. The sceptical attack 
on causes was a response to the complex theories of causation developed by the dogmatists, especially the 
Stoics. See Barnes (1983), pp. 149-203. 
'6SeeMMKI. 
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follow, or exist simultaneously with its effect37: 
A cause must either co-subsist with its effect or precede it, or exist after its 
effect has come about. Now to say that a cause is brought into existence after 
the coming about of its effect is ridiculous. Nor can it precede its effect; for it 
is said to be thought of relative to it, and they [i. e. the dogmatists] themselves 
say that relatives, insofar as they are relatives, co-exist and are thought 
together with one another. Nor can it co-exist with it; for if it is to effect it, 
and if what comes into being must come into being by the agency of 
something which already exists, then a cause must first become a cause and 
then in this way produce its effect. (OS III, 26-27. Translated by Annas and 
Barnes (1994) pp. 149-150, slightly amended from Hankinson (1995), pp. 
218-224. The material in the square brackets has been added by me). 
Note also the similarity of the following sceptical argument, recorded by Sextus 
Empiricus, which casts doubt on the existence of arguments: 
Thus arguments are composed of statements and compound objects cannot 
exist unless the things from which they are composed co-exist with one 
another (this is clear from beds and the like). But the parts of an argument do 
not co-exist with one another. For when we say the first assumption, neither 
the second assumption not the consequence yet exists; when we say the 
second assumption, the first assumption no longer exists and the consequence 
does not yet exist; and when we utter the consequence, its assumptions no 
longer subsist. Therefore the parts of an argument do not co-exist with one 
another. Hence arguments will seem to be unreal. (OS II, 144. Translated by 
Annas and Barnes (1994), p. 105). 
with this passage, refuting the Naiyäyika parts (avayava) of the syllogism, from 
the Va1dCC. 
gang gi tsbe dam bca' ba brjod pa de 1 tsbe gtan tshigs la sogs pa med la gtan 
tshigs brjod pa na yang dam bca' la sogs pa med do/ de 1 pbyirgtan tsbrgs la 
sogs pa dag yod pa ma yin no/ 
When the thesis is uttered, the reason, etc [i. e. the other parts of the syllogism] 
do not exist, and when the reason is uttered, the thesis, etc do not exist. 
Therefore, the reason, etc do not exist. (VaidC48). 
This represents a selection of some of the more striking formal parallels early 
`See MMK XX, SS 6, RV I, 47, and especially Vaid/VaidC 12 (examined in chapter 8). 
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Indian Madhyamaka and classical scepticism. No doubt further examples could be cited. 3S 
2.5. A Refutation of the Sceptical Interpretation. 
Nevertheless, Nägärjuna is not a sceptic. Why not? 
2.5.1. Nägarjuna's Knowledge-Claim. 
Nägärjuna's assertions that he has no view/position/thesis must be seen in the 
context of his philosophy as a whole. What one finds repeatedly throughout Nägärjuna's 
works is that his basic philosophical position is that entities (bbäva) lack svabbäva. 39 Nor is 
Nägärjuna averse to using overtly epistemological language in expressing this position, a 
tendency which is particularly pronounced in the YS(the very work in which Nägarjuna 
states that the wise have no position (phyogs=paksa)): 
skye ba shes pas jig pa sties/ 
jig pa shes pas mi rtag shes/ 
mi rtag nyid la jug shes pas/ 
dam pa 1 chos kyang rtogs par gyur// 
By the knowledge of arising, destruction is known. 
By the knowledge of destruction, impermanence is known, 
and by the knowledge which penetrates into impermanence, 
the supreme doctrine is understood. (YS 22). 
dngos la mkbas pa rnams kyis nil 
dngos po mi rtag bslu ba 1 cbos/ 
gsog dang stongpa bdag med pa/ 
rnam par dben zbes bya bar mtbong// 
Those who know reality' see that entities are impermanent, deceptive 
phenomena, vain, empty, selfless, and isolated. ' (YS25). 
"See also Garfield (1995), p. 107,118,129,246,254,356 for further comments on parallel arguments. 
"See, for example, MMK XXIV, VV/WC 21-22, SS 3,15-16, LS 24, AS 18, etc. 
aadngos la mkhas pa rnams'. Lindtner (1982), p. 109, translates as 'those who understand facts (bhä va)'. 
Scherrer-Schaub (1991), p. 217, translates as'ceux qui sont eclaires ä l'endroit des entites'. 'dngos' can be 
reconstructed as 'bhäva', which I translate here as 'reality' (see Monier-Williams (1899), p. 754). 'mkhas 
pa' might be reconstructed as 'pandits'. In which case the literal meaning of the phrase would 
be 'the 
learned/wise men with regards reality'. 
'"Isolated' translates rnam par dben which is itself a translation of vivikta. Vivikta has a range of meanings in 
Buddhist thought, but in the present context it is used, I think, as a synonym for s`ünya. See Candrakirti's 
commentary on this passage, which makes this point. YSV25, 
de bas na dngos po 'di de liar mthong bas 
mkhas pa de dag gis dben par mthong ngo dben zhes 
bya ba ni stong pa's' See also Scherrer-Schaub 
(1991), p. 218. 
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The ultimate truth (paramärthasatya) is that all entites are empty, i. e. without 
svabhäva. 4` Understood in the context of Abhidharma philosophy, this appears to mean 
both that entities are dependently arisen (pratltyasamutpanna), and that they do not have 
primary substantial existence (dravyasaf). Which is to say that all dependently arisen 
entities have merely conceptually constructed existence (prajaptisaf). Thus entities 
which dependently arise are like a dream, a reflection, etc. 43 
There is an obvious problem with the coherence of this position, for it entails an 
infinite regress, as the Abhidharmika would point out. (How can all entities be conceptual 
constructions? Surely there must be an unconstructed foundation for conceptual 
construction, and something or something, itself not conceptully constructed, which does 
the constructing). But this is not my concern here' Rather, the relevant point is that 
emptiness is essentially an ontological doctrine, rather than an attack on all knowledge- 
claims. It states something about how things actually are. Namely, it states that all entities 
have a prajnaptisat, dependently arisen existence; an existence without svabhäva. 
Although primarily an ontological teaching, emptiness does have epistemological 
implications, but these are implications which follow from the fact that entities are in 
reality without svabhäva. Thus, an epistemological implication of the ontological doctrine 
of emptiness is that views/positions/theses which assert the existence of entities with 
svabhäva are false, and the assertion that entities are universally dependent arisings (and, 
like a reflection, prajnaptisa f) is true: 
gang dag brten nas dngos po reams/ 
chu yi z1a ba Ita burns/ 
yang dag ma yin log min par/ 
'dodpa de dag bltas ml phrog// 
Those who assert dependent entities 
to be neither real nor false, 
like the moon in water, 
are not carried away by views. (YS45). 45 
"See here, for example, SS68-69a, 'Since all entities are empty of svabhäva, the incomparable tathigatataught 
the dependent origination of entities. The ultimate (paramärtha) is no more than that [lit. is exhausted in 
that]. ' (dngospo shams cad rang bzhin gyis/ stongpa yin pas dngos rnams kyi rten 'byung de ni de bzhin 
gshegs., mtshungs pa med pas nye bar bstan. dam pa'i don ni derzad do ). See also AS 52 (translated in 
the appendix). 
"For further discussion of this point, and textual references, see Chapter 4. 
"See Chapter 4 for a more detailed examination of this problem. 
"See also YSV45, in which Candrakirti makes it abundantly clear that entities exist like the moon in water, and 
are neither real nor false, in the sense that they lack svabhä va. 
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This passage implies, it would seem, that 'views' (blta= drsti) are knowledge-claims 
which assert that entities have svabhäva. These include both doctrines that assert that (any) 
entities exist in an independent, permanent manner, and also those Buddhist doctrines 
which assert that all entities dependently originate, but that (at least some of) these entities 
are dravyasat. 41 When Nägärjuna says that he does not have a view/position/thesis, this 
means that he does not have a view/position/thesis which asserts the svabhäva of entities. ' 
(There is perhaps another sense in which he does not have a view/position/thesis, but this 
has to do with the psychology of meditation on emptiness, and I shall deal with this in the 
next chapter). But Nägärjuna does uphold the position that entities lack svabhäva. ` 
Unlike the sceptic, for whom there is no knowledge of phenomena in their real nature, 
Nägärjuna contends that there can be knowledge of entities in their real nature. Emptiness 
is not a doctrine which denies that there is knowledge. Entities as they really are exist 
without svabhäva, and this is knowable. '" 
'See here YS 40, If the proponents of existence abide in attachment to entities [and] continue in that same 
way, there is not any wonder in that! ' (gal to yod par smra ba rnams, dngos la zhen par gnas pa ni. lam de 
nyid Ia gnas pa ste/ de lam tshar cung zad med//). 
In his commentary, Candrakirti explains that Nägärjuna here criticizes the theories of the 
non-Buddhists (mu stegs can), i. e. the followers of Sämkhya, who accept the three guns-s as eternal and 
the Vaisesikas, who accept that atoms are permanent entities (rtagpa 5dngospo). See YSV40. 
YS41, 'The proponents of universal impermanence, relying on the path of the Buddha, who remain 
attached to entities by [their] disputes, they are admirable! ' (sangs rgyas lam la brten nas ni. 'thams cad mi 
rtag smra ba rnams/ rtsod pa yis ni dngos po la, chags gnas gang yin de rmad do//). 
Here, Candrakirti continues, Nägärjuna is criticizing his fellow Buddhists-- the Vaibhäsikas, the 
Sauträntikas, and the Vijflänavädins (?! The Vijflänaväda school almost certainly arose after Nägärjuna's 
time)-- who maintain that, though entities dependently arise, (some of? ) these dependently arising 
entities have svabbäva, i. e. are dravyasat See YSV 41. Candrakirti also explains that Nägärjuna's 
statement that such Buddhists are admirable (rmad) is an expression of sarcasm (bsting ba= ullapana). 
See Scherrer-Schaub (1991), p. 274. 
"See here Bhävaviveka's response to the charge that the Mädhyamikas engage in vitandä, i. e. they criticize 
their opponents' positions without asserting their own position. Bhävaviveka replies that the 
Mädhyamikas do have a position (phyogs-=paksa), viz. that the svabbäva of entities is their emptiness of 
svabbäva (svabbäv, -&unyata), and thus they do not commit vitandä. TJv 96.28.1-1 (Iida (1980), p. 88), 
kho bo caggi phyogs la ni ngo bo nyid stong pa nyid yin to-'chos rnams kyi ngo bo nyid de yin pa'i phyir de 
na co 'dri ba nyid ma yin te/ On the notion that the svabbäva of entities is their absence of svabbäva (a 
notion asserted by Candrakirti as well), see the appendix. 
That Nagärjuna has a philosophical position, viz. that all entities lack svabbäva, and that he rejects only 
views/positions/theses which assert or presuppose the notion of svabbäva is the interpretation of Tsong 
kha pa, the founder of the dGa' ldan pa or dGe lugs pa school. See here mKhas grub rje's sTong 294-316 
(trans. in Cabezön (1992), pp. 257-272. ) See also Ruegg (1991), pp. 281-310. 
It is, furthermore, the ignorance of the reality of emptiness, i. e. the absence of svabbäva of entities, which 
produces the afflictions (nyon mongs) and, consequently, disputes (rtsod pa). It is the knowledge of the 
reality of emptiness which puts an end to afflictions and, consequently, disputes. See YS46-49. Again, 
this is by contrast with the classical sceptic, who abstains from disputes (aphasia) and achieves tranquillity 
(ataraxia) by means of his knowledge/impression of his lack ofknowledge of reality. 
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2.5.2. A Non-Sceptical Reading of MMK XIII, 8. 
As I have already explained, Nägärjuna states, at MMKXIII, 8, that emptiness is the 
remedy for all views, but that those who take emptiness to be itself a view are incurable. 
This does not mean, as the sceptical interpretation must claim, that one becomes incurable 
when either one: (i) misunderstands emptiness (which is a second-order knowledge about 
knowledge-claims about how things actually are) to entail a knowledge-claim about how 
things actually are, or (ii) wrongly thinks that emptiness means that one knows (as opposed 
to having the impression) that one does not know how things actually are. 
On the contrary, emptiness is a negative dogmatic assertion about how things 
actually are. Nägärjuna claims to know that the real nature of entities is that they do not 
have svabbäva. This negative dogmatism implies, it seems, a corresponding positive 
dogmatic assertion, viz. that there are entities which are without svabbäva, i. e. which have 
a merely prajapti existence. Nägärjuna claims to know that there are no entities with 
svabbäva, and he knows that there are entities without svabhäva. 5° 
Emptiness is an incurable view, according to my interpretation, if it is 
misunderstood by falling into either of the two extremes of nihilism or etemalism. S1 The 
nihilist would misunderstand emptiness to mean that entities do not exist (rather than that 
entities with svabbäva do not exist). " The eternalist misunderstanding, one might 
speculate, could have a gross and a subtle form: Emptiness might be misunderstood as an 
Absolute Reality. " Or, more subtly, although it might be understood that emptiness means 
"It strikes me, furthermore, that when Nägärjuna claims that he knows that all entities lack svabhäva, he is 
using the term 'knowledge' in a very strong sense. Which is to say that Nägärjuna thinks that it is 
indubitably correct that entities lack svabhäva. He does not mean merely that there is good evidence, or it 
is quite likely, that all entities lack svabhäva. His proclamations have the ring of certainty about them-- 
there is no tentativeness or suggestion that the truth mightbe otherwise. Entities lack svabhäva-- this is 
how things actually are (as seen, according to Nägärjuna, by the Buddha), not how things quite probably 
are! See here especially AS 40-41, in which Nägärjuna describes emptiness (sünyata) as the 
'incontrovertible (avisamvadin) truth (bhrltam)' (For Sanskrit text and English translation see appendix). 
For Nägärjuna's rejection of the views of etemalism (sasvatagraha/sasvatfdrsh) and nihilism 
(ucchedadarsana) see, for example, MMKXV, 7,10-11, andAS22. 
52See here especially RVII, 19, 'This teaching [i. e. emptiness], poorly understood, ruins the unwise man. In this 
way he sinks down into the filth of the nihilist view. ' (vinasayati durjnäto dharmo yamavipascitam/ 
nastitadrstisamale yasmädasminnimajjati/). 
53See here Nägärjuna's famous statement that there is no difference (visesa) between nirvana and samsara. 
MMK XXV, 19, na samsarasya nirvanatkimcidasti vis`esanam/ na nirvapasya samsaratkimcidasti 
visesanam// This might mean, then, that nirvana is the true nature of cyclic existence, viz. its absence of 
svabhäva, rather than being a non-dependently originating Absolute Reality which is distinct from the 
dependently originating world. 
If this is the case, then Nägärjuna is here employing the term'nirvana' in an ontological sense (which 
later Buddhists called the prakrtinirvana). Which is to say that nirvana is here a synonym for the way 
things really are, or the ultimate truth (paramarthasatya). The ultimate truth, the nirvana, of samsaric 
entities is that they are empty of svabhäva. Nirvana (in its ontological sense) is atemporal in the sense 
that it is always and in every case the way things really are. 
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that entities dependently originate, it might not be understood that emptiness also means 
that dependently originating entities are prajnaptimätra. s' 
(And also, perhaps, emptiness is an incurable view if one merely correctly 
understands it (as the absence of svabbäva in all entities) in a theoretical way, without 
having any inclination to achieve the corresponding perception of emptiness, i. e. the mere 
absence of svabbäva of entities, in meditative experience. But much here needs further 
explanation and clarification, which must wait until the next chapter). 
2.5.3. The Non-Sceptical Purpose of Nagarjuna's Method of 
Argumentation. 
There is a final consideration. The classical sceptic, as I have explained, employs 
various arguments in order to demonstrate the equipollence (isosthenia) of all 
knowledge-claims. In every case, there will be conflicting knowledge-claims, and there 
will be no adequate justification for choosing between them. It is this technique which is 
intended to produce suspension of judgement (epoche), and, consequently, non-assertion 
(aphasia) and tranquillity (ataraxia). But there is no similar method present in Nägärjuna's 
texts. The arguments which Nägärjuna presents are not intended to demonstrate that there 
is equally good evidence for conflicting knowledge-claims. On the contrary, Nägärjuna 
invariably refutes the views which he examines. For example, in the first verse of the 
MA Nägärjuna states that, 
na svato näpl parato na dväbhyäm näpyahetutah/ 
Williams (I 997b), p. 7 notes that it is rare for nirvana to be used in Buddhist texts as a synonym for 
ultimate truth, but he cites two early Indian Mädhyamika texts which do seem to express such 
synonymity, viz. YS35 in which Nagärjuna says that nirvana is taught by the Buddhas to be the only truth 
(bdengcigpar), and CSXII. 23 in which Aryadeva states that nirvana is emptiness. 
But contrast this ontological usage of the term 'nirvana' with what might be called its 
'epistemological sense'. Which is to say that the term'nirvand is also employed by Nägärjuna to mean the 
knowledge of the true nature of samsara (and, consequently, the freedom from the afflictions and 
sufferings of cyclic existence). Nirvana (in its epistemological sense) is simply the correct 
understanding of nirvana (in its ontological sense), i. e. that all entities are empty of svabhava. See YS 
6c-d, 'Just thorough knowledge of cyclic existence is declared to be nirvana' (parijnanam bhavasyaiva 
nirvanam itikathyate/% Compare the Tibetan translation, srid pa yongs su shes pa nyid/mya ngan 'das 
zhes bya bar brjod/I). Candrakirti, in his commentary on this half-verse, says that the thorough 
knowledge which is nirvana is the thorough knowledge that the svabhava of cyclic existence (srid pa) 
does not arise (skye ba medpa). See YSV6c-d. Unlike nirvana (in its ontological sense), nirvana (in its 
epistemological sense) is attained by an individual cognizer at a particular time. 
Finally, notice that nirvana (in its ontological sense) exists independent of nirvana (in its 
epistemological sense) but nirvana (in its epistemological sense) exists dependent on nirvana (in its 
ontological sense). Which is to say that entities are in fact empty of svabhava whether or not this is 
known, but it can only be known that entities are empty of svabhava because they are in fact empty of 
svabhava 
"See chapter 4. 
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utpannä jtu vidyante bhä väh kvacana kecana. 
No entities whatsoever exist-- anywhere, at any time-- arisen from 
themselves, from others, from both [self and others], or from no cause. 
(MMKI, 1). 
Nägärjuna does not say that there are equally good reasons for asserting that 
entities originate in each of these four ways, and therefore he does not know in which way 
entities originate. He does not suspend his judgement. On the contrary, his point is that 
entities do not originate in any of these four ways. Here one must understand, I think, that 
Nägärjuna means that entities with svabhäva do not originate in any of these four ways. " 
And, as there is no other conceivable way in which their origination might occur, therefore 
there are no entities with svabhäva. There is no sceptical doubt in this statement. 
S51t is acknowledged by both Candrakirti and Bhävaviveka that MMK 1,1 is a non-implicative negation 
(prasajyapratisedha). See Prj, chapter 1 (Tibetan text and English translation of the relevant passage in 
Kajiyama (1973), pp. 168-169, English translation also in Ames (1993), p. 221), and PP 13.1 interpret 
this to mean that, for Candrakirti and Bhävaviveka, in denying that entities'with svabhäva' arise in any of 
these four ways, Nagärjuna does not mean to imply that entities'with svabhäva'arise in some other way. 
In fact, the four negated possible ways in which entities 'with svabhäva' might arise are exhaustive. But 
this does not mean that there are not entities which arise without svabhäva. 
I say this with awareness of Wood's interpretation of the non-implicative negation, according to 
which Nägarjuna intends to deny simply and totally the existence of all entities. Thus, according to 
Wood, Nagärjuna negates the arising of entities in any of the four stated ways, and this is to be understood 
as the negation of the existence of entities per se.. Nagarjuna's purpose, according to Wood, is to 
establish a nihilisitic conclusion, viz. that entities do not originate at all. See Wood (1994), esp. pp. 48 ff 
However, even Wood's nihilisitic interpretation of Nagärjuna is mitigated, because-- although 
Wood does not admit that entities exist for Nägarjuna-- he does allow that entities 'appear'. See, e. g., 
Wood (1994) p. 266,278. In which case Nagarjuna's complete denial of existence, according to Wood's 
interpretation, is of existence construed in a rather narrow sense. For surely insofar as entities appear 
there is a sense in which they might be said to exist? (They exist at least as objects of cognition, for 
example). How could something appear and yet be totally non-existent? Despite his advocacy of a 
radical nihilist interpretation of Nagärjuna, I think that Wood himself must qualify Nagarjuna's 
non-implicative negation. That is, 'no entities arise as more than appearances from themselves, from 
others, from both or from no cause. ' This would seem to be very close to the interpretation which I have 
presented, viz. that entities arise but only without svabhäva, which means that they have merely 
conceptually constructed existence (prajn`aptisat). Entities exist, but only as appearances for the mind. 
See here AS 4-5, which, I think, might be read as saying that, cyclic existence (bhava) has an 
ontological status comparable with illusions, etc. Illusions, etc, Nägarjuna says, are perceived-- i. e. they 
appear, they are not nothing-- which entails that they do exist (they are born (jata), as Nägarjuna puts it). 
The implication would seem to be that cyclic existence too is not merely nothing; it too is perceived, etc, 
and hence must have some positive ontological status, no matter how tenuous. 'Like here [in this world] 
an echo arises depending on a sound, and also like an illusion and a mirage [arise], so too cyclic existence 
arises. If the illusion, the mirage, the gandharva § city, the reflection, as well as dreams, were not born, 
there would not be perception, etc of them. ' (yadvacchabdam pratityeha pratisabdasamudbhavah/ 
mäyämarfcivaccäpi tathä bhavasamudbhavah/mäyamancigandharvanagarapratiblmbakah/yadyajätäh 
saha svapnaima syättaddarianädikam//). 
But for a very different translation of these verses, see Lindtner (1982), p. 141. My translation is 
supported by that of Tola and Dragonetti (1995b), p. 127. See also their explanation of these verses, p. 
149, 'the magical illusion, the mirage, etc have a certain form of existence, an illusory one. This form of 
existence is the same form of existence of the empirical reality. It is this form of existence which allows the 
perception ofthe magical illusion etc and ofthe empirical reality. ' 
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Nägärjuna is not unsure about whether or not entities (with svabhäva) originate in any of 
these four ways. Nagärjuna's statement is a negative dogmatic knowledge-claim. 
Nägärjuna claims to know that entities (with svabhäva) do not originate in any of these 
four ways (and, therefore, entities (with svabhäva) do not exist), and his arguments are 
intended to provide the justification which makes his statement a case of knowledge. 
Nägärjuna is no sceptic. His arguments are not designed to show that knowledge is 
impossible. On the contrary, they are designed to produce the knowledge that entities lack 
svabhäva. sb 
"It might be objected that I have demonstrated only that Nagärjuna is not a sceptic in the sense of classical 
scepticism. Perhaps, the objection might continue, Nägärjuna's philosophy is similar to some form of 
modern philosophical scepticism. However, as I have already explained (see note 4), it would seem that 
modem philosophical scepticism in its diverse forms-- beginning with the Cartesian method of doubt-- 
shares with classical scepticism the essential characterisitic of 'not knowing', regardless of the many 
differences which undoubtedly distinguish these two types of scepticism. It is precisely this basic 
characterisitic of scepticism-- modern as well as classical-- which is absent in Nägärjuna's philosophy. 
Nägärjuna is confident that he knows how things actually are. He is, then, profoundly unsceptical. No 
doubt more work needs to be done in comparing Nägärjuna's philosophy with the various versions of 
modem scepticism, but I suspect that my thesis would be confirmed by such research. 




3. Non-Conceptuality and Knowledge of Reality 
in Nägärjuna's Epistemology. 
3.1. Introduction. 
In the previous chapter I have argued against the interpretation that Nagarjuna's 
epistemology is a form of scepticism concerning the ultimate truth (paramärthasatya), or 
reality (tattva). Instead, I have maintained, Nägärjuna claims to know that the nature of 
reality is the absence of svabhäva of all entities, i. e. all entities are dependently originating 
and without further reducible, further analyzable existence (which is to say that they are, 
without exception, prajnaptisat rather than dravyasa f). Nägärjuna's declarations that he 
has no view/position/thesis are to be understood as statements that he has no 
view/position/thesis which asserts that entities have svabhäva. But, I have claimed, he 
does make the truth-bearing statement that entities are-- in reality-- without svabhäva. 
There appears, however, to be a problem with this interpretation. There is a 
number of passages in texts attributed to Nägärjuna in which it is stated that reality (tattva, 
dharmata) is (in some sense) non-conceptual and inexpressible (for now I leave the issue of 
the exact meaning of'non-conceptual' and 'inexpressible' undetermined). Most famously, 
this point is made in the MMK, 
nivrttamabhidhätavyam nivrtte cittagocare/ 
anutpannäniruddhä hi nirvänamiva dharmatd// 
When the domain of thought has ceased, the linguistic referent has ceased. 
Indeed, like nlrväna, the true nature of things is without origination, without 
cessation. (MMK XVIII, 7). 
aparapratyayam säntam prapancairaprapaücitam/ 
nirvikalpamanänärtbametattattvasya laksanam// 
Not dependent on another, calm, not diffused by conceptual 
diffusion, free from conceptual discrimination, without diversity-- this is 
the description of reality. MMK XVIII, 9. ' 
Similar declarations are made in the LS, 
'See also the opening verses of the MMK, 'I pay homage to the fully awakened one, the most excellent of 
speakers, who taught dependent origination, the benign cessation of conceptual 
diffusion-- no cessation, 
no origination, no destruction, no permanence, no identity, no difference, no coming, no going. 
' 
(anirodbamanutpädamanucchedamas`äivatam/ anekärtbamanänärtbamanägamanirgamam/ yab pra- 
ttyasarnutpädam prapancopatamam s`ivam/desayämäsa sambuddhastam vande vadatäm varaml). 
48 
laksyalaksananirmuktam vägudbära varjitam/ 
säntam jagadidam drstam bhavatä jnänacaksusä// 
You [the Buddha], having the eye of knowledge, saw this world-- which is 
free from characterized objects and characteristics, without expression by 
words-- as calm. (LS 1)). 
animittamanägamya mokso nästi tvamuktavän/ 
atastvayä mahäyäne tatsäkalyena desitam// 
yada väptam mayä punyam stutvä tväm stutibhäjanam/ 
nimittabandhanäpetam bhijyättenäkhilam jagat// 
You have said that without entering into the signless there is not liberation. 
Therefore you comprehensively taught it in the Mahäyäna. 
May the whole world become free from the bond of signs, by means 
of the merit obtained by me, having praised you, the worthy recipient 
of praise! (LS 27-28). 
While the AS states that, 
astiti säsvatl drstirnästrtyucchedadarsanam/ 
tenäntadvayanirmukto dbarmo yam desitastvayä/ 
catuskotivinirrnuktästena dharmästvayoditäh/ 
vijänasyäpyavyneyä vjcäm kimuta gocaf; jýp// 
'It exists' is the eternalist view. 'It does not exist' is the nihilist doctrine. 
Therefore, you taught this dbarma, which is free from [these] two extremes. 
Thus, you declared dharma-s to be free from the four positions. 
They are unknowable even to consciousness, how much less are 
they the domain of words? (AS 22-23). 
bhäväbhävadvayätitamanatitam ca kutracit/ 
na ca jnänam na ca jneyam na cästi na ca nästi yat// 
yanna caikaln na cänekam nobhayam na ca nobhayam/ 
anälayamathä vyaktamacintyamanidarsanam// 
yannodeti na ca vyeti nocchedi na ca säsvatam/ 
tadäkäsapraffkäsam näksarajnänagocaram// 
That which has gone beyond the duality of existence and non-existence, but 
has not gone beyond to anywhere, is neither knowledge or an object of 
knowledge, is neither existing nor not existing; that which is neither one nor 
many, not both [one and many] nor neither [one or many], is without basis, 
is, moreover, unmanifest, inconceivable [and] incomparable; that which 
does not appear and is not concealed, is neither annihilated nor eternal-- 
that, similar to space, is not the domain of words and knowledge. (AS 37-39). 
I do not want to comment at this point on the precise meaning of these and other 
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similar passages. However, they clearly communicate that for Nägärjuna reality, and 
hence presumably knowledge of reality, is in some sense neither conceptual nor sayable. ' 
Why does this appear to be a problem for my interpretation of Nägarjuna's 
philosophy? I have claimed that, according to Nägärjuna, reality (tattva) is the absence of 
svabhäva of entities. In which case my interpretation entails that knowledge of reality is 
clearly both conceptual and expressible. That is, 'all entities are without svabhäva' is both a 
conception of and a statement about the true nature of things. It would appear, then, that my 
interpretation of Nägärjuna's theory of knowledge of reality contradicts what Nägärjuna's 
texts themselves say about this knowledge. Yet, as I have already shown, these texts also 
often assert that the nature of reality is the absence of svabhäva of entities. In which case 
the contradiction would appear to exist in Nägärjuna's texts themselves. That is, 
Nägärjuna's texts express both that the ultimate truth/reality is the absence of svabhäva of 
entities, and that the ultimate truth/reality is beyond conceptions and inexpressible. Is this 
contradiction real or merely apparent? If the contradiction is to be resolved, one must give 
an account of how it is that reality is correctly known by the conception and statement that 
'all entities are without svabhäva', yet reality is also beyond conceptuality and language. 
It is my intention in this chapter to explain and assess two distinct ways in which 
this apparent contradiction might be resolved. I shall call these two distinct resolutions of 
the apparent contradiction interpretation (1) and interpretation (2). 3 These two 
'The issues of the conceptualizability and the expressibility of reality are intimately linked. It might be claimed 
that concepts and words are identical. However, there seems to be a strong case for a real distinction 
between concepts and words. For there is the case of'not being able to find the right words to express one's 
ideas' (there may be, as Evans (1982), p. 74 says, 'a gap between what a speaker says and the thought he has 
in his mind'). Also there is the fact that different words can express the same concept. Further, words can 
in certain situations (e. g. the young child or the parrot) be uttered without expressing any concept 
whatsoever. It might be countered that such utterances are not really words, but rather 'meaningless 
sounds'. However, if a sound only becomes a word by being attached to, or expressive of, a concept, then 
this demonstrates that a word is not the concept, but rather the vocal (or sub-vocal ) expression of the 
concept. Finally there is the case of people who can certainly have concepts, but who cannot speak at all. 
It seems true to say that words are founded on concepts, insofar as a word is an expression of a 
concept. And it may be that a concept is always potentially expressible as a word, even if it is not actually 
expressed, or if it is instead expressed in a non-linguistic way (e. g. by a gesture). Concepts are not identical 
with words but they do seem to be transparent to words. Words are not identical with concepts, but there 
is no word ifa sound fails to express a concept. 
Thus, in the context of the present study, a conceptualizable reality would be always (potentially) 
expressible linguistically. And, an unconceptualizable reality would necessarily be inexpressible. (I am 
not, however, claiming that Nägärjuna himself was aware of this relationship between concepts and 
words). 
'Let me suggest also, briefly, two other interpretations, (a) and (b)-- which attempt to reconcile the conception 
and statement that reality is the absence of svabbäva of entities with the notion that reality 
is beyond 
conceptualization and expression-- which I shall not consider in detail in this chapter: 
(a) depends upon the equivalence, in Abhidharma philosophy, of svabbä va and svalaksana. 
Williams 
(1981), p. 241 notes that theAKBh equates svalaksanaand svabbiva. SeeAKBh 
VI, 14. See also Griffiths 
(1986), p. 167, Cox (1995) p. 139. 
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interpretations are not only distinct but also they are incompatible. Which is to say that it 
would be contradictory to hold both interpretation (1) and interpretation (2). I shall argue 
that, although interpretation (1) and interpretation (2) are plausible readings of texts 
attributed to Nägärjuna, interpretation (2) is probably closer to Nägärjuna's intentions. 
However, I shall also argue that both interpretation (1) and interpretation (2) entail serious 
philosophical difficulties. It is not clear to me, then, that either interpretation (1) or 
interpretation (2) is a philosophicallysuccessful resolution of the apparent contradiction in 
Nägärjuna's statements that there is conceptual, expressible knowledge of reality, and that 
reality is beyond conceptualization and inexpressible. ' 
Dharma-s, according to the Abhidharma, have svabhäva, which means that they have in reality (and 
not simply through conceptual construction) a defining characteristic (svalaksana)-- some property which 
distinguishes them as the type of entity which they are, as distinct from other types of entities. 
Thus, according to this interpretation (a), to deny that entities have svabhäva, as does Nägärjuna, is to 
deny that there are in reality (as opposed to through conceptual construction) any entities with defining 
characteristics. In fact, all that there is in reality (i. e. independent of conceptualization), according to this 
interpretation, is pure becoming or pure change, upon which the conceptualizing mind imposes the 
concepts of various entities with their defining characteristics. Reality is simply pure change which is 
subsequently categorized by the mind into the manifold types of entities. Thus, reality-- the pure process of 
change-- is prior to and independent of the conceptual discrimination (vikalpa) and conceptual diffusion 
(prapafca) which fashions this pristine process of change into the familiar world of entities. 
Now, it might be that this is what Nägärjuna means. But if this is the case his position is surely 
incoherent. For this interpretation relies upon the notion that reality is 'pure change', undivided into 
distinct entities. But what sense can be made of this notion? Surely the idea of change always presupposes 
that there is something which is changing. Change is always a predicate of an entity. Change is necessarily 
change of entity x. The notion of change without an entity of which it is the change seems 
incomprehensible. I contend, then, that it is impossible to understand the notion of pure change. To say 
that there is change entails the question 'what is changing? ' In other words, the idea that there is change, 
and then the conceptualizing mind categorizes this change into various distinct entities, is illogical. 
Change in fact presupposes entities which are changing, rather than being an entity-free foundation upon 
which the mind constructs the world of entities. 
(b) states that to know the absence of svabhäva of entities, and hence their dependent origination, is 
not to know how this law of dependent origination operates in detail. One might know that x must arise in 
dependence upon conditions, but this does not mean that one knows the specific conditions which give rise 
to x. Further, to know the general law of dependent origination is not to know all of the entities to which 
this law applies. One might know that whatever exists must arise in dependence upon conditions, but this 
does not mean that one knows all ofthe entities which do exist. 
Given the infinite complexity and extent ofthe dependently originating universe, there is, then, a sense 
in which reality-- in its infinite details and extent-- is inconceivable. But this does not mean that reality-- in 
its infinite details and extent-- is unconceptualizable. The infinite details and extent of the dependently 
originating universe are in principle accessible to conceptual knowledge. However, given the finite 
capacity of the mind (of a non-Buddha, at least), it is not practically possible to know them. Thus, reality, 
in a general sense, is conceptualizable as the dependent origination of entities, This reality, in its infinite 
details and extent, is also conceptualizable, but is inconceivable for the finite mind. 
It is in this respect that the Mahäyäna doctrine that a Buddha is omniscient (sarväkärajfatä, 
sarvajriäna) is significant. Extraordinarily, a Buddha-- given the infinite capacity of his mind-- is said to 
know reality-- i. e. the dependent origination of entities-- in its infinite details and extent. See here RV 5, 
40-64 in which Nägärjuna describes the ten bodhisattvabhrimi-s, which culminate in omniscient 
Buddhahood. His description perhaps follows that of the Daiabhürnikasvtra, one of the most important 
sources for Mähäyana Buddhology. See Lindtner (1982), p. 166. For a further reference to the 
omniscience (sarvajfa) of the Buddha, see RV 1,74. On the bodbisattvabadmi-s and the omniscience of a 
Buddha see Dayal (1932), pp. 283-291, Williams (1989), 204-214, and Griffiths (1994). 
'Whether Nägärjuna himself actually intended either of these interpretations it is of course impossible to 
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3.2. Interpretation (1) Non-Conceptual Knowledge of 
an Unconceptualizable Reality. 
One way to overcome the apparent contradiction is by means of an equivocation in 
the term 'reality'. It is unavoidably contradictory to state that 'it is the case that there is 
conceptual knowledge of reality and it is not the case that there is conceptual knowledge of 
reality' ifthe affirmation and the negation is of'conceptual knowledge of reality' in the same 
sense. However, it is not contradictory to state that 'it is the case that there is conceptual 
knowledge of reality in one sense of the term 'reality" and 'it is not the case that there is 
conceptual knowledge of reality in another sense of the term'reality". 
The point might be expressed as follows: 
There is {conceptual knowledge of reality) and there is not { conceptual 
knowledge of reality) =a contradiction. 
There is conceptual knowledge of {reality), and there is not conceptual 
knowledge of {reality}Z #a contradiction. 
If this is the case, then what is required is a delineation of the different senses of the 
term 'reality'. Interpretation (1) says that it is on this basis that one might hold together, 
without contradiction, Nägärjuna's claims that there both is and is not conceptual 
knowledge of reality. 
According to interpretation (1), reality, is the absence of svabhä va of entities. Thus, 
reality, is conceptualizable, and is the object of the conceptual knowledge that 'entities are 
without svabbäva. ' Which is to say that the conception and statement that 'entities are 
without svabhäva' is a true conception and statement. This conception and statement 
know. The likelihood is, I suspect, that Nägärjuna never thought the matter through. There is certainly 
little evidence to suggest otherwise. The fact is that here, as in so many cases, Nägärjuna's statements-- 
from a philosophical point of view at least-- are inchoate. The interpreter is forced to make use of his own 
resources in order to explore the possible implications of what Nägärjuna says. This is a perfectly 
legitimate activity, it seems to me, so long as the implications which one explores are not then attributed, 
in fully worked-out fashion, to Nägärjuna himself. Nägärjuna says x. xmight be interpreted in manner 
y. It might even make great philosophical sense to interpret x in manner y. Nevertheless, it does not 
follow that Nägärjuna intended x to be interpreted in manner y. Perhaps he intended x to be interpreted in 
some other way. Or, perhaps he never really considered quite what he meant when he said x! The point is 
that, unless Nägärjuna actually says what he means by his statement x, it is difficult to know what he 
himself had in mind. One of the difficulties (or should it be delights? ) facing the interpreter of 
Nägärjuna's writings is that many of his statements are philosophically undeveloped and thus liable to 
various interpretations. Which is not to say, I must emphasize, that any of the possible interpretations 
necessarily express what Nägärjuna himself meant. It is quite possible that Nägärjuna simply made a 
number of philosophically undeveloped assertions, and thought no more about the matter! There is no 
reason to think otherwise. 
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accurately apprehends reality,. This explains why it is that Nägärjuna not infrequently 
declares the ultimate truth to be the absence of svabbäva of entities. 
By contrast, as the passages quoted above suggest, reality- is unconceptualizable. 
Something which is unconceptualizable cannot be conceptualized. Reality, is therefore 
not a possible object of conceptual knowledge. In fact, according to interpretation (? ). 
reality2 can only be apprehended by non-conceptual knowledge. According to 
interpretation (1), there is an extraordinary cognitive faculty (tattvajäna), non-conceptual 
in nature, which apprehends an unconceptualizable reality,. (I leave aside for the moment 
the troublesome issue of the intelligibility, of 'non-conceptual knowledge of 
unconceptualizable reality,. ') Thus, 
Interpretation (1)= There is conceptual knowledge of {reality}, and there is 
not conceptual knowledge of {reality},. There is non-conceptual 
knowledge of (reality),. 
Note that interpretation (1) is not sceptical about reality,. It does not say that there 
is not knowledge of reality,. More precisely, it claims that reality, is not to be known 
conceptually but that reality, is to be known non-conceptually. Interpretation (1) rests, 
then, on a distinction between two means of knowledge, viz. knowledge by means which 
are conceptual (and expressible) versus knowledge by means which are non-conceptual 
(and inexpressible). Interpretation (1) states that in the matter of reality2 there is no 
knowledge by means which are conceptual, but there is knowledge by means which are 
non-conceptual. (This of course raises the philosophical problem of what a non- 
conceptual means ofknowledge might be. I shall discuss this issue shortly). 
Interpretation (1) might derive textual support from Bhävaviveka's teaching that 
the ultimate (don dam pa) has two aspects (ream pa gnyis), viz. the ultimate which cannot 
be specified (rnam grangs ma yin pa 'i don dam) and the ultimate which can be specified 
(rnamgrangskyi don dam). The first aspect is, he says, among other things, supramundane 
(jig rtes las 'das pa), without impurity (zag pa med pa) and without conceptual diffusion 
(sprospa medpa). The second aspect is described by Bhävaviveka as, along with various 
other appellations, (the object of? ) pure mundane knowledge (dagpa jigrten pa'i ye sties), 
and having conceptual diffusion (sprospa dang bcas pa). It is this second aspect of the 
ultimate, Bhävaviveka says, which is expressed by his thesis (dam bca) or position 
'See especially AS 52 (translated in the appendix), and 
SS 68-69a (translated in chapter 2, note 42). 
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(phyogs) that all entities are without svabbäva. The first aspect of the ultimate, being 
beyond conceptual diffusion, is inexpressible by means of a thesis. It is, he claims, beyond 
the extremes (mtba) of existence (yodpa) and non-existence (med pa). ° Perhaps the 
implication here is that all conceptualization takes place in accordance with the notions of 
existence and/or non-existence. That is-- to employ the fomulation often referred to as the 
catuskotl'-- x exists, does not exists, both exists and does not exist, or neither exists nor 
does not exist. There are no other conceptual possibilities. To claim that the ultimate (in its 
unspecifiable aspect) is beyond the categories of existence and non-existence is, it would 
appear, to place it beyond the reach of conceptual knowledge. ' 
'See TJv, 96,27,4-8,96,28,1-1 (lida (1980), p. 86,88), ... 
don dam pa ni rnam pa gnyis to de la gcig ni 
mngon par 'du byedpa med par jug pa jig Tien las 'das pa zag pa med pa sprospa med pa'o gnyi. s pa ni 
mngon par 'du byedpa dang bcas par jug pa bsod nams dang ye shes kyi tshogs kyi rjes su mthun pa dag 
pa jig rten pa'i ye shes zhes bya ba spros pa dang bcas pa ste ' 'dir de dam bcas pa'i khyad par nyid bzung 
bas nyespa med do/... kho bo cag gi phyogs la ni ngo bo nyid stong pa nyid yin to ... See also MS, 2-3,5-6, ... 
dam pa'i don ni spros bral to de yang rnam pa gnyis su bya rnam grangs 
kyi ni don dam dang; 'rnam prangs ma yin don dam mo,... spros pa shams cad kyis . stong pa de ni rnam 
grangs ma yin pa'i "dam pa'i don du shes par bya., yod pa'i mtha' dang med pa'i m tha' gnyis po shams cad 
spangspa ste/... 
7See Ruegg (1977). For an explicit use of the term'catuskotl by Nägärjuna himself, see AS23. (Sanskrit text 
and English translation given above). 
'This sort of understanding of Madhyamaka has certainly had numerous proponents. In Chinese Madhyamaka, 
Chih-tsang (458-522), for example, declares that the ultimate truth transcends all verbalization, because it 
transcends the catuskoti. See Swanson (1989), p. 90. 
In Tibetan Madhyamaka, there is the interpretation of Madhyamaka which mKhas grub rje calls the 
yod min med min position (which he vehemently criticizes), according to which reality is 
unconceptualizable and inexpressible in terms of the four positions of the catucko, , which exhaust the 
conceptual, expressible possibilities. Thus, reality is accessible only to non-conceptual knowledge. 
Cabezön notes that it is not clear, however, who the advocates of this position were. It was attributed by 
Se ra rJe btsun Chos kyi rgyal mtshan (1469-1544) to Go rams pa bSod nams seng ge (1429-1489) and 
Säkya mchog ldan (1428-1507). However, Go ram pa says in his ITa ba'i shah 'byed that he does not hold 
the yod min med min view. There is evidence, although it is not conclusive, that Säkya mchog Idan did in 
fact hold such a view. See Cabezön (1992), pp. 147,442-443. For mKhas grub jre's critique of the yod min 
med min position, see especially sTong 98-111 (Cabezön (trans) (1992), pp. 101-112). 
See also the modern rNying ma scholar Mi pham rgya mtsho (1846-1912). Williams (1997b), pp. 
114-115 writes that 'for Mi pham any suggestion of going beyond entity and negation, x and not-x, is a 
chance to introduce a third value which in its very impossibility as that which is neither of two 
contradictories forces the mind to a new level beyond which there can be none higher, the level of the Great 
Madhyamaka, the level of that gnosis which is the calming of all verbal differentiations (spros pa thams cad 
zhi ba'i ye sties). ' 
Williams notes that Mi pham quotes MMKXV, 10 in support of his position: 'It exists' is the grasping 
of permanence. 'It does not exist' is the view of annihilation. Therefore, the wise man should not depend on 
existence or non-existence. ' (astlti sätvatagräho nästityucchedadarsanam/ tasmädastittianästitve 
näsrryeta vicaksaaah/I). (My translation). 
See also R VI, 62, 'Therefore, know the unique doctrine transcending non-existence and existence, the 
ambrosia which is the Buddhas' teaching called 'profound". (dharmayautakarnityasmännästyastitva- 
vyatikramam/viddhigambhframityuktam buddhänäm 9 sanämrtam). 
According to interpretation (1), then, Nägärjuna means that existence and non-existence is the basic 
duality in terms of which the conceptual mind functions. To go beyond this duality is to attain a gnosis of 
a reality which transcends conceptualization. 
But the opponent of interpretation (1), such as mKhas grub rje (see sTong 104-105, Cabezön (trans) 
(1992), pp. 106-107), will argue that Nägärjuna 'goes beyond existence and non-existence' 
in the sense 
that he avoids the extremes of existence 'with svabhävä and complete non-existence. Reality. 
i. e. the 
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3.2.1. The Unconceptualizable Reality-- Immanent or 
Transcendent? 
But what precisely is reality,? It seems that there is a basic ambiguity in the sense of 
the term. Is the non-conceptual knowledge a knowledge of an unconceptualizable reality. 
which is the true nature of entities? Or is the non-conceptual knowledge a knowledge of an 
unconceptualizable reality, which is transcendent to, i. e. quite other than, entities? The two 
possibilities might be placed in opposition as follows: How entities really are is 
unconceptualizable, known only by non-conceptual knowledge, versus an 
unconceptualizable Absolute Reality-- known only by non-conceptual knowledge-- which 
is placed apart from the world of dependently originating entities. Thus, interpretation (1) 
might be understood in (at least) two divergent ways: 
(I a) There is conceptual knowledge of { reality), [= the absence of svabb va 
of entities] and there is not conceptual knowledge of { reality}, [= the 
unconceptualizable true nature of entities]. There is non-conceptual knowledge 
ofreality2. 
(lb) There is conceptual knowledge of {reality}, [= the absence of svabbävaof 
entities] and there is not conceptual knowledge of {reality} [=the 
unconceptualizable Absolute Reality, placed apart from the world of dependently 
originating entities]. There is non-conceptual knowledge of reality2. 
The distinction here is between an unconceptualizable reality which is immanent, 
as the innermost nature of the world of dependently originating entities (la), and an 
unconceptualizable reality which is transcendent to these dependently originating entities 
(1 b). In both cases, however, reality,, the absence of svabbäva of entities, is a surface-level 
sort of reality. It is reality in a provisional sense. Reality, is, according to these 
interpretations, the object of what Bhävaviveka calls 'pure mundane knowledge' (dagpa 
jig rten pa Y ye sties). It is taught for those who are not able yet to know reality, (which, 
according to these interpretations, Bhävaviveka calls the supramundane ('jig rten las 'das 
pa) ultimate) because of spiritual ineptitude. Perhaps also reality, is taught in order to 
facilitate the transactional, worldly (vyavabära) conduct of those who have realized 
reality,. That is, the true nature of entities is unconceptualizable, but in order for those who 
know reality, to continue to act in the world it is necessary for them to conceptualize 
entities as without svabbäva. 
absence of svabhävaof entities, transcends the extremes of existence (with svabhä va) and non-existence, 
but this does not mean that reality transcends conceptualization. See also Napper (1989), pp. 83-84. 
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As I shall explain in more detail later, however, the notion of two realities-- one 
final and unconceptualizable (be it the true nature of entities or an Absolute which is set 
apart from entities), the other provisional and conceptualizable-- is surely problematic. 
For, I think it is correct to say, the relationship between these two realities is obscure. (Not 
to mention the perplexing difficulty concerning what sense if any can be made of an 
unconceptualizable reality-- be it the true nature of entities or a transcendent Absolute). 
But more about this shortly. 
3.3. Is Interpretation (1) Supported By Textual Evidence? 
What is distinctive about interpretation (1) is that it asserts that reality is not simply 
the absence of svabhäva of entities. It states that this notion of a conceptual izable reality is 
a provisional or mundane ultimate truth. This notion of a conceptualizable reality must be 
superseded by the notion of an unconceptualizable reality, known only by non-conceptual 
knowledge. 
It appears to me that, if Nägärjuna is upholding interpretation (1), it is probably of 
type (1a) rather than type (1b). There is no textual evidence to support (1 b). There is no 
indication given by Nagärjuna that he is referring to an Absolute Reality, placed apart from 
the dependently originating world. On the contrary, several of the passages which I have 
quoted above state explicitly that the reality being described is precisely the true nature of 
entities. It is, Nagärjuna delares, this world (jagadidam) which is free from characterized 
objects and characteristics (laksyalakcananirmuktam), without expression by words 
(vägudähäravarjitam). It is dharma-s-- i. e. the basic constituents of existence-- which are 
said to be free from the four positions (catuskoti), not some reality placed elsewhere. And 
Nägärjuna states that the domain of thought (cittagocara) and, hence, the linguistic referent 
(abhidhätavya) have ceased with respect to the dharmat, -- a term used in Mahäyäna 
Buddhism, as Griffiths notes9, to denote the true nature of the dharma-s themselves. The 
impression which these passages give, then, is of an unconceptualizable reality which is 
the true nature of the entities of the dependently originating world, not some transcendent 
Absolute. '° 
It seems undeniable that the verses from Nägärjuna's texts which I have already 
'See Griffiths (1994), p. 149. Dharmatd is of course an abstract noun which literally means 'dharma-ness' or 
dharma-hood. It is that which is the essence, one might say, of all dharma-s. For the rare use of the Pali 
equivalent, i. e. dhammatä, in the Pali Nikayas see Warder (1970b), pp. 286-287. 
'°See here the Chung lun, which says, commenting onMMKXXII, 12, that'the true character of all dharma-s is 
utter clarity and purity, and cannot be grasped. ' (Trans. by Bocking (1995), p. 326. 
) 
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quoted and translated at the beginning of this chapter might be understood as an assertion 
of an unconceptualizable reality, i. e. the true nature of entities, accessible only to 
non-conceptual knowledge. Further, when Nägärjuna says that he has no view, no 
position, no thesis, one might take this to mean that the true nature of entities is not 
amenable to conceptualization and expression. " 
It is also the case that the quite common statements by Nägärjuna which declare 
that the absence of svabhäva of entities is the ultimate truth might conceivably be 
interpreted as a provisional statement of the ultimate truth-- to be finally replaced by a 
non-conceptual knowledge of the unconceptualizable true nature of entities. (Although, it 
must be admitted, this would be very much an interpretation. There is no explicit textual 
evidence in these passages that this is what Nägärjuna in fact meant. ) Nägärjuna's verses 
are malleable, it must be acknowledged, and it does seem possible to mold them into a 
shape which fits interpretation (1). If one wants to find an unconceptualizable reality, 
known only by a non-conceptual knowledge, in Nägärjuna's writings it is quite possible to 
understand some of his statements in such a manner. And, with some effort and ingenuity, 
there is usually some way to accommodate statements by Nägärjuna which seem to 
contradict this interpretation. 
This having been said, interpretation (1) does not appear to me to be the most 
plausible reading of Nägärjuna's texts. It should be noted that explicit statements which 
might be construed to support the 'unconceptualizable reality' thesis are not common in 
Nägärjuna's writings. Might the advocate of interpretation (1) therefore be guilty of what 
R. Robinson calls the fault of'mosaic interpretation'? That is, might he be laying excessive 
weight on isolated verses which might be simply passing remarks, unintegrated with the 
mainstream of Nägärjuna's thought? One might also suspect that advocates of 
interpretation (1) commit what R. Robinson calls the fault of'insinuating the future. "' That 
is, proponents of interpretation (1) might be reading into Nägärjuna's works a doctrine (that 
is, of an unconceptualizable reality) which is present in a developed form only later in the 
history of Madhyamaka My own judgement is that Nägärjuna probably meant to assert 
that there is no other ultimate truth/reality than the absence of svabhävaof entities. He does 
not mean to claim that there is an unconceptualizable reality, known only by a non- 
conceptual knowledge. The occasional verses in which Nägärjuna writes of non- 
"See here Lang (1983), P. 154. 'The Mädhyamikas use logic and the techniques of argumentation to expose 
the limitations of their opponents' theories. Their critique of other philosophical positions 
is intended to 
demonstrate the inability of language to express ultimate truth, not to supplant one thesis by, another. ' 
'See Robinson (1953), pp. 1-4. 
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conceptuality can be explained as descriptions of a meditative knowledge-experience of 
the absence of svabb va of entities, rather than as references to an unconceptualizable 
reality. This is the position, in brief, which I have called interpretation (2), and which I 
shall explain in detail later. 
3.4. A Philosophical Critique of Interpretation (1). 
As I have explained, interpretation (1), in both its varieties, relies on the notion of an 
unconceptualizable reality, apprehended only by non-conceptual knowledge. It follows, 
then, that interpretation (1) will only make sense if one can make sense of this notion. And it 
is precisely here that the great philosophical problem with interpretation (1) lies. It appears 
difficult to make a philosophically respectable case for an unconceptualizable reality. 
apprehended by non-conceptual knowledge. I shall explain here some of the difficulties. 
3.4.1. The Paradox of Unconceptualizability and Ineffability. 
The statement that there is an unconceptualizable (and inexpressible) reality seems 
open to the easy refutation that this statement is itself conceptual, (and expressible). It is a 
case of conceptual knowledge of a (supposedly) unconceptualizable reality. The statement 
that there is an unconceptualizable reality is therefore self-refuting. If the statement is true, 
then it is false. 13 I shall suggest two possible solutions to this (apparent) paradox: 
(i) The proponent of interpretation (1) might retort that reality is 
unconceptualizable, with the exception that it can be conceptualized as 
unconceptualizable. In other words, reality is almost entirely unconceptualizable. The 
only exception to the rule is the concept of reality's unconceptualizability. No other concept 
"See here mKhas grub rje's similar criticism of the yod min med min interpretation of Madhyamaka. mKhas 
grub rje argues that, if, as the proponents of the yod min med min interpretation say, the true nature of 
entities is beyond all predication by means of the categories of existence and non-existence, then it could 
not be consistently claimed that entities are in fact free of conceptual diffusion (spros bra[) or that they are 
not conceptualizable in terms of the categories of existence and non- existence-- assertions which the yod 
min med min proponent must uphold yet which are refuted on his own premisses. Which is to say that, 
according to mKhas grub rje, the yod min med min position is self-contradictory, because it conceptualizes 
and states that the true nature of entities exists in a way which is not conceptualizable in terms of the 
categories of existence and non-existence. See sTong 99, (trans. Cabezön (1992), pp. 102-103). 
In the context of ancient Indian philosophy, one fords a clear statement of the paradox of ineffability in 
Bhartrhari's Väkyapadiya 20-21, aväcyamiti yadväcyam tadaväcyatayä yada/väcyam ityacas1 , eta 
väcyameva tadä bbavet//ath pyaväcyamityevam na tadväcyam pratiyate/ vivaksitäsyayävasth saiva 
nädbyavasiyate//See Houben (1995), pp. 381-401. 
Williams (1978), p. 2 notes that the Abhidharma/Abhidhamma considers ineffability to be incoherent 
'Buddhaghosa observed that there is nothing which escapes being named, for if we say that a thing is 
ineffable then that thing is thereby named as'ineffable'. ' 
See also Jackson (1993), pp. 81-82. 
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only exception to the rule is the concept of reality's unconceptualizability. No other 
concept ofthe (almost entirely) unconceptualizable reality is possible. 
The proponent of interpretation (1) might, in other words, introduce a two-tiered 
hierarchy of conceptuality with regard to the unconceptualizable reality. " The tier of 
legitimate conceptualization of the unconceptualizable reality would contain onl\ one 
member-- the concept that reality is unconceptualizable. All other conceptualization 
would belong to the tier of illegitimate conceptualization concerning the 
unconceptualizable reality. 
It might be objected that this introduction of two-tiers of concepts is an artificial 
and arbitrary strategy, a case of special pleading designed to evade (rather than solve) the 
insoluble problem of the paradox of unconceptualizability. If one concept is permitted 
with regard to the supposedly unconceptualizable reality, why are other concepts not 
equally legitimate? To simply assert that one concept is permitted concerning an 
unconceptualizable reality, but not others, does not explain how it can be that this one 
concept has such privileged status. 
I am not sure that this objection is convincing, however. Maybe reality is thatsortof 
matterabout which nothing can be conceived, except that it is unconceptualizable. Other 
concepts are not legitimate wih regard to reality because reality is the way that it is - 
unamenable to any concepts, except the concept that it is not amenable to concepts. Hence 
the 'privileged status' of the concept that reality is unconceptualizable. That is, the 
privileged status of the concept 'unconceptualizable' stems from reality's nature as 
unamenable to conceptualization, except the concept 'unconceptualizable'. (It might still 
be objected, however, that it has not been explained how it is that reality is by nature, unlike 
other entities, only accessible to the concept 'unconceptualizable'. Which is to say, why 
does reality have this privileged status? ). 
(ii) The second possible solution to the paradox can be explained by means of an 
argument by analogy. If I say, for example, that I have no concept of NewYork, then I have 
the concept that I have no concept of New York. But it would be wrong to suggest that I am 
here caught in a paradox. My concept that I have no concept of New York is not a quality 
possessed by New York itself It is not that I have the concept of New York as having the 
quality 'not conceived of by David'. Rather, my concept that I have no concept of New 
York is a concept of my inability to form a concept of New York. By contrast, if I have the 
'°Houben (1995), p. 397 notes that Russell, Carnap, and Tarski resort to a hierarchy of languages in order to 
overcome paradoxes. 
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concept that New York is large, exists on the east coast of America, and has a high crime 
rate, these are (if I am correct) qualities possessed by New York itself. 
Similarly, perhaps, the concept that reality is unconceptualizable might plausibly 
be understood as a concept about the inability of concepts to apprehend this reality (the 
difference being, of course, that unlike the case of New York, it is (supposedly) not even 
possible for concepts to apprehend reality). It is not that reality has the quality 
'unconceptualizable' anymore than the inability to conceive of New York is a quality of 
New York itself. Thus the statement that reality is unconceptualizable is not actually 
paradoxical, because what is conceptualized by this statement is the inability of concepts 
to apprehend reality, rather than a quality of reality itself. 
Still, it might be objected that if it is not possible to have a concept of reality, then 
this is not simply a concept of the inability of concepts to apprehend reality. There must 
be-- the objection might continue-- something about, a quality of, reality itself which 
makes it impossible to form a concept of this reality. This quality of reality itself is reality's 
'unconceptualizability. ' In other words, if one asks why is it impossible to form a concept of 
reality, the answer must be that it is impossible to form a concept of reality becaue realityis 
unconceptualizable. In this case the paradox of non-conceptuality is not resolved, for one 
has the concept of the quality, 'unconceptualizability', possessed by the unconceptualizable 
reality! 
In conclusion, it is not clear to me whether the paradox of unconceptualizability 
(and ineffability) can be resolved. (Which is to say that I am not sure whether or not it is a 
real paradox). There appear to be reasonable arguments on both sides. I suspect that we 
have here an example of a philosophical debate which might continue indefinitely. 
3.4.2. The Night in Which All Cows are Black. 
Hegel, in his Phenomenology of Spirit, criticizes Schelling's notion that reality is 
without specifications and determinateness. He comments that such a reality would be 
contentless and singularly uninteresting, 'as the night in which, as the saying goes, all cows 
are black-- this is cognition naively reduced to vacuity. "' 
Hegel's criticism can also be applied to interpretation (1), in its advocacy of an 
unconceptualizable reality, apprehended by non-conceptual knowledge. It is my 
"Phenomenology of Spirit (trans. Findlay, 1977), p. 9. 
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contention that the concept is what picks out or discriminates x (or that x is y). See here M. 
Dummett's comment, concerning the concept of a square, that'at the very least' to grasp the 
concept'is to discriminate between things that are square and those that are not. "° Thus, 
(a) an entity which is conceptualizable is an entity which can be discriminated, and 
an entity which is unconceptualizable is an entity which cannot be discriminated. An 
entity which can be discriminated can be known (for knowledge involves the 
discrimination of entities), but an entity which cannot be discriminated cannot be known. 
It is not possible that an entity cannot be discriminated and is knowable. In which case, an 
unconceptualizable reality, i. e. a reality which cannot be discriminated, and which can be 
known is a contradiction. 
(b) knowledge which is non-conceptual is knowledge which cannot discriminate 
anything. But knowledge which cannot discriminate anything is not knowledge. There 
cannot be, therefore, non-conceptual knowledge. 
In fact, the notion of non-conceptuality, as I am employing it here, is perhaps 
incompatible with consciousness per se. For consciousness is arguably always 
consciousness of x. In order for consciousness to be consciousness of x, x must be picked 
out, i. e. discriminated, from other entities. As I have explained, it is the concept that 
enables one to discriminate x (or that x is y). Without concepts there would be no 
discrimination of x at all. And without the discrimination of x, there would be no 
consciousness ofx, and hence no consciousness. A non-conceptual consciousness is thus 
impossible. " 
16 Cited in Peacocke (1989), p. 10. 
"See here the Abhidharma account of samjia, best translated as 'conceptualization'. Samjfl is the mental 
factor (caitta) which enables consciousness (citta) to identify/recognize the distinctive characteristic 
(nimitta) of its object. Significantly, samjn"ä must be present in all states of consciousness. See 
Nyanaponika Thera (1976), pp. 45-48,70, Williams (1980), pp. 14 ff. It would appear, then, that for the 
Abhidharma there are no non-conceptual states of consciousness. 
It might be objected, however, that the Abhidharma does recognize the 'cessation of sensation and 
conceptualization' (samjnävedayitanirodba/samjhi veditanirodba, also known as the nirodbasamäpattr), 
a meditative attainment (samäpatti) and non-associated compositional factor (cittavipryuktasamskära) 
which follows after the naivasamjnJnäsamjnJyatana, the fourth and highest of the ärupyadbyäna-s. It is 
achieved, apparently, only by Aryan-s. There is a comparable meditative factor, called the 
asamjnisamäpatti, which is said to be achieved at the level of the fourth dhyäna by non-Aryans 
(prthagjana). Both of these meditative states are, it is claimed, characterized by the absence of samjf-3. 
See AKBh II, 43-44, III, 6b. In which case it is wrong, it might be objected, to say, as I have, that the 
Abhidharma does not accept non-conceptual states of consciousness. 
In reply, I say that in these meditative states, according to the Abhidharma, the practitioner possesses 
nothing but very basic physical functions, described as the'life principle' (/ivita). See AKBh II, 45a-b. In 
what sense, I wonder, then, can these meditative conditions be labelled 'states of consciousness'? In fact, 
these absorptions are described as'interruptions' of the mind. See AKBh H, 44d. See Griffiths (1986), p. 
xiv, 10, etc, Ruegg (1989), 193- 198. The practitioner's mental continuum is entirely absent or dormant. 
Thus, for the Abhidharma, a state without conceptualization (asamjfa) would be-- not a special form of 
consciousness but rather-- an absence ofany mental activity. 
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It appears to me, then, that the advocate of a non-conceptual knowledge of an 
unconceptualizable reality must truly be proposing a'night in which all cows are black. ' For 
his position entails that a reality which cannot be discriminated is apprehended (if this is the 
right word) by a knowledge which does not discriminate anything! How is this 
distinguishable from total blankness? 
There are perhaps two possible objections to my account. I have argued that there 
can be no unconceptualizable reality which can be known because (i) all knowledge 
involves discrimination, and (ii) it is only concepts which discriminate. An opponent 
might question either (i) or (ii). 
If (i) is rejected, the opponent must claim that there is a special form of knowledge 
which does not discriminate, i. e. does not pick out x or x is y. This special non- 
discriminatory knowledge apprehends the unconceptualizable reality. 
But surely it is contradictory to claim that knowledge can apprehend without 
discriminating. I do not think that I can make sense of knowledge which does not 
discriminate anything. 
If (ii) is opposed, the opponent must claim that not all discrimination occurs via 
concepts. There is a special form of discrimination which does not occur by conceptual 
On the whole (though not always), traditionally Buddhists appear to have treated the 
nirodhasamapatti as resembling but not the same as the attainment of enlightenment. See AKBh I V, 56, in 
which the nirodhasamäpatti is described as'similar to Nirvana. ' (translation into English from the French 
of de la Vallee Poussin is by Pruden (1988), p. 631). For the meditator who leaves this absorption, 'it is as if 
he has gone to Nirvana and has returned from it. ' See also AKBh VI, 43c-d. The nirodhasamäpattiis also 
described as delivering the meditator 'from the hindrance of the defilements and from the hindrance that 
opposes the arising of the eight liberations'. AKBh VI, 64a-b (translation into English from the French of 
de la Vallee Poussin is by Pruden (1988), p. 1018). It would appear, then, that here the nirodhasamäpatti, 
though not itself the highest spiritual goal, is closely connected with the attainment of liberation. (But 
how, I wonder, can a complete absence of mental activity have any soteriological significance? ). 
But see also Ray (1994), pp. 369-372, who cites various early Buddhist texts in which the 
nirodhasamäpattiappears to be actually equated with nirvana. Ray argues that the nirodhasamapattiwas 
seen as the highest spiritual goal especially by early Buddhist forest renunciants (as opposed to settled 
monastics). Ray also claims to find evidence that the nirodhasamapattiwas not considered in early texts 
to be a state of unconsciousness, but rather it was considered to be a transcendence of ordinary, i. e. 
conceptual, consciousness. But, again, I don't think that I can make sense of this notion. Consciousness 
without conceptualization would appear to me to be an absence of consciousness, rather than 
transcendent consciousness. 
It should also be noted that, according to Vaibhasika cosmology, there is a peculiar class of beings 
called the asamjnisattva-s. These beings possess a non-associated mental factor called 'the conceptless' 
(äsamjnika). These are beings who reportedly dwell in the sphere of the Brhatphala deities, which is the 
level of the fourth dhyana. They exist in a state of conceptionlessness. See AKBh II, 41 b-d, III, 6b. See 
Ruegg (1989), p. 196. See also DNI, 2,31 (Walshe (trans) (1987), p. 81). Walshe (1987), p. 541 explains 
that such beings 'having attained a high absorption [i. e. the fourth jhana], and fearing the perils of 
conscious existence , they 
have wished for , and gained, an unconscious state. 
With the first stirring of 
perception, however, they fall away from that realm... ' Presumably such beings experience nothing at all 
Far from being enlightened, i. e. attaining knowledge of reality, the asamjnisattva shuts down his entire 
conceptual apparatus in order to avoid reality. He is, I suggest, the ultimate escapist. 
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means. It is this special form of discrimination, i. e. a non-conceptual knowledge, which 
apprehends the unconceptualizable reality. 
But the claim that there is such a non-conceptual discrimination of reality seems 
rather strange to me. This special non-conceptual knowledge must discriminate reality 
without picking out x or x is y (for if this knowledge picked out x or x is y it would be, by 
definition, conceptual). But what can it possibly mean to discriminate reality without 
picking out x or x is y? No answer is forthcoming. The opponent might say, of course, that 
there can be no answer because I am asking for a conceptual explanation of a non- 
conceptual knowledge. But I can surely with equal justification say that there can be no 
answer because such a non-conceptual knowledge does not exist. (That is, if no such 
answer is forthcoming, I have no reason to believe that there is such a non-conceptual 
knowledge of an unconceptualizable reality). Maybe here we reach the limits of the 
discussion! 
3.4.3. S. Katz, etc on Non-Conceptual Religious Knowledge. 
The notion of non-conceptual religious knowledge has been the subject of some 
debate in recent years amongst scholars. Much of the discussion has focussed on the work 
of S. Katz concerning the nature of mystical experiences. " Katz argues against the notion 
that there are pure, unmediated, i. e. non-conceptual, mystical experiences. He rejects the 
theory that there are such non-conceptual experiences, which only become subject to 
conceptualization after the event, i. e. when the mystic begins to reflect on and 
communicate what he has non-conceptually realized. On the contrary, Katz claims, the 
mystical experience itself must be conceptually-laden, even if the mystic himself does not 
realize that this is the case. Katz says that 'the notion of unmediated experience seems, if 
not self-contradictory, at least empty. 19 Conceptualization must be intrinsic to a mystical 
experience if this experience is to be meaningful, i. e. if it is to be an experience of anything 
at all. This is essentially the point which I have just made in 3.4.2. 
M. Bagger", who appears to be in agreement with Katz, makes some important 
and related points: 
(i) If there were non-conceptual experiences then they would be contentless. In 
which case, the mystic should not be able to remember the experience which he has had (for 
"'See for example Katz (1978), p. 22-74, and Katz (1992), pp. 3-41. 
"Katz (1978), p. 26. 
2°See Bagger (1991), p. 407. 
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there would literally be nothing to remember). Yet mystics do claim to remember-- often in 
a very vivid manner-- the supposedly non-conceptual experiences which the`, have had. 
Insofar as they remember something, then, the original experience must have involved 
discrimination, and, hence, must have been conceptual. 
(ii) The mystic might well be unaware of the conceptualization which takes place in 
his supposedly non-conceptual experience. Nevertheless, the conceptualization must be 
present if the experience is to occur. Conceptualization might well take place on a 
'sub-conscious' level, ' as when one identifies a familiar object-- the sun for example-- 
without reflecting that 'there is the sun'. I shall have more to say about this later, for it 
provides a key to an alternative interpretation (i. e. interpretation (2)) to interpretation (1) 
concerning the meaning ofnon-conceptual knowledge inNägärjuna's writings. 
(iii) Even ifthere were non-conceptual experiences-- pure consciousness events, as 
Bagger calls them-- it is difficult to see what religious significance they might have. Such 
an experience would be akin to deep sleep, and would surely not yield any information 
about the nature of reality. What truth could be conveyed by such an experience, and what 
bearing could it possibly have on life? 
I think that these points raise some very serious difficulties for interpretation (1), 
given its claim that there is non-conceptual knowledge of unconceptualizable reality2. 
Which is not to say, I must emphasize, that therefore Nägärjuna does not hold a version of 
interpretation (1). Rather, it is simply to say that if Nägarjuna (or anyone else, for that 
matter) upholds a version of interpretation (1), then it seems difficult to make sense of their 
position. 
I am uneasy, however, about one possible implication of Katz's, etc critique. Katz 
says that what the mystic experiences is, in fact, conditioned by the religious practices, 
doctrines, and symbols which the mystic has been familiar with in his pre-mystical 
consciousness. Katz argues, then, that it is not the case that all mystical experiences have 
essentially the same content. Rather, mystical experiences will vary depending on the 
cultural and religious conceptual framework which the mystic brings to his experience. 
The Buddhist's supposedly non-conceptual experience of reality conforms to, or at least is 
informed by, the religious concepts and symbols with which he is familiar and by which he 
has been convinced. The Christian's supposedly non-conceptual experience of reality 
2'See here also Williams (1992b), pp. 198-199. 'An experience which is non-conceptual in the sense that it 
could never be conceptualized even in subsequent cool reflection is simply meaningless. If this point 
requires the there must be [in the supposedly non-conceptual experience] some sort of subconscious 
conceptualization going on, then so be it. ' 
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also conforms to, or at least is informed by, the religious concepts and symbols with which 
he is familiar and by which he has been convinced. The very meaning and importance 
which the religious person gives to the experience which he has depends upon the system of 
values and ideas with which he is accustomed. The conceptually-laden nature of the 
mystic's experience-- where the concepts originate in the particular, distinct religious 
tradition in which he practises-- gives the lie to the theory that mystical experiences are 
unanimous, and that the mystics realize some common non-conceptual core of all 
religions, which transcends the merely conceptual differences of the various religious 
traditions. 22 
While what Katz says here seems to me to be true, it would be wrong to conclude 
that therefore religious experiences, and the knowledge of reality which they supposedly 
give, are necessarily culturally relative. Concepts need not be just sources of prejudice, 
which hem us into a limited way of seeing the world (although they certainly can do this). It 
is concepts which might also enable communication and rational assessment, which cause 
one to transcend one's present (culturally, etc) conditioned perspective. That cognition of 
reality is necessarily conceptual need not entail, as the relativist claims, that cognition of 
reality is simply the domain of culturally determined opinions rather than knowledge. 
The fact that cognition of reality must be conceptual means that it is open to 
evaluation and criticism-- to the possible demonstration that what is taken to be a cognition 
of reality is/is not in fact. My contention is that, though there is no 'pure' non-conceptual 
knowledge of reality, there might be a 'pure' conceptual knowledge, i. e. a conceptual 
cognition which accurately apprehends the nature of reality. The purity of the conceptual 
cognition could, at least in principle, be tested by reason. In which case, it would not be 
culturally relative, not simply a belief or opinion. It is not that there is simply a host of 
religious traditions, each with its own opinion or set of opinions about the nature of reality, 
none of which is any better or worse than the others. The opinions can be scrutinized 
rationally, I suggest, in order to determine their various strengths and weaknesses. 23 
R. Forman, a critic of Katz's approach, claims that Katz, in denying the 
See Katz (1978), pp. 26 ff. 
23See here Nagel (1997), p. 3, Reason, if there is such a thing, can serve as a court of appeal not only against the 
received opinions and habits of our community but also against the peculiarities of our personal 
perspective. It is something each individual can find within himself, but at the same time 
has universal 
authority. Reason provides, mysteriously, a way of distancing oneself from common opinion and received 
practices that is not a mere elevation of individuality-- not a determination to express one's 
idiosyncratic 
self rather than go along with everyone else. Whoever appeals to reason purports to 
discover a source of 
authority within himself that is not merely personal, or societal, but universal-- and that should also 
persuade others who are willing to listen to it. ' 
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non-conceptual experience of reality, traps the religious practitioner in the house of his 
own tradition. The house has no doors or windows, according to Forman, for Katz provides 
no way out of conceptual construction. By contrast, Forman says, the religious practitioner, 
by means of a non-conceptual knowledge of reality, 'might plausibly be thought to walk out 
of her culture's house, and for a moment get outside into the light. '24 
Now, it may well be that Forman is right that Katz himself provides no way out of 
the house of culture (although it is not entirely clear to me that this is in fact Katz's 
position25). But the way out is not, I think, where Forman looks for it. Relativism is not 
transcended by appeal to a non-conceptual knowledge of an unconceptualizable reality, 
accessible to practitioners from different religious traditions. 
As I have already explained, such knowledge, far from providing a 
common-ground or standpoint of objectivity would appear to be empty and even 
non-sensical. Ifthe way out ofthe prison is sheer incoherence than that is rather depressing! 
Moreover, the advocate of non-conceptual knowledge of an unconceptualizable reality is 
condemned to relativism just as much as the self-acknowledged relativist, because he 
places the cognition of reality beyond conceptuality, which means that his supposed 
knowledge of reality is not susceptible at all to assessment. If his knowledge-claim does 
not, in his opinion, require assessment, then surely, in fairness, this same claim might be 
made in support of any competing claims to religious knowledge. In which case religious 
knowledge-claims are reduced to matters of opinion. If there is a way out of relativism, I 
contend, it is by means of conceptual knowledge-claims, put to the test of rationality. 
(Notice that this entails that not all knowledge-claims made by religious traditions can be 
equally valid. Some knowledge-claims will be found to be more reasonable than others). 
Of course the relativist may always claim that what I call 'rationality' is itself a 
culturally relative phenomenon. Thus such rationality cannot in fact adjudicate between 
competing culturally determined conceptual knowledge-claims concerning reality. But I 
suspect that a good case can be made for the position that the basic principles of rationality 
are universally applicable, although I admit that this claim would require considerable 
"See Forman (1991), p. 420. See also Forgie (1985) who is critical of Katz, etc on similar grounds. 
"Katz (1978), p. 64 does state that 'though we have concentrated on the active role of the knowing self in the 
epistemological process for the most part... as a corrective to the traditional way in which mystical 
experience is approached, it also has to be recognized, at the same time, that this experiential situation also 
needs to be turned around... mystical experience is not (putatively) solely the product of the conditioned 
act of experience as constituted from the side of the experiencer, but is also constituted 
by what the object 
or 'state of affairs' is that the mystic (believes he) 'encounters' or 'experiences'. 
' Perhaps, then, the 
relativism of which Katz is accused by his critics is a caricature. 
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defence, and I do not want to argue the point here. "b 
Katz, at least as interpreted by his adversaries, would claim that all religious 
cognition of reality is determined by cultural patterns. The advocate of pure consciousness 
contends that there is a culturally transcendent experience of reality, which he takes to 
mean that there is a non-conceptual knowledge of an unconceptualizable reality which 
subsequently gets interpreted, i. e. conceptualized, in various culturally determined ways. 
In one important respect these two positions are similar: they both regard 
conceptualization as essentially distorting. Conceptualization stands in the way of 
knowledge of reality. The conclusions which they draw are however different. Whereas 
Katz (as interpreted here) abandons the notion of knowledge of reality and accepts the 
necessarily perspectival character of religious experience, the advocate of pure 
conciousness asserts that there is knowledge of reality but finds it necessary to abandon the 
possibility that this knowledge of reality is conceptual. This leaves him with the 
insuperable difficuly of making sense of a non-conceptual knowledge of an 
unconceptualizable reality. 
My contention, on the other hand, is that concepts remain faithful to reality. In fact, 
reality can only be apprehended conceptually. (It is perhaps when concepts are badly 
employed that reality gets distorted). That reality can only be apprehended conceptually 
does not mean that what counts as reality is simply a matter of (culturally conditioned) 
belief and opinion. On the contrary, it means that the variety of(culturally, etc conditioned) 
incompatible assertions regarding reality are liable to evaluation and rigorous analysis. (I 
do not deny, however, that the evaluation of competing claims concerning reality is often a 
very demanding undertaking). 
3.4.4. The Problem of the Two Truths. 
In what is perhaps the most famous passage of the MMK, Nägärjuna proclaims that 
the Buddhas' teaching of the dharma (buddhänäm dharmadesana) depends upon two 
truths-- the truth of worldly convention (lokasamvrtisatya) and the truth (satya) from the 
ultimate point of view (paramärthatah). The distinction (vibhäga) between these two 
truths must be understood if the Buddhas' teaching is to be comprehended. 27 
"Nagel (1997) provides an extended and lucid defence of rationality as a universal rather than a culturally 
relative phenomenon. His basic point is that any rational argument which attempts to establish the 
culturally relative nature of reason must presuppose the very universality of reason which it intends to 
refute. See also Williams (1991) for some discussion ofthe issue of the universality of reason. 
2'MMK XXIV, 8-10, dye satye samupäsritya buddbänäm dbarma des`anä/Iokasamrrtisatyam ca satyam ca 
paramarthatah "ye nayorna vijänanti vibbägam satyayordvayoh/ to tattvam na vijananti gambbiram 
I do not want here to enter into the complex and perennial debate about the precise 
meaning or meanings of this declaration. However, it is clear that one sense at least of 
'conventional truth' is the various non-definitive teachings which are employed in order to 
realize the ultimate truth, i. e. reality. Nägärjuna must be saying, at least, that it is necessary 
to rely on these teachings in order to come to know the ultimate truth. 
If, however, the ultimate truth is, as interpretation (1) maintains, 
unconceptualizable, how is it that reliance on conceptual conventional truths will be 
efficacious in bringing about the realization of this ultimate truth? The relationship 
between an unconceptualizable ultimate truth and the conceptual, conventional truths of 
Buddhist doctrine is very problematic. Once the breach between the unconceptualizable 
ultimate truth and the conceptualizable conventional truth has been created, it seems to be 
impossible to bridge the chasm. 
How is it that some concepts-- i. e. the various teachings which are conventional 
truths-- can be relied on to produce a non-conceptual knowledge of an unconceptualizable 
ultimate truth? Any explanation would of course involve conceptualization, which would 
seem to compromise the unconceptualizable nature of the ultimate truth. An explanation 
would have to state precisely what it is about the (supposedly) unconceptualizable, 
inexpressible ultimate truth which reliance on the conventional truths of Buddhism helps 
one to realize. However, without such an explanation, the claim that Buddhist teachings 
are efficacious cannot be justified. Without such justification, the notion that certain 
concepts are to be relied upon in order to realize the unconceptualizable ultimate truth will 
remain an assertion which cannot be substantiated. 
Interpretation (1) in fact entails epistemological (and ethical) relativism. If no 
conceptual formulations can be justified as 'closer' to the unconceptualizable reality than 
others, then no conceptual formulation can be demonstrated to be any better (or worse) than 
any other. But if, on the contrary, some conceptual formulations are shown to be'closer' to 
the unconceptualizable reality than others, then the unconceptualizable reality is not in fact 
unconceptualizable. 
It might be objected that for interpretation (1) in fact-- following Bhävaviveka-- the 
ultimate truth is only unconceptualizable in one of its aspects, i. e. reality,. Reality-- the 
mundane ultimate truth-- is accessible to conceptualization. It can be specified. That is, it 
is the absence of svabbävaofentities. In which case it can be demonstrated that the various 
buddbas`äsane// vyavahäramanäs`ritya paramärtho na des`yate/ paramärthaman3gamya nirv3nam 
nädhigamyate// 
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conceptual, conventional teachings of Buddhism are efficacious in bringing about the 
realization of this conceptualizable ultimate truth. 
But this solution just pushes the problem one step back, because it prompts the 
unanswerable question how is the (provisional) ultimate truth which is conceptual izable-- 
i. e. the absence of svabbäva of entities-- related to the unconceptualizable (final) ultimate 
truth, i. e. reality? Why should it be that the realization of the conceptualizable ultimate 
truth should have any bearing on the realization of the unconceptualizable ultimate truth? 
How can a conceptualizable provisional ultimate truth be any 'closer' to the 
unconceptualizable final ultimate truth than any other conceptualization? The intractable 
problem is, in this case, the relationship between the two aspects of the ultimate truth. 
Of course, the proponent of interpretation (1) will claim that although reality, is 
unconceptualizable, some concepts are indicative of this reality whereas others are not. 
One thinks here of the Zen image of the finger pointing at the moon. Just as the finger 
directs one towards the moon, the conceptual truths of Buddhism direct one towards the 
ultimate unconceptualizable truth. And just as the finger pointing at the moon is not the 
moon which it directs one towards, so too the conceptual truths of Buddhism are not the 
ultimate truth-- at least in its final, unconceptualizable aspect-- which they direct one 
towards. Z" Candrakirti might perhaps be interpreted to be making this point in his 
commentary to MMK XXIV, 9, 
aträha-- yadi tarbi paramärtbo nisprapancasvabbävab sa evästu, tatkimanayä 
aparayä skandbadbätväyatanäryasatyapratltyasamutpädädidesanayä 
prayojanamaparamärthayä, atattvam bi parityäjyam/yacca parityäjyam kim 
tenopadistena, ucyate/satyametadevam/kim tu laukikam 
vyavahäramanabbyupagamya abbidbänäbidbeyajnänajneyädilaksanam, 
asakya eva paramärtbo desayitum, adesitasca na sakyo 'dbigantum, 
anadhigamyaca paramärtham na sakyam nirvänamadbigantumiti.. 29 
Here it is objected [by an opponent]: If then the ultimate [truth] is an intrinsic 
existent which is without conceptual diffusion, let that be so! In that case, 
2"See Garfield (1995), p. 298, who offers the following explanation of MMK XXIV 8-10: '... the [ultimate] 
truth that is to be grasped can only be indicated through language and thought, which are thoroughly 
conventional and which can only be interpreted literally at the conventional 
level. ' 
"Compare here the Tibetan translation: 'dir smras pa% gal to don dam pa sprospa dang brat ba'i rang bzhin yin 
na `o na de nyid yin la rag mod phung po dang%khams dang skye mched 
dang ''phags pa'i bden pa dang 
rien cing 'brel par 'byung ba la sogspa stonpa don dam pa ma yin pa gzhan 
'disci zhig dgos de nyid ma 
yin pa ni yongs su spang bar bya ba yin na gang yongs su spang 
bar bya ba yin pa bstan pa des ci zhig 
bya' brjod par bya ste de ni de liar bden mod 44 'on kyang brjod par bya 
ba dang brjod par hued pa 
dangshespa dang%shes bya la sogspa'i nmtshan nyid can jig rtenpa'i tha snyad la khas ma blangs pardon 
dam pa bstan par mi nus la, ma bstan na yang rtog par mi nus shing 
don dam pa ma rtogs par yang m} a 
ngan las 'das pa'i yang grong khyer du phyin par in i nus so 
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what is the purpose of this inferior" teaching-- which is not the ultimate [truth]-- of the aggregates, elements, sense-fields, noble truths, dependent 
origination, etc? Surely what is not true should be rejected; and what is [accomplished] by means of that teaching to be rejected? 
It is replied [by Candrakirti]: This is certainly true. However, without 
assenting to ordinary transactions-- characterized by naming and named 
object, knowledge and object of knowledge, etc-- it is simply not possible to indicate31 the ultimate [truth]. And [if' the ultimate truth is] not indicated, it 
cannot be realized. And without realizing the ultimate [truth], it is not 
possible to realize nlrvJpa. 33 (PP 494). 3; 
But, interpreted in this way, Candrakirti's reply does not really come to terms with 
the force of the opponent's objection. The opponent is surely right that if the ultimate truth 
is aisprapan"ca, and if this means that reality is in fact unconceptualizable, it must be that all 
conceptual expressions of this ultimate truth are simply false qua expressions of the 
ultimate truth. The notion that some concepts, viz. the conceptual formulations of 
Buddhism, 'indicate' the unconceptualizable ultimate truth is incoherent. It appears to be 
an attempt to have one's cake and eat it. To indicate is to point out, and to point out is to 
discriminate-- i. e. conceptualize-- what is pointed out, in this case the (supposedly) 
unconceptualizable ultimate truth. It is irrational that reality is both: (i) 
unconceptualizable and (ii) indicated conceptually. (i) and (ii) are incompatible. The 
Mädhyamika must give up either (i) or (ii). If the Mädhyamika wants to preserve the 
efficacy ofBuddhist theory and practice, it is (i) which must be abandoned. 
70Aparayä is the feminine, singular instrumental of 'apara'. Monier Williams (1899), p. 50, gives'... inferior, 
lower, other... different... ' The Tibetan translation is 'gzhan', which means 'other'. See Chandra Das 
(1970), p. 1077. 
"Desayitum is the causative infinitive of di§ Monier-Williams (1899), p. 479 says that the causative of dis 
means'to show, point out, assign, direct, order... teach, communicate, tell, inform... ' 
"Unlike the Sanskrit, the Tibetan makes the conditional sense explicit with the particle 'na'. 
"na sakyam nirvänamadhigantun. The Tibetan translation here is not literal and is more poetic than the 
Sanskrit: 
... mya ngan 
las 'das pa'i yanggrongkhyerdu phyin parmi nus so. '... and one is not able to arrive 
at the city/palace of nirväna. ' 
"See also PP 372 where Candrakirti explains that, although in fact (yadyapyevam) the domain of thought 
(cittagocara) and therefore language (abhidhätavyarn) do not operate (nivrtta) with respect to reality 
(tattva), nevertheless (tathäpi) the characteristics (lalcsana) of reality must be expressed (ucyatam) by 
means of [conceptual] imputation (samäropatah), through compliance with transactional truth 
(vyavahärasaty3nurodhena). See as well YSV29 in which Candrakirti explains that teachings such as 
those of the skandba-s, dhätu-s, and äyatana-s are fictions (brdzun pa), but they are nevertheless 
useful/necessary (dngos) as a means (thabs) which is introductory (thog ma nyid) to the ultimate (don 
dam pa). This is because the person (skye bo) with an unpurified mind (blo Bros ma byang ba) cannot 
initially (thog ma nyid) bear (bzod) the teaching of the dharma which is free from the abyss of the two 
extremes (mtha'gnyiskyig. yangsmedpa'i chos). Note, however, that in this passage Candrakirti does 
not say that reality is in fact beyond language and thought. On the contrary, he states, without 
qualification, that reality (dekko na) is the emptiness of the world (gro ba), i. e. the world is empty of 
svabhä va, like an illusion (sgyu ma bzhin du tang bzhingyis stong). 
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3.4.5. Concluding Philosophical Reflections on Interpretation 
(1). 
My conclusion is, therefore, that interpretation (1) entails apparently insuperable 
philosophical problems. If Nägärjuna upholds a version of interpretation (1), then he is 
open to the criticisms which I have made. 
Those Mädhyamikas who advocate an unconceptualizable reality, apprehended 
by non-conceptual knowledge, will argue that I have become stuck in conceptual 
difficulties, and I am thus blind to the higher perspective of a non-conceptual knowledge of 
an unconceptualizable reality. To this I reply that I can make no sense of such an 
unconceptualizable reality, nor, consequently, of the non-conceptual knowledge of it. No 
doubt opponents will counter that this simply supports their point-- I am unable to make 
sense of an unconceptualizable reality, accessible to a non-conceptual knowledge, because 
my perspective is limited by my stubborn adherence to concepts. Of course, they will say, 
you cannot make sense of a reality which can be discriminated only non-conceptually; this 
is because the only tools which you permit for'making sense' are conceptual! But what 
other tools are there, I ask? 
Or else, my opponents might say, you place too much emphasis on'making sense'; 
the unconceptualizable reality is apprehended by a non-conceptual experience which does 
not have ajustification'. That attempts to make sense of this position entail paradoxes and 
insoluble difficulties just proves that the nature ofreality is in fact unconceptualizable. 3` 
But, while I am certainly open to the possibility that there are higher perspectives 
than the one for which I have argued here, this suggestion by the advocate of interpretation 
(1) seems to me to point towards irrationalism and relativism. A reality which is not 
ascertainable by conceptual means, and is apprehended by some other mysterious method 
"See here Eckel (1987), pp. 45-49, who claims that the paradoxes produced by the Madhyamaka logical 
analysis demonstrate the inability of the conceptual mind to cognize reality. One is left therefore with an 
experience of freedom from the shackles of the conceptual mind. The paradox is the solution rather than a 
problem. Eckel writes of this paradox as more accurately called 'irony', which is 'the exquisitely learned 
humor of a mind that perceives in each affirmation about the nature of things the presence of its opposite 
and senses in the irony and ambiguity of things a freedom from the bondage of ordinary conception. ' It 
seems to me, however, that a paradox simply indicates the non-sensical nature of what is being said. See 
Ruegg (1977), p. 5, who writes that Nägärjuna does not employ paradoxes, his reasoning being founded 
on the principles of non-contradiction and excluded middle. One might say, I think, that it is precisely the 
paradoxicality of views which assert svabhäva which, according to Nägärjuna, makes them refutable. 
But not all views assert svabhäva, therefore not all views suffer from paradox, and thus not all views are 
refutable. (Whether all views which assert the svabhäva of entities are in fact, as Nägärjuna claims, 
paradoxical is, however, I think, highly dubious). 
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which cannot be communicated, seems to me to be irrevocably subjective as well as 
philosophically and religiously/spiritually barren. 
Note, finally, the possible ethical and political implications of such a doctrine. A 
leader or teacher who has supposedly realized an unconceptualizable reality need not be 
accountable for his utterances and actions. When questioned about his reasons or motives, 
he might simply say that his statements and actions cannot be explained, because they stem 
from his non-conceptual, inexpressible realization of reality. This is surely a recipe for 
despotism. 
3.5. Interpretation (2). The Non-Conceptual Meditative 
Knowledge-Experience of Emptiness. 
As I have explained, Nägärjuna states that there is conceptual knowledge of reality, 
namely, 'all entities are without svabhäva', and also that reality is free from conceptual 
diffusion, not a linguistic referent, etc. The resolution of the apparent contradiction by 
means of an equivocation in the term 'reality', so that one sense of 'reality' is 
conceptualizable and another is unconceptualizable, leads to unacceptable philosophical 
consequences. The notion of an 'unconceptualizable reality', apprehended by 
non-conceptual knowledge, seems to be unintelligible. Interpretation (1), then, would 
appear to be a philosophical dead-end. 
Let me suggest another interpretation, i. e. interpretation (2) which, unlike 
interpretation (1), does not advocate an unconceptualizable reality, apprehended by non- 
conceptual knowledge. According to interpretation (2), when Nägärjuna says that reality 
is nisprapanca, nirvikalpa, etc this is not actually a description of reality. (In other words, 
Nägärjuna's way of expressing himself is imprecise, even inaccurate). Rather, it is a 
description of the nature of the experience of knowing reality, i. e. the absence of svabbäva 
of entities, as this experience occurs in a meditative context. 36 
This is not to say that the meditative experience of knowing reality is in all senses 
non-conceptual. On the contrary, the meditative experience of knowing reality must be 
36t1A dmittedly, explicit references to meditation (bhävana) seem to be almost non-existent in the writings of 
Nägärjuna which I have examined. See, however, MMK XXIV, 24. See also LS 26, 'Certainly, without 
entering that meditation practised by the äryan-s, of course the signless consciousness will not occur here 
in any way. ' (äryairnisevitämenamanagamya hi bhävanäm/nänimittam hi vijfänam bhavatiha katham 
cana/I). Given that Nägärjuna was a Buddhist monk, and meditation is essential to Buddhist practice, it 
seems reasonable to think that some of his statements may be about meditative states, even though he 
does not explicitly say so. Further, there is some indirect evidence that Nägärjuna is sometimes adverting 
to meditative experience (see my discussion below of his frequent use of the term vivikta). 
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conceptual, in the specific sense that such a meditative experience discriminates 
something, viz. the absence of svabbäva of entities. That is, the meditative experience is 
the experience of something. Otherwise it would not be a case of knowledge, for nothing 
would be known when having this experience. (There is a problem here, however. As I 
shall explain, what is known in the meditative experience is in fact, according to 
interpretation (2), a mere absence, i. e. emptiness (sünyata- . 
It is debatable whether or not a 
mere absence is in fact something, and whether or not, consequently, it is in fact possible to 
have knowledge of it. But more about this later). 
Nevertheless, there are other senses of the term 'non-conceptual' and it is in these 
senses that a meditative experience of reality might appropriately be called 
'non-conceptual'. In other words, interpretation (2) depends on an equivocation in the 
meaning of the term 'conceptual'. Given that the meditative experience of reality does 
discriminate the true nature of entities as its object, the meditative experience can be 
characterized as'conceptual'. But the term 'conceptual' can have other meanings as well (I 
shall identify three other meanings). It is in these senses that the meditative experience of 
reality might acceptably be called'non-conceptual'. Thus, according to interpretation (2), 
I 
The meditative knowledge-experience of reality is conceptual in sense, of 
conceptual', and is not conceptual in sense,, sense3, sense, of'conceptual'. 
But all of this requires further explanation and clarification, which I shall now 
attempt to give. 
3.5.1. Knowledge of Reality Versus the Reality Which is Known. 
There is clearly a difference between reality and the knowledge of reality. It is, 
according to the Mädhyamika, always the case that all entities are without svabhäva, 
whether or not it is known that this is the case. Thus, Candrakirti, for example, quotes with 
approval the canonical statement to the effect that the tathägata-s (who know the true 
nature (dharmata) of dharma-s), may either arise or not arise but the dharmatä of dbarma-s 
remains. 37 The dharmatä, i. e. the true nature of entities (their absence of of svabbäva) is 
always the case, although the knowledge of it may be present or absent. Knowledge of 
"PP 40, utpädädvä tathägatänamanutpädädvä tathägatänäm sthitaivaisä dharmänäm 
dhannatä. See also MA 
VI, 222 a-c, sangs rgyas rnams ni byung ba'ami ma byung yang rung dngos su na 
dngos po kun gyi slong 
pa nyid' See also MABh 182, in Tauscher (trans) (1981), p. 69. For an early canonical source 
for this idea, 
see the Samyuttanikäya1.25,17ff, uppädä vä tathägatänamanuppädä vä tathägatsnam- 
"thitä va sä dhätu 
dbammatthitatä... (Quoted in Tauscher (1981), p. 130. ) 
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reality is dependent for its existence upon the reality which is known, but reality is not 
dependent for its existence upon the knowledge of it. Which is to say that all entities have a 
conceptually constructed existence, and are thus marked by emptiness, whether or not any 
cognizer knows that this is so. 
(Notice, however, that (for the Mädhyamika)-- although the true nature of entities 
is not dependent on the knowledge of it-- this true nature of entities is dependent on the 
mind's activity of conceptual construction. If the mind's activity of conceptual 
construction did not occur, there would be no entities, and hence no true nature ofentities. I 
suspect that this is the meaning of Candrakirti's declaration, in the MA, of the'emptiness of 
emptiness' (stung nyld stong nyi l s'Unyatäsünyata). Emptiness, as the true nature of 
entities, is as much empty of mind-independent existence as are the entities of which it is 
the emptiness. As Candrakirti says, the teaching of the emptiness of emptiness opposes 
(bzlog) the (wrong) apprehension of emptiness as a dngospo(=bbäva)-- a dngospobeing, 
in my judgement, here a'mind-independent existent')". 
See here Bhävaviveka's explanation, in the TJv, of the compound 'paramärtha 
Bhävaviveka explains that, taken as a karmadhäraya compound, the expression 
paramärtha means 'the object which is ultimate'. The object (artha) is reality/the true 
natue of things, which is qualified by the adjective 'ultimate' (parama). But, understood as 
a genitive tatpurusa compound, the expression 'paramärtbd means 'the object of the 
ultimate'. " The ultimate (parama) is here a noun, standing for 'ultimate knowledge' 
(paramajn"äna), which possesses as its object (artha) reality/the true nature of entities. 
Thus, Bhävaviveka's analysis of the compound in these two ways makes the distinction 
between reality, and the knowledge which apprehends this reality. 
3.5.2. Knowledge of Reality is an Experience. 
'Knowledge', it must be recognized, is both of something and for someone. There is 
no knowledge without something which is known. But, equally, there is no knowledge 
which occurs abstracted from a subject who is knowing. (In this second respect knowledge 
is similar to, for example, the phenomenon of pain. A pain unlocated in a subject is 
"MA VI, 186, stong pa nyid ces bya i stongnyidgang/stong nyid stongnyid du 'dod 
de/ stong nyid dngos po'' 
blo can gyi/'dzin pa bzlog phyirgsungs pa yin/ 
`°Tjv 96,27,3-1(Iida (1980), pp. 82-83), don dam pa zhes bya ba la don zhes bya ba ni shes par 
bya ba yin pa'i 
phyir/don de brtagpar bya ba danggo bar bya ba'i tha tshiggo/dam pazhes 
bya ba nimchog ces bva ba'i 
tshiggi sgra yin te, 'don dam pa zhes bsdu ba ni/de don yang yin 
la dam pa yang yin pas don dam pa'o/ 
yang na dam pa'i don de ream parni rtog pa'i ye shes dam pa'i 
don yin pas dam pa'i don to ' 
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meaningless"). It is not simply that 'there is knowledge of x' but rather that 'for subject a 
there is knowledge of Y. It is non-sensical to speak of something being known without 
anyone who possesses the knowledge. I cannot intelligibly say that it is known that there is 
a red apple on the table and yet there is no one who has the knowledge that there is a red 
apple on the table. (Note that, of course, this does not mean at all that there cannot be a red 
apple on the table without someone who has the knowledge of the red apple on the table). 'x 
is known' permits the question 'x is known by whom? ' Insofar as knowledge is not only of 
something but also for someone, it is the case that knowledge is an experience. 
In which case, knowledge of reality in the context of meditation, as a species of 
knowledge-in-general, is not simply knowledge of something, it is also knowledge for 
someone. There is both something which is known, viz. reality, and a subject who knows it. 
The meditative knowledge ofreality is an experience. 
I do not want here to explore in detail the problematic notion of 'experience'. The 
essential point for my present purpose is that many41 experiences have, to borrow a 
distinction made in contemporary epistemology, both a content and a character. M. 
Pendlebury has defined the content of an experience as the properties which the experience 
represents, whereas the character of the experience is the properties which the experience 
possesses. 42 
Take for instance my experience of a sunset. It is true to say that my experience 
represents a sunset. There is a content, viz. the sunset, of which the experience is an 
experience. However, it is not correct to attribute the properties of the sunset to the 
experience itself That my experience is of a sunset does not mean that my experience is a 
sunset! The sunset has properties-- such as its orange and red colour, its location in the sky, 
it is several miles long etc-- which my experience of the sunset most certainly does not 
have. My experience is not an orange and red colour, nor is it located in the sky, and it is 
certainly not several miles long. 
My experience of the sunset does of course itself possess properties-- which 
constitute the character of the experience-- but these are not the properties represented by 
the experience. For example, the experience of the sunset will possess an emotional 
property or emotional properties. The experience will feel a certain way-- perhaps happy, 
"For some reflections on the necessary connection of pain with a subject, see Williams 
(1997b), pp. 167 ff. 
"I intentionally say that'many', rather than'all', experiences have both a character and a content. 
This is because 
there are some experiences-- for example, experiences of bodily sensations such as pain-- which 
feel a 
certain way, but which do not represent any properties. Such experiences 
have character but not content. 
See Pendlebury (1992), p. 126. 
4 Pendlebury (1992), pp. 125-127. 
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sad, exciting, boring, etc. Just as the properties of the sunset which are represented by the 
experience are not possessed by the experience, so too the properties possessed by the 
experience of the sunset are not properties of the sunset which is represented by the 
experience. The sunset is not happy or sad, exciting, boring etc. 
In other words, many experiences have a subjective pole and an objective pole. 
Both the subjective pole and the objective pole have a variety of properties. But it is simply 
a confusion to attribute to the objective pole properties which belong to the subjective pole, 
or vice versa: 
Experience= experience [characterized by properties a, b, c] of an object [with 
properties x, y, z]. 
I shall argue that three of the properties which characterize the meditative 
knowledge-experience of reality (as opposed to the properties which characterize the 
reality which is experienced) might plausibly be called 'non-conceptual'. That is, the 
meditative knowledge-experience of reality possesses the properties of acquaintance with 
its object (see 3.5.3), absence of explicit conceptualization (see 3.5.4), and focussed 
conceptualization (see 3.5.5). 3 
"There is also, arguably, a sense in which all experience has a non-conceptual and inexpressible character. 
Unlike trees, tables, and other physical entities, an experience is not a public object. There is an irrevocably 
private dimension to experience. You cannot have my experiences, and I cannot have your experiences. 
This does not mean, however, that one cannot give an account of one's experiences. Nor does it mean that 
any such account is necessarily inaccurate. In fact, it is possible to give an accurate account of one's 
experience. Nevertheless, the account-- even if it is an accurate account-- is not the experience of which it 
is the account. 
Suppose, for instance, that I have an experience of a sunset. I might describe to you the nature of my 
experience. I might say what the sunset which I experienced was like. For example, the sunset was bright 
red and tinged with yellow, several miles long, etc. I might also describe to you how it felt for me to 
experience this sunset. I felt absorbed, peaceful, delighted, etc. This account of my experience might be 
either inaccurate or accurate. Perhaps I have remembered incorrectly. In fact, the sunset was not tinged 
with yellow, and I felt sad, not delighted. Or else it might be that my account of my experience is entirely 
accurate. That is, the sunset which I experienced was in fact bright red and tinged with yellow, several 
miles long, etc, and it might be entirely true that I felt absorbed, peaceful, delighted, etc. Nevertheless, if I 
relate this accurate description of my experience to you, you do not have my experience, though my 
accurate description might enable you to understand, and empathize with, my experience. Perhaps you 
have had a similar experience in the past, and you now recollect it, and think, 'what David has experienced 
must be just like what I experienced at that time'. Further, even if we experience the same sunset at the 
same time, and both feel the same way when doing so, your experience is not mine, and neither is my 
experience yours. 
Thus, any description, any conceptualization, of an experience-- though it might be accurate-- 
remains simply a description/conceptualization, and is not the experience itself. One might say that 
experience has a 'lived', first person character. It is this which is untranslatable into concepts and words. 
See here Nagel (1974), pp. 435-450, who comments that the subjective nature of an experience, 
'what-it-is-like-to-be a particular subject', is only accessible from the point of view of the subject himself. 
See also Pivicevic (1986), pp. 151-152, who writes, 
'That experiences... occur biographically accounts for the exclusively 'private ownership' of 
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3.5.3. Knowledge by Acquaintance. 
'Conceptual knowledge' can have the sense of a theoretical knowledge, which is 
unacquainted with the object described. I have knowledge of the platypus because I have 
been informed about the nature ofthe platypus. The platypus has been described tome, and 
I have understood the description. But I have never come across a platypus in the flesh, as it 
were. In this sense I have a conceptual, i. e. theoretical, knowledge. When I come across the 
platypus (of which, perhaps, I have had previously a theoretical knowledge), then I have 
what might be termed a non-conceptual knowledge by acquaintance of the platypus. (But 
note that both the theoretical knowledge and the knowledge by acquaintance are 
conceptual in the different sense that they both involve discrimination of the object 
'platypus'. ) 
Similarly, interpretation (2) suggests, there is a distinction between a theoretical 
knowledge of reality-- i. e. that all entities are without svabbäva-- and an acquaintance with 
this reality. The meditative experience which Nägärjuna describes as without 
conceptualization has the character of direct acquaintance as opposed to being merely 
experiences and distinguishes experiences from public objects... We can, of course, and do, make 
objectifying references to our own and other people's experiences, reflect upon them, analyze them, 
discuss them. Moreover we are able to analyze to some extent, as well as report about, our own 
experiences while they are actually happening. Provided I am articulate enough, I can give a running 
commentary on my own mental states and attitudes and describe them in minute detail, possibly just as 
vividly and as acurately as any 'external object'. But none of this diminishes the difference in ontological 
status between experiences and intersubjectively accessible public items. My experiences are slices of my 
own lived time and are, in this sense, inalienably mine, as no'external' object can be. ' 
One's meditative experience of reality is (if one admits the existence of such a phenomenon), like all 
other experiences, a first-person occurrence. I might describe my meditative experience of reality to you. I 
might say that I experienced the absence of svabbä va of entities, that I felt calm, at one with the object of 
meditation (like water poured into water, as the Tibetans say), etc. This might in fact be an accurate 
description of my experience. This is actually what was experienced, and how it felt to be having the 
experience. Nevertheless, the description is not the experience. And if you too have had at the same time 
as myself a meditative experience that all entities are without svabbäva, and you also felt calm, at one with 
the object of meditation, etc this does not mean that your experience is mine, or that my experience is 
yours. Any account of a meditative experience of reality must necessarily leave out the lived-nature, the 
first person perspective, ofthe experience, which is not translatable into concepts and words. 
While I think that this is a philosophically respectable sense in which experience-- including the 
meditative experience of reality-- might be termed 'non-conceptual' (and 'inexpressible'), it must be 
acknowledged that there is no indication in Ndgärjuna's writings that this is what he in fact means. But this 
is not surprising given that the first-person nature of experience-- it appears to me-- has only been 
systematically explicated in modern, western philosophy, especially by philosophers influenced by 
phenomenology and existentialism. This interpretation, then, reads Nägärjuna in the light of a modern 
theory of experience. This modern theory of experience is no doubt worthy in its own right of serious 
philosophical study, but it would be anachronistic to suggest that Nägarjuna intends his claims that (the 
experience of) reality is non-conceptual to be understood in this way. Furthermore, if Nägärjuna's 
statements that (the experience of) reality (tattva) is Lt s_ prapanca, nirvikalpa, and so on meant that the 
meditative experience of reality is a first person-event, then, given that all experiences are first person 
events, Nägärjuna would have to admit that all experiences are nisprapafca, nirvikalpa, etc! But, in fact, 
Nägärjuna describes only (the experience of) reality in these terms. 
theoretical. It is in this sense non-conceptual. The theoretical knowledge of reality is. one 
might say, the knowledge of the fact that all entities lack svabhäva. By contrast, in the 
context of meditative experience, one might come face-to-face with the emptiness 
(sünyata) of entities itself. 
In dGe lugs pa Madhyamaka exegesis, it is explained that emptiness (or, better, an 
emptiness`), i. e the very absence (abhäva, med pa) of svabhäva itself, is an (albeit 
negative) characteristic or quality of each entity. It is said to be a dharrna/chos. 45 However, 
though (an) emptiness characterizes each entity, ordinary people (mu stegs can) fail to 
perceive it. 46 Through a meditative training-- consisting of repeated analysis 
demonstrating the absence of svabhäva of entities, coupled with samatha meditation 
(which makes one's mind calm, concentrated and potent)-- it is said that one comes to 
perceive emptiness(es). 47 One has a personal realization of the quality which is the absence 
of svabhäva in the meditative object. One sees it for oneself, as it were. (See here the 
traditional Buddhist formulation of the three levels of wisdom (prajfa), according to which 
meditative wisdom (bhävanämayrpraj"a) occurs after, and as the result of, the wisdom of 
hearing (srutamayprajna) and the wisdom of reflection (clntamayrprajna. There is a 
process of learning about and deepening one's understanding of the nature of reality. This 
culminates in a personal realization. One no longer simply knows that reality is such and 
such. One is now directly acquainted with this reality). " 
Candrakirti's comments on Nägärjuna's statement, at MMK XVIII, 9, that reality 
(tattva) is not dependent on another (aparapratyaya) are pertinent. Candrakirti explains 
that tattva is not dependent on another in the sense that one who realizes tattva, i. e. the truth 
that all things lack svabhäva, must do so by himself, i. e. by direct personal experience 
rather than by the instruction of another. I understand this to mean that in effect Candrakirti 
takes this passage to be about the character of the experience of reality, rather than about 
the reality which is experienced. " 
"As Napper (1989), p. 94, comments, for Tsong kha pa, 'emptiness is not seen as a unitary Absolute, but rather 
as multiple. There are as many emptinesses as there are phenomena. Each and every phenomena has its 
own emptiness, and the emptiness of one is not the emptiness ofanother. ' 
"See Klein (1986), pp. 151-152, p. 181. 
46See Napper (1989), p. 85. 
47See Hopkins (1996), pp. 91 if, Klein (1986), p. 16. Williams (1989a), pp. 72-74. 
`For a very early, non-Mahayana reference to the three levels of wisdom, see the Sangrti Sutta, DN III, 220 
(trans. Walshe (1987), p. 486. Pagel (1995), pp. 199,242ff notes that the three levels of wisdom feature in 
the Samädhiräja scitra and the Bodhisattvapitaka. Lopez (1988), pp. 7-8 quotes Samdhinirmocanasritra 
VIII, 24, which is about the three levels of wisdom. See also AkBh II, 72b, VI, 5c-d, VII, 18c-d, and 
BK 
(trans in Beyer (1974), pp. 104-105. ) I am not aware of any direct reference by Nägärjuna to the three 
levels of wisdom. 
4°See PP 373. 'The meaning [of aparapratyaya] is that [tattva] is not to be understood by means of the teaching 
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Candrakirti proceeds to give the famous analogy of people with eye-disease 
(taimirika) who mistakenly (vitatham) see hair (kesa), gnats (masaka), and flies (maksika), 
etc. People with this eye-disease can be taught by another person without eye-disease 
(vitimira) that their vision of hair, gnats, flies, etc is false. And it might be described to the 
people with eye-disease how it would be to have vision without the false seeing of hair, 
gnats, etc. In a sense, people with eye-disease might understand. They could even describe 
accurately that they have eye-disease, that it causes them mistakenly to see hair, gnats, 
flies, etc, and they might be able to accurately describe what it would be like to see without 
the eye-disease influencing their vision. Nevertheless, their knowledge remains 
theoretical, for, despite their knowledge of the fact that there are no gnats, flies, hairs, they 
still sees the gnats, flies, hairs, etc. They are not acquainted with not falsely seeing in this 
way. Their actual vision has not been changed, no matter how eloquently and thoroughly 
they might be able to describe what it would be like to be without the eye-disease. They 
would, as Candrakirti says, be aware of(prati-pad) only so much (etävamätrakam). 
Similarly, Candrakirti says, the teaching of emptiness might be taught by another, 
and this teaching might be understood. Yet one would still fail to see emptiness. One's 
understanding would be theoretical rather than by acquaintance. One would still fail to 
perceive the absence of svabhäva of entities, even though one would understand that in fact 
the absence of svabhäva is the true nature of entities. One's knowledge would be, then, 
merely conceptual, in the sense that it had not yet transformed one's perception. One has 
yet to have the correct vision of emptiness (avipaiitasunyatädarsana) for oneself, a 
face-to-face encounter with reality, which takes place in the context of a meditative 
of another. It is to be understood by oneself alone. ' (paropadesägamyam/ svayamevädhi- 
gantavyamityarthah/) 
Bhävaviveka also understands the meaning of aparapratyaya in the same way: "Here [in this verse] 
'.... aparapratyayam means that this [ultimate reality] is not known through another [person]. That is, it is 
directly perceived without any external tradition, and is known for oneself through direct experience'. 
(Prj, on MMK XVIII, 9, trans. by Eckel (1980), pp. 222-223. Material in square brackets is added by 
Eckel). 
The Chung lun explains that a person with such personal realization of the truth is not swayed by 
non-Buddhist teachers, even when they display supernatural powers. His understanding of and conviction 
concerning reality is steadfast; he'has faith in himself and in his own mind and does not follow them [ i. e. the 
non-Buddhist teachers]. ' The Chung lun says that even if such non-Buddhist teachers magically transform 
their bodies so that they appear like the Buddha (and, presumably, in this guise teach their wrong views), 
the man with personal understanding of the truth will not have his mind diverted 
from the truth! See 
Bocking (1995), p. 284. 
In the Tibetan translation of MMK XVIII, 9 'aparapratyaya', i. e. 'not dependent on another', is 
rendered as 'gzban las sties min', i. e. 'not known from another'. Further, the 
Chinese translation of the 
MMK, as translated into English by Bocking (1995), p. 275, is'to know 
for oneself, not following others'. 
There seems to have been a consensus, then, that 'aparapratyaya', which literally means'not 
dependent on 
another' is to be interpreted, atMMKXVIII, 9 to mean'known by personal understanding'. 
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experience. 50 
It must be appreciated, however, that there is a distinction between a meditative 
perception of emptiness, and the perception of this emptiness in the context of one's life as a 
whole. It does not follow that because one has had a face-to-face encounter with emptiness 
in meditation, therefore in one's post-meditative experience of entities one will perceive 
their emptiness. The meditative experience of emptiness is more like a remission of the eye 
disease, rather than a permanent cure. The permanent post-meditative perception of 
emptiness would be analagous to actually permanently curing the eye disease, rather than 
simply having theoretical knowledge ofwhat it would be like to be without the eye-disease, 
and having occasional periods of remission. At least in the dGe lugs pa understanding (of 
Candrakirti's position), one directly perceives emptiness (in meditation) at the first bhümi, 
but one only begins to perceive the emptiness of entities in post-meditative experience at 
the eighth bhümi" 
However, knowledge by acquaintance of emptiness in the context of meditation is 
presumably intended to be a step towards a knowledge by acquaintance of entities as empty 
in one's life as a whole. A face-to-face encounter with emptiness in meditation is perhaps a 
necessary condition for one's post-meditative perceptual experience to be (eventually) 
brought into permanent accord with one's theoretical understanding that all entities are 
without svabhäva. 
When entities are perceived in everyday life to be without svabhäva, one would no 
longer, presumably, become attached to them. 52 The idea is, I suppose, that if one actually 
saw entities to be lacking svabhäva, one would become thoroughly convinced that they are 
unworthy of attachment. One would thus no longer covet these entities. 53 It is a first 
50PP 373, yathä bi taimirik4 vitatbarp ketamasakamaksikädir ipam paiyanto vitimiropadeienäpi na sakuvanti 
kesänäm yathävadavasthitam svarüpamadarsananyäyena adhigantavyamataimirikä ivädhigantum, kim 
tarbi ataimirikopadesänmithyaitadityetävamätrakameva pratipadyante/ yadä tu timiropagbätyavi- 
parfta, ýunyatädar anänjananjitabuddbinayanäb santah samutpannatattvajfänä bhavanti, tadä tat 
tattvamanadhigamanayogena svayamadbigacchantlti/ 
"See here Hopkins (1996), pp. 103-104. I must stress, however, that there is no indication in Nägärjuna's texts 
of the relationship between meditative perception of emptiness and the subsequent post-meditative 
perception of entities as characterized by this emptiness. Nägärjuna is simply silent on the matter. The 
idea that meditative perception of emptiness takes place at the first bbümi, whereas the perception of 
entities as characterized by emptiness begins to take place at the eighth bbumi would appear to be, as far 
as one can tell, a much later idea. 
s2See here, for example, YS29 in which Ndgärjuna says that, unlike the people of the world ( jig rten), who-- 
blinded by ignorance (ma rig Idongsgyurpa)-- are followers of the stream of desire (sredpa rgvun gyi 
des prangs), the wise man (mkbaspa) is free from desire (sredpa dang bral ba). 
53See YSV31 in which Candrakirti says that those who merely hear (thospa tsam) the term 'emptiness' without 
personal understanding (so so ranggisrtogspa) are like people who believe that merely hearing about food 
(zas) and water (chu) will appease hunger and thirst. A theoretical knowledge of food and drink does not 
satisfy hunger and thirst. Similarly a theoretical knowledge of emptiness is no substitute for personal 
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principle of Buddhist teaching that it is attachment/desire which causes suffering 
(dubkha), and the absence of attachment entails the cessation of suffering. Thus, the 
soteriological implication of meditative knowledge by acquaintance of emptiness would 
be (according to the Mädhyamika) to facilitate the eventual total freedom from attachment, 
and hence the eradication of suffering. " 
(The soteriological implication of the meditative perception of emptiness is, 
however, problematic, for, as I will explain later, it seems difficult in fact to distinguish the 
meditative knowledge by acquaintance of emptiness, i. e. a mere absence, from a complete 
blank. In which case, how could a meditative state of mere blankness help one in any way 
acquaintance with emptiness. Presumably, Candrakirti means that it is only personal acquaintance with 
emptiness (in one's life as a whole? ) which will enable one to appease one's craving/attachment, etc. 
"It might be objected that most ordinary, unenlightened people (prtbagjana) do in fact already perceive the 
absence of svabhävaof entities, in that they perceive that entities lack an independent existence, i. e. are 
dependently originating. It is simply false, according to this objection, to claim that one's inability to 
perceive entities as dependently originating is the cause of one's attachment (and other defilements) and 
suffering. People seem to get attached and to suffer despite their knowledge by acquaintance of the 
dependent origination of the entities to which they are attached. It might be replied that such ordinary 
people do not really perceive the dependent origination of entities. Their knowledge is theoretical rather 
than by acquaintance. But it is debatable whether this reply is adequate. It is at least plausible to contend 
that, on the contrary, such ordinary people are fully acquainted with the dependently originating nature of 
the entities to which they get attached, and yet they still get attached. (Whether they ought not to get 
attached is, of course, a different matter). 
The Mädhyamika perhaps has a response to this problem. The Mädhyamika says that the absence of 
svabhäva of entities means, not only that they dependently originate but, that they have prajfaptisat 
(conceptually constructed existence). Thus, it would seem that for the Mädhyamika attachment (and 
hence suffering) is not cut simply by perceiving the dependent arising of entities. For one might still 
arguably remain attached to an entity despite having perceived it as dependently originating. For the 
Mädhyamika, perhaps, attachment is only extirpated by going one stage further-- i. e. by perceiving that 
the entities which dependently originate are merely conceptual in nature. (Or, perhaps one might say, for 
the Mädhyamika to perceive fully dependent origination means to perceive that entities originate only as 
conceptual constructs). This is what it means to perceive, in post-meditative experience, the emptiness 
of entities. The Mädhyamika might argue, then, that-- while it is possible that ordinary people might in 
fact perceive, i. e. have knowledge by acquaintance of, entities as dependently originating, and yet they 
remain attached to these entities-- it seems untenable to claim that ordinary people perceive, i. e. have 
knowledge by acquaintance of, these dependently originating entities as conceptual constructs. The root 
cause of attachment is, therefore-- according to the Mädhyamika-- the ordinary, unenlightened person's 
failure to perceive dependently originating entities as being conceptual constructs. 
Still, this Mädhyamika explanation does not seem convincing. There seems to be no a priori reason 
why one might not still get attached to entities, even if one perceives that they are conceptual constructs. 
The Mädhyamika might say, of course, that one oughtnot get attached to them, because they have such a 
tenuous, merely conceptually constructed existence, and one's attachment will only bring one suffering. 
But this does not mean that one willnot be attached, despite the Mädhyamika advice. 
I also note that the Mädhyamika claim that all entities are conceptual constructs seems highly 
implausible, and in many ways philosophically problematic. For a discussion of this point, see chapter 4. 
In which case, even the Mädhyamika argument that: (i) all entities are conceptual constructs, (ii) 
attachment to conceptually constructed entities will cause suffering, (iii) therefore, one ought not to get 
attached to entities, is probably not sound, given that (i) is probably not true. A far more plausible 
argument (though it would still require considerable defence) would state that: (i) all entities 
dependently originate (though they are not, in all cases, conceptual constructs), (ii) attachment to 
dependently originating entities (be they conceptually constructed or more-than- conceptually- 
constructed) causes suffering, (iii) therefore, one ought not to get attached to entities. 
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to transform one's everyday experience of entities? ). 
3.5.4. Lack of Explicit Conceptualization (and the Complete 
Absence of Verbalization). 
I have argued that all knowledge must be characterized by conceptuality. insofar as 
knowledge involves discrimination. There cannot be knowledge which does not have 
something of which it is the knowledge. There cannot be, therefore, knowledge which is 
non-conceptual in this sense. 
Nevertheless, it is arguable that there are plenty of knowledge-experiences which 
occur without any explicit conceptualization. I have been discriminating the various 
computer-keys for several hours. However, it is only in the past minute that I have made 
this discrimination explicit. That is, I have only noticed my activity of discriminating the 
computer-keys in the past minute. Before that, there was obviously discrimination of the 
computer-keys-- for I have been effectively employing my computer-- even though I had 
not thought 'there are the computer-keys! ' The conceptualization of the computer-keys 
which has been taking place for several hours has only in the past minute become explicit. 
It would seem to be true, in fact, that, although all knowledge-experiences are 
conceptual, the vast majority of one's knowledge-experiences are of a non-explicitly 
conceptual nature. I am reminded here of Heidegger's explication of this point. For the 
most part, he contends, one is engaged in the everyday world in a way which does not 
involve judgements about the entities with which one engages. One generally uses a 
hammer, for instance, without standing back from the activity and reflecting, 'this is a 
hammer'. Nevertheless, one does discriminate the hammer, for one is able to employ it 
quite effectively. In fact, Heidegger contends, entities tend to be explicitly conceptualized 
when they no longer function in the way in which one expects. If the hammer breaks, it is at 
this point that I am most likely to explicitly conceptualize about the hammer. The hammer 
which I have been discriminating in a non-explicit way will suddenly stand-out to me as a 
hammer. I am likely to judge that 'this is a hammer, and it is broken. ' As long as the 
hammer fulfills its function, however, I am unlikely to make my conceptualization of it 
explicit. 55 
Another situation in which conceptualization is likely to be explicit is when one is 
learning, and has not yet mastered, some skill. While learning a piano-sonata, for example, 
"See Being and Time (trans. Macquarrie and Robinson (1962)), pp. 98,102-107. It is worth noting, however, 
that Heidegger's explication of the pre-theoretical apprehension of entities takes place in the context of his 
complex ontological speculations, with which I am not here concerned. 
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the pianist must explicitly conceptualize the musical directions which enable him to play 
the music. But as he becomes more familiar with the music-- with practice-- he will think 
less and less in this explicitly conceptual way. When he has perfected his playing, I suspect 
that there is very little explicit conceptualization which takes place. This is not to say that 
the pianist's experience becomes non-conceptual (i. e. in the sense of 'not discriminating 
anything'), for he certainly does discriminate the music which he plays. But the pianist is 
unlikely on the whole to be aware of the conceptualization which occurs. He simply plays, 
naturally and without noticing the various notes which he is discriminating. 
I want to argue, then, that when Nägärjuna says that reality is nisprapanca, etc. a 
philosophically plausible way to interpret this statement is that the experience of knowing 
reality, as it occurs in meditation, is without any explicit conceptualization. The 
knowledge-experience must discriminate something, to be sure, and in this sense it is 
undoubtedly conceptual. There is the face-to-face discrimination of the quality of 
emptiness possessed by entities. It is just that, at the time of the meditation, the meditator, 
due to his absorption in his experience of emptiness, does not reflect'this is emptiness', nor 
does he proclaim'this is emptiness'. He does not stand-back from the experience in which 
he is immersed. He is simply absorbed in the experience, like the pianist who is totally 
familiar with the music which he plays. In this sense, then, the meditator on reality also 
does not have a view, a position, or a thesis. He does not formulate or express a proposition 
that entities lack svabbäva, although he is undoubtedly discriminating, in a face-to-face 
encounter, this lack of svabbäva. 
But this in no way inhibits, I would suggest, the ability of the meditator to make the 
conceptualization which occurs during his meditation explicit, during his post-meditative 
experience (just like the pianist, if required, can relate the various steps he takes in playing 
the mastered sonata). At the time of the meditation, he might be simply absorbed in his 
experience of emptiness. But afterwards he might well think and say that 'I experienced the 
absence of svabbäva of entities. ' This conceptualization and statement would, further, be a 
perfectly accurate description of what he discriminates in his meditative experience of 
reality. The Mädhyamika would, on the basis of his meditative experience, be able to say 
and conceptualize that the ultimate truth about entities is that they lack svabbä va. The 
Mädhyamika might not have a thesis/position/view at the time of meditation on reality, but 
this is entirely compatible with his having an accurate thesis/position/view later on. 56 
"This is a notion for which there is certainly a precedent in earlier Buddhist thinking about meditation. In the 
higher levels of the meditative absorptions (dhyäna, jhäna) no initial thought (vitarka, vitakka) and 
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3.5.5. Focussed Conceptualization. 
I must stress again, however, that such knowledge by acquaintance of emptiness 
must still be conceptual in the sense that something is discriminated, viz. the absence of 
svabhäva of entities. If something were not discriminated, there would in fact be nothing 
with which one would be acquainted in the meditative experience. 
But, I suggest, the meditative experience of reality is conceptual in a very focussed 
fashion. It has only one object, that is, the true nature of all entities (emptiness). Such a 
meditative experience takes the true nature of all entities as its sole object. The 
conceptualization which occurs is a case of one-pointed concentration (samädhi), and one 
is undistracted by the usual stream of mental-chatter which normally occurs in (primarily 
non-meditative) experience. It is this undistracted, focussed nature of the meditative 
experience of reality which produces the state of calm (sänta) which Nägärjuna describes 
(at MMK XVIII, 9; see quotation above) as a characteristic of reality. Perhaps it would be 
more accurate to say that both the meditative experience of emptiness and emptiness itself, 
as a mere absence, are calm. In fact, it is the mind which experiences reality, as well as the 
reality which is experienced, which are calm. The mind is no longer caught up in the 
turmoil and conceptual diffusion (prapafca) of (primarily non-meditative) experience. 
In this case, when Nägärjuna describes-- also at MMKXVIII, 9-- reality (tattva) as 
'without diversity' (anänärtha) this might be a description of both reality as the single 
characteristic possessed by all entities, i. e. their true nature which is their lack of svabhäva, 
and the nature of a meditative experience which focusses on this single characteristic 
possessed by all entities. Such an experience does not have diverse objects, but rather is the 
experience of only the common nature of all things. Which is not to say that entities do not 
have other characteristics. It is simply that the meditative experience focusses on one of 
their characteristics-- viz. their lack of svabhäva-- to the exclusion of all others. (Like, for 
example, when one focusses on the redness of a rose to the exclusion of the rose's other 
characteristics-- its shape, size, smell, etc. The rose does not cease to have these 
characteristics when one's awareness is focussed only on the redness of the rose). In this 
case, the meditator on reality, aware only of the common nature of all things, cannot, at the 
sustained thought( vicära) is said to take place. Yet Buddhist texts give clear, precise 
descriptions of what 
(supposedly) is experienced in these meditative absorptions. For example. the 
first arüpajhäna is said to 
be the sphere of infinite space (äkasanancäyatana). There are accurate 
descriptions of the meditative 
absorptions even though the meditator who is absorbed in dhyan i 
jhJna is at that time unable to 
explicitly conceptualize or describe what he experiences. See, 
for example, L)N 182-184 (Walshe (1987) 
(trans), pp. 161-162). 
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time of his meditation, have a view/position/thesis about entities in their particularity. The 
following statement from the YSmight be interpreted in this way. 
'di 'am de 'o zhes gang du/ 
rnam par dpyad nas mi dmigs na/ 
rtsodpas 'di 'am de bden zhes/ 
mkhas pa su zhig smra bar gyur// 
Which wise man will assert, by means of a dispute, that 
'this or that is true', when, as a result of sustained thought, he 
does not perceive anywhere 'this or that'? (YS42). 
'Sustained thought' is here a translation of rnam par dpyad, which Lindtner 
re-constructs as vicära. 57 Vicära is traditionally said to be present-- along with 'initial 
thought'( vitarka)-- in the first dhyäna, or meditative absorption. 5ß This might suggest, then, 
that Nägärjuna is here adverting to a meditative state in which the meditator is cognizant-- 
in a concentrated, probing fashion-- only of the reality common to all entities, without any 
perception of their particularity, as'this or that' ('di 'am de). 
It is worth noting in this respect that Nägärjuna sometimes describes reality as 
isolated or separated (vivikta). 5° According to the Pali tradition, viveka is separation from 
the five hindrances (nlvarana) to meditation, and is especially associated with the first 
jhäna. 60 Which is to say that when the mind becomes separated from the five hindrances, 
one achieves the first jhäna. As I have already said, the first jhäna is traditionally a level of 
meditative attainment (samapatti) in which mental activity (vitakka and vicära) occurs, 
though in an undistracted manner. This suggests to me that Nägärjuna might actually 
mean, not that reality is isolated, but that there is a meditative experience-- which occurs in 
the first dhyäna-- in which the mind focusses on the nature of reality to the exclusion of, i. e. 
isolated or separated from, all other matters. One is aware totally and only of the absence of 
svabhäva of entities. All other conceptualization has fallen away. (I am speculating here, 
"Lindtner (1982), p. 113. 
"See Nyanaponika Thera (1976), p. 56. See also, for example, DN I, 73 (trans. Walshe (1987), p. 102). 
"See VVC 29, YS 25,30,66,69. 
'See Gethin (1992), p. 165. See also Scherrer-Schaub (1991), p. 244. Vivikia is also traditionally used to 
denote the physical isolation of the monk who is seeking liberation. Thus, it is in the physical isolation of 
the forest hermitage, etc that the monk strives to achieve the meditative isolation (in jhänaldhyäna) from 
distractions and hindrances. The principle is, no doubt, that such physical conditions are most conducive 
to the attainment of jhäna/dhyana. See Gethin (1992) p. 170, Scherrer-Schaub (1991) pp. 218-219. 
See 
also Ray (1994), pp. 63-64, who notices the emphasis placed on seclusion (viveka) as a virtue 
in the 
Suttanipäta especially. Ray argues that such seclusion was a mark of the life of Buddhist 
forest renunciants 
(as opposed to settled monastics), for whom meditation (as opposed to textual study and the vinava) was 
of paramount importance. 
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but the speculation at least seems sensible). 
3.6. Concluding Remarks on and Criticisms of 
I nterpretation(2). 
I have explained three ways in which, according to interpretation (2), a meditative 
experience of reality might be called 'non-conceptual' without meaning that the experience 
does not discriminate anything at all. Such an experience might be itself characterized, in 
the ways which I have suggested, as non-conceptual-- i. e. It is a focussed, undistracted 
knowledge by acquaintance without explicit conceptualization-- while still being 
conceptual in the sense that it discriminates an object, i. e. the absence of svabhäva 
(emptiness) which is the true nature of entities. 
Perhaps, then, interpretation (2) offers a different way to understand Bhävaviveka's 
teaching that the ultimate (don dam pa) has two aspects (rnarn pa). Bhävaviveka's 
supramundane ( jigrtenlas'daspa) ultimate, without impurity (zagpa medpa) and without 
conceptual diffusion (spros pa med pa) might correspond to this focussed meditative 
knowledge by acquaintance, without explicit conceptualization, of emptiness. The 
second aspect of the ultimate, which Bhävaviveka describes as pure mundane knowledge 
(dag pa jig rten pa' ye shes), and having conceptual diffusion (spros pa dang bcas pa), 
might correspond to the theoretical, factual knowledge that all entities lack svabhäva. (It 
is this second aspect of the ultimate, it may be recollected which Bhävaviveka says is 
expressed by his thesis (dam bca) or position (phyogs) that all entities are without 
svabhäva. ) 
As I have said already, interpretation (2) is, in my judgement, the most plausible 
reading of Nägärjuna's texts. The dominant concern of his writings is that the ultimate 
truth/true nature of entities is their absence of svabhäva. (See here chapters 2 and 4 for 
textual evidence). It seems advisable, therefore, to interpret those uncommon passages 
which use the language of non-conceptuality to be describing a particular way of 
experiencing this absence of svabhäva, rather than as asserting a 
distinct 
unconceptualizable reality. But let me, in conclusion, suggest two serious philosophical 
difficulties with interpretation (2). 
3.6.1. The Problem of Emptiness as a Mere Absence. 
I have explained that, according to interpretation (2), the meditative experience of 
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reality has as its object solely the very absence of svabhäva itself, i. e. emptiness. 
Meditation on emptiness is thus conceptual, in the sense that it discriminates something. 
But what can it possibly mean to discriminate a mere absence? Can the discrimination of 
an absence in fact be distinguished from the discrimination of nothing at all? It is arguable, 
then, that the meditation on emptiness, after all, involves a complete cessation of 
conceptualization-- i. e. it does not discriminate anything-- akin to the already-mentioned 
samjnävedayitanirodha/nirodhasamäpattiofthe Abhidharma. 6' 
But in this case the meditation on emptiness is perhaps not actually a state of 
consciousness (and certainly not a state of knowledge). For, as I have explained, 
consciousness is arguably always consciousness of something. Unless Nägärjuna were to 
view liberation as the annihilation of all mental activity whatsoever, it is difficult to see 
what soteriological benefit could be derived from such a meditation (assuming, indeed, that 
it is even psychologically possible). 62 
The unanswered question is, of course, whether Nägärjuna intends the meditation 
on emptiness to be such a state of complete mental inactivity. According to interpretation 
(2), Nägarjuna's intention, no matter how problematic, is that emptiness is something (a 
mere absence) which is known in meditation. Meditation on emptiness is therefore 
intended by him to be, in the sense that something is discriminated, conceptual. I concede, 
however, that Nagarjuna's intention might be different. Perhaps for him meditation on 
emptiness is, after all-- as the complete cessation of conceptualization-- truly without any 
discrimination, though why the attainment of such mental blankness would be desirable I 
cannot understand. 
3.6.2. Interpretation (2) and the Question of Nihilism. 
I will argue in the next chapter that Nägärjuna's philosophy, understood as an 
assertion of universal absence of svabhäva, is tantamount to nihilism, despite Nägärjuna's 
advocacy of the Middle Path. Interpretation (2), as I have explained, sees emptiness as a 
61See note 17. It is perhaps significant in this respect that the Chung-lun, commenting onMMK XVIII, declares 
that the samadbi of cessation (of feeling and conceptions) (nirodhasamäpattr) is regarded as the highest 
samädhi, insofar as it entails the cessation of all mental activities. This is evidence, then, of 
both the 
acknowledgement of the existence such a meditative state, and a valuing of it, within early Madhyamaka 
thought. See Bocking (trans) (1995), p. 281. 
620ne possible solution to this problem is that emptiness is nota mere absence. In other words, some positive 
character might be attributed to emptiness. (E. g. purity, bliss, etc). It is this positive character which 
is 
discriminated in the meditation on emptiness. No doubt this is an explanation which would appeal to 
some later Mädhyamikas, influenced by tathagatagarbha teachings. See 
Hookham (1991), Williams 
(1989a), pp. 105. ff: 
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quality, albeit a negative quality, of entities. It is this quality alone of entities, their ultimate 
truth, which is discriminated by the meditative knowledge by acquaintance of emptiness. 
But if Nägärjuna's philosophy entails nihilism, then there can be no entities which have 
emptiness as their quality and there can be no emptiness which is the quality of entities. 
The nihilist implications (probably unintended by Nägärjuna) of Nägärjuna's philosophy 
therefore make interpretation (2) philosophically untenable. It is to this problem of 
nihilism which I shall now turn my attention. 
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4. The Problem of Nihilism in the 
Philosophy of Nagärjuna. 
4.1. Introduction. The Charge of Nihilism and 
Nägarjuna's Response. 
In Nägärjuna's texts, his opponents not infrequently object that if the ultimate truth 
is, as Nägärjuna says, the emptiness (sünyata) of all entities, then Nägärjuna's teaching in 
fact destroys all entities. ' Nägärjuna's position entails, in other words, nihilism. 
Nägärjuna's response to this criticism is invariably that, on the contrary, it is the ultimate 
truth, viz. emptiness, which makes possible all entities. ' His opponents have, he claims, 
misunderstood the meaning of emptiness. ' Emptiness does not entail the non-existence of 
the various entities of which it is the emptiness. On the contrary, emptiness means that 
'See especially W/VVC 1-20, and MMK XXIV, 6, spoken by an opponent, sunyatäm phalasad- 
bhävamadbarmam dharmameva ca/ sarvasamvyavahäräm§ca laukikänpratibädhase// See also the 
opponent's criticism at SS 15, gal to dngos rnams rang bzhm gyis/med na dman mnyam khyad 'phags 
dang/sna tshogs nyid ni mi grub cing/rgyu laskyang nimngon grub min// 
2S ee MMK XXI V, 14, sarvam ca yujyate tasya sunyatä yasya yujyate/sarvam na yujyate tasya tünyam yasya 
na yujyate//VV 70, For whom emptiness prevails, for him all things prevail. For whom emptiness does not 
prevail, for him nothing prevails'. (prabbavati ca sunyateyam yasya prabbavanti tasya sarvärthäh/ 
prabbavatinatasyakimcinnaprabbavatitünyatäyasya/I). See also WC70. 
Jackson (1985), pp. 407-414, in an article on W/VVC 70 makes the important point that, although the 
law of dependent origination might be what makes all entities possible, it does not itself enable one to 
deduce which entities actually exist. That everything which exists is possible because of dependent 
origination does not mean that because of dependent origination everything exists. It is true that ifx exists 
it must arise in dependence upon conditions. But it is not true that because everything which exists arises in 
dependence upon conditions, therefore x exists. It is true, for example, that if happy and unhappy re-births 
do exist, then they will arise in dependence upon conditions, but this does not in itself prove that there 
actually are happy and unhappy re-births. It just proves that, if happy and unhappy re-births were to occur, 
they would arise in dependence upon conditions. It is true, to take another example, that if enlightenment 
were possible, it will arise in dependence upon conditions, but this does not prove that enlightenment is in 
fact possible. It just demonstrates that, if enlightenment were possible, it would occur in dependence upon 
conditions. 
Note also that even if an entity does exist, the general law of dependent origination does not 
demonstrate which conditions are necessary for it to come into existence. It is true that because x exists, it 
must have arisen in dependence upon conditions. But it is not true that because x exists in dependence 
upon conditions, therefore it must have arisen in dependence upon specific condition y. For example, 
happy re-births come into existence, according to Buddhism, in dependence upon ethical actions. But one 
cannot successfully argue deductively that because happy re-births arise in dependence upon conditions, 
therefore happy re-births arise in dependence upon the specific condition which is ethical actions. It is 
theoretically possible that happy re-births arise in dependence upon, for instance, unethical actions. 
Thus Jackson argues-- convincingly I think-- that at WC 70 Nägärjuna'makes an illegitimate move' 
by arguing deductively from the general law of dependent origination to the validity of specific Buddhist 
applications of this law of dependent origination, such as the four noble truths, and the law of karma and 
re-birth. 
'MMK XXIV, 7, atra brilmah sunyatäyäm na tvam vetsi prayojanam/sunyatäm sünyatärthamca tats ev'am 
vihanyase// 
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these entities exist as dependent arisings, without svabhäva. Emptiness, is Nägärjuna 
claims, the famous Buddhist Middle Way between eternalism and nihilism. ' Entities exist. 
it is true, but they exist only in dependence upon conditions. Entities are thus empty of 
independent existence. Nägärjuna turns the opponents' argument on its head, claiming 
that in fact it is the rejection, rather than the acceptance, of the teaching of emptiness which 
destroys all entities. ' Entities arise and perish in dependence upon conditions. To deny 
emptiness is to deny that there are such dependently arising entities. It is, therefore, 
emptiness which explains the existence of all entities. 
When one first reads Nägärjuna's explanations of the compatibility of emptiness 
and the existence of all entities they perhaps seem entirely convincing. Of course 
emptiness is compatible with the existence of the various entities of the world, for 
emptiness is precisely, as Nägärjuna so often reiterates, the absence of svabhäva of all 
entities. And Nägärjuna sometimes describes svabhävaas existence which is independent 
of causes and conditions. This is clearly stated, for example, in the MMK: 
na sambba vab svabbä vasya yuktab pratyayabetubbih/ 
betupratyayasambbütab svabbävab krtako bbavet// 
svabbä vab krtako näma bba visyati punab katbam/ 
akrtrimab svabbä vo bi nirapeksab paratra ca// 
The occurrence of svabhäva is not appropriate by means of conditions and 
causes. 
Svabhäva produced by causes and conditions would be created. 
But indeed, how could svabhäva be created? 
For svabhäva is uncreated, and is independent of another. (MMK XV 1-2). 
'See, for example, MMK XXIV, 18a-b, yah pratrtyasamutpädah sünyatäm täm pracaksmahe/ VV 22 ya. sca 
pratftyabhä vo bhä vänäm iunyateti sä proktä/yasca pratftyabhavo bha vati hi tasyäsvabhä vatvam//, VVC 
70, yap §unyatäm pratityasamutpadam madhyamäm pratipadam cal ekärthäm nijagäda pranamämi 
tam apratimabuddham//LS 22, yah pratftyasamutpädab s`unyatä saiva to matä/bhävah svatantro nästiti 
simhanädasta vätulah//AS 40a-b, yah pratftyasamutpadah ttinyata sai va to matä/ 
See also Candrakirti'sPP 368 for a particularly clear statement of this point: 'Here some people insist 
that the Mädhyamikas are not different from nihilists, since they [i. e. the Mädhyamikas] say that good 
and bad acts, the agent, the consequences [of acts], and the entire world are empty of the svabhäva of 
entities. For the nihilists also say that [all] this does not exist. Therefore, the Mädhyamikas are not 
different from nihilists. [We reply: ] It is not so. Why? Because Mädhyamikas are proponents of 
dependent origination. Having apprehended causes and conditions, they explain that the entire present 
world and future world is without svabhäva, because dependently arisen. ' (atraike paricodayanti-- 
nastikävliicta mädhyamikah, yasmatkusa1äkufa1am karma kartäram ca phalam ca sarvam ca lokam 
bhä vasvabhä vaiunyamiti bruvate/ nastikä apt hi etannästitr bru vate/tasmännästikä viäistä mädh vamikä 
iti/ naivam. kutah, pratityasamutpädavädino hi madhyamikäh hetupratyayänpräpva pratitya- 
samutpannatvätsarvamevaihalokaparalokamnihsvabb vam varnayanti4. 
'See MMK XXIV, 36, sarvasamvyavahäräms`ca laukikänpratibädhase/ yatprattyasamutpäda. ünyatäm 
pratibädhase// 
90 
In fact, Nägarjuna says, no entity (bhäva) has svabhäva. All entities are therefore 
empty (sünya), i. e. they are empty of svabhäva. They are, in other words, dependently 
arisen (pratityasamutpanna): 
dngos po thams cad rang bzhin gyis/ 
stong pa yin pas dngos reams kyi/ 
rten 'byung de Di de bzhin gshegs/ 
mtshungs pa med pas nye bar bstan// 
Since all entities are empty of svabbäva, the unequalled tatbägata taught the 
dependent arising of entities. (SS68) 
This includes even the dharma-s out of which, according to Abhidharma 
philosophy, macroscopic entities are formed: 
apratltyasamutpanno dbarmah kascinna vidyate/ 
yasmättasmädasünyo hi dharmab kascinna vidyate// 
Since a dharma not dependently arisen does not exist, 
therefore a non-empty dbarma certainly does not exist. (MMK XXIV, 19). 
One is tempted to think, then, that Nägärjuna is certainly right, and that his 
opponents have simply misunderstood the ultimate truth which he expounds. For 
Nägärjuna denies, it would seem, only that entities have an independent, uncreated 
existence, and there is obviously no incompatibility between this ultimate truth, and the 
manifold world of entities. The ultimate truth provides, in fact, the explanation of the 
interrelationships between, and the coming-to-be and passing away of, the various entities 
which constitute the world. Entities-- be they animate, inanimate, mental, physical, small, 
big, etc-- share the common characterisitic-- their ultimate truth-- that they lack svabbäva, 
i. e. they exist in dependence upon conditions. Who could seriously argue with this? 
However, it is my contention that Nägärjuna's claim that ultimate truth, i. e. 
emptiness, and the existence of entities are compatible-- in fact that the ultimate truth is 
that which makes possible the existence of entities -- is not as obviously correct as it 
perhaps appears. The opponents' objections have more bite to them than Nägärjuna's easy 
reply might suggest. 
This might explain, incidentally, why the charge of nihilism was frequently 
levelled against Nägärjuna and later Mädhyamikas, despite the (superficially convincing) 
Mädhyamika protestations. It is perhaps not simply that Nägärjuna, and others were 
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consistently misunderstood by a series of rather dull-witted opponents. For if the 
opponents of Madhyamaka philosophy simply failed to see that emptiness meant 
dependent origination, and repeatedly took it to mean non-existence-- despite the 
reiterated Madhyamaka declarations that dependent origination and emptiness are 
synonyms-- then they surely must have been very stupid! If one is to take the persistent 
objections to Madhyamaka seriously, one must suspect that there is a more substantial 
philosophical disagreement to be uncovered. 
The purpose of the present chapter is, then, to critically examine Nägärjuna's claim 
that it is emptiness, i. e. the absence of svabhäva of all entities, which makes the existence 
of entities possible. My argument will be that, seen in the context of Abhidharma 
principles (in the context of which Nägärjuna was certainly working), Nägärjuna's claim 
that emptiness is the absence of svabhäva of all entities entails considerably more than 
simply that entities are dependently originating. In fact, seen in the light of Abhidharma 
philosophy, there would appear to be a strong argument that Nägärjuna's assertion that all 
entities lack svabhäva does destroy-- contrary to Nägärjuna's intention-- the manifold 
world of entities. Nägärjuna may be, unwittingly, a nihilist. ' Nägärjuna might think that he 
treads the Middle Way, but perhaps in fact he has taken a wrong turning. 
4.2. The Abhidharma Notion of svabhäva. 
Nägärjuna says, I have explained, that the dependent origination of entities is 
incompatible with their possession of svabhäva. Taken at face-value, this means simply 
that all entities dependently arise, and therefore they do not have independent existence. 
However-- and this is a crucial point-- in Abhidharma philosophy the dependent 
origination of some entities, i. e. samskrta dbarma-s, is said to be actually compatible with 
their possession of svabhäva. In other words, according to Abhidharma thought, 
possession of svabhäva does notentail independent existence. ' 
6My interpretation here should be distinguished from that of Wood (1994). Wood argues that Nägärjuna is 
self-avowedly a nihilist. I claim, by contrast, that Nägärjuna probably did not see himself as a nihilist, but 
that it is arguable that, given the principles of his philosophy, he may have been one anyway. And, 
certainly, given the pre-suppositions of Abhidharma philosophy, his thinking would have been 
understood by many of his fellow Buddhists to result in nihilism. I would also like to acknowledge my 
debt in what follows to P. Williams, especially Williams (manuscript 2), pp. 12-29. Many of the points 
which I make in this chapter have been inspired by Williams' interpretation of Madhyamaka, with his 
emphasis on the need to view Madhyamaka philosophy in the context of Abhidharma thought. 
-Mention must also be made of the unconditioned (asamskrta) dbarma-s which, according to Vaibhäsika 
Abhidharma, are äkä9a, pratisamkhyänirodha, and apratisarvkhyänlrodha. They both have svabbäva 
and do not dependently originate. See AKBh I, 5-6. See also Griffiths (1986), p. 168. It would appear, 
then, that-- although for the Abhidharma possession of svabhävadoes not entail independent existence-- 
possession of svabbäva is compatible with independent existence. Some entities which have svabhäva 
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For the Abhidharmika8, svabbäva is attributed to dbarma-s because dbarma-s are 
independent of causes and conditions in a specific sense. Dbarma-s are not dependent 
upon parts for their existence. The dbarma-s are the basic constituents of the world, i. e. 
they are the foundational components of spatio and/or temporal continua. They are not 
further physically reducible or mentally analyzable into constituents, ' and they are the 
constituents of all other entities. These dbarma-s are, for the Abhidharmikas, 'ultimate 
truths' (paramärthasatya), and have 'substantial' orprimary existence (dravyasat). '° 
There are innumerable instances of these dharma-s, but these innumerable 
instances are classified, by the Abhidharmikas, into a finite number of categories. In the 
Vaibhäsika Abhidharma at least, there are four categories of conditioned (samskrta) 
dbarma-s-- form (rzipa), consciousness (citta), consciousness-factors (caitta), and 
conditioned factors dissociated from consciousness (cittaviprayuktasamskära)-- and one 
category of unconditioned (asamskrta) dbarma-s. In the AKBb, each category is further 
sub-divided (except citta, which has only one member), so that in total seventy-five types 
of dharma-s are enumerated. " Each type of dharma has a self-characteristic (svalaksana), 
i. e. a definable nature, an own-nature (svabbäva), '2which distinguishes it in the taxonomy 
from the other types of dbarma-s. There are, according to this classification, eleven rüpa 
dharma-s, one citta dbarma, forty-six caitta dharma-s, fourteen cittaviprayuktasamskära 
dbarma-s, and three asamskrta dbarma-s. 13 There are disagreements between 
Abhidharma/Abhidhamma traditions-- and within the same tradition in different texts and 
at different stages in the tradition's development-- about the details of this taxonomy, but 
these need not detain us here. 14 
(the samskrta dharma-s) dependently originate; some entities which have svabhäva (the asamskrta 
dbarma-s) do not dependently originate. 
'In the following analysis of Abhidharma philosophy, I primarily rely on Vasubandhu's 
Abhidharmakoiabhäsya and Sanghabhadra's *Nyayänusära. It should be noted, however, that these 
works post-date Nägärjuna's writings by several centuries. Further, despite what some 
interpreters say 
(see, for example, Kalupahana (1986)), it is not clear that the Abhidharma with which 
Nägärjuna was 
familiar was that of the VaibhäsikalSarvastiväda. For example, when 
in the VVC 7 Nägarjuna provides a 
list of dharma-s, it does not seem to correspond to the traditional Vaibhäsika taxonomy. 
See Bhattacharya 
(1990), p. 100 for a brief discussion of this issue. (It is clear, however, that 
Candrakirti was familiar with 
both the Vaibhäsika and the Sauträntika schools, for he refers to them by name. 
See YSV40. ) 
9AKBh VI, 4. See Cox (1995), pp. 138-139. See also Matilal (1986), pp. 246-248. 
'°See Williams (1981), p. 238. Cox (1995), pp. 138-139. There are numerous references in the 
AKBh to 
dharma-s as dravya See, e. g., AKBh II, 22, II, 62c, IV, 4. Griffiths 
(1986), p. 167 notes that the term 
'dravyasat is used by Sanghabhadra frequently (if the Sanskrit reconstruction 
from the Chinese by de la 
Vallee Poussin is correct). 
"See Cox (1995), p. 12. 
"See AKBh VI, 14c-d. svabhäva evaisäm svalaksanam (Sanskrit in Williams 
(1981), p. 254). See also 
Griffiths (1986), p. 167, Cox (1995) p. 139. 
"See Cox (1995), p. 12. 
"For example, Karunadasa (1967) describes many of the disagreements with respect 
to rüpadharma-s. Cox 
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Samskrta dharma-s are-- it must be emphasized-- subject to dependent origination 
(pratityasamutpäda). 15 Thus, the samskrta dbarma-s have the general characteristics 
(sämänyalaksana) of birth (jäti), duration (stbiti), and impermanence (anityata). Often, 
decay (jars) is also included in this list. 16 In fact, complex theories of conditionality were 
developed to explain the arising, duration, decay, and impermanence of samskrta 
dharma-s. " These samskrta dharma-s are, furthermore, said to remain only for a moment 
(ksana). ' 8 
The complex, reducible/analyzable entities constructed out of the 
svabbäva-endowed ultimate truths (the dharma-s) have a derivative or secondary existence 
(prajfaptisaf and are conventional truths (samvrtisatya). '9 These are the entities of the 
commonly experienced world-- i. e. the world oftrees, mountains, houses, and people. 
Conventional truths, it would seem, are, for the Abhidharma, entities which are 
conceptual constructs in the sense that they are the product of the mind's synthesizing 
activity on the basis of the various dbarma-s. 2° In which case, it appears that for the 
Abhidharma, conventional truths originate in dependence upon two factors: (i) the 
constituents, i. e. dharma-s which form the basis of construction, and (ii) the constructing 
activity of the mind. Without the presence of both of these elements, there can be no 
(1995), p. 67-68, notes that the motley collection called the cittaviprayuktasamskära dharma-s occurs 
throughout Vaibhäsika Abhidharma, though the dharma-s which are included in this category vary, 
whereas in Theraväda Abhidhamma there is no separate category cittavippayuttasankhata. And so on. 
"See AKBh III, 24d, III, 27. 
"See Cox (1995), pp. 146-149. Griffiths (1986), p. 52. See also Karunadasa (1967), pp. 79-90. On the 
svalaksana and the sämänyalaksana see, for example, AKBh VI, 14c-d. Note, however, that one could say 
(although the Abhidharma philosophers do not) that the svalaksana/svabhäva is itself a general 
characteristic (sämänyalaksana) of dbarma-s in the sense that they universally and necessarily possess 
one. 
"See Karunadasa (1986), pp. 126-141. 
"See AKBh III, 11 a-b, III, 85b-c. See Karunadasa (1986), pp. 79 ff for some of the controversies about the 
interpretation ofthe momentariness of dbarma-s. 
"On the distinction between conventional truths and ultimate truths, seeAKBh VI, 4. Sanghabhadra and, later, 
Pürnavardhana make a further distinction between 'first order' and 'second order' prajnaptisat entities. 
First order prajdaptisatentities are those which are constructed directly on the basis of dravyasatentities 
whereas second-order prajfaptisatentities are constructed on the basis of other prajnaptisatentities. A 
pot, for example, is constructed out of various parts, such as its sides, bottom, handle, which are not 
themselves dravyasat A forest, to take another example, is constituted by a number of trees, which are 
themselves constituted by their various parts. And so on. There can, then, be very complex conceptual 
construction-- with entities being constructed on the basis of entities which are themselves constructed, 
etc. However, even second-order prajnaptisat entities must finally have a dravyasat basis. All 
construction-- no matter how complex-- is finally based on an unconstructed reality. See Williams 
(1981), p. 238, Buescher(] 982), pp. 153-154. 
9 assume that this construction of prajfaptisatentities involves the participation of the mind, which enables 
one to apprehend a unified entity, a whole, on the basis of a number of dharma-s. See Griffiths (1986), 
pp. 49-50 who, however, seems to be over-confident that prajtiapttisatis The kind of existence belonging to 
things simply in virtue of there being linguistic conventions which refer to them. ' Surely the prajnaptisat 
entities exist for the Abhidharmika at least partly because they are composed of dravyasatentities and not 
simply because they are referred to by linguistic conventions. 
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conventional truths. 21 
4.3. Nägarjuna's nihsvabhava Understood in the 
Abhidharma Context. 
Thus, for Abhidharma philosophy, it is incorrect to say that the possession of 
svabbäva, i. e. the nature/characteristic possessed by the irreducible/unanalyzable dharma, 
entails that a dbarma is independent of causes and conditions. All dharma-s possess 
svabbäva and most of these svabbäva-possessing dbarma-s, i. e. all of the samskrta 
dharma-s, also dependently originate. By contrast, Nägärjuna seems to say that an entity 
with svabhäva would have independent, uncreated existence. 
4.3.1. A Terminological Difference? 
It might be argued, therefore, that Nägärjuna has simply defined svabhäva 
differently than the Abhidharmikas. Which would be to say that the svabhäva which 
Nägarjuna rejects is not the svabbäva which the Abhidharmika upholds. Whereas 
Nägärjuna defines svabbäva as independent existence, the Abhidharmika defines 
svabbäva as irreducible/unanalyzable existence, i. e. dravyasatrather thanprajaptisat. 
In this case, it might be argued, Nägärjuna and the Abhidharmika agree that there 
are dependently originating, irreducible/unanalyzable (dravyasat) samskrta dbarma-s. 
But whereas for Nägärjuna the dependent origination of these samskrta dharma-s means 
that they do not have svabbäva (= independent existence), for the Abhidharmika these 
dependently originating samskrta dbarma-s do have svabbäva (= irreducible/unanalyzable 
existence). With regards to samskrta dbarma-s, Nagä. rjuna and the Abhidharmikas are in 
philosophical agreement but terminological disagreement. (But note that if Nägärjuna is 
claiming that allentities lack svabbäva (= independent existence), then this would seem to 
imply that for him, unlike for the Abhidharmikas, there are at least no asamskrta 
dbarma-s22). 
21I am not sure ifthis point is ever made quite so explicitly in Abhidharma texts. Nevertheless, it appears to be an 
assumption which underlies the Abhidharma philosophy. See, for example, AKBh IX, where Vasubandhu 
explains that, in the case of the individual Devadatta, for example, Devadatta is only a name that one gives 
to the series of samkkäras' (Translated into English from the French of de la Vallee Poussin by Pruden 
(1988), p. 1342). Thus, there are two components necessary for conceptual construction: The 
dravva-s 
(here, the samskara-s) which are the basis of construction, and the actual conceptual construction (here, 
the giving ofa name). Without both ofthese components, it is clear that for Vasubandhu 
Devadatta' simply 
would not exist. 
'See here MMK XXV, 5, which might be interpreted to support this reading, bhävas`ca yadi nirvänam 
nirvänam samskrtam bha vet/näsamskrto hi vidyate bad vah kva cana kas`cana// 
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4.3.2. Universal Absence of svabhava as Equivalent to 
prajriaptim atra 
There is a strong argument, however, that in fact the disagreement with regards to 
svabhäva is not about terminology. One must remember that Nägärjuna is, after all, a 
second century Indian Buddhist. The lingua franca of ancient Indian Buddhist philosophy 
was the language of the Abhidharma. It is improbable, it can be argued, that Nägärjuna 
would simply begin to employ, without notification, a key term of the Abhidharma 
philosophy in an innovative way. It is more plausible that Nägärjuna considers the notion 
of svabhäva which he refutes to be precisely that employed within the Abhidharma context 
in which he operates. (It certainly appears from Nägärjuna's texts that he thought that he 
had a point of substantial disagreement to make). 
In this case, when he claims that all entities lack svabhäva, Nägärjuna probably 
means, not simply that no entities originate independently of conditions, but that no entities 
originate independently of their constituent elements, and the constructing activity of the 
mind. And these constituent elements are themselves conceptually constructed. There are 
no basic existents-- neither physically reducible nor mentally analyzable-- out of which the 
prajnaptlsat world is formed. Thus, all entities whatsoever are, for Nägärjuna, simply 
conceptual constructs. When Nägärjuna says that entities with svabhäva would be 
uncreated and independent he must mean, in fact, that such entities would be uncreated by 
and independent of the constructing mind. Nägärjuna's denial of svabhäva is not in fact a 
statement of the truism that all entities dependently originate, but is rather an assertion that 
all entities originate in dependence upon the constructing mind. 
If this interpretation is correct, the ultimate truth is for Nägärjuna that there are no 
ultimate truths in the Abhidharma sense. (See here also Candrakirti's idea that the actual 
svabhäva of entities is their lack of svabbäva ). 23 By this Nägärjuna does not mean simply 
that there are no independent, permanent entities. Nägärjuna means, rather, that there are 
no irreducible/unanalyzable, more-than-conceptually constructed entities. In the language 
of later Madhyamaka philosophy, no entity whatsoever is found under analysis. 24 
'See appendix for a discussion of this notion in Candrakirti's thought, and adumbrations of 
it in Nägäjuna's 
writings. 
As Williams (manuscript 2), p. 27 notes, there are thus two distinct senses in which the term'ultimate 
truth' (parämarthasatya) is employed in Madhyamaka. Ultimate truth can mean: (1) ultimate truth 
in the 
Abhidharma sense of irreducible/unanalyzable existence, and (2) ultimate truth 
in the sense of'how things 
actually are', i. e. the true nature of things. For the Mädhyamika, then, there 
is no ultimate truth in sense (1), 
but there is ultimate truth in sense (2). In fact, the ultimate truth in sense 
(2) is that there is no ultimate truth 
in sense (1). 
"'See, for example, Hopkins (1996), pp. 410-411. 
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Nagärjuna's advocacy of universal absence of svabhäva is equivalent to prajnaptrmätra. =` 
I think that the evidence which I have collated below (see 4.4. ) demonstrates that 
Nägärjuna does indeed employ the Abhidharma notion of svabhäva, and his denial that any 
entities have svabhäva does entail, for him, that all entities are prajnaptisat. In which case, 
Nägärjuna's claim that emptiness does not entail nihilism, because emptiness means 
simply that entities lack independent existence, is untenable. Nägärjuna's superficially 
convincing argument completely fails to address the real criticism which his opponents are 
making of his philosophy. Ndgdduna does not in fact deny only that there are 
independently existing entities. Ndgdduna denies also that there are any entities which 
arise independently of conceptual construction. Nägärjuna's opponents do not think that 
universal dependent origination of entities would result in nihilism. But they do consider 
that, if all entities were to have conceptually constructed existence-- as Ndgdduna claims-- 
then nihilism would indeed be entailed. As I shall explain later (see 4.7. ), I think that they 
are right. 
25My interpretation here runs counter to a common theory that Niigärjuna re-asserts the Buddha's original 
teaching of dependent origination, i. e. the teaching in the early jgama-s, which had been departed from 
by Abhidharma philosophy. See, for example, Kalupahana (1986), pp. 5-7. My contention is that, on the 
contrary, the Abhidharma did not depart from the teaching of dependent origination. Rather, it in fact 
developed this teaching by clearly distinguishing between two types of dependently originating entities, 
viz. dravyasatdependent originating entities, and prajn'aptisatdependent originating entities. 
Nägärjuna too accepts that all entities dependently originate, but he also develops this notion, by 
claiming that all dependent origination is of the prajnaptisattype. 
There is, then, no question of the original teaching (in the early ägama-s) of dependent origination 
being departed from (unless all development is considered to be a departure). Rather, both the 
Abhidharma and Nagärjuna's philosophy should be seen as developments of this original doctrine of 
dependent origination. 
Furthermore, Nägärjuna's assertion that all entities have a prajfaptisatsort of dependent origination 
is only possible, it should be noted, because the Abhidharma had already developed the distinction 
between dravyasat and prajfaptisat dependent origination. His philosophy of prajfaptimätra 
presupposes the Abhidharma terminology and distinctions. 
It would be an anachronism, therefore, to suggest that Nagärjuna's position that all dependent 
origination is of a prajfaptisatvariety is simply a re-assertion of the doctrine of dependent origination as 
found in the early ägama-s. The early ägama-s could not have said that all dependent origination is 
prajfaptisa4 because the notion of prajfaptisa4 as opposed to dravyasa4 had not as-of-yet been 
articulated! 
No doubt Nigärjuna felt that his notion of prajnaptimätra was justified by buddhavacana, but I 
suspect that the buddhavacanahe would rely upon here would be, not that of the early ägama-s, but rather 
that of early Mahayana sutra-s, especially of the Prajnäperamitätradition, which themselves pre-suppose 
the Abhidharma vocabulary. See here AS 2, 'Just as you [the Buddha] understood personally in the 
Mahäyäna the selflessness of dharma-s [i. e. the lack of svabbäva of dharma-s], so [you] taught it to the 
wise, because of the influence of [your] compassion. ' (yathä tvayä mab vane 
dharmanair- 
4tmyamätrnanä1 viditam des`itam tadvaddblmadbbyab karuna vas`ät/I). 
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4.4. Evidence for prajnaptimätra in Na-rjuna's 
Writings. 
At no point of which I am aware does Nagärjuna explicitly and unambiguously 
state that all entities are prajnaptisat, at least in the works which I consider to be most 
reliably attributable to him. 2" The question is, therefore, what other indirect textual 
evidence is there that Nagärjuna does in fact think that all entities lack svabhäva-- in the 
Abhidharma sense that they are reducible/analyzable, and hence conceptual constructs? I 
shall examine the evidence, which, I think, is plentiful. 
4.4.1. Dependence on Parts. 
Admittedly, there do not appear to be many places in Nägärjuna's writings where 
he makes explicit that he means that all entities originate in dependence upon their parts. ' 
26I mean theMMK, SS, VV/VVC, YS, RV, CS, and (perhaps) Vaid/VaidC. The term'prajnaptl does occur at RV 
I, 47, 'The cause whose production is prior [to is effect] or whose production is simultaneous [with its 
effect] is in fact a non-cause, on account of the lack of knowledge of origination through prajnapti [agreed 
usage? convention? ] or indeed in accordance with reality. ' (prägjätab sahajäta§ca heturahetuko 'rtbatah/ 
prajn"apterapratitatvädutpattescaiva tattvatab. ) The meaning of this passage, and the meaning of the 
term'prajnapti' in particular, seems to me to be rather obscure. As Warder (I 970a), p. 184 notes, the term 
'prajn"aptl can have the sense of 'agreed usage', which might fit in the context of this verse. (See also 
Monier-Williams (1899), p. 659 who lists 'agreement' as a meaning of prajfaptr). Hopkins (1975) p. 23 
translates 'prajnapte I in this verse as'conventionally'. I suspect that a dGe lugs would interpret this verse 
to mean that a cause does not exist with svabhäva (sasvabhävahetu) either conventionally or ultimately. 
(See Hopkins (1975)-- a dGelugs-influenced scholar-- who translates RVI, 47 in this way). This is, 
according to the dGelugs exegesis, a principal point of difference between the so-called Präsangika and 
the so-called Svätantrika Madhyamaka. Svätantrikas, according to the dGelugs, uphold that there 
issvabhäva conventionally but not ultimately, whereas Präsangikas claim that there can be no svabhäva 
either conventionally or ultimately. See Lopez (1987), p. 68 ff. I do not want to investigate the 
meaning of this distinction-- and the textual evidence in Indian Madhyamaka (which is far from plentiful 
(see Lopez (1987, p. 68 ff, Hopkins (1989)) for it-- here. For the present purpose, the important point is 
that it would appear that the term'prajnaptl is not at R VI, 47 being used in the sense of prajnaptisat 
The * Vyavahärasiddhi (Tha snyad grub pa) 5 a-b states that all of the twelve members of cyclic 
existence are tha snyad kyis ni gdags pa, which Lindtner (1982), p. 99 re-constructs as vyavaharatab 
prajnap4, which he translates as 'conventional designations. ' The * Vyavahärasiddhi is attributed to 
Nägärjuna by Säntaraksita (see Lindtner (1982), p. 94), but, despite Lindtner's confidence that the work is 
by Nägärjuna, the attribution is surely quite doubtful (given the lack of other evidence). 
There is also Nägarjuna's reference to prajnaptirupadäya at MMK XXIV, 18, which I will discuss 
shortly. (See 4.4.7). 
Dr. P. Williams informs me of a passage in the Prattyasamutpädavyäkhyäna (attributed to 
Nägärjuna) which states that 'btags pa tsam du yod pa de ni rdzas su yod par mi rung ngo. ' It is a moot 
point whether these texts are actually by Nägärjuna. For some discussion of the attribution of this text to 
Nägärjuna see Lindtner (1982), pp. 15-16,170-171. If this text is by Nigärjuna, it is an explicit 
statement of his recognition of the prajnaplisat-dravyasatdistinction, although it does not show that 
he 
considers all entities to be prajn-aptisat 
27Actually, in the Vaid Nägärjuna argues that parts (yan lag) are dependent upon the wholes (yan lag can) of 
which they are the parts!. See Vaid 3 3, yan lag can med pa'i phyir yan lag yod pa ma yin no// 
The same 
point is made by Aryadeva, CSX1V, 9b-c, gangphyiryan lag can med pa/des na yan 
lag kyang yodmin/ . 
This is an application of mutual dependence which, though typically Madhyamika 
(see, for example, MA 
VI, 161), is surely simply contrary to the principles of Abhidharma philosophy, which claims that wholes 
are dependent on their parts, but not vice-versa. 
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On the contrary, as I have already explained, he usually describes svabhävamore broadly as 
independence from causes and conditions. There are, however, the following statements in 
the R V: 
naiko nekapradesatvännäpradesasca kascana/ 
On account of many parts, there is not one, and there is nothing without 
parts... (R V I, 71 a-b). 
skyes bu kbams drug 'dus pa'i phyir/ 
yang dag ma yinji Ita ba/ 
de bzbin kbams ni re re la 'ang/ 
'dus pbyir yang dag nyid du min// 
Just as the person is not real, because it is a composite of the six elements, 
likewise also each element is not a reality, because it is a composite. (R V I, 
81). 28 
4.4.2. 'Samvrti' and 'sämvita' in the AS. 
The terms 'samvrtl and 'sämvrta' (which, I think, are synonyms29) are used in 
Nägärjuna's AS to denote the dependently originating entities of which the universe is 
constituted3Ö: 
28See also Aryadeva's CS{XIV, 19a-b, dngos po ganggang yongs brtag pa/de dang de la gcig nyid med/In 
addition, especially noteworthy is the Hastavälangmaprakarana, attributed by the Tibetan translations to 
Aryadeva (although it is attributed to Dignäga by the Chinese translations). See Tola and Dragonetti 
(1995b), pp. 2-5 for a discussion ofthe authorship of this text. (They favour the attribution to Aryadeva). 
The Tibetan translation refers to this short work as the'Commentary of the Treatise which is called'The 
Parts of the Constituents" (cha shas kyi yan lag ces bya ba i rab tu byed pa'i grel pa). Indeed, the main 
theme of the work is that no entity is partless, and thus there are no irreducible/unanalyzable atoms. All 
entities are said to be prajnaptisat(btagsyodpa) in the sense that they exist dependent on sides, parts, etc 
(ngos cha la sogs pa la Itos nas yod pa). See HV 1-3. Here then is an explicit expression of 
prajnaptmätra. If the HV is by Aryadeva (which is very far from certain) this would prove that 
Nägarjuna's direct disciple, at least, advocated that everything has conceptually constructed existence. 
Many later Mädhyamikas clearly reject partless dharma-s, and this would seem to imply that, 
according to them, everything is prajn"aptisat Säntaraksita, for example, in the Madhyamakälamkära, 
states that all entities have parts. See Tillemans (1983), pp. 305-320. See also mKhas grub rje sTong 
151-156 (Cabezön (trans) (1992), pp. 147-151). See also Säntideva, who writes at BC 9,86 that 'even the 
constituents can be analyzed down to atoms. The atom too can be divided according to the directions... ' 
(trans. Crosby and Skilton (1996), p. 124). 
'Although Monier-Williams (1899) does not list 'sämvrta', 'samvrtd (p. 1116) is clearly very similar in 
meaning to'samvrtl. 
'But the ASalso uses the term'samvrti in a second sense, that is, to denote all of the Buddhist teachings other 
than the teaching of the ultimate truth, i. e. emptiness (sunyata). In this sense, emptiness is the teaching 
with definitive meaning (nitärtha) whereas samvrti is the various Buddhist teachings of provisional 
meaning (neyärtba). See AS 56-57, 'The gift of the dbarma, the ambrosia which 
is the teaching of the 
Buddhas, was proclaimed [by you, i. e. the Buddha]. It was declared to be the definitive meaning. 
It is, of 
course, just the emptiness of dharma-s. But the teaching of arising and ceasing, etc, 
beings and souls, etc, 
was declared by you, Oh Protector, to be just the provisional meaning, and 
is samvrh: ' 
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... pratyayajam visvam tvayoktam nätha sämvrtam// 
... everything 
born out of conditions is declared by you. Oh Protector, to be 
sämvrta. (AS 6c-d). 
hetupratyayasambhütä paratanträ ca samvrtih/ 
Samvrti arises from causes and conditions and is dependent. (AS44a-b). 
As I have explained already, in Abhidharma philosophy samvrtisatya denotes an 
entity which has prajnaptisat status. It seems plausible that Nägärjuna's description of all 
dependently originating entities as 'samvrti and 'sämvrta'-- bearing in mind the 
Abhidharma use of the term'samvrtisatya'-- is meant to communicate that all entities have 
a conceptually constructed existence. Entities are conventions, that is, in the sense that the 
do not exist independently of the constructing mind. 
4.4.3. 'Samvrd' and 'vyavahara' in MMK XXIV. 
The term samvrtl appears also at MMKXXIV, 8 as a member of the compound 
'lokasamvrtisatya'. Nägärjuna proclaims that the Buddhas' teaching of the doctrine is 
based upon two truths-- the truth of worldly convention (lokasamvrtisatya) and the truth 
from the ultimate perspective (paramärthatah). Then, at MMK XXIV, 10 Nägärjuna 
employs the term 'vyavahärd, which is here, I believe, a synonym for lokasamvrtisatya in 
verse 831. He says that without depending on convention (vyavahära), the ultimate 
(paramärtha) is not taught. Without understanding the ultimate, nirväpa is not attained. 12 
One way of reading these verses" is that the ultimate truth depends upon 
convention in the sense that the ultimate truth is nothing other than the truth about the 
various entities which make up the world. In other words, the ultimate truth is simply that 
entities are nothing more than conventional. There is thus no ultimate truth apart from, 
independent of, the conventions of which it is the ultimate truth. Nirväna is attained when 
conventions-- i. e. all entities whatsoever-- are seen for what they really are. i. e. in their 
(dbarmayautukamäkhyätam buddhanäm s`äsanämrtam/nitarthamiti nirdistam dharmänäm 911bvataiva 
hi/y3 tritpädanirodhädisattvajivädide§anä/neyärthä ca tvayä nätha bhäsitä sam ; rtisca sil ). 
"Monier-Williams (1899), p. 1034, lists 'usage, custom... ordinary life, common practice' as meanings of 
' vya vahära 
For the Sanskrit text of these verses, see chapter 3, note 27. 
For a quite different reading, see 3.4.4. 
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ultimate truth. And what entities really are is lokasamvrtisatya/vyävahära, which-- again 
bearing in mind the Abhidharma notion of samvrtisatya-- means that they are conceptual 
constructs. (The implication here is, of course, that ordinary, unenlightened people have 
not attained nirväna precisely because they have failed to see the ultimate truth about 
entities. The fact that all entities are just conventional truths=conceptual constructs is not 
seen by the unenlightened. See here also note 52). Certainly, there is a fair amount of 
extrapolation in this interpretation ofMMKXXIV, 8 and 10, but I think that nevertheless it 
is a plausible reading. 34 
4.4.4. Synonyms for prajnaptimatra. 
Furthermore, Nägärjuna sometimes describes all entities as the product of kalpanä, 
vikalpa, and parikalpa, terms which might be synonyms for prajnapti. He also sometimes 
refers to all entities as 'nämamätrd, which might be a different name for prajnaptimätra. 
Thus, Nägärjuna declares that, 
atastvayä jagadidam parikalpasamudbbavam/ 
parijn"ätamasadbbütamanutpannam na nasyatill 
Therefore, you [the Buddha] have fully understood that this world is produced 
from parikalpa. It is unreal, unarisen [and] is not destroyed. (LS 19) 
kalpaaämätramltyasmätsarvadbarmäh prakäsitäh/ 
Therefore, all dbarma-s have been made manifest [by the Buddha] to be 'only 
kalpanä... (AS 36a-b) 
' jig rten ma rig rkyen can du/ 
gang pbyir sangs rgyas reams gsungs pa/ 
'di yi pbyir na jig rten 'di/ 
roam rtog yin zbes cis mi 'thad// 
Since the Buddhas speak of the world as having the [causal] condition which 
is ignorance, therefore why not accept that this world is vikalpa? (YS 37) 
nämamätram jagatsarvamityuccairbbäsitam tvayä/ 
"Garfield (1995), p. 299, understands these verses in a similar way. 
He writes that '... Nägärjuna is not 
disparaging the conventional by contrast to the ultimate, but is arguing that understanding 
the ultimate 
nature of things is completely dependent upon understanding conventional 
truth... understanding the 
ultimate nature of things is understanding that their conventional nature 
is merely conventional... the 
understanding of ultimate truth is in an important sense the understanding 
of the nature of the 
conventional'. 
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You sonorously declare that the whole world is only näma. (AS 35a-b). 3` 
4.4.5. The Non-origination of Dependently Originating Entities. 
Also, it is perhaps significant in this respect that Nägärjuna does not simply say that 
entities dependently originate. He often declares that in reality there is no origination of 
dependently originating entities: 
pratrtyajtam cäjtamäha tattvavidäm varah// 
... and the 
best of knowers of reality said the dependently arisen is not arisen. 
(YS 48c-d). 
This might be read as a statement that dependently originating entities do not 
originate with svabbäva. See here YSV 48 in which Candrakirti claims that this is the 
meaning of Nägärjuna's statement. Thus Candrakirti comments that 'the dependently 
arisen is not arisen with svabbäva'. (rten cing bre1 par'byung ba ago bo nyid kyis ma skyes 
pa). Candrakirti's interpretation is corroborated by YS 19 in which Nägärjuna states that: 
tattat präpya yadutpannam notpannam tatsvabhä vatah/ 
svabbävena yannotpannamutpannam näma tatkatham// 
That which is arisen depending on this and that is not arisen in accordance 
with svabbäva. 
How can that which is not arisen by means of svabbäva be called 'arisen'? (YS 
19). 
Presumably Nägärjuna's statements that the dependently arisen is unarisen with 
svabhäva are intended as more than simply declarations of the truism that a dependently 
arisen entity is not independent. His declarations are surely, it seems to me, meant to 
communicate something more significant than this! 
It can be argued, therefore, that Nägärjuna means that dependently arisen entities do 
not have svabhävain the Abhidharma sense, i. e. they are not dravyasat. Which is to say that 
"See also RV I, 99, 'On account of the mere non-existence of form, space is nämamätraka 
How [can there be] 
form without the elements? Hence [form] also is nämamätraka (rripasyäbhävamätratväd. 
äýam 
nämamätrakam/ bhütairvinä kuto rüpam nämamätrakamapyatah//). (The 
Tibetan translation of this 
verse appears to be wrong. See Hahn (1982), p. 39 for a suggested amendment). 
I find the meaning of this 
passage somewhat obscure, however. It is not clear to me whether, 
for instance, it is meant to imply that 
all entities are nämämätraka. (E. g. it does not say that the elements upon which 
form depends are 
themselves nämarnätraka). 
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they are prajnaptisat. (In Abhidharma terms these are the only possible categories. 
Whatever is not dravyasatmust be prajnaptisafj. This would explain why the dependently 
arisen entity which arises without svabbäva cannot be called'arisen'. That is, there are no 
real, dravya, dependently arising entities. All dependent arising entities are conceptually 
constructed (prajiapti), and in this sense their arising is unreal. 
4.4.6. Comparisons with Dreams, Illusions, etc. 
Hence, perhaps, Nägärjuna's frequent comparisons of dependently originating 
entities to dreams, illusions, and other fabricated entities. Dependently originating entities 
have, like a dream or an illusion, an existence which depends solely on the constructing 
activity of the mind. (Perhaps also, dependently arising entities are said to be like a dream, 
illusion, etc because-- like a dream or illusion-- they appear one way, i. e. as having more 
than conceptual existence, yet exist in another way, i. e. as merely conceptual constructs) : 
utpanno pi na cotpanno yadvanmäyägajo matab/ 
utpannam ca tatbi visvamanutpannam ca tattvatah// 
Just as an illusory elephant is considered to be, although arisen, in addition 
unarisen, so everything is both arisen and in reality unarisen. (AS 30). 
yathä mayä yathä svapno gandharvanagaram yatbä/ 
tathotpädastathä sthänam tathä bhatlga udährtam// 
Arising, duration, and cessation are declared to be like an illusion, a 
dream, [and] a city of gandbarva-s. (MMK VII, 34) 
yatbä mäyägajo naiti kutascidyäti na kva cit/ 
cittamobanamätratvädbhävatvena na tisthati// 
tatbä mäyopamo loko naiti yäti na kutracit/ 
cittamohanamätratvädbhävatvena na tistbati// 
Just as an illusory elephant-- because it is simply a delusion of the mind-- 
does not come from anywhere, goes nowhere, [and] does not endure really, so 
too the world, which is like an illusion, does not come [from anywhere], goes 
nowhere, [and] does not endure really, because it is simply a delusion of the 
mind. (RVII, 12-13). 36 
4.4.7. MMK XXIV, 18: An Analysis. 
Finally, there is also the extremely important but variously-interpreted 
MMK 
'See also MMK XVII, 33, 
SS 14,56,66, YS 27, LS 18-19, AS 4-5,18, etc. 
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XXIV, 18, in which Nagarjuna says that dependent origination (pratrtyasamutpäda) is 
emptiness (sunyata), and emptiness is prajnaptirupädäya (and the middle path (madhyamä 
pratipaf). 37 
The phrase 'prajnaptirupädäya', or, as it is usually expressed, 'upädäyaprajfaptl 
means, literally, 'concept based upon' or 'concept depending upon'. (See here also the 
Tibetan translation 'brten nas gdags pa'). 38 As Warder explains, the commentary on the 
Kathävatthu says that the term ' upädäyd means 'conditioned by' (paticca), 'depending on' 
(ägamma), 'not without that' (na vinä tam). ` The Pali equivalent of upädäyaprajfapd, i. e. 
upädäyapafnatti or upädäpannatti, is used, for example, in the Kathävatthu, in a section 
entitled 'Examination of the 'Concept Depending Upon" (Upädäpannattänuyoga). Here it 
is explained that the person (puggala) is a concept (paff"attr) which is not a real entity. If the 
person were a real entity (rather than a concept) it would be identifiable with its really 
occurring constituents-- identified in the text as the khandba-s, dhätu-s and so on-- either 
individually or collectively. But the person cannot be so identified. The person is, then, a 
concept, established by convention, depending upon its really occurring constituents, but 
itself not a really occurring entity. '° See here also Candrakirti's commentary on MMK 
XVIII, 1, in which he explains that non-Buddhists (tirthika), because they do not 
understand upädäyaprajnapti-s, do not realize (because of fear (trhsa)) that the self (ätrnan) 
is merely a name (nämamätrakam). " 
It seems likely that Nägärjuna means that an entity which is a prajnaptirupädäya is 
one which is a concept (prajfapti) depending on (upädäya) its parts. (Though, of course, for 
the Mädhyamika, unlike for the Abhidharmika, the parts out of which an entity is 
constituted are themselves inevitably prajnaptirupädäya). In this case, MMKXXIV, 18 
"MMK XXIV, 18, yab pratityasamutpädah iunyatäm tam pracaksmahe/sä prajn'aptirupädäya pratipatsaiva 
madbyamä. For other interpretations of this verse, see, for example, May (1959), pp. 237-238, 
Kalupahana (1986), pp. 339-341, Nagao (1991), 189-200, and Wood (1994), pp. 192-195. The Tibetan 
reads, rtes cing 1irel par byung ba gang/de ni stong pa nyid du bshad/de ni brten nasgdags pa ste/de nyid 
dbu ma! lam yin no/% Note that the Tibetan might be read either as saying that pratltyasamutpäda 
(rten 
cing 'brel par 1, yung ba) is prajnaptirupädäya (brten nas gdags pa) or that 
sunyatä (stong pa nyid) is 
prajnaptirupädäya (brten nasgdagspa). This is because the reference of the pronoun 
'dd is ambiguous. 
However, in the Sanskrit, this ambiguity does not occur, because the pronoun 'sa' 
is a feminine 
nominative, singular, and can thus only refer to aunyatä (a feminine, nominative, singular noun), and not 
to pratttyasamutpädab(a masculine, nominative, singular noun). 
"See here Nagao (1991), p. 190. I assume that prajlaptirupädäya= upädäyaprajnapti. 
Candrakirti appears to 
think so, for his commentary on Nigarjuna's phrase consistently employs 
the form 'upädäyaprajfaptl. 
The Tibetan translators must also have considered the two phrases as synonyms, 
because they translate 
both Nägdijuna's'prajnaptirupädäya' and Candrakirti's 'upädäyaprajnaptl as'brtennasgdagspa' 
"Warder (1970a), p. 190. 
'Kath vatthu, pp. 33-39. (Aung and Rhys Davids (trans) (1969)). 
See also Warder (1970), p. 186. 




could plausibly mean that what is dependently originating (i. e. each and every entity) is 
empty (of svabbäva), and a dependently originating entity, empty of svabhäva, is a concept 
depending upon its parts. Seen in the light of emptiness, i. e. universal absence of si abhäva, 
then, the dependent origination of all entities is equivalent to prajnaptimätra. 
* 
It might be objected, however, that a prajapti is a concept, and not a conceptually 
constructed entity to which a concept might refer. A concept of a chariot (to use a 
traditional example) is obviously not the same as an actual (though conceptually 
constructed) chariot. I have a concept of a chariot which I have now brought to mind, but I 
nevertheless certainly do not have a chariot. Even if Nägärjuna claims that all entities are 
prajnaptisa4 he clearly upholds the distinction between concepts and their conceptually 
constructed referents. As Nägärjuna says, 
samjnärthayorananyatve mukham dahyeta vabnrnä/ 
If there were identity of the concept and [its] object, the mouth would be 
burned by the [concept] fire. (LS 7a-b). 
... gal to 
bum pa mngon par brjod pa dang/ bum pa gcig nyid yin na bum pa 
brjodpa bzbin du phyi rol yang jim pa'i gong bu dang/ kbor lo dang/ cbu la 
sogs pa 'dus pa la ma Itos par grub par ' yur te/ bum pa la sogs pa mngon par 
rtogs nas bum pa la sogs pa grub par gyur ro/ bum pa zbes brjod pa na kba 
gang bar gyur la me zbes brjod pa na mcbu 'tsbig par gyur to de Itar 'dodpa 
yang ma yin no/ 
... 
if the word 'pot' and the pot were identical, [then] just as the word 'pot' 
comes into existence even externally, not depending on the assemblage of the 
lump of clay, the [potter's] wheel, the water, etc, [likewise], having clearly 
comprehended [the word] pot, the pot, etc would come into existence. When 
uttering 'pot', the mouth would become full, and when uttering 'fire' the 
lips 
would burn. And this cannot be accepted. (VaidC52). 
However, although it is clear from these passages that Nägärjuna 
does want to 
uphold the distinction between concepts which refer to conceptually constructed entities 
and the conceptually constructed referents, this does not mean 
that he uses the term 
'prajfaptfrupädäya to denote the concepts which refer to conceptually constructed entities, 
rather than the conceptually constructed referents. As 
Warder has shown', there is a long 
"Warder (1970a), pp. 181-196. 
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tradition (albeit only fully developed long after Nagärjuna's time) in Abhidhamma thought 
of using the term'paff"attl both to denote concepts which refer to conceptually constructed 
entities and also to denote the conceptually constructed referents. ('Panfattl also denotes 
those concepts which refer to dharma-s, non-conceptually constructed entities, (though, of 
course, pafnattidoes not denote the dharma-s themselves) but that is not relevant here). 
In other words, for the Abhidhamma, it is not correct to assert that conceptually 
constructed entities are not paffatti. Which is not to say that concepts which refer to 
conceptually constructed entities and the conceptually constructed referents are conflated, 
but rather that the term 'pafnattl has two distinct senses-- i. e. pannatti--s which refer to 
conceptually constructed entities, and pan-Hauls which are the conceptually constructed 
entities. " And, significantly, perhaps, the term 'upädäyapafnattl (as distinct from 
'pafnattl) is sometimes used only to denote the parinatti-s which are the conceptually 
constructed referents and not the pain"atti-s which refer to conceptually constructed 
referents. 44 
Thus, it is quite possible that Nägärjuna is here using the term 'prajriaptirupädäyd 
to denote conceptually constructed existents, i. e. the referents of concepts. Which is to say 
that a prajlaptlrupädäya is the chariot, for example, itself, and not the concept which has 
the chariot as its referent. 
* 
Candrakirti seems to understand 114AIKXXIV, 18 in the way that I have suggested, 
for he writes, in his commentary on this verse, that emptiness and upädäyaprajfapti (and 
the middle path) are 'different names' (visesasamjn"a), i. e. synonyms, for dependent 
origination (pratltyasamutpäda). 45 Candrakirti gives the traditional example of the chariot 
(ratha). He says that, the prajüapti of the chariot which occurs depending on (upädäya) the 
parts (atgnl) of the chariot is not produced with svabhäva. Non-production with 
svabhäva(svabbävenänutpatti), Candrakirti says, is emptiness (sünyata). ' In otherwords, 
"The distinction is between, in Abhidhamma terms, concepts (pazi atti): 'requiring to be made understood 
(panfäpetabba)' (i. e. conceptually constructed entities), and 'making understood' (pannäpana) (i. e. the 
concepts which refer to conceptually constructed entities (and dharma-s)). Warder notes that 
Buddhadatta (5th century) makes this distinction in his Abhidhammävatira, as do later Abhidhamma 
thinkers. The most developed expression of this theory is in the Paramatthavinicchaya of Anuruddha II of 
Käiici (12th century). See Warder (1970), pp. 190-196. 
"See Warder (1970a), p. 192. 
"PP 504, tadevam pratityasamutpädasyaivaitä visesasamjnäh-- iünyatä, upädlya prajnaptih, madhyamä 
pratipad iti// 
"PP 504, yä ceyam svabhävas`vnyatI sä prajriaptirupädäya, saiva s`ünyatä upädayaprajnaptiriti 
vya vasthäpyate/ cakrädinyupädaya rathAdgäni rathah prajnapyate tasya y3 svängän vupädä ti a 
prajnaptih, sä svabhävenänutpattih, yä ca svabhävenänutpattih, s5 9ünyat3/ See also the Tibetan 
translation, stung pa nyidgang yin pa de ni brten nasgdagspa ste/stung pa nyid ni brten nas gdags pa zhes 
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chariot is dependently originating = is empty (of svabhäva) = is a prajnapti dependently 
originating on the basis of its parts. 47 
It seems clear that Candrakirti here intends the example of the chariot to illustrate 
what is the case about all entities. All entities are dependently originating, which means that 
they are empty of svabhäva, which means that they are prajnapti-s, i. e. conceptually 
constructed entities, depending upon parts. 
Candrakirti at least is therefore unequivocal, it seems to me, in his assertion of 
prajn"aptlmätra. Thus, in the YSV he criticizes his fellow Buddhists (rang gi sde pa)-- 
whom he identifies as the Vaibhäsikas (bye brag tu smra ba), Sauträntikas (mdo sde pa), 
and Vijii navädins (ream par sizes pa tsam du smra ba)-- for asserting that (some) 
dependently arising entities have dravyasat(rdzas su yod pa nyid), i. e. svatzlpa (ranggi ngo 
bo), here a synonym for svabhäva. He compares them, rather unkindly, to a wild horse (#a 
dmu rgod) which imitates the behaviour of an ass (bong bu)! (The implication being, of 
course, that the Mädhyamika, because he rejects that any dependently originating entity 
has dravyasat, is the thoroughbred! ) 4ß 
4.5. Prajrlaptimätra and karma. 
There is very strong evidence, then, for the interpretation that Nägärjuna advocates 
that all entities have conceptually constructed existence. It should be noted, however, that it 
does not follow that because Nägärjuna says that everything is a conceptual construct, 
therefore the world, i. e. the manifold of conventions, is, for Nägärj una, under one's control. 
One needs to resist here, I think, the notion that the manner in which one conceptually 
constructs is, according to Nägärjuna, generally a matter of choice. On the contrary, it is 
presumably the case that one's world is largely, in Nägärjuna's view, a conceptual 
construction on the basis of previous actions (karma), so that one is subject to it, rather than 
in control of it. The way in which the world manifests is the inevitable consequence of past 
deeds (karmavlpäka). Nägärjuna's acceptance of the law of karma is clear: 
las mains 'bras bu bcas nyid dang/ 
gro ba dag kyang yang dag bsbad/ 
bya bar main bzhag dogs la/ khor lo la sogspa shing rta i yan lag la brten nas shing rtar dogs la/de'i rang 
gi yan lag la brten nas btags pa gang yrn pa de ni/rang bzhin gyis ma skyespa yin la/gang rang bzhin gyis 
ma skyespa deni stongpa nyid.. 
"See also MA VI, 150-165. 
'See YSV40-42. 
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Actions having consequences and also the states of existence have been 
correctly explained [by the Buddha]. (YS32a-b). 
asubhätsarvaduhkhäni sarvä durgatayastathä/ 
subhätsugatayah sarväh sarvajanmasukhäni ca// 
All sufferings and bad migrations result from vices. 
All good migrations and the pleasures in all [re-]births result from virtues. 
(RVI, 21). 49 
It must be granted, however, that Nagärjuna never explicitly states that the world 
one is born into is a conceptual construct as a result of karma. 50 He might simply mean that 
the fact that one is born into a particular sort of world and particular circumstances is a 
product of karma. 51 But if karma is the most significant conditioning force on the mind for 
Nägärjuna-- which, given that he is a Buddhist, it clearly is-- and if everything is according 
to Nägärjuna entirely a conceptual construct, it would seem to follow that it is karma which 
fundamentally produces the conceptually constructed world in which one exists. 
I think that this is a very important point to stress, because it shows that, if in 
Nägärjuna's view the world is a conceptual construct, nevertheless to a great extent for 
Ndgarjuna one is subject to, rather than master of, it. Conventions (samvrtl) are, therefore, 
often not entities which one can decide whether or not to construct in the way in which one 
does. On the contrary, conventions usually force themselves upon one; the way in which 
one constructs them has already been decided, as it were, by the law of karma. 
In many cases, particularly I suppose concerning entities of the natural world, if 
there is consensus or agreement about conventions-- for example, if we agree that the river 
is flowing with water-- it is presumably the case that we agree because of common 
karmavipäka, rather than because we have each 'decided' to construct a river flowing with 
water! Our common karmavipäka compels us both to construct a river flowing with water. 
"See also MMK XVIH, 5, XXIV, 17; VVC 70. 
"It is, however, true that the Bodhicittavivarana which is traditionally attributed to Nägärjuna, states that 
'convention arises from karma [produced by] defilement. ' (kun rdzob nyon mongs las las byung) (BV 
69a). This seems to state pretty explicitly that the conventional world actually exists as a consequence of 
karma. However, Williams (1984), p. 79 ff has argued persuasively that the BV is not by Nägärjuna. 
Willaims speculates that theB V 'may have been composed in the 'school' of 
Säntaraksita'. 
It appears that both of these conflicting views of the relationship between karma and the physical world are 
present in Buddhist philosophy. According to Karunadasa (1967), p. 110, the Theraväda Abhidhamma 
advocates that only the matter (rüpa) which constitutes the body of a living being comes 
into existence as 
the result of kamma. The matter of the world external to living beings is not the product of 
kamma. But 
according to the Andhakas, the world external to living beings is also a result of 
kamma For a record of 
this controversy, see Kathävatthu pp. 205-207 (Aung and Rhys Davids (trans) 
(1969)). Vasubandhu 
seems to say that the Vaibhäsika view is that the receptacle or physical world 
(bhäjanaloka) itself, and not 
simply the bodies of sentient beings, is the result of karma. SeeAKBh III, 45-46a-b. 
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Human beings inhabit a generally similar conventional world because their common 
karmavipäkaobliges them to construct the world in a generally similar sort of fashion. The 
preta might see the river as flowing with pus, and he might be in agreement with other 
preta-s in this matter, but this too is presumably because of common karmavipäka, rather 
than through any personal choice. Preta-s and humans might disagree on whether there is a 
river of pus or a river of water, but this is because their karmavipäka is different, so that the 
conventions differ which they are compelled to construct. (But note that, in this example, as 
both humans and preta-s see a fiver, their karmavipäka must to some degree be similar). 
Preta-s, I imagine, cannot decide to construct rivers of water in place of their conceptually 
constructed rivers of pus just as human beings (excepting great yogis-s, perhaps) cannot 
choose to construct rivers ofpus in place of their rivers ofwater. 52 
This explanation also suggests, incidentally, that for Nägärjuna it is not one's 
culture or linguistic community which primarily determines the conventions which one 
constructs, contrary to some modern interpretations of Madhyamaka. 53 Rather, it is one's 
karma which is the most fundamental cause of the conceptual constructs to which one is 
subject. The root cause of my experiencing the world in the way in which I do-- with its 
trees, mountains, rivers, etc-- is that my karma has matured in such a way as to subject me to 
"It is not, however, the case that unenlightened people know that the world which they conceptually construct 
is a conceptual construction. On the contrary, unenlightened people erroneously perceive and 
erroneously believe the conceptually constructed world to be (largely) mind-independent. Entities 
appear one way but exist in another, as the dGe lugs pa tradition says (Hopkins (1996), p. 405). The 
conceptually constructed nature of entities is, of course, only fully seen by the enlightened sage. Thus, 
Candrakirti says that entities, though in fact conceptually constructed , 'exist 
[i. e. as mind-independent 
entities] from the perspective of the consensus of the world'. (jigrten grags pa i sgo nas yod pa yio. See 
MA VI, 167. This 'perspective of the consensus of the world' is, of course, wrong. In the MABh, 
Candrakirti declares that entities-- which delude the unenlightened people (byispa mains)-- are, for the 
enlightened people (de lasgzban pa reams), 'mere conventions' (kun rdzob tsam), because these entities 
arise in dependence, like an illusion, etc. Entities delude the unenlightened people in that these entities 
are thought to have svabhäva The enlightened people are, by contrast, free from this delusion; they see 
that entities are in fact prajnaptisat MABh 107-109 (quoted in Williams (1991 b), p. 211), byispa mains 
la nislu bar byed pa yin lade lasgzban pa reams Is ni sgyu ma la sogspa Itarrten cing brel bar 'byung pa 
nyidkyiskun rdzob tsam gyurro// 
The unenlightened person, according to the Mädhyamika, believes that he has knowledge of mind- 
independent entities (e. g. via perception), but this is an erroneous belief. This erroneous belief is, 
presumably, encouraged by the fact that other people, who conceptually construct similarly to oneself 
(primarily because of similar karmavipäka), will also (usually) perceive the entity which one perceives. 
Because of the agreement amongst people about what is perceived, one concludes (wrongly) that one's 
cognition is a case of knowledge, in the sense of an apprehension of a mind-independent state-of-affairs. 
In fact, however, one's cognition is of a commonly acknowledged conceptually constructed entity (a 
shared fiction, as it were). See here BA IX, 6 a-b, 'Even what is perceptible, visible 
form, etc, [is 
established] by consensus, not by knowledge'. (My translation is based on that of 
Crosby and Skilton 
(1996), p. 115). (pratyaksamapi rrrpädi prasiddbyä na pramäpatah). 'Consensus' is a translation of 
prasiddhi (see Monier-Williams (1899), p. 697, 'general opinion, publicity, celebrity, renown, 
fame, 
rumour. ') 
"See, for example, Huntington (1989). 
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this sort of conceptual construction. That we both have similar experiences is presumably 
primarily because our karma is maturing in similar ways, not because we originate from a 
common culture or share a language, etc. 
It will undoubtedly be the case that the culture or linguistic community in which one 
exists will affect to some extent the way in which conceptual construction will occur. For 
example, artifacts, institutions and values are obviously at least in part a matter of culturally 
determined conceptual construction. (Whether Nägärjuna himself was aware of this point, 
I do not know. References in his works to socio-linguistic communities as forces of 
conditioning are conspicuous by their absence! References to karma, however, are 
common). However, it is worth noting that the specific culture and linguistic community in 
which one exists is itself presumably largely a conceptual construction as a result of karma. 
The primary cause of conceptual construction is, then, karma, rather than cultural or 
linguistic conditioning. 
I must add, however, that Nagärjuna's view that natural entities are the product of 
conceptual construction governed primarily by karma seems pretty implausible to me. I 
think that I can perhaps accept that I exist in the sort of world, in the sort of circumstances, in 
which I find myself as a result of karma, but it seems incredible to believe that the world in 
which I find myself is itself actually a product of karma. Am I really to believe that the 
world of trees, mountains, rivers, etc (and even the constituents of these entities) is entirely 
a conceptual construct which only comes into existence because of my past actions? This 
seems no less bizarre (perhaps more bizarre), surely, than the claim that trees, mountains, 
rivers, etc (and their constituents) somehow exist because of the cultural or linguistic 
conditioning to which one is subject. 
It seems far more likely, then, that so-called conventions, i. e. the manifold entities 
of the world, are in fact, in many cases (for example, the entire natural world), not 
essentially a result of conceptual construction, i. e. they are not actually conventions. I 
suggest that there is a world-- of complex natural entities-- which exists prior to and 
independent of conceptual construction, be the conceptual construction a result of 
karma, 
cultural conditioning, or of any other form. Yet, ifNägärjuna is advocating prajnaptimätra, 
he cannot admit that this is the case. 
And there is another (and, I think, fatal) problem with Nägärjuna's explanation 
here. 
He might want to advocate that the laws of karma govern the conceptual constructions 
which take place, but I do not think that in fact he can consistently uphold 
this position as 
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position as well as the notion of prajnaptimätra. For if the laws of karma govern conceptual 
construction, then it must follow that the laws of karma are not themselves conceptual 
constructs. That the conceptually constructed world is a result of karma entails, I think. 
that the various laws which (supposedly) determine how one conceptually constructs the 
world on the basis of previous actions are not themselves part of the conceptually 
constructed world. Nägärjuna's advocacy of the law of karma appears to compromise his 
position that everything is conceptually constructed. 
4.6. Prajnaptimatraand the Possibility of a Public World. 
This is just the beginning of Nägärjuna's difficulties, however. I contend that the 
verylntelligibllityof much of one's experience depends on the assumption that many of our 
cognitions do in fact apprehend mind-independent realities. " Even if Nägärjuna were 
right, and there is not a mind-independent world which our cognitions apprehend, we must 
take for granted this mind-independent world nonetheless. 
For example, if I trust my cognition of a pool of water, I trust that the pool of water 
which I cognize is accessible to the cognitions of other people (and, indeed, that these other 
people exist independently of my mind). I trust that they too can perceive the water, that it 
will quench their thirst, etc. And I trust that the water is there to be cognized by others not 
because we engage in a collective fantasy of thirst-quenching water, but because there is a 
mind-independent pool of water to be cognized. This is what it means to trust that one's 
cognition of the water is correct. I cannot trust that my cognition of the pool of water is 
correct, yet think that there is no mind-independent pool of water to be apprehended, by 
myself and others. And I do and in fact must-- if I am to act at all and to participate in public 
reality-- trust my cognition in this way. 
Searle" makes the point that much human communication presupposes the 
mind-independent existence ofmany of the entities which are communicated about. This is 
a condition for the possibility of communication, and the fact that one does take part in such 
communication proves that one assumes that such entities do actually exist independently 
of one's mind. Such communication also, of course, assumes that the people with whom 
one communicates exist independently of one's mind. If I am to say to you that I am going 
to bathe in the pool of water, I must assume that the pool of water which I am planning to 
bathe in is accessible to your cognitions, as well as to mine. I also must assume that this 
"See Searle (1995), p. 184. 
"See Searle (1995), pp. 181-188. 
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water is not simply a shared conceptual construct which we both have, but that there is an 
actual, i. e. mind-independent pool of water which I (and you too) may bathe in (provided it 
is large and deep enough! ). What could it mean, I wonder, to believe that one is going to 
bathe in a conceptually constructed pool of water (and, perhaps, with a conceptually 
constructed friend)?! " 
So, a difficult problem for Nägärjuna-- who holds that there are no 
mind-independent entities, i. e. no entities with svabhäva, to be known-- is how, if 
everything is a conceptual construct, a public world would be possible. Nägärjuna would 
of course admit that the unenlightened person believes that (many) entities have svabhäva, 
i. e. are more-than-conceptually constructed, even though this is not, according to 
Nägärjuna, a correct belief Thus, perhaps Nägärjuna would claim, it is the false belief in 
more-than-conceptually constructed entities which allows the unenlightened person to 
participate in a public world. But, then, it is not really that there is a public world which the 
unenlightened person participates in, but rather a world which he falsely believes to be 
public (but which is really his conceptual construction)! 
And this reasoning has the peculiar consequence that, if one comes to know and 
perceive that all entities are in fact without svabhäva, i. e. are conceptual constructs, then the 
false belief and perception which enables one to participate in an (apparently) public world 
would be destroyed. The enlightened Mädhyamika would see, not only that all objects of 
the supposedly public world are conceptual constructs but also, that the very people with 
whom he might share the publicly accessible world are themselves his own conceptual 
constructs. There are in fact no other people who have similar karmavipäka to oneself and 
with whom one might therefore participate in a commonly acknowledged conceptually 
constructed world! The enlightened Mädhyamika must surely be a solipsist (which seems 
to me to be a peculiar sort of enlightenment). 
It is difficult to see how, in this condition, the Bodhisattva ideal-- which is a 
This is not to say, however, that all objects of knowledge have a more-than-conceptually-constructed 
existence. To take an obvious example (cited by Searle (1995)), the rules of a game are entirely a 
conceptual construct. When one knows the rules of the game, one apprehends a conceptual construct to 
which people in general assent. It is the general assent of people to the rules of the game-- rather than a 
mind-independent state-of-affairs-- which makes the rules of the game correct. If other people no longer 
agreed to the rules of the game which I uphold, then the rules of the game which I uphold could not be said 
in any meaningful sense to be correct. I could not then be said to know the rules of the game. Human 
institutions generally seem to have this status ofbeing shared conceptual constructions 
Nevertheless, even in the case of such conceptually constructed institutions, one must assume that the 
human beings with which they are shared, at least, are not themselves one's conceptual constructs. 
Otherwise, the conceptually constructed institutions would not actually be shared, because the people 
with whom one supposedly shares them with would not have existence independent of one's mind. 
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fundamental pillar of Mähäyana (and hence Madhyamaka" ) spirituality-- could be 
enacted. It does, after all, seem to be a real paradox (and by this I mean a non- sensical 
statement, a contradiction) that the Bodhisattva saves all sentient beings yet there are no 
sentient beings to be saved (for they are all the Bodhisattva's own conceptual constructs). " 
The realization of emptiness-- i. e. of the conceptually constructed nature of everything, 
including all sentient beings-- would seem to be incompatible with the ideal of compassion. 
The Bodhisattva who holds together knowledge of emptiness and compassion is not so 
much extraordinary as deeply puzzling. 
4.7. The Nihilistic Consequences of prajnaptimatra. 
But it is not just that prajnaptimätra precludes the possibility of a public world, and 
hence of compassionate activity. In addition, it would appear that Nagarjuna's opponents 
are right, after all, to accuse Nägärjuna of nihilism. For Nägärjuna is not merely saying-- 
despite his apparent claims to the contrary-- that entities are dependently originating, but 
further that all entities are entirely conceptually constructed. But if all entities are entirely 
conceptually constructed, then there can be nothing unconstructed out of which 
conceptually constructed entities can be constructed. And if there is nothing unconstructed 
out of which the conceptually constructed entities are constructed, then these conceptually 
constructed entities cannot exist. Conceptually constructed entity zmight be constructed 
on the basis of y. Ymight also be constructed on the basis of x. And so on. But at some 
point this regress must stop. Not everything can be a product of conceptual construction, 
because 'conceptual construction' requires a basis or material which is not itself 
conceptually constructed. 59 To claim otherwise would be to advocate that one's mind 
creates the entire world exnibilo! One can see here, perhaps, the cause of the Abhidharma 
(and the Yogäcära6°) objection to Madhyamaka philosophy. 
'Tor Nägärjuna's advocacy of the bodbsattva ideal, see RV, V. Some of the most striking Indian Mahäyäna 
works on the bodhisattva ideal are by Mädhyamikas. Most notably, there is 
Säntideva's BC and 
Candrakirti's MA/MABh. 
58See here Vajracchedikä sutra p. 123 (Conze (trans) (1973)). Of course, one usually tries to overcome this 
paradox by interpreting it to mean that the Bodhisattva saves all sentient beings 
but there are no sentient 
beings with svabbäva to save. (Rather than there being literally no sentient 
beings to save). But this 
simply will not do, given that, as I have argued, the position that all sentient 
beings lack svabbäva in fact 
reduces to the solipsistic position that sentient beings are simply the creation of one's mind. 
We end up 
back in the paradox, which I take as a sign-- not that here we have to do with some trans-rational truth 
but 
rather-- that there is something seriously wrong with (incoherent about) the 
Madhyamaka position, 
which upholds both the truth of emptiness and the ideal of the Bodhisattva. 
"See here Searle (1995), esp pp. 55-56. 
'Williams has argued that the Yogäcära is perhaps best understood as a response to what were 
felt to be the 
nihilist implications of the Madhyamaka teaching of prajnaptimätra. 
Thus, the Yogäcära returns to the 
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Also, the notion of conceptual construction would appear to entail-- not on],, 
something foundational on the basis of which constructed entities can be constructed, but 
also-- someone or something foundational who or which is doing the constructing. If it is 
contended that all entities are conceptually constructed, this would seem to necessitate an 
answer to the question, conceptually constructed by whom? If it is then said, as a consistent 
Mädhyamika presumably must say, that whoever conceptually constructs is himself 
conceptually constructed", an infinite regress results. I don't think that I can make sense of 
the idea that even the agent (the self, the mind, or whatever one chooses to call it) which 
conceptually constructs entities is itself a conceptual construction. The explanation that 
the agent is itself a conceptual construction begs the question, for such a conceptual 
construction would itself require an agent to do the constructing. The meaning of 
'conceptual construction' pre-supposes an agent which is a perpetrator of, and is logically 
prior to, the conceptual construction. 62 
The very idea of conceptual construction seems to imply, then, both some material, 
itself unconstructed, which is the basis of construction, and also some agent who is the 
constructor of what is constructed. Yet, according to the interpretation which I have 
presented, in his assertion that all entities are conventions, i. e. prajaptlsat, Nägärjuna 
precludes the possibility of either of these necessary requirements for conceptual 
construction. If, therefore, as Nagärjuna seems to say, the ultimate truth is that all entities 
are conventional truths in the Abhidharma sense, then it seems to follow that-- unwelcome 
as the conclusion might be to Nägärjuna himself-- in fact nothing whatsoever exists at all. 
Nägärjuna is, as his opponents contend, a nihilist. " 
Abhidharma principle that there must be a dravyasat basis for prajnaptisatentities. For the Yogäcära, 
Williams argues, this dravyasat substratum is the (mental) flow of experiences, i. e. the 
paratantrasvabhäva, on the basis of which the world of objects is constructed. In other words, the series 
of mental moments cannot be analyzed away (though it is, of course, dependently originating). Its 
foundational existence is pre-supposed if there is to be any conceptual construction at all. See Williams 
(manuscript 2), pp. 25-36. 
61See here MA VI, 71 c-d, mdor na ji Itar sties bya med de bzhia blo yang med ces don 'di shes pargyis/ 
62This in no way contradicts the important psychological/spiritual point that, in many respects, one's views 
about one's self are conceptual constructs (e. g. as a result of upbringing, habit, education, and, arguably, 
karma). I am simply making the compatible philosophical point that in order to have conceptually 
constructed views about who one is, there must be someone/something which has the views, or is doing 
the viewing. 
'If my reasoning here is correct, then it can be concluded, in addition, that Nägärjuna falls into the paradox of 
nihilism, of which the opponent at VV 1 accuses him. For his statement that 'all entities are empty of 
svabhävd does indeed, it would seem, entail that nothing whatsoever exists. In this case, absurdly, 
Nägärjuna cannot actually utter the statement or establish that 'everything is empty'-- for the statement 
and the proof are themselves non-existent! 
It simply will not do to reply, as does Nägärjuna at VV/VVC22-23, that his statement (vacanam) 
that all things are without svabbäva-- though itself without svabhsva (nihsvabhävamapl)-- can engage 
(vartate) in elucidating the absence of svabhäva (nihsvabh vatvaprasädhane) of entities, just as carts 
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4.8. An Alternative Reading. Nagarjuna as a Critic of 
the Vaibhasika Theory that (samskrta) dharma-s 
sasvabhavamatra are Permanent. 
Is there any way out of this conundrum for the interpreter of Nägärjuna? Can 
Nägärjuna be saved from nihilism (and solipsism)? Let me suggest an alternative 
interpretation. "° 
According to this alternative interpretation, the true object of the Madhyamaka 
critique of svabhäva is actually the position, propounded by the Vaibhäsika Abhidharma, 
that (samskrta) dharma-s, insofar they exist 'with svabhäva only' (sasvabbävamätra) are 
permanent. In which case the Abhidharma notion of svabbävawhich Nägärjuna attacks is 
not svabhäva as denoting irreducible/unanalyzable and thus more-than- 
conceptually-constructed existence. Rather, he attacks the Vaibhäsika theory that the 
possession of svabhäva by the (samskrta) dharma-s entails that the (samskrta) dharma-s 
exist (with svabhäva only) in all three times, i. e. permanently. 
For the Vaibhäsika Abhidharma, the present existence of (samskrta) dharma-s (in 
which they are endowed with-- together with svabhäva-- activity (käritra)) is dependently 
originating, indeed momentary. However, these (samskrta) dbarma-s-- possessing 
svabbävabut without activity-- are said to exist also in the past and the future. (Samskrta) 
dharma-s are (with svabhäva only) permanent. 
The permanent existence of the (samskrta) dharma-s (with svabhäva only) is what 
enables (samskrta) dharma-s to have various capacities (sämarthya) even when the 
(samskrta) dharma-s are not presently existent, i. e. even when the (samskrta) dharma-s do 
not have activity (karitra). For example, the (samskrta) dharma-s' permanent existence 
(ratha), garmants (pats), pots (gbata), etc can engage (vartante) in their respective 
functions (käryesu) 
though dependently originating, without svabbäva. Nägärjuna's idea here is, then, that the teaching of 
universal emptiness does not negate the existence of entities, but just their existence with svabbäva. 
Hence entities can still function, including Nägärjuna's statement that'all entities are without svabbäva. 
' 
The problem is that, as I have demonstrated in this chapter, if literally everything 
is without 
svabbäva, and this means prajnaptimätra, then it is impossible that any entities-- 
be they carts, pots, cloth, 
or statements asserting the absence of svabbäva of all entities-- can exist at all 
in order to fulfill their 
respective functions. An absurd idea, surely, but one which seems to 
be entailed by Nägärjuna's 
philosophy of emptiness, if understood in the Abhidharma context. 
suppose that one might try to solve the problem of nihilism by resorting to 
interpretation (1). considered in 
chapter 3. That is, Nägärjuna might be understood to assert-- not that entities 
in their true nature are 
prajnaptimatra but rather-- that entities in their true nature are unconceptualizable. 
But if one resorts to 
this solution to the problem of nihilism, one is confronted by the textual and philosophical 
difficulties 
which I have explained in the previous chapter (see 3.3-3.4). 
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(with svabbäva only) is meant to explain how (samskrta) dbarma-s may be cognized (e. g. 
by memory or imagination) even when they are past or future, and also how past (samskna) 
dharma-s may have causal efficacy (e. g. the karmic effects of past skilful and unskilful 
mental (samskrta) dbarma-s). Thus, when one remembers or imagines a (samskrta) 
dharma, it is the (samskrta) dharma existing with svabbäva only which is one's object of 
cognition. If one suffers pain because of a previous unskilful (samskrta) dharma it is the 
(samskrta) dbarma existing with svabbäva only which affects one's present mental 
continuum, producing the present mental (samskrta) dbarma. 65 
I make no comment here on the cogency of this Vaibhäsika explanation. The 
important point in the present context is that such an explanation was, the Vaibhäsikas 
thought, necessitated by various philosophical problems which arise from the position that 
(samskrta) dbarma-s dependently originate in a momentary fashion (for how can a 
momentary (samskrta) dharma be an object of cognition if it is no longer or not yet existent, 
and how can such a momentary (samskrta) dbarma have causal efficacy if it has ceased? ) 
The notion that the (samskrta) dbarma-s, existing sasvabbävamätra, are permanent is not 
then intended as a denial of, but rather is an attempt to solve the theoretical problems posed 
by, this momentary dependent origination of (samskrta) dharma-s. 
But Nägarjuna might argue that the Vaibhäsika theory that the (samskrta) dbarma-s 
exist permanently (with svabbäva only) compromises the notion that (samskrta) dbarma-s 
are dependently originating. In effect, the Vaibhäsika theory entails that there is a 
permanent essential nature of dependently originating (samskrta) dbarma-s which remains 
independent of the process of arising and cessation. For the Vaibhäsika Abhidharma, then, 
dependent origination of (samskrta) dharma-s is not dependent origination through and 
through-- there is an essential nature which is untouched by pratltyasamutpäda. 
According to this interpretation, Nägärjuna's philosophy would not entail nihilism. 
Nagärjuna does not reject (samskrta) dharma-s, understood as the foundational (though 
dependently originating) existents upon which the world of complex entities is constructed. 
He does not assert that everything is a conceptual construct. There are foundational 
(samskrta) dharma-s, Nägärjuna might be saying, but, contrary to the Vaibhäsika theory, 
they do not possess a permanent existence (with svabbäva only). Which is to say that the 
foundational (samskrta) dbarma-s in no respect are other than dependently originating. 
'See AKBh V, 25c-d-27. See also Williams (1981), pp. 227-257. Cox (1995), pp. 134-137,141. 
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4.8.1. Textual Difficulties. 
However, although I would not completely discount this interpretation, it seems to 
me to be somewhat implausible. I think that for Nägärjuna, and later Mädhyamikas, it is far 
more likely that it is the Abhidharma theory of dharma-s with svabhäva as 
irreducible/unanalyzable (and, hence, as more-than-conceptually constructed) existents-- 
rather than the specifically Vaibhäsika theory of (samskrta) dharma-s (with svabhäva only) 
as existing permanently-- which is the (principal) object of attack. This is for three 
reasons: 
(i) As I have already commented (see note 8), it is not at all clear that the 
Abhidharma philosophy with which Nägärjuna was familiar was in fact that of the 
Vaibhäsika school, who upheld the notion that (samskrta) dharma-s exist permanently 
sasvabhävamätra. And Nägärjuna at no point explicitly mentions the Vaibhäsika doctrine, 
which is surely strange if it is the principal object of his attack. 
(ii) As I have explained in detail in this chapter, there is very strong evidence in 
Nägärjuna's texts that his fundamental objection is to the notion that any dependent 
originating entity has more than a conventional, conceptually constructed status. Thus, it 
does not seem that, even if Nägärjuna, etc were criticizing the Vaibhäsika doctrine of 
permanent (samskrta) dharma-s existing with svabhäva only, it is the primary object of his 
critique of svabhäva. That is, a large body of textual evidence (reviewed above) suggests 
that, even if (samskrta) dharma-s with svabhäva were posited as in all respects 
impermanent or momentary-- i. e. as being through and through dependently originating-- 
Nägärjuna, etc would object to them, on the grounds that the possession of such a svabhäva 
would entail irreducible/unanalyzable (and, hence, more-than-conceptual), albeit 
momentary, existence. 
(iii) Finally, it is clear that later Madhyamikas, such as Candrakirti (see YSV40-42) 
criticize the notion of svabhäva not only as it appears in the Vaibhäsika Abhidharma, but 
also as it occurs in the Sauträntika and Vijnänavädin' schools, neither of whom accept the 
Vaibhäsika theory of permanent (samskrta) dharma-s (with svabhäva only). (In fact, the 
Sauträntikas were vigorous opponents of this Vaibhäsika theory. They assert the complete 
momentariness of (samskrta) dbarma-s with svabbävab). What all three of these schools 
For a more sustained attack by Candrakirti on the Vijiiänavädins, see MA VI, 
45-97. The Vijnänavädins are 
presented as upholding that the paratantrrarüpa, i. e. the dependently originating 
flow of experiences, is 
the basis or cause of prajfaptisatentities. MA VI, 47 a-b, de phyirgzhangyi 
dbanggi ngo bogang, 'dngos 
po btags par yod pa i rgyur gyur... It is this notion of a foundational paratantrarüpa which 
Candrakirti 
refutes. 
6'See AKBh V, 25c-d- 27. 
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have in common is an adherence-- contrary to Madhyamaka-- to some foundational, 
more-than-conceptually constructed form of existence (dravyasafj. Candrakirti makes 
clear that his objection is to the notion of dravyasatas it occurs in all three of these schools. 
He does not say that his objection is to the Vaibhäsika theory that (samskrta) dharma-s 
sasvabhävamätraexist permanently. 
4.8.2. A Philosophical Problem. 
But even if Nägärjuna were saved from nihilism by means of this alternative 
interpretation, this would not be the end of his philosophical difficulties. Even if Nägärj una 
accepts that there are simple, more-than-conceptually constructed dbarma-s (albeit, in all 
respects dependently originating), he will still accept, with the Abhidharma, that all 
non-atomic (complex) entities, i. e. wholes, are conceptual constructs on the basis of these 
really existing dharma-s. 
But it seems to me that this way of drawing the distinction between conceptually 
constructed and not conceptually constructed existents-- presupposed by Abhidharmikas 
and Mädhyamikas alike-- is philosophically dubious. I find it implausible that complex 
entities, i. e. wholes which have parts, must always be conceptually constructed. Is it 
actually the case that the various commonly experienced complex entities of the natural 
world, for example, are conceptually constructed on the basis of numerous atomic 
particles? Is a tree or a mountain, for instance, really a conceptually constructed entity-- all 
that exists in a non-conceptually constructed way being various dharma-s, which the mind 
uses as its basis of construction? It seems far more plausible that wholes such as mountains 
and trees, etc68 exist with parts but also independently of conceptualization. 
Granted, many of the functions that one attributes to these whole, natural entities are 
mind-dependent (e. g. the tree is for fire-wood, the tree is for shelter, the tree is beautiful) but 
this is very different than saying that the whole, natural entities to which one attributes 
functions are themselves conceptually constructed. Entities when cognized acquire a value 
within the realm of human purposes, even if this position or value is 'useless'. But this 
emphatically does not mean that natural, complex entities are reducible to the values which 
are assigned to them. 69 
`Williams (1997b), p. 141 argues for the inclusion of the person in the category of such natural entities, which 
are not simply conceptual constructions. 
69See here Searle (1995), p. 14ff. One might also argue that some of the characteristics (e. g. colour, perhaps) 
attributed to complex, natural entities do not actually inhere in these entities. 
This would be to introduce a 
Lockean-type of distinction between primary and secondary qualities. Of course, 
it is a moot point 
precisely which qualities of a natural entity are inherent and which qualities are not. 
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Thus, a fundamental philosophical mistake, perhaps, in the Abhidharma and 
Madhyamaka philosophies alike, is that they equate complex existence (the existence of the 
whole) with conceptually constructed existence. My contention is that it seems more likely 
that many complex entities have in fact mind independent existence. '° 
No doubt one must accept that complex entities-- such as trees and mountains-- 
cannot exist without their (essential) parts, but it does not follow, therefore, that such 
entities are conceptual constructs on the basis of their (essential) parts. That a tree, for 
example, cannot exist without dependence upon its (essential) constituents-- the roots, 
trunk, branches, etc-- does not entail that the tree is a conceptual construction. It just means 
that one of the conditions which must exist in order for the entity 'tree' to occur is that its 
various (essential) constituents be present. Complex entities have that type of existence 
which is dependent upon (essential) parts but this is not to say necessarily that they are 
conceptually constructed out of their (essential) parts. " 
Of course, some complex entities, it might be conceded, are entirely conventional, 
i. e. entirely the product of conceptual construction. For example, institutional facts such as 
governments and marriages are completely dependent on consensus or custom for their 
existence. If human beings and human societies did not create governments and marriages, 
they simply would not exist at all. Perhaps the same might be said of artifacts-- such as cars 
and tables, although, one should note, such artifacts are always constructed out of 
(complex) natural materials, i. e. non-artifacts, which, though certainly dependently 
originating, are not dependent on conceptual construction for their existence. " 
4.9. Conclusion. 
Thus, on one reading (for which there is a considerable amount of textual evidence), 
Nägärjuna declares that everything is simply a conceptual construct, and he is thereby 
condemned, contrary to his intentions, to nihilism. On another reading (for which there is 
far less textual support), Nägärjuna attacks only the Vaibhäsika theory that dharma-s exist 
permanently sasvabbävatnätra. According to this latter reading, Nägärjuna is right to 
declare that he is no nihilist, for he claims only that dbarma-s are in all respects dependently 
originating, and not that even dbarma-s are conceptual constructs. There is thus a 
'In taking this position, I am siding, on this specific issue, with the Naiyäyikas and against the 
Buddhists. For 
the Naiyäyikas, the whole is a distinct entity, dependent upon its parts but nevertheless not a conceptual 
construct out of the parts. See Matilal (1986). 
See Searle (1995). See also Williams (1997b), pp. 141-155. 
'For some reflections on this issue, see Searle (1995), Williams (1997b), pp. 
140 ff. 
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foundation, not itself conceptually constructed, on the basis of which conceptual 
construction may take place. However, even according to this interpretation, Nägärjuna 
advocates the dubious position that all complex entities (non-dbarma-s) have conceptually 
constructed existence (prajaptlsaf). Even if Nägärjuna's philosophy does not entail 
nihilism, then, it is probably guilty (along with the Abhidharmikas and other Buddhist 
thinkers73 who reject the more-than-conceptual existence of wholes) of excessive 
ontological parsimony. 
"I think, for example, of Dharmakirti. See Matilal (1986), p. 272, Dreyfus (1997), pp. 55-59. In fact, the 
tendency in the whole of Buddhist philosophy is to regard complex entites/wholes with great suspicion. 
No doubt this is at least partly for religious/spiritual reasons. It is blatantly obvious that it is the complex 
entities to which one tends to get attached (rather than their atomic constituents! ). One is more likely to 
be attached to one's car, for example, than to the molecules of metals, etc which are its parts. It is also 
obvious (though this somehow does not stop our folly) that we suffer when these complex entities to which 
we are attached dissolve into their parts, as they must eventually. Hence the Buddhist tendency to stress 
the unreality of these complex entities may be seen as a means to stop one coveting them, which would put 
an end to suffering. But, while it is undoubtedly true that complex entities are 
liable to dissolution into 
their parts-- and one would thus be wise not to get attached to these complex entities 
if one wants to avoid 





5. Introduction To Part B. 
In the first part of this thesis, I have examined and assessed the interpretation that 
Nägärjuna's philosophy is a form of scepticism, and I have concluded that Nägärjuna is not 
a sceptic, for he claims to know that all entities lack svabhäva. I have, furthermore, 
investigated the notion of non-conceptual knowledge in Nägäruna's thought. I have 
argued that, though Nägärjuna saw himself as treading the middle path between nihilism 
and etemalism, insofar as he asserts that entities do exist, but exist only without svabhäva, 
nevertheless it appears that, understood in the context of Abhidharma philosophy, his 
claim that all entities are without svabhävais probably tantamount to nihilism. 
I move now, in the second half ofthis thesis, to a different but related issue. Ancient 
Indian epistemology' is discussed primarily in terms of (means of) knowledge2, and objects 
of knowledge (pramäna and prameya). Nägärjuna states, in verse 30 of the 
Vigrahavyävartanl, that he does not apprehend (upa-labb) anything by way of any 
(means of) knowledge. ' He subsequently, in verses 31-51, presents an extensive critique of 
the pramäna-s and prameya-s. Another work attributed to Nägärjuna, the 
Vaidalyaprakarana, contains, in verses 2-20, a similarly extensive critique. The central 
concern of the second half of this thesis will be, in fact, to examine and assess these 
'It might be objected that the application of the term 'epistemology' to the ancient Indian pramäna theory is an 
imposition. However, I think that there is a good case for using the term in this context. Epistemology 
(from the Greek, episteme, knowledge, and logos, theory), first employed by J. F. Ferrier in Institutes of 
Metaphysics (1854), is essentially the investigation into the nature of knowledge-- the various ways in 
which knowledge is gained, what makes a knowledge claim valid, etc. These are precisely the sorts of 
issues with which the Indian pramäna theory deals. Though there is no precise equivalent, the word 
änvlksikl, commonly used by the Naiyäyikas from Vätsyäyana onwards, appears to have acquired a 
meaning somewhat similar, though broader, than the term 'epistemology'. It came to mean the special 
investigation of reasoning, logic, and knowledge. See Runes (1984), p. 109, Chatterjee (1978), p. 1, and 
Matilal (1977), p. 77. 
As I shall explain in more detail later, 'pramäna' in early Indian epistemology (i. e. as found in the NS) refers 
both to the various methods of arriving at knowledge, and the knowledge thus arrived at. (There is a 
similar dual-meaning of the English term'perception', for example (perception (pratyaksa) is, as we shall 
see, one of the pramäna-s). One may say both that one knows the tree bymeans ofperception, and that the 
knowledge of the tree is a perception). It was only in later centuries that these two phenomena were 
distinguished. It should be noted that apramänais'knowledge' in the sense of a correct cognition of an 
entity. Thus, a pramäna is not knowledge in the sense of including the demonstration or justification that 
one's cognition is correct. (Contrast this notion of knowledge with the notion of knowledge as'justified 
true belief, which I have employed in Chapter 2). Early Indian epistemology does, of course, discuss 
the issues of validation. i. e. bow one knows that one knows, but a pramäna can be a pramäna without this 
validation having taken place. See chapter 6 for more discussion of this issue. See Matilal (1986), p. 
135-140. It should also be noted that knowledge (pramäna) is, according to the early Indian epistemology, 
a transient mental episode. This is by contrast with many Western notions of'knowledge' as an enduring 
quality ofthe subject. See Dreyfus and Lindtner (1989), p. 34. 
`I'V `VVC 30. Sanskrit text cited in chapter 7, note 7. 
122 
critiques. 
If, however, one is to come to understand what Nägärjuna's critiques of the 
pramäna-s and prameya-s might mean, one needs to do two things: (i) clarify the nature of 
the theory ofpramäna-s and prameya-s at which the critiques are aimed, (ii) carefully study 
the content of the critiques of these pramäna-s and prameya-s, as found in the VVWV[ 'C 
and the Vaid/VaidC. I will, therefore, begin by examining the (Nyäya) theory of 
pramäna-s and prameya-s, and will then explicate the actual structure and mechanics of the 
arguments which criticize this theory, as found in the two aforementioned works attributed 
to Nagärjuna. I shall, furthermore, attempt to assess these critiques from a philosophical 
perspective. 
A helpful study of the critique of the pramäna-s and prameya-s in the VV/VVC has 
been provided by M. Siderits. 4 F. Tola and C. Dragonetti have given a comprehensive 
commentary of the argument in the Vaid/VaidC. S However, to my knowledge no study to 
date has examined at length the two critiques together. This would, it seems to me, be a 
useful endeavour, because the two arguments are in many aspects similar, and hence can 
help to illumine one another, and also, in some significant aspects, quite different, and 
hence together will give a complete picture of the early Indian Madhyamaka critique of the 
pramäna theory . Furthermore, 
I believe that there is still much philosophical work to be 
done in understanding and evaluating the arguments presented in both critiques. My aim 
in what follows is, therefore, both to make use of both critiques in order to achieve as 
comprehensive an understanding as is possible of Nägärjuna's (or, at least, the early Indian 
Mädhyamika) attack on the pramäna-s and prameya-s, and to treat these critiques with as 
much philosophical sensitivity as I can muster! 
'See Siderits (1980), pp. 307-335. 
'See Tola and Dragonetti (1995), pp. 99-114. 
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6. The Nyäya Pramäna Theory. 
6.1. Introduction. 
The issue of (the means of) knowledge (pramäna) preoccupied Indian philosophers 
from very early times. Speculation about knowledge developed with the gradual 
accumulation of various rules for practising the art of philosophic disputation. 
Practitioners of this art are mentioned, for example, in the early epic literature, and, 
disparagingly, in the Pali Canon. ' The connection seems natural; philosophical disputation 
is concerned, after all, with knowledge. If one wants to philosophize successfully, then, 
one must understand under what conditions a knowledge-claim is acceptable. 
These rules for disputation were not associated with a single philosophical school. 
On the contrary, they seem to have been the common property of the various schools, on the 
basis of which debates could take place. Thus, there are several early extant versions of the 
rules for disputation, both Brahmanical and Buddhist. 2 
Theories of knowledge were thus developed by quite divergent philosophical 
schools-- Naiyäyikas, Buddhists, Mimämsakas, Vedäntins, etc. These schools theorized 
strenuously in defence of their particular understanding of the nature of knowledge, and 
the manners in which it might be attained. 
It is not clear to what extent, if at all, the very early pramäna theorists considered 
the theories of knowledge to have spiritual or soteriological significance. Which is to say, 
we do not know whether they considered their reflections on pramäna-s as such to have a 
direct bearing on the issue of liberation. ' But the connection is surely there to be exploited, 
for it is a commonplace of much Indian philosophy/spirituality that liberation (moksa) 
from suffering is achieved through the transcendence of ignorance. 4 
It is not surprising, then, that pramänatheory came to be seen as the means by which 
'See Matilal (1977), p. 76. 
'As Matilal (1977), pp. 76-77, writes, 'there are several specimens of Väda-sästras which have come down to 
us for comparison: The Vida system incorporated in the Nyäya-s`ästras, the Vida section in Caraka and 
the Vida rules in the Upäyahrdaya as well as in the works written by Maitreya and Asanga. There was 
another list prevalent at this time. This is the list of Tantrayuktls, which partly coincides with the list of 
Vida categories. This list is found in Kautilya's Artbas`ästra as well as in Caraka. ' On the Upäyahrdaya 
see Kajiyama (1991), pp. 107- 117. 
'See Potter (1977), p. 20, Williams (1978) p. 280. 
'This emphasis on the replacement of ignorance by knowledge is, of course, a strong tendency 
in many Indian 
religious and philosophical schools. Williams (1978), p. 280, notes that it can be 
found at least as far back 
as the early Upanisad-s, according to which freedom from transmigration is a consequence of 
knowledge. 
Knowledge of reality is vitally important because it empowers one to become liberated. 
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ignorance could be replaced by truth, suffering overcome, and liberation achieved. The 
opening verse of the Nyäya Sütra-s, an extremely important and relatively early work in 
pramäna theory, states that true cognition (tattvajäna) of the sixteen epistemological 
categories (padärtha), the first and most important of which is pramäna, brings about the 
ultimate happiness (nihsreyasa)s The following verse states that the primary cause of 
transmigration and suffering (duhkha) is ignorance, or false cognition (mithyäjäna). 
Suffering results from (re-)birth (janma) (and death), i. e. the process of transmigration, 
which is itself caused by volitional activities (pravrtti). These are in turn produced by the 
various faults (dosa) which accrue from past actions. And these faulty past actions 
occurred because of ignorance (mithyäjfäna). It is, therefore, by eradicating ignorance 
that all the causal process which follows from it will be destroyed, and emancipation 
attained. ' Thus emancipation from transmigration and suffering (apavarga) is to be 
achieved by replacing ignorance by knowledge. It is for this reason that an investigation of 
the nature of knowledge and its objects is so important. The spiritual significance of the 
epistemological inquiry is paramount in the NS. ' 
The pramäna theory which is criticized in the Vaid/VaidCis, without a doubt, that 
of the Nyäya school, as found in some redaction of the NS. The Vaid begins by 
enumerating sixteen epistemological categories, the first two of which are pramäna and 
prameya, a list which is found, in exactly the same order in the already-mentioned first 
SNS 1,1,1, praminaprameyasams`ayaprayojanadrstäntasiddhäntävayavatarkanimayavädajalpavitandähetvä- 
bhäsacchalajätinigrahasthänänäm tattvajnänänihireyasädhigamah// 
'NS 1,1,2, duhkhajanmapravrttidosamithyäjnänämuttarottaräpäye tadanantaräpayadapavargaht The 
parallel here between the Nyäya account and the Buddhist formula of the twelvefold pratityasamutpäda 
and achievement of liberation through its reversal is obvious and striking. 
'Potter (1977), p. 20 notes, however, that, unlike in later Naiyäyika writings, the epistemological and 
soteriological elements of the Nyäya Sütra-s'only sit uneasily side by side'. This suggests, then, that their 
integration was recent and incomplete. Williams (1978), p. 280 writes that in the Vaid/VaidC Nagarjuna, 
'during an extensive examination of the sixteen Naiyäyika categories shows no indication that he is 
dealing with an alternative means of liberation. ' Williams cites this evidence in support of the position 
that the Nyäya school may possibly originally have been, and perhaps still was in Nägarjuna's time, 
exclusively concerned with epistemology, and not at all with soteriology. The portions of the NSwhich 
deal with the issue of emancipation would then, presumably, be a later stratum of the text. However, 
Williams appears to be wrong here, because VaidC53, quotes (in the Tibetan translation) the statement 
in 
NS I, 1,1 that liberation (my italics) occurs by means of true cognition of the sixteen categories', and 
claims that this is the opponent's accepted theory (grub pa'i mthd, siddhanta). The VaidCof course, goes 
on to refute this theory, calling it'the superficial position of the foolish logician'. 
See VaidC, 53, 'di Itar 
Iha mains dga' ba 5 rigs pa phra ba i phyogs su lhung ba khyod kvi tshiggi 
don bcu drug yongs su shes pas 
grol bar gyur ro/ zhes bya ba ni grub pas mtha' yin no/ This passage clearly shows 
that the 
soteriological, and not simply the epistemological, orientation of the Naiyäyikas was 
known to the author 
of the VaidC. Thus, the Nyäya school must have had this orientation when the 
VaidC was composed. 
However, this does not in itself prove that the Nyäya school had this spiritual orientation at the 
time of 
Nägärjuna, for, as I have noted previously (see 1.5), the attribution of the 
Vaid and VaidC to him is 
doubtful. 
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verse of the NS. Nagärjuna (or whoever is the author of the Vaid 'VC) 'aid sa` s that, as a 
proponent of emptiness (stongpa nyid du srnra ba, *sünyatävädin), the purpose of his 
treatise is to remove the arrogance of those (de 
_yi nga rbýal spang 
ha) who with the 
arrogance of [their] knowledge of logic/reasoning (rtog shes pa'i nga r`Tval is) clearly 
wish for disputes (rtsodparmngon 'dodpa). ' He shall, as the title of his work suggests, tear 
the Naiyäyika position into tiny pieces. ' Furthermore, the Vaid, VaidG, in presenting the 
arguments of the opponent, contains numerous quotations from (preserr'ed in Tibetan 
translation) and references to the NS. '° 
The identity of the opponent, or opponents, and hence which precise prarnäna 
theory is being criticized, in the VV/VVCis, however, not quite so obvious. This issue 
has, indeed, been the subject of some modem scholarly controversy. " However, it seems 
' Vaid 1, rtogge shes pa'i nga rgyal gyis/gang zhig rtsod par mngon 'dod pa/ de vi nga rc va1 spang ba'i ph vir. 
zhib mo rnam 'thag bshad par bya/ VaidC 1, gzhan dag dir rgol ba thams cad k vis tshad ma dang, gzhal 
bya dang/ the tshom dang/ dgospa dang/ dpe dang/ grub paimthah dang/ yan lag dang rtogge danc 
gtan la dbab pa dang/ rtsodpa dang/ brjod pa dang/ sun ci ph yin du brgal ba dang/ gtan tshigs liar snang 
ba dang/ tshig dor ba dang/ Itag chod dang/ tshar gcad pa'i gnas rnams gdon mi za bar khas blangs nas 
gtan du byed kyi stong pa nyid du smra ba rnams kyis ni zhen pa med pa'i phyir tshad ma la Bogs pa'i don 
khas len parmi byed do... 
'The Sanskrit word 'vaidalya' (Tibetan, zhib mo rnam par 'thag pa) means 'tearing to pieces', so that 
Vaidalyaprakarana is a karmadhäraya compound meaning the 'Treatise (prakarana, Tibetan, rab tu bved 
pa) which is the Tearing to Pieces'. What it tears to pieces are, of course, the epistemological categories 
of the Naiyäyikas. See Tola and Dragonetti (1995a), p. 4. 
"For a thorough study of the references to and quotations from the NS in the Vaidand VaidC, see Tola and 
Dragonetti (1995a), pp. 99-156,179-201. 
"Bhattacharya thinks that the opponent is a Naiyäyika, whereas Lindtner suspects that the opponent is an 
Abhidhärmika of some unknown variety following the rules of debate, which include a 
pramäna prameya theory, in a Buddhist logical treatise such as the Upiyahrdava. (However, it should be 
noted that Kajiyama (1991) has argued at length that the Upäyahrdaya-- which is extant only in a Chinese 
translation-- is actually by Nägarjuna! ) There is evidence for both interpretations. Thus Bhattacharya 
cites several examples of Naiyäyika technical terms which are used in the course of the VV. Lindtner, for 
his part, points to various verses which appear to indicate (in fact, according to Lindtner, only make sense 
if) the opponent is a Buddhist. For example, verses 7,8 and 54,55, along with the autocommentary, seem 
to assume that the opponent accepts the listed 119 kusaladharma-s, which are almost certainly a list from 
some (unknown to us) Abhidharma school or treatise. However, Bhattacharya thinks that it could be that 
a Naiyäyika opponent is using the standpoint of Buddhists against Nägarjuna, who is himself a Buddhist. 
In other words, the opponent, a Naiyäyika, argues here in accordance with principles which Nägarjuna, 
as a Buddhist, should accept. This would be a good debating tactic because the refutation becomes more 
powerful if it demonstrates that Nägarjuna contradicts the religious tradition to which he belongs. 
Lindtner also points to the repeated use of the Buddhist term 'ägama'instead of the Naiyavika term 
's`abda', and also to the coherence of the VVwith the SS and the MMK, which are both (according to 
Lindtner) directed against the Abhidhärmikas. He also argues that, as Nägarjuna devoted a special work, 
viz. the Vaid to the controversy with the Naiyäyikas, a second work would have been redundant. This 
last argument does not make sense, however, because Lindtner himself has acknowledged that 
Nägarjuna did write two works directed against the Abhidharma, without one of them being considered 
by Lindtner to be redundant. According to Lindtner's reasoning, the VV, if it is a third critique of 
Abbidharma, would be doubly redundant! It seems to me that ifNagarjuna wrote (at least) two works in 
criticism of Abhidharma, he may well have written two critiques of Nyaya philosophy. (Lindtner's 
argument also makes the rather doubtful assumption that the Vaid is by Nägarjuna). Another possibility, 
which Johnston and Kunst suggest, is that Nägarjuna in the VV has more than one opponent 
in mind. 
This seems to me to be a reasonable interpretation. At any rate, what is clear 
is that, whoever the 
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clear to me that, whoever the opponent or opponents in the VV/VVC in fact were, the 
pramänatheory which is presented and criticized is essentially indistinguishable from that 
advanced by the Nyäya school. And, as Johnston and Kunst haved correctly noted, the 
parallel between the critique of the pramäna-s at VV/VVC 31-51 to the discussion at NSII, 
1,8-19 is indisputable. " 
In commenting on the theory of the pramäna-s in the NS, one must be sensitive to 
the fact that this text is a rather cryptic (though fairly orderly) set of aphorisms. Matilal 
suggests that it may have been intended as a mnemonic device rather than a self-sufficient 
text. 13 The significance of what is stated by these aphorisms is often far from obvious, and it 
was the task of many commentators over many hundreds of years to explore their meaning 
and possible implications. (The same might be said, incidentally, of Nägärjuna's critiques 
of this pramäna theory! ). Thus, for example, the definitions of the four pramäna-s at NS 
I, 1,4-7 have been the subject of extensive commentary and dispute. Much of this 
discussion post-dates the final redaction of NS, and also Nägärjuna's writings. One also 
needs to be aware that the Nyäya pramäna theory is not (indeed, as the Mädhyamika 
responses to it are not) a monolithic set of ideas without development or diversity. The NS 
is in fact the foundation upon which the later theorists built. 
6.2. Cognition (jrlana). 
Knowledge (pramäua in the NS or, in later Nyäya, pramä (see below)), for the 
opponent is, he accepts an ontology and an epistemology which is in its essential aspects similar to that of 
the early Naiyäyikas. See Lindtner (1982), p. 71, Bhattacharya (1978), p. 89, and pp. 99,100,102-103, 
106,112,115,116,119,132-136 and Johnston and Kunst, in Bhattacharya (1978), p. 40. 
"See Johnston and Kunst, in Bhattacharya (1978), p. 40. Although the theory of the padirtha-s, including the 
categories of pramäna and prameya, in the NS is undoubtedly the object of criticism in the Vaid and 
VaidCand quite probably the object of criticism in the Wand VVC, it should be noted that it is not clear 
which redaction of the NS is being criticized. While NS is traditionally attributed to one man, viz 
Aksapäda Gautama, it is certain that it is actually the creation of many authors, and accumulated over 
several centuries. It is not known at what stage in its development NS was when it was criticized by 
Nägärj una and the author of the Vaidand VaidC. Williams (1978), p. 290, has argued, that 'there was a 
Nyäya very close to that portrayed in at least the first two books of the Nyäyasutasprior to Nägärjuna. ' 
This must be the case, he contends, given the copious references to and quotations of the doctrines which 
are contained in these two books. However, this argument is weakened by the fact that the quotations and 
the most explicit references are contained in the Vaidand VaidCwhich, although attributed to Nägärjuna, 
may actually have been composed later than his time. In other words, the author of the Vaid and VaidC 
may have been working with a different and later redaction of the NS than was Nägärjuna. The exact 
relation between NS and the Wand VVC is unclear and probably complex, given that NS II, 1,8-19 
states and refutes a critique of the pramäna-s which is very similar to the one contained in the VV and VVC 
31-51, while, in the VV and VVC, Nägärjuna himself appears to be aware of the Naiyäyika 
counter-arguments to his own critique. One suspects that these two texts are in fact a record of an 
ongoing and perhaps long-standing oral debate, which preceded the actual writing down of the 
well-rehearsed opposing positions. See Matilal (1977), p. 78, Williams (1978), pp. 287-290. 
"Matilal (1977), p. 53. 
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Naiydyikas, is a type of cognition (jfäna), and a cognition is a mental event. It is more 
accurate, then, to speak with Matilal of'knowledge-events' or'knowledge-episodes'. " 
An understanding of knowledge-episodes in Nyäya philosophy must clarify two 
issues: (i) the nature of cognition in general, and (ii) the nature of knowledge-episodes in 
particular. What is a cognition, and what is it that makes a knowledge-episode distinct 
from other types of cognition? 
6.2.1. Cognition (jäana) in the NS. 
The NSsays that cognitions are transitory (anavasthäyin) qualities (gura) of the 
self (ätman). i5 What one would ordinarily call a single cognition of, for example, the pot, 
is in fact a series of very similar cognitive events cognition of the pot at t, pot at t,, etc. 
Series of these transitory cognitions are described as giving a distinct apprehension 
(abbivyaktagrabana) of the object because they follow one another in uninterrupted 
succession (santan). The NSgives the analogy of the series of flashes of light from a lamp 
(pradlpärc., ). I take this to mean that cognitions, like the momentary flashes of the lamp, are 
so quick and follow in such close succession that they are not noticed (perhaps the 
modern-day equivalent analogy would be film-projection). Together they enable a distinct 
apprehension to be formed of the object. 16 Clearly, also, cognition is intentional" in nature. 
Whenever there is a cognition there is something of which it is the cognition. 
The NS does not provide a systematic taxonomy of cognitions, although one can 
detect the beginnings of a process of categorization. The NS distinguishes, for example, 
"See Matilal (1986), pp. 97-101. As Matilal says, this conception of knowledge as a temporary mental event is 
at odds with the dominant western philosophical understanding which, since Plato's Meno (according to 
which knowledge has the character of'not running away'), has described knowledge as a permanent (or at 
least enduring) acquisition. If I say that I know that 2+2=4, I am likely to be referrring, not to a particular 
mental event of correct computation (the knowledge-episode that 2+2=4) but rather to my enduring 
possession of the knowledge that 2+2=4 (whether or not I am actually having a cognition, i. e. a 
knowledge-episode, that 2+2=4). 
"See, for example, NSIII, 2,21, in which an opponent objects to the Naiyäyika claim that cognition 
is a quality 
of the self (ätnaguna). For the transitoriness of cognitions, see NSIII, 2,45-46. 
16NS, III, 2,47-49. 
"I use the term 'intentional' here in the general sense in which it is employed by Brentano and 
Husserl (a use 
which is itself derived from the Christian scholastic tradition). When one cognizes there 
is always and 
necessarily something of which one is cognizant. This is the nature of consciousness. 
See Dancy and Sosa 
(1992), pp. 54-55, and 185-186. I do not mean to imply any other similarity 
between Nyäya epistemology 
and the epistemologies of Brentano and Husserl. The equivalent term 
in Nyäya philosophy is vi§ayatä, 
which Monier-Williams (1899), p. 997 defines as'the character or condition of 
being an object or having 
anything for an object, the relation between an object and the knowledge of 
it'. See Matilal (1968), p. 8 
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knowledge-episodes from doubt (samsaya)'8, and confutation (tarka)19 (as we shall see. 
according to later Nyäya philosophy, confutation produces a cognition which is not a 
knowledge-episode). Some reference is also made to memory (smrti). 20 And the notion of 
erroneous cognition, is implied in the NSby its identification of various fallacies which 
can occur in reasoning. ' 
6.2.2. The Developed Nyaya Theory of Cognition (jnana). 
The laterNaiyäyika theori sts22 are more explicit and present a developed taxonomy 
of cognitions23 (see table 224). First, they divide cognitions into non-memories (anubbava)" 
and memories (smrtl). Memories can be in accord with the object (yatbärtha) recollected 
or not in accord with the object (ayatbArtba) recollected. 26 
'$NS11,1,23, samänänekadbarmopapattervipratipatterupalabdhyanupalabdhyavyavasthätaca viaesäpekso 
vimarsab samsayah// 
19NS, 1,1,40, avijn'ätatattve 'ripe kiranopapattitastattvajnänärthamlibastarkah// 
20NS, 111,2,19,26-35,43-44. 
21See NS I, 2, and NS V, 2. 
22My account here of the 'later theorists' largely relies on Chatterjee (1978), pp. 20-48. His interpretation is 
based on texts (much later than the NS) such as the Saptapadarthl, the Tarkasamgraha, the Tattvadipikä, 
the Tarkabbäsä, the Nyäyamadjarr, etc. See also Potter (1977), pp. 154-156. 
2'Matilal says that, according to the later Naiyiiyikas, in addition to the various categories and sub-categories 
of cognition, there are also non-cognitive mental events. Affective and volitional mental events such as 
willing, happiness, desire, etc are not included under the heading 'cognition' (jfäna), because they have 
only indirectly an objective reference (i. e. by being attached, as it were, to a cognition which refers to an 
object). Thus, if I feel fear, for example, there is a perceptual, imaginative, or recollective cognition of 
an entity x, and, on the basis of this cognition, the mental event of fear occurs. One cannot have an 
emotion or a volition without an underlying perception, recollection, imagination, etc of an object. For 
example, I feel scared on the basis of a perception of a wild dog. My feeling is dependent upon the 
perception. Thus the intentionality of such affective and volitional states is second-order, in the sense 
that they cannot occur without an intentional cognition to rely upon (there must be a cognition of 
something of which I am scared). The category'mental event' is wider than the category 'cognition', 
though there are no mental events which occur independent of cognitions. Not all mental events are 
cognitions, but all non-cognitive mental events exist dependent on cognitive mental events. The NS 
itself does not, however, say anything about the relationship between emotions/volitions and cognitions. 
See Matilal (1968), p. 8 
27his table is inspired by Chatterjee (1978), p. 22, and Potter (1977), p. 154. 
The term 'anubhava' seems to be rather resistant to adequate translation in this context. Monier-Williams 
(1989), p. 36 gives 'perception, apprehension, fruition; understanding; impression on the mind not derived 
from memory; experience, knowledge derived from personal observation or experiment; result, 
consequence. ' Chatterjee (1978), p. 20 translates the term as 'presentation'. Potter (1977), p. 154 prefers 
'presentative apprehension. ' I settle for 'non-memory' because the other alternatives seem rather obscure 
and/or inaccurate. 
26Chatterjee (1978), p. 22 says that dream-cognition is understood by the Naiyäyikas to be a species of memory 
which is not in accord with the object recollected. Presumably this means that dream-cognitions are 
formed out of the recollections of previous knowledge-episodes, which get combined and otherwise 
distorted in sometimes peculiar ways. The objects of dream-cognitions, or at least their components, 
always correspond to previously known objects. I wonder then if, according to this theory, 
imagination in 
general could be viewed as a form of memory. It seems, however, at least questionable whether a theory 
which sees dreams and imagination as essentially reproductive of previous knowledge-episodes 
is entirely 
adequate. It might be argued that dreams and imagination can in fact at least sometimes 
have a creative and 
revelatory rather than only a reproductive character. But the relationship between 
dreaming imagination 
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However, memories, even when in accord with their object, are not 
knowledge-episodes (prams). This is because a correct memory simply reproduces a 
previous knowledge-episode, rather than producing a new knowledge-episode. This was, 
it is worth noting, a controversial point in Indian philosophy. Some schools argued that 
correct memory is in fact a type of knowledge. 27 
Unlike memory, non-memories cognize the object afresh, rather than mentally 
reproducing the object on the basis of previous non-memories. I might perceive a fire or 
infer that there is a fire because there is smoke. In both cases the phenomenon of the fire, 
previously uncognized by me, has been apprehended. Later I may remember the fire which 
I perceived or inferred, but this is, according to the Naiyäyikas, a mental reproduction of 
my previous knowledge-episode. 28 
Although all knowledge-episodes are non-memories, not all non-memories are 
knowledge-episodes, however. Such non-memories which are also not 
knowledge-episodes are generally classified as cognitions characterized by doubt 
(sams`aya), error (viparyaya), and cognitions produced by confutation (tarka) (all three 
categories are often themselves sub-divided into various types). Thus, the category 
'cognitions which are non-knowledge-episodes and non-memories' is wider than the 
category 'erroneous cognitions', because it includes also the phenomena of doubting and 
cognitions produced by confutation. 
Whereas erroneous cognition is not a knowledge-episode (aprama) because it is 
simply wrong, i. e. it contradicts the real nature of its object, a doubting cognition is not a 
knowledge-episode because it fails to arrive at a definite and explicit judgement about its 
object. Doubting is a state ofwavering judgment (vlmarsa), a cognition which is not able to 
assert anything certain about the object towards which it is directed. As such it is neither 
true not false. If I am not sure whether or not the object I perceive is a tree-stump or a man I 
have not made a judgement which can be evaluated as true or false. This is by contrast with 
error, which asserts something about the object, but gets it wrong. If I perceive the 
tree-stump as a man there is a definite judgement which is false. 
Confutation (tarka) is a form of reasoning which may occur as a result of doubt 
(samsaya) about which of two contradictory qualities an entity actually possesses. 
29 For 
and memory is a large issue which requires more investigation and consideration. 
27Chatterjee (1978), p. 27, says that the Vaisesikas considered memory to be a 
distinct form of knowledge, as 
did the Jainas. The ATimämsa, however, did not. 
CChatterjee (1978), pp. 26-28. 
"See NSBh I, 1,40, Jhä (trans) (1984), p. 446. 
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example, there might be doubt about whether the body is eternal or non -etern al. One of the 
contradictory qualities is refuted by a demonstration that its acceptance would entail an 
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were eternal, it would follow that the body does not decompose. But this is absurd, because 
the body does decompose. Therefore, it is not the case that the body is eternal. Confutation 
is akin, then, to the reductioadabsurdum. It is argument concerned solely with identifying 
the fallacies (upfidbJ) in positions. " 
The Naiyäyikas clearly came to see tarka as supportive (sabakärin) in the 
production of knowledge-episodes, but not as productive 
by itself of 
'See Potter (1977), pp. 203-207. 
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knowledge-episodes. " Why exactly this is so is not, however, very clear. 
It appears to be the case that confutation cannot produce knowledge for the 
Naiyäyikas because it is a type of reasoning that does not conform to the rules of inference 
(anumäna). It does not have the parts of the syllogism (avayava). There is not a thesis 
(pratija), reason (betu), example (udäbarana), application (upanaya), and conclusion 
(nigamana). 32 But why, I wonder, must all reasoning have the form of the syllogism in 
order to produce knowledge? 
Uddyotakara seems to argue that tarka is not a means of knowledge because, unlike 
inference, it does not establish concomitance between an subject (paksa) and its property 
to be proved (sädhya) . It simply refutes that the subject has a particular property. The 
point seems to be, then, that tarka does not produce any new knowledge. Used on its own it 
is simply cavil (vitan(fa), i. e. argumentation for the sake of finding fault rather than 
establishing any position. But it could be objected, I think, that if it is established that an 
entity does not have a property is this not a form of new knowledge? 33 
Matilal makes the point that, for the Naiyäyikas, knowledge-episodes must be 
based on empirical evidence. Thus, for instance, inference (anumäna) must have recourse 
to a previously perceived familiar example (drstýnta). By contrast, tarkaemploys solely a 
priori arguments to deduce the fallacies or paradoxes in philosophical positions. As such, 
it cannot be a means of knowledge. 34 However, surely an a priori argument that establishes 
the paradoxes in philosophical positions produces the knowledge that these positions are in 
fact paradoxical? Furthermore, it is not clear to me that a confutation is necessarily purely 
a priori. It may, for example, depend on the contradiction between the position under 
scrutiny and a commonly perceived fact. For example, take the (obviously absurd) 
position that the body is eternal. A confutation might proceed as follows: 'If the body were 
eternal it would not decompose. The body is commonly perceived to decompose. 
Therefore, it is not eternal. ' 
The Nyäya position that tarka does not produce knowledge is, then, rather puzzling 
(to me, at least! ). It is not surprising, I think, that some Naiyäyikas, referred to by 
Uddyotakara with disapproval, claimed that tarka is a form of inference, and hence 
is 
actually productive of knowledge. " The notion of tarka, it seems to me, requires a 
"NSBh I, 1,40, Ad (trans) (1984), p. 448. See Chatterjee (1978), pp. 44-45. 
"On the members of the Nyäya inference, see Potter (1977), pp. 179-189. Chatterjee 
(1978), pp. 274-277. 
"See NSV I, 1,40, Jhä (trans) (1984), pp. 454-458. On vitandä see Potter (1977), p. 208. 
"Matilal (1986), pp. 78-79. 
"NSV 1,1,40, Jhä (trans) (1984), p. 454. Matilal (1986), p. 79 notes that the Jainas accepted tarka as an 
independent means of knowledge. 
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separate, thorough study (which I shall not undertake here). 
6.2.3. Pramäna-s. 
Finally, the later Naiyäyikas identify four means of knowledge (pramäna) by 
which knowledge-episodes (prama) can occur. These means of knowledge are perception 
(pratyaksa), inference (anumäna), comparison (upamäna), and verbal testimony (sabda).; ° 
Let me illustrate what is meant by means of a simple example. 
Take the case of the platypus. How might one know the platypus? One may 
perceive the platypus By means of perception one has a knowledge-episode of the 
platypus. One may infer that there is a platypus, because, although the platypus itself has 
not been perceived, certain signs of the platypus have been perceived (e. g. its tracks, its 
droppings, its home). By means of inference, one has a knowledge-episode of the platypus. 
One may know that there is a platypus on the basis of the testimony of a reliable witness. 
Perhaps the local platypus expert has seen the platypus, and tells one that it exists By 
means of verbal testimony, one has a knowledge-episode of the platypus. Finally, one may 
never have perceived a platypus, but may have a knowledge-episode of it if a correct 
analogy is made between certain features of a familiar entity and the platypus (e. g. the 
platpyus has a beak like a duck, the platypus lays eggs like a chicken, etc). By means of 
comparison, one has a knowledge-episode of the platypus. (This is a rather simplified 
explanation of the four ways in which knowledge-episodes may occur, according to the 
Naiyäyikas, but it serves, I think, to illustrate their general point). 
Note, however, that the distinction between pramäna and pramä is not present in 
the NS. That is, the NS does not distinguish between the means of knowledge and the 
knowledge-episodes thereby arrived at. 37 (It does not, for example, contrast perception in 
"Indian philosophers, of course, keenly debated the number and definitions of the pramäna-s. The Cärväkas, 
for example, admitted only perception as a pramana. (In fact, theTattvopaplavasimba, a Cärväka text 
from the seventh or eighth century by Jayaräi Bhatta, does not even accept that perception (pratyaksa) 
is 
a means of knowledge. This appears to be a significant epistemological shift from the early 
Carväka 
position. See Franco (1983), pp. 147-166). Some Buddhists, such as Dignäga, rejected comparison and 
verbal testimony as distinct pramäna-s. See Hayes (1988). Other schools added 
different, distinct 
pramäna-s (for example the disputed phenomenon of memory). On the number and types of pramäna-s 
accepted by the various schools of Indian philosophy, see Hattori (1968), pp. 
78-79. I do not, however, 
wish to enter into these controversies. It will suffice for the present purpose to appreciate 
the basic nature 
of the Nyaya theory. 
17 See Shastri (1964), pp. 424-427. Williams (manuscript 1), p. 12, writes that'for classical 
Nväva, perception 
as a pramäna is a meansof knowing. Gautama, on the other hand, refers to perception as 
the knowledge- 
event itself... This contradiction within the school is criticised by Dignäga and 
later Jayanta Bhatta, 
Vacaspatimisra (both c. 9th-10th century) and others urge the addition of 'by which' 
(yatah) to the 
definition so that perception becomes the instrument of cognition rather than the cognition itself. 
' 
Dignäga, PS k. lc-d (Hattori (trans) (1968), p. 28) says that '[we call the cognition itself] 
'pramäna'... ' 
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the sense of the process by which one arrives at knowledge, with the perception which is 
the result of such a perceptual process). Thus, when referring to the theory of knowledge in 
the NS, the best translation of the term'pramäna' is probably 'knowledge-episode'. This 
point is especially important for the present study, because the pramäna theory which 
Nägärjuna criticizes is that found in the NS. In explaining Nägärjuna's critique, then, my 
translation of'pramäna will generally be'knowledge-episode'. 
6.3. Prameya-s. 
When a cognition which is not a memory actually corresponds to its object, then it 
is a knowledge-episode (pramäna, or, in later Nyäya, prama). Knowledge-episodes might 
be described as truth-hitting (following Matilal38), non-memories. But what is it that these 
knowledge-episodes hit? What is the nature of the objects, i. e. the prameya-s, which are 
correctly apprehended by a knowledge-episode? 
NSI. 1.9 identifies various types ofprameya-s (a very motley list, I might add), viz. 
the self (ätman), the body (sarira), the senses (indriya), objects of the senses (artba), 
cognitions (buddhi), mind (mans), activity (pravrttr), faults (doss), transmigration 
(pretyabhäva), consequences (pbala), suffering (duhkba), and emancipation (apavarga)39, 
which are then explained individually. ' 
Vätsyäyana, in his commentary on this verse, elaborates on this apparently peculiar 
collection. He says that the list is not exhaustive, and the items mentioned are those objects 
of knowledge-episodes which are most relevant to the pursuit of emancipation from 
transmigration. The objects of knowledge-episodes which he then adds to this list are, 
significantly, the six ontological categories (padärtha) found in the Vaisesika Sütra-s41, viz. 
substance (dravya), quality (guns), motion (karman), universal (sämänya, jätr), inherence 
(samaväya), and individuators/particulars (visesa). ` 
because it is [usually] conceived to include the act [of cognizing], although primarily it is a result. ' 
(Material in square brackets is added by Hattori). 
38Matilal (1986), pp. 13 5-140. 
39NS, I, 1,9, ätmatarFrendrryärtbabuddhlmanah pra vrttidosapretyabha vaphaladuhkhäpa vargästu prameyam/ 
'0S ee NS, 1,1,10-22. 
There seems to have been, from early on, a close relationship between the Nyäya and Vaisesika schools. 
See 
Dreyfus (1997), pp. 52-53 who describes the Vaisesika as a'sister school' of the Nyäya. See also 
Potter 
(1977), p. 12 who writes that 'although there were occasional points of disagreement, 
Nyäya and 
Vaisesika have from the first considered themselves as mutually supportive, Nyäya specializing 
in 
epistemology and methodology, Vaisesika in metaphysics. ' The VS was almost certainly compiled 
earlier than the NS. See Matilal (1977). 
'2NSBh, 1,1,9 (translation by Jhä (1984), p. 212 with some small amendments), 'Though apart 
from these 
enumerated, there are many other 'objects of knowledge' also-- such as substances, qualities, motions, 
universals, particulars, and inherence-- yet it would be impossible to enumerate all such objects severally, 
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However, Vätsyäyana's explanation must be imprecise here, because it cannot be 
the case that these ontological categories are additional prameya-s; rather, it must be that 
the prameya-s mentioned in NSI, 1,9 are examples or instances of entities which fall under 
these categories. For the six ontological categories are inclusive, no object of cognition 
could possibly fall outside of them. The upshot of this is, then, that objects of knowledge 
are substances, qualities, motions, particulars, universals, and inherence (or combinations 
of these six categories). 
Vatsyäyana's point (rather badly expressed by him) that prameya-s fall under the 
six ontological categories is important, because it shows that for Vätsyäyana the NSs 
epistemology of pramäna-s and prameya-s is to be understood in conjunction with the 
Vaisesika metaphysics of substances, qualities, universals, etc. And Vätsyäyana's 
commentary being the earliest which is extant, it seems reasonable to take him as 
authoritative on this point. This Vaisesika influence injects a realist metaphysics into the 
Nydya pramäna theory. 
6.4. Nyäya Realism. 
Realism', it must be admitted, is a notoriously vague and ambiguous term. As 
Dreyfus points out43, the Naiyäyikas are realists in three senses: (i) they accept the reality of 
external objects, i. e. objects which have existence independently of the cognition of them, 
(ii) they advocate the existence of universals which are not linguistic or mental objects. In 
other words, some of the external objects which exist independently of the cognition of 
them are universals, and (iii) they attempt to abide by the dictates of common-sense in their 
philosophical explanations. This appears to mean that the Naiyäyikas think that their 
philosophical theories should be compatible with ordinary beliefs, such as the belief that 
the external world exists, and that this world is knowable by means of perception and 
reasoning, etc. 
I am employing the term 'realism' in the present context primarily in sense (i). The 
Naiyäyikas accept the mind-independent existence of many' of the entities which fall 
so what the Sutra has done is to make specific mention of only those'objects' whose right cognition 
brings 
emancipation, and wrong cognition leads to birth and rebirth. ' For the Vaisesika ontological categories, 
see VS, 1. See also Potter (1977), pp. 43-145. Absence or non-existence (abbäva) was 
later made a 
distinct ontological category, beginning with Candramati. See Potter (1977), p. 143. 
"Dreyfus (1997), p. 54. 
"While many of the entities which fall under these categories are said to have mind-independent reality, not all 
enitities have for the Naiyäyikas such mind-independent reality. For example, many qualities 
(guna), such 
as hatred, effort, pleasure, pain are of a mental nature. See Potter (1977), pp. 
112-128. Also, as Potter 
notes, the Naiyayikas 'adhere to certain parsimonious practices' with regard to universals. 
The category 
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under the ontological categories of substance, qualities, motions, universals (making them 
realist in sense (ii)), inherence, and particulars. Thus, knowledge-episodes are cognitions 
of objects, be they substances, qualities, motions, etc (or combinations of these), which 
often exist independently of the mind, i. e. whether or not they are actually cognized. 
Furthermore, as I have already noted, cognition (jnäna) itself is said in the NS to be a 
quality (guna) of the substance (dravya) which is the self (ätman). Thus, it is not simply the 
external objects which are cognized which have a existence separate from the cognition of 
them; the temporary cognitions themselves inhere in a substance which exists 
independently of them. Thus, I would amend Dreyfus' sense (i) of Nyäya realism to read 
that the Naiyäyikas accept that external and internal objects (i. e. the self) exist 
independently of the cognition of them. 
The Nyäya epistemology's starting point is then, it is fair to say, the common-sense 
intuition that knowledge is a matter of the correct apprehension of objects which are 
independent from cognition. Thus, knowledge is a matter of cognitions mirroring, so to 
speak, a state of affairs. 
A perception of an object, 'red pot', for example, is a perception of a quality 'red' in 
which inheres the universal 'redness', and a substance 'pot' in which inheres the universal 
'potness'. These qualities, substances, universals, etc of external objects occur whether or 
not cognitions correctly apprehend them. Perceptual knowledge may therefore be 
described as an undistorted apprehension of its object as it is in itself. 
Similarly, inference is the process of reasoning about the entities which have been 
perceived in order to draw correct conclusions about their imperceptible properties. I see 
smoke on the hill, I know that smoke is invariably concomitant with fire. I therefore have a 
knowledge-episode that there is fire on the hill, even though I cannot perceive it. Again, 
the process is one of mirroring and accurate portrayal of what occurs independently of the 
cognition. There is a fire to be apprehended by an inference, and this fire exists as a 
substance, in which a universal 'fireness' inheres, with its qualities, in which inhere the 
appropriate universals (for example, 'hotness', 'brightness') whether or not the cogniton of 
it occurs. Reality is thereto be contacted, as it were. 
of universals was seen, by Siväditya's time, to contain both mind-independent universals (jsti) and 
mind-imposed universals (upädhi). In order to qualify as mind-independent, a universal had to pass a 
number of tests. For example, a universal must have more than one instance. Further, a universal cannot 
be accepted as mind-independent if such acceptance would lead to an infinite regress (for example, the 
universal 'universalhood' is thereby ruled out). A number of other tests were also enumerated. See Potter 
(1977), pp. 135-136. However, it must be emphasized that these tests were only developed many 
centuries after the NS. 
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So too with verbal testimony and comparison. What is apprehended by relying on a 
reliable report by another person as well as the unfamiliar entity which is known by means 
of an accurate comparison with a familiar entity (drstänta) exist independently of and 
undistorted by the knowing subject. 
I shall argue that it is precisely this realism which is the principal object of 
Nagarjuna's attack in his critiques of the pramäna-s and the prameya-s. Nägärjuna is 
directly opposed to the Nyäya theory that there are knowledge-episodes which apprehend 
mind-independent objects. According to Nägärjuna, given that all entities are prajnaptisat, 
there are no mind-independent entities for knowledge-episodes to apprehend. But a full 
discussion of this point must wait until later. 
6.4.1. Concepts and Language in Nyaya Realism. 
All knowledge-episodes involve, for the Naiyäyika, conceptualization, and (at 
least potentially) language. Even perception is of this nature, although many later 
Naiyäyikas recognized an inchoate form of perception (nirvikalpapratyaksa) in which 
conceptualization and hence linguistic expressibility are undeveloped. The impetus for 
this later position is found in the definition ofperception given at NSI, 1,4, which states that 
'perception is the cognition-- unnamed/non-verbal (avapadesya), accurate (avyabhicän) 
and having a determinate nature (vyavasäyätmaka)-- produced through the contact 
(sannikarsa) of the senses (indriya) and the object (artha)'. 45 Many later Naiyäyikas, 
beginning with Väcaspatimisra, took the definition of perception as (i) 
unnamed/non-verbal and as (ii) determinate to be referring to two different stages in the 
perceptual process, viz. the nirvikalpa, or indeterminate, and the savikalpa, or 
determinate, perception. 
There are various accounts given by the Naiyäyikas of the precise nature of the 
nirvikalpa perception. 46 The important point here, however, is that even this minimally 
conceptual, pre-linguistic perception-- most obviously exemplified in the perceptions of 
young children-- is seen to be potentially fully conceivable/expressible. The nirvikalpa 
stage is defective because it does not apprehend clearly and fully what is actually there. 
Unlike some Buddhists, most notably Dignäga, for whom perception is essentially 
`NS I, 1,4, indriyärthasannikal3Fotpannam jfanamavyapedesyamavyavbicäri vyavasäyätmakam 
pratyaksam//. 
"See Shastri (1964), pp. 430-457. Williams (manuscript 1), p. 12, gives a concise summary of various ways in 
which Naiyäyikas, such as Väcaspatimisra, Udayana, Jayanta, and 
Gangesa, have interpreted the 
distinction between nirvikalpa and savikalpa pratyaksa 
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non-conceptual and inexpressible47, the Naiyäyikas advocate the continuity between a 
minimally conceptual, pre-linguistic perception and its conceptually developed, 
linguistically expressed counterpart. Everything perceived is fully conceptual Izable and 
sayable, even if what has been perceived has not yet actually been fully conceived or stated 
at all. 48 
If knowledge-episodes accurately apprehend the world of qualities, substances, 
universals, etc, and such knowledge-episodes are essentially a conceptual and linguistic 
affair, then the Naiyäyikas see language and concepts (vikalpa), when used in 
knowledge-episodes, as undistorting media for understanding the world as it is 
independent of cognition. " This is, of course, by contrast with some Buddhists, such as 
Dignäga, for whom conceptualization and language have an inevitably distorting function. 
Thus, for Dignäga, the only cognition which apprehends sensed objects as they actually are 
is perception, which, as we have seen, is, for Dignäga, conception-free (and 
language-free). " 
It must be cautioned here that the Naiyäyikas are not claiming that there is, as the 
Mimämsakas claim, a natural correspondence between particular words, i. e. sounds, and 
the world to which these words refer. " On the contrary, NS 11,1,56-57 states that the fact 
that one uses a particular word (sabda) to refer to a particular object (or class of objects) 
"P. S. I, 1, C, k, 3 c-k. 3 d. mngon sum rtogpa clang bral ba/ shes pagang la rtogpa med pa de ni mngon sum mo/ 
rtogpa shes bya ba 'di ji lta bu shigce na, ming dangrigs sogs bsrespa 'o/ 
For Udayana's argument for the continuity between the two forms of perception and the translatability of 
nirvikalpa perception into sa vikalpa perception, see Matilal (1986), pp. 335-340. 
49As Williams (1978), pp. 278-279 notes, Potter (1977), pp. 2,148 is wrong to claim that the Naiyäyikas seem 
to anticipate the modem analytic philosophy of language. While it is true that the Naiyäyikas display a 
great interest in the nature and functioning of language, they do so precisely because it is language which 
enables one to get at reality as it is independent of the linguistic and conceptual structures which mirror it. 
Language is a key to the extra-linguistic state of affairs. This is by contrast with many modem analytic 
philosophers of language, according to whom metaphysical issues are reducible to matters of linguistic 
usage and misusage. As Williams says, both the Naiyäyika and the modem analytic philosopher are 
interested in language, but for very different reasons. 
SÖSee Matilal (1986), p. 324, 'The Buddhist [i. e. Dignäga, Dharmakirti, etc]... concludes that the immediate 
perceptual awareness grasps only the simple, unitary, indivisible, and unanalysable whole, called 
svalaksana, and the mental construction [ vikalpa or kalpanal coming next simply superimposes upon it 
the so-called structure of universals and attributes... the first awareness arising from the sense sees the 
object, the second awareness only conceptualizes. ' There is thus a discontinuity between the two types of 
cognition, and only perception is able to apprehend the sensed-objects. See also Hattori (1968), pp. 
79-80,82. 
"On the Mimämsä school's view that there is a natural relation between words and the objects signified, see 
Kunjunni Raja (1963), pp. 19-21. See also Buescher (1982), pp. 9-19, who notes that, because 
language, 
i. e. the Sanskrit language, accords with the structure of the objective world for the Mimämsakas and the 
grammarians (such as Pataiijali and Bhartrhari), therefore 'grammatical analysis [of 
Sanskrit] was an 
analysis of the structure of reality itself. Studying Sanskrit grammar was comparable, 
in some sense, to 
our studying physics. ' 
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(artba) is on account of convention (sämayikatvät). `= For instance, none of the words, 
blangpo (Tibetan), cow(English), and go (Sanskrit) has a privileged, natural relation to 
the entities which they identify. The connection between a word and an object is created 
rather than natural. But the point is that, the conventionally established word, i. e. 
whatever particular sound is agreed to refer to an entity, will actually identify an entity 
which exists independently of it. Whether one labels entity xby word yor word z, there is 
an entity xto which wordy and word zrefer. The nature of this entity xis not altered by the 
fact that different words might be employed with regard to it. 
6.4.2. The Nydya Account of Error. 
This basic correspondence between concepts/language and the world as it is in 
itself does not mean, however, that, for the Naiyäyikas, there can be no error in the 
cognitive process (as I have already explained, the Naiyäyikas accept the category of 
erroneous cognitions), but rather that such error is parasitical upon a basic accordance 
between the conceptual and linguistic structures of the mind and the mind-independent 
world which they apprehend. Error occurs, certainly, but only on the basis of true 
apprehensions. One can only mistake, for example, a tree-stump for a man because there is 
an existing tree-stump to be apprehended, and because one has apprehended a existing man 
in the past. (If one had never cognized a man, one would not be able to mistake a tree-stump 
fora man). One's error is a case of misidentification (anyatbäkbyätl). 
In the case of the cognition of an entirely fictional entity such as the unicorn or the 
rabbit's horn-- or a contradictory entity such as a square-circle or the son of the barren 
woman-- the error is the conjunction of entities which, separately, are existents 
"NS 11,1,55-57, s`abdärthavyavasth nädapratisedbab// na simayikatväccbabdärthasampratyayasya// 
74tivisese cäniyamät// See also, Kunjunni Raja (1963), pp. 21-24. Kunjunni Raja says that, although 
there is not for the Naiyäyikas a natural relationship between words and their objects, this does not mean 
that the conventions (samketa) between a word and its object are necessarily established by men. On the 
contrary, the Naiyäyikas believed that at least some such conventions are established by God. Thus the 
Naiyäyikas distinguish between impermanent, humanly established linguistic conventions 
(paribbäsäsamketa) and permanent, divinely created linguistic conventions (abhidbäsamketa). Even 
this permanent form of conventional relation between words and their objects is still in contrast with the 
Mimämsä position, however, according to which the relationship between words and their objects 
is 
without any author, part of the fabric of the universe, as it were, uncreated either 
by human or divine 
agents. Houben(1992). pp. 219-242 claims that the Sanskrit grammarians, such as 
Bhartrhari, disagreed 
with the Naiyäyika notion of linguistic convention. The Naiyäyikas claim that a 
linguistic convention 
(samaya, samketa), i. e. a relation between a word (iabda) and an object (artba), might 
be created by a 
deliberate act of a person, without reference to tradition and custom (anägarna). 
The grammarians, b, 
contrast, held that linguistic conventions must be grounded in the established usage 
(abhvisa) of 
traditional learning . 
In other words, the Naiyäyikas countenanced linguistic innovation whereas the 
grammarians did not. 
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(somewhere, at some time). A rabbit and a horn, or a son and a barren woman, exist 
separately. The error is the conjunction of the rabbit and the horn, or the son and the barren 
woman, as a single entity. `3 In which case, although there is no rabbit's horn or son of a 
barren woman which exists anywhere or at any time, there is a rabbit, a horn, a son, and a 
barren woman. If one had never had a knowledge-episode of a rabbit and a horn, or a son 
and a barren woman, one would not be able to falsely combine these entities. Even entirel` 
fictional entities and contradictory entities are based, therefore, on true apprehensions. 
Thus, the negation (pratisedba) of an erroneous cognition means that the entity 
erroneously cognized does not exist in the place where and/or at the time when it is 
erroneously cognized. (In the case of the entirely fictional entity and the contradictory 
entity, the negation of the erroneous cognition means that the entities erroneously 
cognized as a single entity do not exist in conjunction). The implication of this negation is 
that the entity erroneously cognized exists somewhere/at some time. (In the case of the 
entirely fictional entity and the contradictory entity, the implication of the negation is that 
the entities erroneously cognized as a single entity exist separately). Hence the Naiyäyika 
theory that negation is always limited and implicative, and never absolute. ` 
For the Naiyäyika, then, every concept or word has, directly or indirectly, an 
"On the Nyäya misidentification or misplacement (anyathäkhyätr) theory of error, see Matilal (1986), pp. 
205-213. See also Potter (1977), p. 110. This theory of misidentification, incidentally, presumably can 
be applied also to memories (smrh) which are not in accord with their objects (ayathärtha), and not just to 
erroneous cognitions (see above for this distinction). If I remember that the day before yesterday was 
sunny, and it was in fact cloudy, my memory is not in accord with the object. But I can only incorrectly 
remember the day before yesterday as sunny because I have, at some other time, had a 
knowledge-episode (or a series of knowledge-episodes) of a sunny day. (I am extrapolating here from 
the Nyäya theory of misidentification. I do not know whether the Naiyäyikas actually give such an 
account of memories which are not in accord with their objects). 
Furthermore, the theory of misidentification seems to entail that there is a very close connection 
between erroneous cognitions which are not memories (e. g. erroneous perceptions) and the phenomenon 
of memory. One can only misidentify a particular object if one has previously had a knowledge-episode 
of the object (or its components) with which it is confused. I can only incorrectly cognize the man in the 
distance to be a tree because I have a memory of a tree which I have previously known. If I have never 
known a tree, then it is inconceivable that I misidentify the man as a tree. An error occurs, then, when a 
revived memory gets mixed-up with the present perception of the object. Matilal (1986), pp. 286-291 
gives an account of this connection between memory and erroneous perception. As he writes: 'How can I 
see a physical object such as a red tomato or a white horse when no such object is present in my visual field? 
The Nyäya answer to this question is amazingly simple: I do not see an actual (physical) object in this 
occasion but I see only a remembered physical object. This device is technically called 'presentation 
through revived memory' or jfänalaksanä pratyäsatti' 
"This Nyäya theory of negation is clearly expressed by the opponent in the VV/'VVC. VV 11, sata ei a 




kriyate näsatah.... VVC 20, ... asati 
hi pratisedhye kasya pratisedhah. See Matilal 
(1968), especially p. 52, 'whenever we talk of negation or absence, it is relevant to ask of what the absence 
or negation is that we are talking about. Nyäya does not accept any such thing as'pure negation'. 
Thus an 
absence, it claims, must be an absence of something. This something is termed the prativogin 
(the 
counterpositive) of the absence in question. ' See also Potter (1977), p. 143-146. 
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existing referent. Not everything which is said or conceived is true, however, because 
concepts/words can be misapplied, thus mistaking one existing entity for another, or 
wrongly combined, resulting in a fabricated 'complex' entity of which the supposed 
components do exist. Everything existent is cognizable (and hence conceptualizable) and 
nameable, and, although not everything conceptualizable and nameable is existent. 
everything conceptualizable and nameable, even when not directly corresponding to an 
15 existent, can be traced back, as it were, to existents. 
6.5. Validation of the pram na-s. 
There is an important distinction between a knowledge-episode, i. e. a correct 
cognition, and the proof/validation of this knowledge-episode. (In other words, the term 
'knowledge' as used by the Naiyäyika does not denote justified true belief). Unless one 
holds that knowledge-episodes are self-validating, i. e. self-evident, the validation of the 
knowledge-episode will require something more than simply the existence of the 
knowledge-episode itself. 
For example, I have a correct cognition of a water in the distance. But, unless I take 
correct cognitions to be self-evident (a view which runs into difficulty, I think, because 
sometimes we think that our cognitions are correct when in fact they are not), I do not as of 
yet know that this cognition is correct. To gain this further knowledge, I would have to 
prove/validate in some way that the cognition is correct. For example, I could look again, I 
could ask other people what they see, I could throw pebbles at the object-- do they make 
splashing noises? I could approach the object and taste or feel it. Such actions might 
constitute a proof/validation of my original correct cognition. (At precisely what 
point/under what conditions my cognition is proved to be correct is of course 
controversial). Note that the cognition was correct prior to the proof of its correctness. 
In some cases one has knowledge-episodes, i. e. correct cognitions, and yet they are 
neverproved/validated. I may have a correct cognition of water in the distance. As of yet I 
do not know that this cognition is correct. If I then walk away and never consider my 
cognition of the water in the distance again, I will never know whether or not it was correct. 
Yet, despite the fact that my cognition of the water in the distance was never 
proved/validated, this cognition was correct. One may know without knowing, on the 
basis 
"Matilal (1968), p. 68, writes that the principle underlying Nyäya-Vaisesika ontology was the position 
that "all 
that are reals are knowable (/neya) and nameable (abhidheya)'. The thesis was sometimes misconstrued 
to state that all that are known [i. e. cognized] are reals... ' See also Matilal 
(1986), p. 29. 
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of some proof, that the knowledge-episode in question was in fact a case of kno%ý ledge. So. 
one must be careful to distinguish the existence of the knowledge-episode from the proof 
that it is a knowledge-episode. I want to stress this point, because, as we shall see, this is a 
distinction which Nägärjuna, in his critique of the Nyäya pramäna theory, sometimes 
conflates. 
But there is another important distinction here, which it is also rather easy to 
conflate. The issue of how one validates a knowledge-episode must not be confused with 
the issue of how consciousness is reflexive. The proof that a knowledge-episode is in fact a 
knowledge-episode is an entirely different phenomenon from the awareness that one is 
aware. For example, it is one thing to be aware that I am having a cognition of distant 
water; it is quite another thing to prove that my correct cognition of the distant water is a 
correct cognition. The Naiyäyikas in fact have plenty to say about the reflexivity of 
consciousness. 56 However, my concern here is with Nyäya theories about how knowledge- 
episodes are validated. 
6.5.1. The Nyäya Theory of Extrinsic Validation. 
The tendency in Nyäya philosophy is to claim that knowledge-episodes are 
validated, i. e. proved to be in accord with their objects, if the object functions or acts in the 
way in which it is cognized. Thus, a perceptual knowledge-episode of water is proved to 
be a correct perceptual cognition if, for example, it can be drunk, whereas if the perceived 
water cannot be drunk, it is a mirage rather than real water, and the perception of it as water 
is a case of error rather than of knowledge. In other words, the correctness of a 
knowledge-episode is attested by reference to a further cognition of the efficacy 
"According to the Nydya theory of reflexivity, there can be an introspective cognition (anuvyavasäya), a 
mental perception, which immediately follows the cognition of an object, and which takes this cognition 
of the object as its object. One is consequently aware that one is aware. Note that, while the cognition 
which the anuvyavasäya cognizes might be either a knowledge-episode or a non-knowledge-episode, the 
anutivavasäya itself must always be accurate. My cognition of water, for example, may 
be incorrect or 
correct, but my introspective awareness that I am having a cognition of water cannot 
fail to be true. See 
Siderits (1980), p. 324, Matilal (1986), pp. 143-147. 
The Nyäya theory of anuvyavasäya is quite different from the theory of reflexivity explicated 
by 
various Yogäcära-influenced thinkers, notably 
Säntaraksita. For the Naiyayikas, reflexivity invol,, es 
two separate cognitions; the cognition of th object and the subsequent mental perception of 
this cognition 
of the object. Furthermore, not all cognitions are followed by such a mental perception 
(though most 
cognitions are). One is not necessarily aware that one is aware of an object. 
By contrast, Säntaraksita's 
theory is that reflexivity does not involve a second and subsequent cognition; the very cognition of 
the 
object includes the simultaneous awareness of this cognition (svasamvedana). 
Furthermore, this 
reflexivity occurs in every instance of cognition. Cognition without this reflexivity 
would not be 
cognition, like a mirror which does not reflect would not be a mirror. 
There is no such thing as not being 
aware of one's awareness of an object. See Williams(] 997a). 
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(phalajäna) or confirmatory behaviour (pravrttisämarthya) of the objects which are 
cognized. If the object actually acts in the way in which it is initially cognized. then this 
proves that the initial cognition does apprehend an object which exists in the 
mind-independent world. The knowledge-episodes are, therefore, extrinsically validated. 
i. e. validated by the objects of which they are the knowledge-episodes. 
The Naiyäyikas claim that the knowledge-episodes which must be finally relied 
upon in order to apprehend the confirmatory behaviour of the object are perceptions. III 
this sense perceptual cognition is the basic type of knowledge-episode. `8 Perceptions 
provide the evidence upon which a proof of a knowledge-episode may proceed. Thus, the 
mechanics of the validation of a knowledge-episode are as follows: One has a 
knowledge-episode of an object. There is subsequently a perception of the confirmatory 
behaviour of the object. On this basis, there is an inference: becausethere is a perception of 
the confirmatory behaviour, therefore the original knowledge-episode of the object is 
proved to be a knowledge-episode. " If I rely on the verbal testimony, for example, of a 
trustworthy person (äpta), that the platypus lives in Australia, the consequent 
knowledge-episode that the platypus lives in Australia is proved to be a 
knowledge-episode on the basis of the perception in Australia of the confirmatory 
behaviour of the curious duck-billed, egg-laying, amphibious creature in question. The 
trustworthy person has said that the platypus lives in Australia, and the receiver of this 
information subsequently perceives in Australia an animal behaving in accord with the 
description of the platypus provided by the trustworthy person. One infers that, because 
the confirmatory behaviour of the platypus is perceived in Australia, the cognition 
produced by the verbal testimony of the trustworthy person is a knowledge-episode. 
The basic problem with this theory of extrinsic establishment is that it appears to 
involve either circular reasoning or the fallacy of an infinite regress (This is a problem 
which Nägärjuna points out, as we shall see). For, as I have explained, the confirmatory 
behaviour which provides the evidence for the validation of the knowledge-episodes must 
itself be apprehended by a perceptual knowledge-episode. But how is this perceptual 
knowledge-episode, by means of which other knowledge-episodes are validated, itself 
proved to be correct? It would be tautologous if it were validated by the confirmatory 
"My account of the Nyäya theory of extrinsic establishment depends on Chatterjee 
(1978), pp. 81-89, Mat ilal 
(1986), pp. 160-179. They rely primarily on the Nyäyamanjari of 
Jayanta Bhatta, the 
Nyayavärtttkatätparyatfkäof Väcaspati Misra, and Udayana'sParisuddhi. 
`'See Van Bijlert (1989), p. 33. See also Matilal (1986), p. 5 who writes that, 
for the Naiyäyikas, perceiving is 
'the most direct, basic, and indubitable knowing. ' 
"See Matilal (1986), p. 164. 
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behaviour itself (for the issue at stake is precisely whether it can be proved that this 
perceptual knowledge-episode correctly apprehends the confirmatory behaviour). The 
alternative is that the perceptual knowledge-episode of confirmatory behaviour is 
validated by further knowledge-episodes. For example, the perception of the confirmatory, 
behaviour of the water (it quenches my thirst) is validated on the basis of a further 
perception of the confirmatory behaviour (it feels like water). But this entails an infinite 
regress (for how is it proved that the perception of the feeling of the water is correct? ). 
The later Naiyäyikas (much later than the NS and Nägärjuna's critiques) vv ere 
aware of this difficulty. Their responses are complex and varied. In general, however, the 
Naiyäyikas appear to offer a psychological rather than an epistemological solution. One 
does not generally doubt the correctness of the cognitions which apprehend confirmatory 
behaviour. If the water quenches my thirst, I do not usually doubt the perceptual 
knowledge-episode of the water quenching my thirst. If the fire burns my hand, then I do 
not doubt that the knowledge-episode of the fire burning my hand is in fact correct. If on 
some unusual occasion one were to doubt such a knowledge-episode of confirmatory 
behaviour, the cognition would be validated by appeal to further confirmatory behaviour 
(e. g. not only did the water quench my thirst, it quenched other people's thirst, it felt like 
water, etc). This does not lead to an infinite regress, however, because the psychological 
need for validation stops as soon as the doubt which impedes action is dispelled. Sooner or 
later, the evidence that the water which I perceive is in fact water will be sufficient for me to 
believe that it is water. I am then able to act successfully on the basis of this conviction. I 
will be happy, for example, to take a bath in the water now that my doubts have been 
vanquished. 60 
It could of course be argued that this pragmatic answer to the problem of validation 
of knowledge-episodes of confirmatory behaviour is actually an evasion of the issue, for it 
is still possible that, despite one's psychological convictions, the cognitions of 
confirmatory behaviour are in fact false, in the sense that they do not correspond to a 
mind-independent reality (for example, by analogy with a dream in which one believes that 
one is tasting water, one believes that other people are tasting the water too, etc and yet 
there is not in fact any water which is being tasted). 
But the Naiyäyika can, I think, reasonably object that it is highly unlikely that one's 
psychological convictions, on the basis of cognitions of confirmatory 
behaviour, are 
60See Matilal (1986), pp. 172-179, Chatterjee (1978), pp. 81-89. 
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wrong. Granted, it is theoretically possible, by analogy with the dream, that all of one's 
cognitions of the confirmatory behaviour are actually false. That is, it is theoreticall\ 
possible that not just my initial perception of the water, but my subsequent cognitions of 
the water as wet, thirst-quenching, cool, etc are delusions. It might be, then, that there is no 
mind-independent water. But a theoretical possibility (especially such an implausible one) 
is not the same as an actuality. If it is claimed that, nevertheless one cannot be certain that 
the cognitions of the confirmatory behaviour are themselves correct, then the Naiyäyika 
could respond that the requirement of certainty is too strict. The Naiyäyika can say, quite 
reasonably, that it is highly probable that the cognitions of confirmatory behaviour are 
correct, and this is sufficient grounds for proof. The Naiyäyika might insist, I think, that the 
onus is on the opponent to prove his (the opponent's) highly improbable thesis that the 
cognitions of the confirmatory behaviour are notcorrect, and thus cannot be used as proof 
of the correctness of the initial knowledge-episode. 
6.5.2. Validation According to theNyayaSutra-s. 
The extrinsic validation of knowledge-episodes is indeed the usual explanation 
given by the later Naiyäyikas. However, the NS itself gives no indication that the 
pramäna-s are validated extrinsically. On the contrary, NSII, 1,19, in the context of a 
debate about validation of pramäna-s, approvingly gives the analogy of the light (pradlpa). 
This seems to indicate that, rather than being extrinsically validated, for the author/s of the 
NS, pramäna-s are self-validated, i. e. self-evident, just as a light is self-luminous, i. e. self- 
evident when it lights -up its object. 
This example appears to be given in reply to the opponent's objection at NS 
II, 1,17-18, that, if knowledge-episodes were validated by other knowledge-episodes, there 
would be an infinite regress (anavastha), and if the infinite regress is not accepted, the 
absurd consequence would result that the objects of knowledge are apprehended without 
knowledge-episodes. The point seems to be that (i) without itself being proved, the 
pramäna cannot apprehend the prameya, but (ii) if the pramäna is proved by another 
pramäna an infinite regress is entailed. The opponent appears to have the Naiyäyika 
caught in the two horns ofa dilemma. (Note, however, that this is only an apparent dilemma 
because (i) is fallacious; as I have explained there is no contradiction in a 
knowledge-episode apprehending an object of knowledge without itself having 
been 
proved to be a knowlege-episode and (ii) is unconvincing. I have suggested above 
how the 
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infinite regress might reasonably be stopped). 
NS H, 1,19 appears to respond that, by analogy with a light (pradlpa) which is 
self-illuminating, i. e. self-evident when it illuminates other things. the 
knowledge-episodes are, unlike the objects of knowledge, self-validating, i. e. self-evident, 
and thus require no validation by other knowledge-episodes (or, indeed, by means of the 
confirmatory behaviour of the objects which they purport to cognize). ' (For a fuller 
discussion of the light example as an analogy for self-evident knowledge-episodes, and for 
an assessment of the philosophical difficulties entailed by a theory of self-evident 
knowledge-episodes, see 7.3). Thus, the NS appears to advance a different position than 
the Nyäya tradition which stems from it. 
As Siderits has explained62, however, Vätsyäyana understands the example of the 
light in the NS differently, i. e. not as supportive of the self-evidence of the pramäna-s. 
Vätsyäyana says, rather obscurely, that the example of the light in the NSindicates, not that 
the pramäna-s are self-evident, but that, just as the light can be both a pramäna and a 
prameya, so other pramäna-s may themselves be prameya-s of other pramäna-s. 63 
The notion that a light is a pramäna is strange; the point seems to be that light is an 
instrument which assists in the perception of an object. ' I can see the red chair, for 
example, (partly) because there is light. Thus, the light is a means of knowledge in the 
sense that it is one of the conditions by which the perceptual knowledge of the red chair is 
possible. So Vätsyäyana seems to be saying that light is actually a pramäna (rather than 
being an analogy for the pramäna-s). In which case, he here uses the term 'pramdgd is a 
very broad sense. Clearly, a light is not a pramäna in the narrower senses in which I have 
explained it in the present chapter. 65 That is, a light is not itself a knowledge-episode, nor is 
it one of the four means in which knowledge-episodes occur (such as by perception, 
inference, etc). It is, rather, a particular external condition which in some cases supports 
the occurrence of a knowledge-episode. 
That a light may be the prameya of a pramäna can be interpreted more 
straightforwardly: there can, for example, be a perception of a light, an inference about a 
light, etc. But perhaps Vätsyäyana is attempting to make a philosophically more 
interesting point than this. Perhaps he intends to communicate that, 
just as a light 
"WS 11,1,17-19, pramänatah siddbeh pramanänäm praman3ntarasiddhiprasaýgah' 
' tadvini vrttervä 
pramanasiddbi vattatsiddbth// na, pradlpaprakäiasiddhi vattatsiddbeh// 
"'See Siderits (1980), pp. 322-325. See also Matilal (1986), pp. 59-61. 
67NSBh II, 1,19. Ad (trans) (1984), p. 649. 
6'NSBh II, 1,19. Jhä (trans) (1984), p. 649. 
"See Siderits (1980), pp. 322-323. 
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sometimes becomes the object of a knowledge-episode, so too a knowledge-episode can 
become the object known by another knowledge-episode. This occurs, I suggest, when a 
knowledge-episode is validated. In this situation there is a correct cognition that the 
knowledge-episode was correct, i. e. was a knowledge-episode. For example. I have a 
perception of water. I taste the water, and it quenches my thirst. I then have a knowledge- 
episode that the initial perception of the water was indeed a knowledge-episode. Clearly, 
then, a knowledge-episode may, in the epistemic situation of validation, become the object 
of a knowledge-episode. I do not know that this is what Vätsyäyana means to convey-- his 
explanation is rather opaque. Nevertheless, it seems a philosophically plausible 
explanation of the notion that a pramänamight also be aprameya. 
At any rate, what is clear is that Vätsyäyana does not understand the example of the 
light in the NSas supportive of a theory of self-validating, i. e. self-evident, knowledge- 
episodes. However, whether or not Vatsyayana's own interpretation is credible, as Tola 
and Dragonetti note66, he himself acknowledges, at the beginning of his commentary to NS 
11,1,20, that some authors (probably Naiyäyikas), unlike himself, consider the light 
example to be supportive of the self-evidence of the pramäna-s. 67 Thus, it seems to be the 
case that in early Nyaya philosophy there was a diversity of opinion on this matter, with the 
extrinsic validation of the pramäna-s eventually becoming the generally accepted 
position. 
This issue of the validation of the knowledge-episodes forms the basis of 
Nägarjuna's critique in the VV/VVC of the Nyaya pramäna theory, and it plays a major 
role in the critique in the Vald/Va1dC. The evidence that there was not unanimity among 
the early Naiyäyikas about whether the pramapa-s are extrinsically validated or 
self-evident goes some way to explaining the form of Nagarjuna's critiques, which 
examine and refute in some detail both of these alternatives. If the Naiyäyikas had all held 
that the pramäna-s are extrinsically validated, then there would have been no need to refute 
in any detail the theory that the pramäna-s are self- evident. The amount of attention given 
by Nagarjuna both to theories of extrinsic validation and self-evidence suggests, perhaps, 
that he was dealing with Naiyäyika opponents of diverse or unsettled opinion on this 
matter. Let us turn now to Nagärjuna's critiques. 
'See Tola and Dragonetti (1995a), p. 182. 
"'See NSBh, 11,1,20, Jhä (trans) (1984), p. 655, (trans as NSBh, II, 1,19a). 
147 
7. The Critique of Pramäna-s and Prame3ya`s 
in the Vigrah avyavartanl. 
7.1. Introduction. 
7.1.1. The Opponent's Objection at VV/VVC 5-6. 
Nägdrjuna's critique is motivated by an objection raised by his opponent. 
Nagärjuna has stated, the opponent notes, that all entities are empty (stlnyäh sarvabhä%'äh). 
But in order to attribute emptiness to entities, Nägärjuna must first apprehend them by 
means of some knowledge-episode (pramäna), be it a perception (pratyaksa), inference 
(anumäna), verbal testimony (jgama) or comparison (upamäna). However, the opponent 
continues, the knowledge-episode is itself an entity (bbäva) and is thus, according to 
Nägärjuna's statement, itself empty. Therefore, there are for Nägärjuna no pramäna-s by 
which entities to be negated, i. e. made known as empty, are apprehended. And thus his 
position that all entities are empty is not tenable. ' 
Note that here the opponent is not arguing that the objects of a knowledge-episode 
must exist, i. e. be non-empty, in order to be negated (although he later, in a separate 
objection, makes this point toot). Nor is he making the point that the negation which makes 
known the emptiness of all entities itself is an entity and must, as empty, be unable to 
negate (although, again, he also makes this point in another objection'). 
Rather, the opponent says that the entities to be negated must first (tävat) be 
apprehended by a knowledge-episode in order subsequently to be negated. One cannot, 
for example, negate , 
i. e. make known the emptiness of, the pot unless one has correctly 
cognized the pot which one is going to negate (for otherwise one would not know what it is 
WV 5-6, pratyaksena hi tä vadyadyupalabhya vini vartayasi bbä vän/ tannästi pratyaksam 
bhä vä 
yen opalabbyante//anumänam pratyuktam pratyaksenägamopamäne cal anumänägamas3dhyä ye 
'rth3 
drstäntasädbyäs`ca// WC 5-6, yadi pratyaksatah sarvabbävänupalabbya bbavännivartayati sänyäh 
sarvabhävä id tadanupapannam/ kasmät/ pratyaksamapi hi pramänam sarvabhäväntargatatv3c- 
chunyam/ yo bhävänupalabhate so pi sunyah/ tasmät pratyaksena pramänena nopalambhabhä vo 
nupalabdbasya ca pratisedhänupapattrh/ tatra yaduktam stinyäh sarvabbävä 
iti tadanupapannam/ svätte 
buddhih, anumänenägamenopamänena vä sarvabhävänupalabbya sarvabbävavyävartanam 
krivata iti, 
atra brumah/ anumänopamänägamäsca pratyaksena pramänena pratyuktäh yatbä 
hi pratyaksam 
pramänam sunyam sarvabbävänäm s`rlnyatvädevamanumänopamänägamä api 
sclnyih sarvabhä vänäm 
sunyatvät/ ye numänasädbyä arthä ägamasadhyä upamänasädhyäsca te 
pi sünyäh sari abh3 vänäm 
srinyatvät/ anumänopamänägamaisca yo bhävänupalabhate so pi 
sunyah/ tasmädbhävänämupa- 
lambbäbbä vo nupalabdhänäm ca svabhä vapratisedbänupapattih/ tatra yaduktam 
sunyäh sarvabhä v3 iti 
tann/ 
'SeeVVand VVC 11-12. 
'See VV and VVC 17-19. 
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that one is to negate! ). The knowledge-episode which apprehends the pot to be negated 
must itself exist. (A non-existent knowledge-episode cannot apprehend an<<thin). But the 
implication ofNägärjuna's own assertion of universal emptiness is, the opponent contends, 
that there can be no knowledge-episode which exists in order to apprehend the entities to be 
negated. ' 
7.1.2. Nagarjuna's Response at VV/VVC 30. 
It is obvious that the opponent has here taken Nägärjuna's assertion of universal 
emptiness to mean that nothing whatsoever exists. Thus, if nothing whatsoever exists, then 
there can be no knowledge-episode which apprehends the entities of which non-existence 
(emptiness) is subsequently to be made known. However, it is clear that Nagärjuna's 
response at other points (for example, at VVC 22) to this accusation of nihilism is that the 
opponent has misunderstood his assertion of universal emptiness! That all entities are 
empty does not entail that they do not exist; rather, it means that they have an existence 
without svabbäva. ' 
It is in this context, I think, that Nägärjuna's reply to the opponent's objection 
should perhaps be understood. Nägärjuna responds that the opponent's criticism 
(upälambba) would indeed be correct if Nägärjuna claimed to apprehend (upa- labh) any 
entity on the basis of which apprehension he affirmed (pra- v 1) or denied (ni- vrr 
something about it. In fact, however, Nägärjuna says that he does not apprehend anything 
by means of any pramapa, and thus he neither affirms nor denies anything about any entity. 
Therefore, the criticism does not apply to him. ' 
Nägärjuna's point here is certainly obscure. However, it seems plausible that 
Nägärjuna means that he does not apprehend any svabhäva-endowed entity. Thus, he does 
not affirm the existence with svabbäva of entities. But neither does he deny that entities 
'Siderits (1980), pp. 308-309, says that the force of the objection here is epistemological rather 
than 
ontological. But this is inaccurate. The opponent is arguing, after all, that a 
knowledge-episode must first 
exist in order for a negation of what is known to follow. It is, however, correct to say that 
the objection is 
not concerned with the existence ofthe objects negated, nor with the existence of the negation 
itself. 
WC 22, sunyatärtham ca bhavänbhävänämanavasäya pravrtta upälambham vaktum... 
°W 22, yasca pratityabhävo bhävänäm srinyateti sä proktä/ yasca pratityabhävo 
bhavati hi 
tasyäsvabhävatvam//See also VVC 22. 
'VV 30, yadi kimcidupalabheyam pravartayeyam nivartayeyam vä pratyaksädibhirarthaistadabhävänme 
'nupälambhah// VVC 30, yadyaham kamcidarthamupalabheyam pratyakaänumänopamänägamais- 
caturbhih prammnais`caturnäm va pramapanamanyatamena, ata eva pravartayeyam 
vä nivartavevam v3 
yathärthameväham kamcinnopalabhe tasmänna pravartayämi na nivartayämi/ 
tatraivam sari vo 
bbavatopälambha ukto yadi pratyaksädinäm pramäninamanvatamenopalabhva 
bhsvänvinivartavasi 
nanu täni pramänäni na santi taisca pramänairapi gamyä artbi na santiti 
sa me bhavatvevinu- 
pälambhah// 
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exist. 'Deny' here would thus have the meaning of asserting the contrary of existence with 
svabbäva, i. e. total non-existence. Nägärjuna intends to tread the celebrated Middle \V a, 
(madbyamä pratipa f) by advocating the existence without svabbäva of entities, as opposed 
to the extremes of affirmation of existence with svabbäva or denial, i. e. complete 
non-existence. ' 
In which case, according to Nägärjuna, it is a knowledge-episode which exists but 
without svabbäva which apprehends entities which exist but without svabhäva. It is a 
negation (of the svabhäva of entities), which exists but without svabhäva, which makes 
known that these entities do not have svabhäva. This is the true implication ofNägärjuna's 
teaching ofuniversal emptiness. 
If, by contrast, for Nägärjuna there was an apprehension (by means of a 
knowledge-episode) of entities, and then there was a negation which makes known that 
entities do not exist at all, then the opponent's criticism would be correct. For how could a 
knowledge-episode-- which, being itself an entity, would not exist at all-- apprehend 
entities in order that they may subsequently be the object of such a negation? (Not to 
mention the problem of how entities which do not exist at all could be apprehended, and 
how a negation of the existence of all entities-- which, being itself an entity, would not 
exist at all-- could make known that entities do not exist at all). 
This, then, is how I interpret Nägärjuna's reply to his opponent. But what does 
Nägärjuna mean when he says that all entities exist but without svabbäva? Here one must 
recollect my discussion in chapter 4. The absence of svabbäva of entities does not mean 
simply that entities dependently originate. On the contrary, seen in the context of the 
Abhidharma, the absence of svabbäva of entities means for Nägärjuna that entities have 
conceptually constructed existence (prajnaptlsaf, i. e. they originate in dependence upon 
the conceptualizing mind. Thus, there are not really any entities which dependently 
originate in a mind-independent way. 
So, when Nägärjuna says that he does not have any knowledge-episodes of entities 
with svabbäva, he means that he does not have any knowledge of entities which exist 
in a 
mind-independent, more-than-conceptually-constructed, way. By this statement, 
Nägärjuna does not mean that he does not know whether or not there are entities which 
exist mind-independently (which would be a sceptical position). 
On the contrary, he 
clearly means that he does not have knowledge of mind-independent entities 
because he 
For Nägärjuna's advocacy of the Middle Way between existence (with sv abh va) and non-existence, 
see 
MMK XV, 7, XXIV, 18, AS 22. 
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knows that there are not mind-independent entities, i. e. he knows that entities are empty. 
(See chapter 2 for further discussion of this point). ' 
(I remind the reader, however, of what appears to me to be the incoherence of 
Nagäjuna's position. Not only does it seem highly unlikely that all objects of knowledge 
are conceptual constructs, it also seems to make no sense to claim that everything exists 
simply as a conceptual construct. In this case, there would be nothing out of which thine 
are constructed, and nothing or nobody doing the constructing. Nägärjuna might want to 
tread the Middle Path by asserting universal existence without svabhäva, but it would 
appear that, despite his intentions, universal existence without svabhäva in fact reduces to 
the extreme of nihilism). 
7.1.3. Nagarjuna's Challenge at VV/VVC 31. 
Nägärjuna next challenges his opponent. The opponent claims, Nägärjuna says, 
that the establishment of the variety of objects (tesäm tesäm prasiddhirarthänäm) occurs 
through knowledge-episodes (pramänatah). But, Nägärjuna asks, how can there be for 
you (the opponent) the establishment (praslddhi) of the knowledge-episodes themselves? "' 
The word 'establishment' (prasiddhl) here, I think, means 'validation' or'proof. " I 
take Nägärjuna's point to be that the opponent claims that he has knowledge-episodes of 
svabhäva-endowed entities, i. e. he apprehends them by means of perception, inference, 
verbal testimony, and comparison. Nagärjuna's question is, then, how can you prove that 
these knowledge-episodes really do apprehend entities with svabbäva? That is, Nägärjuna 
is in effect saying, prove to me that knowledge-episodes really are knowledge-episodes of 
svabbäva-endowed entities! 
Nägärjuna's challenge should perhaps be seen in the context of the Nyäya theory of 
validation which he is probably criticizing. For the Naiyäyikas, validation of pramäna-s 
'Thus, Nägärjuna's claim that there are no knowledge-episodes of mind-independent entities 
does not mean 
that for him there is no knowledge. For, as I have shown in detail in the first part of this thesis, 
Nägärjuna 
says that he has knowledge of the emptiness, the absence of svabhäva, of entities. 
However, this 
knowledge is not of a mind-independent reality, because emptiness is the emptiness of entities, and the 
entities of which emptiness is the emptiness are conceptual constructs. 
W 31, yadi ca pramänataste tesäm tesäm prasiddhirarthänäm/ tesäm punab prasiddhim 
brühi katham to 
pramänänam// 
"See Monier-Williams (1899), pp. 1215-1216. The verbal root from which the various 
forms are derived is 
sidh. While it is true that Ndgärjuna uses 'establishment' as synonymous with validation there 
is a 
caveat. As we shall see, later in the VV/VVC he equates the 
issue of the means of validation of 
pramäna-s with the issue of the means by which they exist. This 
is clearly a confusion. however, as the 
two issues, as I shall show later, are not equivalent. Perhaps the confusion occurs partly 
because the 
verbal root sidh can mean 'originate, result from' (Monier-Williams 
(1899), pp. 1215-1216) as well as 
'prove, validate'. 
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means proof that these pramäna-s do correctly apprehend the prameya-s. And to correctly 
apprehend the prameya-s means to apprehend them as they exist independently of the 
knowledge-episode which apprehends them. As I have explained in the previous chapter. 
knowledge for the Naiyäyikas is a matter of a knowledge-episode mirroring a 
mind-independent state of affairs. Thus, to validate a pramäna means to prove that it 
actually does mirror such a mind-independent reality. I have a perception of water, for 
example. How is it to be proved that this perception actually apprehends water which 
exists in a mind-independent way? As I have explained, the Naiyäyikas have a variety of 
answers to this question, although the most popular answer seems to be that the knowledge- 
episode is proved to be a knowlede-episode by means of the confirmatory behaviour of the 
object apprehended. The perception of the water is proved to apprehend 
mind-independent water if, for example, the water can be drunk, etc. 
7.1.4. The Purpose of Nagarjuna's Critique at VV/VVC 31-51. 
Nägärjuna proceeds to examine and refute in turn the various ways in which 
pramäna-s themselves might be established (siddba) if they were to apprehend prameya-s 
with svabbäva. Nägärjuna's intention, it appears, is to refute all of the possible ways in 
which pramana-s which apprehend entities with svabbäva might be proved, thus 
undermining his opponent's pretensions to knowledge of prameya-s with svabbäva. The 
opponent says that he has knowledge of entities with svabbäva, but, Nägärjuna contends, 
there can be no proof ofthis knowledge. 
However-- and this is very important-- it is one thing to demonstrate that there is no 
proof that knowledge-episodes apprehend mind-independent entities, but it is another 
thing to demonstrate that knowledge-episodes do not apprehend mind-independent 
entities. I might correctly apprehend the mind-independent tree, for example, but it might 
be maintained that there is no possible way ofproving that I have correctly apprehended the 
mind-independent tree. Furthermore, even if it can be demonstrated that-- not only can 
there be no proollhat knowledge-episodes apprehend mind-independent entities but also-- 
there is no knowledge of mind-independent entities, this does not mean that there are no 
mind-independent entities. It just means that, if there are mind-independent entities, they 
are entirely unknown. Thus, there are three distinct propositions: 
(i) It cannot be proved that there are knowledge-episodes of mind-independent 
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entities. 
(ii) There are no knowledge-episodes of mind-independent entities. 
(iii) There are no mind-independent entities. 
It does not follow that if (i) therefore (ii) and (iii). It would appear, however, that 
Nägärjuna's strategy is to establish only (i). Does Nagärjuna himself think that, by 
establishing (i), he establishes (ii) and (iii)? It is impossible to be sure, of course. However. 
I suspect that Nägärjuna (wrongly) thinks that the demonstration of (i) does entail (ii) and, 
most importantly, (iii). That is, perhaps Nägärjuna erroneously thinks that the 
demonstration that there is no proof that knowledge-episodes apprehend 
mind-independent entities entails both that there is no knowledge of mind-independent 
entities, and, most importantly, that there are no mind-independent entities. This would 
certainly be in accord with the main contention of Nägärjuna's thought-- which is not that 
one cannot prove that knowledge-episodes apprehend mind-independent objects, nor that 
one does not know whether or not there are mind- independent entities but rather-- that one 
does not have knowledge of mind-independent entities because there are no 
mind-independent entities (i. e. entities with svabbäva) to be known. (See chapters 2 and 
4). 
Perhaps at best Nägärjuna might legitimately claim that the successful 
demonstration that there is no proof that knowledge-episodes apprehend 
svabbäva-endowed entities is an indication, or provides some evidence, that there are no 
entities with svabbäva. If it could be proved that knowledge-episodes apprehend 
svabbäva-endowed entities, then Nägärjuna's claim that there are no entities with 
svabbäva would be proved false. If it cannot be proved that there are knowledge-episodes 
of svabbäva-endowed prameya-s, although this does not itself prove Nägärjuna's claim 
that there are no prameya-s with svabbäva, it certainly may be used as supportive evidence 
for his claim. It would make his thesis more plausible. 
Unfortunately for Nagärjuna, however, as I will show, his demonstration that it 
cannot be proved that there are knowledge-episodes of svabbäva-endowed entities 
is in 
many ways flawed. Thus his demonstration does not succeed even as supportive evidence 
for his further claim that there are not any prameya-s with svabbäva. 
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7.1.5. The Theories of Validation Refuted by Nägdrjuna. 
The positions presented and criticized in Nägärjuna's critique may conveniently be 
divided into two groups: (A) those positions which advocate the intrinsic establishment of 
the pramäna-s, and (B) those positions which advocate the extrinsic establishment of the 
pramäna-s. Intrinsic establishment means establishment of the pramäna-s by means of 
pramäna-s, without dependence on the prameya-s. Extrinsic establishment means 
establishment of the pramäna-s by means of dependence on the prameya-s. If pramäna-s 
were established: (A) intrinsically, they might be( I) established by other pramäna-s, or (2) 
self-evident, (B) extrinsically, they might be (1) established by the prameya-s, or (2) 
mutually established with the prameya-s. " 
7.1.6. The Validation of Knowledge-episodes Versus the 
Reflexivity of Consciousness. 
I shall examine and assess in detail Nägärjuna's critiques of each of these positions. 
However, before doing so, let me emphasize a distinction to which I drew attention in the 
previous chapter. Validation of knowledge-episodes is a separate issue from the 
reflexivity of consciousness. The proof that a knowledge-episode is in fact a knowledge- 
episode is an entirely different phenomenon from the awareness that one is aware. 
According to my interpretation, Nägärjuna's refutations are of various ways in 
which knowledge-episodes of svabhäva-endowed entities might be proved/validated. 
Which is to say that Nägärjuna is not here, in my opinion, refuting various theories about 
the reflexivity of consciousness. 
These issues are especially prone to be conflated in the present context for four 
reasons: 
(i) the position that pramäna-s are established by other pramäna-s is similar in form 
to the position that reflexivity involves a second consciousness of the first consciousness. 
That is, consciousness, of consciousness, of an object. " 
"I borrow this categorization, with some modifications, from S iderits (1980), pp. 309-310. 
VV51 is in fact a list 
of most of these positions, which are examined is detail in the previous in VV 31-50. 
VV 51, naiv a svatah 
prasiddbirna parasparatab parapramänairvä/ na bhavati na ca prameyairna cäpyakasmatpramänänärrv' 
The list adds the position that the pramäna-s might be established 'accidentally' or 
'without a reason' 
(akasmät). This position is not discussed anywhere else in the text, however. I assume that 
Nsgäriuna 
rejects it because it is obvious that the mere assertion that the pramäna-s are validated, without any 
explanation at all of how they are validated, is entirely vacuous. It is therefore not 
in need of any serious 
or sustained refutation. 
"As I explained in the previous chapter (note 56), this theory of reflexivity was advanced 
by the Naiyäyikas. 
Consciousness of an object is usually followed immediately by an introspective consciousness 
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(ii) Nagärjuna argues, as we shall see, that the position that pramäna-s are validated 
by further pramäna-s entails an infinite regress. This is also a criticism which can be (and 
is, in Indian philosophy) made of the position that reflexivity involves a second 
consciousness of the initial consciousness of an object (is a third consciousness then 
required in order to be conscious of the second consciousness, etc? ). " 
(iii) The position that pramäna-s are self-validating, i. e. self-evident, is similar in 
form to the position that consciousness is conscious of itself in the very act of being 
conscious of its object (thus a second consciousness is not required in order for reflexivity 
to occur). " 
(iv) As we shall see, the opponent in the VV/VVCemploys the analogy of the self- 
luminous light in support of the position that knowledge-episodes are self-validating, i. e. 
self-evident. Pramäna-s are'self-luminous', so to speak. Consciousness is also said to be 
'self-luminous' by some Indian philosophers in the sense that it is conscious of itself in the 
very act of being conscious of its object. 16 Thus, the same analogy is used in order to 
support two distinct philosophical positions. " 
Now, I do not want to discuss in any detail theories of reflexivity in Indian 
philosophy. My point is that Nägarjuna is engaged, in the VV/VVC, in a critique-- not of 
various theories about the reflexivity of consciousness but rather-- of various theories 
about the validation of knowledge-episodes of svabhäva-endowed entities. 
7.2. Intrinsic Establishment (1). Thepramäna-s are 
Validated by Other pramäna-s. 
In VVC5 1, Nägärjuna describes two different ways in which pramäna-s might be 
thought to be validated by other pramäna-s: (a) by other pramäna-s of the same type as 
themselves-- such as a perception (pratyaksa) by another perception, an 
inference 
(anumäna) by another inference, etc. For example, I might have a perception of a tree. 
This 
perception might be validated by a further perception of the tree. That 
is to say, I perceive a 
tree. I have another look and this second look confirms that the first perception of 
the tree 
was indeed correct, or (b) by pramäna-s of a different type 
from themselves, such as a 
(anuvyavasäya). 
"See Williams (1997a), pp. 17 ff. 
"See, for example, Säntaraksita's theory of svasamvedana, explained 
in the previous chapter (note 56). 
'See Williams (1997a). 
"Thus, Bhattacharya (1978), p. 117, for example, seems to confuse the position 
in the VV VVC that pramäna-s 
are 'self-luminous', i. e. self-validating, with the position of the 
Vijnänavädins that consciousness is'self- 
luminous', i. e. conscious of itself in the very act of being conscious of 
its object. 
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perception by inference, comparison (upamäna), or verbal testimony (sabda). an 
inference by a perception, a comparison, or verbal testimony, etc. '" I might, for instance, 
be told by a reliable person (jpta) that there is a fire on the hill. This might be validated b\ 
the perception of a fire on the hill, or perhaps by the perception of smoke on the hill, 
followed by an inference that therefore there must be fire on the hill. As Siderits notes'", 
this point can be taken in two ways: (i) it might be that particular instances of 
knowledge-episodes are validated by knowledge-episodes either of the same type or of 
other types (e. g. some verbal testimony might be validated by perception, some by 
inference, some by comparison, and some by other verbal testimony). Or (ii) it might be 
that it is a generic traitof particular types of knowledge-episode that they are validated by 
knowledge-episodes of the same type (e. g. all perceptions might be validated by 
perceptions) or a different type (e. g. all verbal testimony might be validated by 
perception). 
7.2.1. Nagarjuna's Refutation of Intrinsic Establishment (1). 
Nägärjuna argues that the position that pramina-s are established by other 
pramäna-s entails an infinite regress (anavastha), because the pramäna-s which validate 
the pramäna-s would themselves need to be validated by pramäna-s, etc. 2° For example, if 
my perception of a tree is validated by a further perception that the object is a tree, that 
further perception of the tree would need to be validated by another perception that the 
object is a tree, and soon. Consequently, no pramänawould ever be validated, because that 
on the basis of which it is validated would always itselfbe in need of validation. xcannot be 
validated on the basis of yif y has not been validated. zmight validate ybut would itself be 
in need of validation, etc. The end result is that x, y, zetc are all unvalidated. 
The point, then, (presumably) is that a knowledge-episode, which (supposedly) 
mirrors a mind-independent object of knowledge cannot be proved to do so through 
corroboration by another knowledge-episode2 which (supposedly) mirrors the same 
18WC 51, näpi parasparatab pratyaksasyänumänopamänägamaih, anumänasya pratyaksopamänägamaih, 
upamanasya pratyaksanumänägamaih, ägamasya pratyaksänumänopamänaih/ näpi pratyaksänum- 
änopamänägamänämanyaih pratyaWnumänopamanägamairyathäsvam/ 
19S iderits (1980), p. 310. 
''°i'Y 32, anyairyadi pramänaih pramänasiddhirbhavettadanavasthä/ nädeh siddhistaträsti naiva madbvasva 
näntasya// VVC 32, yadi punarmanyase pramänaih prameyänäm prasiddhistesäm pramäpänäman vaih 
pramanaih prasiddhirevamaaa vasthäprasarigah/ anavasthäprasarige ko dosah/ ana vastbäprasariga ädeh 
siddhirnästi/ kim käranam/ tesämapi hi prarnänänämanyaih pramänaih prasiddhistesämanyairiti 
nästyädih/ äderasadbhävätkuto madhyam kuto atah/ tasmättesäm pramänänämanvaih prarnänaih 
prasiddhirit7 yaduktam tannopapadyata iti/ 
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mind-independent object of knowledge. For the knowledge-episode. must itself be proven 
to apprehend the mind-independent object of knowledge. If the knowledge-episode. is 
itself said to be proven to mirror the mind-independent object through corroboration by a 
knowledge-episode3, the knowledge-episode, is itself in need of proof. And so on. If I 
have a perception of water, for example, the perception cannot be proven to be correct. i. e. 
to apprehend mind-independent water, by appeal to another perception of the water. For 
how is this second perception of the water itself proved to be accurate, i. e. proved to 
apprehend the water as it is independently of the knowing mind? A third perception of the 
water will suffer from the same problem. And so on. It will be a case of the unproven 
(supposedly) proving the unproven. 
7.2.2. A Solution to the Infinite Regress Problem. 
I do not think, however, that this infinite regress argument is convincing as a 
refutation of the theory that knowledge-episodes are validated by other knowledge- 
episodes. If a knowledge-episode is corroborated by a (finite) number of other knowledge- 
episodes, it might be argued that this will be sufficient proof that the knowledge-episode 
is a correct cognition. If one has a perception of water, and this perception is corroborated 
by another perception of the water, etc, at some point one will be satisfied that one has 
proof that the perception of water is a correct cognition. One would only require endless 
corroboration by further knowledge-episodes, I think, if one's criterion for proof is absolute 
certainty, a criterion which is surely too strict. If my cognition is corroborated by a 
number of other cognitions, I may conclude that it is proved, i. e. highlyprobable, that my 
cognition is a correct cognition, i. e. actually apprehends a mind-independent entity. So 
the infinite regress can be stopped, I suggest, by relaxing the requirement that 
proof--certainty. Perhaps in rare cases, despite the proof of the correctness of my cognition 
by the corroboration of a finite number of cognitions, my initial cognition, and all of the 
corroborating cognitions, are in fact erroneous. In these cases, then, the proof that the 
cognition is correct fails. But these are exceptional cases which do not damage the general 
rule that it is proved, i. e. highly probable, that a cognition is a correct cognition 
if it is 
corroborated by other cognitions. 
Perhaps Nägärjuna would object, however, that this argument misses 
his point. 
According to Nägärjuna, all entities are mind-dependent, i. e. they have conceptually 
constructed existence, although, for the unenlightened mind, these entities appear 
to be 
157 
mind-independent (i. e. to have svabhäva). Thus, it may seem highly probable that a 
cognition which is corroborated by a finite number of other cognitions is a knowledge- 
episode in the Nydya sense, i. e. a cognition which apprehends a mind independent state-of- 
affairs, but in no case is such a cognition actually a knowledge-episode, i. e. it does not 
really apprehend a mind-independent state-of-affairs. The initial cognition and all of the 
corroborating cognitions apprehend, by analogy with the illusion or the dream, an object 
which, though it appears to exist mind-independently, is actually a conceptual 
construction. 
But it can be countered that Nägärjuna has here made a very controverisal-- one 
might say, implausible-- claim, namely that cognitions never actually apprehend mind- 
independent entities (though they often seem to do so). Is not the onus therefore on 
Nägärjuna to prove that cognitions do not apprehend a mind-independent state-of-affairs? 
Nägarjuna has not here provided such a proof. And until this proof is forthcoming, is it not 
reasonable to continue to believe that cognitions which are corroborated by other 
cognitions do, in most cases at least, apprehend a mind-independent reality ? It seems, 
then, that Nagärjuna's refutation of the theory that knowledge-episodes are validated by 
other knowledge-episodes does not succeed. 
7.3. Intrinsic Establishment (2). Thepramäna-s are 
Self-Validating. 
At any rate, Nägärjuna thinks that the pramana-s are not established by other 
pramäna-s because an infinite regress would ensue. But, Nägärjuna argues, all objects 
other than pramana-s are established by pramäna-s. The oak-tree is proven to exist, for 
example, if there is a correct perception of it, or a correct inference about it, etc. Why 
should the pramäna-s themselves be excepted from this rule? It would seem that such an 
exception is arbitrary, and undermines the entire prarnäna theory. For the objects which 
are validated by the pramäna-s are validated by pramäna-s which, it would seem, are not 
themselves validated! In which case, the objects (supposedly) validated 
by the pramäna-s 
have not really been validated. The unvalidated cannot validate. 
The oak-tree, for 
example, cannot be proven to exist by a perception which has not 
been proven to be correct. 
The opponent must, then, give the special reason (visecahetu) which excepts the pramäna-s 
from the general rule that, in order to be validated, entities must 
be proven by 
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knowledge-episodes. ' 
The opponent's response is that the special reason why the pramäna-s are not 
validated by further pramäna-s (hence supposedly incurring an infinite regress) is that the 
pramäna-s are self-validating, i. e. self-evident. The opponent appears to mean that 
pramäna-s are made evident as pramäna-s whenever they make their objects evident. " If 
there is a correctly cognized oak-tree, then there is no further proof of the correctness of the 
cognition necessary. The correctness of the cognition is evident in the very act ofcorrectl} 
apprehending the oak-tree. There is no need to produce another knowledge-episode to 
prove the existence of the knowledge-episode which apprehends the oak-tree. That a 
knowledge-episode is a knowledge-episode is obvious when it happens. Thus, the infinite 
regress ofvalidation ofpramäna-s by further pramäna-s does not occur. (The philosophical 
naivity of this position, if expressed without any qualifications, is striking. I shall have 
more to say about this later). 
7.3.1. The Fire Analogy. 
The opponent gives the example of fire (agni/butäsa1jva1ana) which, he contends, 
illuminates itself (prakäsayati/prasädbayati/dyotayati) in the act of illuminating other 
things. Nägärjuna has his opponent explain that just as (yatba) the fire is exceptional in 
illuminating itself simply in illuminating its object, similarly (tathaiva) the pramäna-s are 
exceptional in illuminating themselves simply in illuminating their objects. =3 As I have 
already explained, the fire example (actually, light (pradipa) in this case is the word used) is 
presented in the NS II, 1,19 in reply to the infinite regress argument and as what appears to 
be a defence, by the Naiydyika, of the position that the pramäna-s are self-evident., ' 
It is of crucial importance here, I think, that the verbal forms pra- käs, pra- sad, 
and dyut, in their causative forms, in addition to meaning (i)'to make bright, illuminate, 
irradiate', can also mean (ii)'to make clear, evident, manifest'. " It seems obvious that the 
`VV 33, tesämatha pramänairvinä prasiddhirvihiyate vädah/ vaisamikatvam tasrnrnvisesahetusca 
vaktavyah// WC 33, atha manyase tesäm pramänänäm vinä pramänaib prasiddhih, pramey3näm 
punararthänäm pramänaih prasiddhiriti, evam sati yaste vädah pramänaih prasiddhirarthän3miti sa 
hiyate/ vaisamikatvam ca bhavati kesämcidarthanäm pramänaih prasiddhib 
kesämcinnetil 
visesahetusca vaktavyo yena hetunä kesämcidarthänäm pramänaih prasiddhih 
kesämcinneti/ sa ca 
nopadistah/ tasmädiyamapi kalpanä nopapanneti/ 
22VVC 33, atr-äha pramänänyeva svähnänam parätmanam ca prasädhayanti/ 
''WC 33, ... 
dyotayati svätmanam yathä hutäsastathä parätrnänam, ' svaparätmanävevam prasädhavanti 
pramänaniti/ yathägnih svähnanam parätmänam ca prakäsayati tathaiva pramänani prasädhavanti 
svätmänam parätrnanam ceti' 
2'NS 11,1,17-19, pramanatah siddheh pramänänäm pramänäntarasiddhiprasarigaG//tadvini vrtten 
j pramäna- 
siddhivattatsiddhih//na, pradipaprakäs`asiddhivattatsiddheh// 
-`See Monier-Williams (1899), pp. 500,653,696. 
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self-illumination of fire must be understood in accordance with meaning (ii) rather than 
meaning (i). Surely the point is not that fire literally illuminates itself in the act of 
illuminating others, as though there is somehow a light which is turned inwards upon the 
fire when it is lighting up its objects! Rather, the point must be that whenever an object is 
illuminated, there is no need for any further proof that there is a light which is doing the 
illuminating. The very illuminating of the object makes it self-evident that there is indeed a 
light which is illuminating. IfI can see the book on my desk, it must be the case that there is 
some light by means ofwhich the book is illuminated. I do not need any further proof of the 
light. The proof of the existence of the light is its very illumination of the object. The 
'self-luminosity of light' is simply a metaphor for this self-evident character which a light 
has in illuminating its object (This ambiguity in the meaning of the verbal forms is, 
however, very important because, as we shall see, Ndgärjuna's refutation of the 
self-luminosity of fire fails partly and primarily because it depends on taking the verbal 
forms in sense (i). But more about this a little later. ) . Similarly, it is being argued, the 
pramäna-s are self-evident when the objects of knowledge are apprehended. When the 
object of knowledge is known, the knowledge-episode is known in the very same act. Otis 
not that pramäua-s literally illuminate themselves, whatever that could possibly mean! ) 
In other words, expressed accurately, the argument from the fire example would 
read as follows: Just as (yatha) the fire is exceptional in being evident simply in 
illuminating its object, similarly (tathaiva) the pramäna-s are exceptional in being evident 
simply by apprehending their objects. 
7.3.2. Nägärjuna's Refutation of Intrinsic Establishment (2). 
Nägärjuna's criticisms of the position that pramäna-s are self-validating are 
directed against the opponent's example of the fire. In fact, he devotes six whole verses to 
the refutation of the fire example. Clearly, he sees the fire example as central to the 
opponent's position that the pramäna-s are self-evident. This might seem rather strange, as 
the issue at stake is not really whether a fire is self-luminous, i. e. self-evident, 
but rather 
whether knowledge-episodes are self-luminous, i. e. self-evident. But why 
does he do see 
the example as having such vital importance? 
Matilal argues that the example of the fire is the basis of an argument 
by analogy. 
Commonly accepted entity xhas property a. Likewise, entity yhas property a. 
The fire is 
self-evident when it illuminates its objects. Likewise prarnäna-s are self-evident 
when 
160 
they apprehend their objects. Obviously such an analogy cannot establish the 
self-evidence of the pramäna-s beyond doubt (for it could be that, whereas a light is 
self-evident, the pramäna-s are not. This is the weakness of arguments by analog} ). But, 
Matilal says, the analogy makes the position that pramäna-s are self-evident plausible. " 
Presumably what Matilal means is that, if it is shown that there is one entity, i. e. the fire, 
which is self-evident, then this suggests that there might be others (e. g. the pramäna-s). 
But if, on the other hand, there are no examples of self-evident entities, then it is highly 
unlikely that the pramäna-s are themselves self-evident. 
Siderits says that it was widely accepted in ancient India that an entity cannot act on 
itself. Thus, for example, a knife cannot cut itself. Yet the theory of self-evidence entails 
that the pramäna-s act on themselves in the same way as they act on other things, i. e. they 
make both other things and themselves evident. Thus, the fire example is presented by the 
opponent as a counter-example to the prevailing Indian notion. And if there is one 
exception, the pramäna-s also might be excepted. But if the supposed exception is 
demonstrated actually not to act upon itself, then there will be no grounds at all for 
asserting the self-evidence of the pramäna-s . Nägärjuna's strategy, then, is to refute the 
example in order to render implausible the theory that the pramana-s are self-evident. 2' 
There is another consideration, however. It is clear that Indian thinkers saw light 
and the cognition/consciousness/mind as strikingly parallel phenomena. Cognition is often 
described in terms of light imagery. Here, then, are some examples, from various Indian 
philosophical traditions. 
In the NS an opponent objects to the Naiyäyika position that cognitions are 
transitory (anavastbäyin), claiming that, if this were the case, there could be only an 
indistinct apprehension (avyaktagrabana) of an object, like a flash of lightning 
(vidyutsampäta) cannot give a distinct apprehension of the form (rüpa) which it lights up. 28 
The Naiyäyika reply also uses light imagery: the transitory cognitions occur in 
uninterrupted succession (santatr), so together they give a distinct apprehension 
(abbivyaktagrahana) ofthe object, like a series of flashes ofa lamp (pradfpärci). 2° 
The opponent also objects to the Naiyäyika position that cognitions 
(jfäna) are not 
simultaneous (ayaugapadya), because, the opponent says, there can be the apprehension 
"Vlatilal (1986), pp. 57-58. 
Siderits (1980), p. 313 and Siderits (1988), p. 313. 
"'NS III, 2,47, avyaktagrahanamanavasthäyitvät vidyutsampätc rtipävyaktagrahanavat' 
''NS II1,2,49, pradrparcih santatyablu'vyaktagrahanavattadgrahanam, 
ý 
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(upalabdhi) of many activities (anekakriya) at the same time (yugapad), ' as when one has 
simultaneously, for example, a visual cognition of a fire, an auditory cognition of running 
water, and a memory of talking with a friend. 
The Naiyäyika response is that such cognitions have the appearance (upalabdhi) of 
simultaneity but in fact they occur in rapid succession (äsusamcära), like the circle of the 
firebrand (alätacakra) appears because the firebrand is moved very quickly. " 
Also, the NS describes visual cognition to be a result of an invisible ray (rasmi) 
emitted by the eye which contacts the object (artha). 32 
Further, in Särnkhya philosophy, 'illuminating' (prakäsa) is one of the three 
functions of the complex cognitive structure called the 'thirteenfold instrument' 
(trayodasakarana) (including mans, buddhi, ahamkära, the sense capacities 
(buddhindriya), and motor capacities (karmendriya)) by which objects are apprehended. " 
The Särnkhyavrtti likens the process of cognition, whereby all objects in the three worlds 
are illuminated, to the illumination by a lamp within a house of the inside of the house. " 
There are, in addition, many references to the luminosity of consciousness (citta) 
in Buddhist texts. Cittamätra-influenced thinkers, for example, employ the light imagery 
in their exposition of the reflexive nature of consciousness (svasamvedana). 3` Further, the 
*Bbadrapälasresthiparrprcchä sutra, from the Ratnaküta collection, describes 
consciousness (vijnäna) as able to occupy a large or a small body, like a light which, placed 
in the centre of a room, illuminates the room whether it is small or large. " This same sutra 
compares the transmigration of consciousness to the light shed by the sun, the shining of 
the pearl, or the fire produced by wood (no explanation is given of the precise nature of the 
similarity). " There is a long tradition, present even in the Afiguttara Nikäya and other 
non-Mahayana texts, of describing consciousness as luminous (cittamprabhäsvaram), in 
the sense that it is intrinsically pure though concealed by adventitious defilements 
(klesa). 38 And so on. 
10NS III, 2,60-61, jnänäyaugapadyädekam manah// na yugapadanekakriyopalabdbeh/i 
"NS III, 2,62, alätacakradarganavattadupalabdhiräsusamcýirät 
32See NS III, 1,32-50. 
33See Larson and Bhattacharya (ed) (1987), pp. 52-53. 
"See Larson and Bhattacharya (ed) (1987), p. 189. 
33See Williams (1997a), p. x. 
"See Chang (trans) (1983), p. 235. The title'Bbadrapälatresthipariprccht is a reconstruction on the 
basis of 
the Chinese and Tibetan titles. See Pagel (1995), p. 433. 
a 37 See Chang (trans) (1983), P. 227. However, note that elsewhere in the *Bbädrapala§resthipariprccha sutr 
consciousness is said to be without light and to be like darkness (! ) insofar as consciousness, 
like darkness, 
cannot be seen or grasped. See Chang (trans) (1983), pp. 224-225. 
3ßSee Lamotte (1962), pp. 52-56. See also again, for example, the *BhadrapälaIresthipariprcchä sütra(Chang 
(trans) (1983), p. 226, 'Sunlight impartially illuminates evildoers and such filthy things as stinking corpses 
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My point is that, given the wide-spread acceptance of the similarity between light 
and cognition/consciousness/mind in various ways, an analogy between light and a form of 
cognition, i. e. knowledge-episodes, would have been quite compelling. An Ancient Indian 
thinker would have been strongly inclined to accept that what is true of light must also be 
true of cognition. Thus, if light is self-evident, then for the Ancient Indian thinker it is 
more than likely that pramäna-s, as forms of cognition, would also be self-evident. I make 
no comment about the soundness of the analogy (other than to say that it seems pretty 
dubious). My point is simply that it would have appeared convincing to an Ancient Indian 
thinker. This goes some way, I think, to explaining Nagärjuna's sustained refutation of the 
self-luminosity of fire. For if he is able to prove that light is not self-illuminating, i. e. 
self-evident, then, for the ancient Indian mind at least, this would be a strong argument that 
pramäna-s also cannot be self-evident. 
So, Nägarjuna's response to the opponent's argument by analogy is that the 
opponent's example is inappropriate (vrsama). 39 Fire is not self-luminous, i. e. self-evident. 
Thus the argument by analogy breaks down. The pramapa-s might be self-luminous. i. e. 
self-evident, if fire/light were self-luminous, i. e. self-evident, but actually, Nägärjuna 
argues, fire/light is not self-luminous. ' Without the supportive analogy of the fire/light, 
the opponent's position that the pramäna-s are self-evident is highly implausible. 
I must admit, however, that, despite these explanations, I find Nägärjuna's strategy 
philosophically disappointing to say the least. I think that a more direct attack on the 
notion of self-evident knowledge-episodes would be more to the point. For clearly there 
are serious questions to be raised about a position which claims that correct cognitions 
which mirror mind-independent objects are self-evident. How, for example, is the 
undeniable phenomenon of error to be explained? I shall have more to say about this matter 
a little later. For now, let us trace and evaluate Ndgärjuna's own attack on the theory of 
without being tainted by their foulness. Similarly, consciousness may reside in a pig, a dog, or a being of 
another miserable plane who eats dirty food, but is stained by none of them. ' This tradition is continued and 
developed in various ways in Tibetan Buddhism, according to which the mind is commonly described as 
luminous by nature (rang bzhin gyi 'odgsal ba=prakrtiprabhäsvara). See van der Kuijp (1983), p. 
43, 
Williams (1997b), p. 2. 
'9W 34a-b, visamopanyäso yam na hyätmänam prakäsayatyagnih// VVC 34, visama evopanyäso 
gnivatpramän ni svätmanam ca prasädhayanti parätmänam ca prasädhayantiti na 
hyagnirätmänam 
prak4gayati/ 
"Contrast here the Chung-lun commentary onMMK RI, 2 in which the author says that 
if the eye were able to 
see other things, it would have to be able to see itself as well, just as a 
light illuminates itself and is 
consequently able to illuminate other things! (I make no comment on this argument, other than 
to note that 
it seems quite bizarre). Here, then, the author of the Chung-lun-- by contrast with 
Nägdrjuna in the V 
VVC and MMK VII, 8 (see following note)-- advocates, rather than refutes, that 
light is self-luminous. 
See Bocking (trans) (1995), p. 134. 
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self-evident pramäna-s. 
There are four distinct arguments which Nägärjuna employs in his refutation of the 
fire example. ' It is quite obvious that these arguments are sophisms. It is, however, fairly 
difficult sometimes to identify the fallacy precisely. However, they are all unsound either 
because they are invalid, or because they rely on questionable premisses, as I shall 
demonstrate. Nägärjuna argues that: 
(1) Illumination means making perceived, or lighting up, what was previously 
unperceived, or in the dark. It only makes sense to speak of'illumination' as the removal of 
darkness. Something which is illumined must therefore be in the dark prior to its 
illumination. A pot can be illuminated because it can be in the dark. However, a fire cannot 
first be dark and then illuminated because there is no such thing as a dark fire. The 
self-illumination of fire is therefore untenable. ' 
Nägärjuna's argument employs causative forms ofpra- käs and pra- sad, both of 
which, as I have already explained, can mean both (i)'to make bright, illuminate, irradiate. ' 
(ii) 'to make clear, evident, manifest'. However, as I have already explained, it seems 
obvious that the fire example must be read in accordance with meaning (ii) rather than 
meaning (i). The fire, i. e. light, makes itself evident in manifesting its object. Its 
illumination of the object is the proof of the existence of the light. No further proof is 
required in order to demonstrate that the light exists. 
But here Nägärjuna takes the meaning of the verbs in sense (i) rather than sense (ii). 
"In Nägärjuna's works, there are two other sustained refutations of the fire/lamplight example. The first 
occurs in the Vaid/VaidC, and will be discussed in detail in the next chapter. The second occurs in MMK 
VII. In the MMX, the opponent presents the 'self-luminous' light as analogous to origination (utpäda), 
the first of the three stages of the existence of a dharma, which, he says (in order to prevent an infinite 
regress), produces both itself and others. MMK VII, 8, pradipah svaparätmänau samprakasayitä yathä/ 
utpädah svaparatm nävubhävutpädayettathä// This is by contrast with the opponent in the VV VVC, 
who presents the fire example in support of the position that pramana-s are self-evident. The fire/lamplight 
example is thus presented by the opponent in both the MMKand the VV'VVC but it is used to support two 
quite distinct positions. Note that in theMMK VII, 9-12 Nägärjuna refutes the light example by means of 
arguments (3) and (4) (though in reverse order) as presented in the VV and VVC. MMK VII, 9-12, pradipe 
nändhakaro 'sti yatra casau pratistitah/ kim prakäsayati dipah prakäso hi tamovadhah 
kathamutpadyamänena pradipena tamo hatam/ notpadyamano hi tamah pradipah präpnute yadä// 
aprapyaiva pradipena yadi vä nihatam tamah/iha stahah sarvalokastham sa tamo nihanisyati// pradipah 
svaparätmänau samprakäs`ayate yadi/tamo pi svaparätmanau chädayisyatyasamsayam// Argument (2 ), 
i. e. that if fire illuminates itself as it illuminates others, it will burn itself as it burns others, is not present 
in 
the MMK refutation. It is interesting that the Vaid and VaidC, in its refutation of the lamplight analogy, 
also omits argument (2). Argument (1), i. e. that fire can only illuminate what is previously unilluminated. 
is 
not present in the MMK refutation, but it does occur in the Vaid and VaidC For a more 
detailed 
comparison ofthese three critiques ofthe fire/lamplight, see the next chapter (table 3). 
VV 34c-d, na hi tasyanupalabdhirdrstä tamasiva kumbhasva// 
VVC 34, vath3 
prägevägninäprakäsitastamasi kumbho nopalabhyate 'thottarakälalnupalabbyate 
gnin3 prak3sitah san, 
evameva yadyaprakätitah prägagnistamasi syäduttarakälarnagneh prakäsanam svä4 atah svitmänam 
prakäs`ayet/ na caitade vam. tasm4diyamapi kalpanä nopapadyata iti/ 
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He is right, of course, that the causatives of pra- käsand pra- sad, when understood as 
'illuminate', have a transitive sense, i. e. illumination is of objects other than the light which 
does the illuminating, and thus 'self-illumination' makes no sense. But his argument 
entirely misses the point that the opponent uses the fire example, not to prove that fire 
illuminates itself, but rather to prove that fire manifests itself-- i. e. is evident, is proved-- 
simply by its illumination of its object. In other words, Nagärjuna's refutation depends 
upon a sense of the causatives of the verbs pra- käsand pra- sad which the fire example 
(properly understood) does not itself depend upon. Nägarjuna's refutation of the fire 
example fails, because he incorrectly takes it to be stating that fire literally illuminates 
itself. If fire is said to illuminate itself, this is simply a metaphor for the idea that the 
existence of the fire, i. e. light, is proved by the illumination of its object. So Nägärjuna is 
here guilty of taking a metaphor literally. 
(2) If fire illuminates itself like (iva) it illuminates others, it will burn 
(paridhaksyatt) itself just as it burns others. 'Burn' here means, I take it, consumption or 
destruction by fire or heat, as when the fire burns its fuel, or the fire burns the forest. So 
'burn' refers to the combustion of materials through contact with fire. The argument is, 
then, that fire consumes and destroys materials other than itself, but that it makes no sense 
to speak of fire consuming or destroying itself. Therefore, fire does not illuminate itself 
when it illuminates other things. " 
Again, Nägärjuna has taken the causatives of the verbs pra- käsand pra- sad to 
mean 'illuminate' when they are, in the case of self-illumination, meant in the sense of 
'self-evident' or 'self-manifest'. Nägärjuna claims that the self-luminosity of fire would 
entail that fire illuminates itself in just the same manner (evameva) as it illuminates other 
things. But, given that fire's self-luminosity is a metaphor for the notion that the existence 
of the fire is proved by its illumination of its objects, Nägärjuna is wrong to argue that the 
self-luminous fire would illuminate itself in the same way in which it illuminates other 
objects. Strictly speaking, self-luminosity, i. e. self-evidence, is not a form of 
luminosity at 
all. The book is illuminated, thus it is self-evident that there must be a 
fire/light which 
illuminates it. It is not that the book is illuminated and the fire/light 
illuminates itself. 
Thus, since fire does not illuminate itself in the same sense that 
it illuminates other things, 
it does not follow that it must burn itself as it burns other things. 
'4735 yadi ca svätmänamayam tvadvacanena prakäsayatyagnih/ paramfva nanvätmänam 
paridhaksvat% api 
hutAIah// WC 35, yadi ca tvadvacanena yathä parähnänam prak"ayatvagnirevameva 
svätrnänamapi 
prakäs`ayati, nanu yathä parätmanam dahatyevameva svätmänamapi 
dhaksyati/ na caitadevam' tatra 
yaduktam parätmanamiva svätmänamapi prakäayatyagniriti Canna 
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Furthermore, even if a fire were self-luminous in the same way that it illuminates 
other things, it still would not follow that a fire must therefore burn itself just as it burns 
other things. It is not entailed that because one quality of fire, viz. its luminosity, is 
self-referring, therefore its other qualities, e. g. its ability to burn, must also be 
self-referring. Thus, one cannot argue validly from the non-self-referential nature of one 
quality of an entity (e. g. burning) to the non-self-referential nature of another quality of the 
same entity (e. g. light)' 
(3) If fire is an entity with the capacity of illuminating (prakäsayati) itself then 
darkness (tamas), as its opposite (pratipaksa), should have the opposite capacity, viz. the 
ability to conceal (praccbädayisyati/cbädaye f) itself. 
One must appreciate again here that prakäsayati, the causative of the verb pra- käs 
means-- in addition to 'bringing to light' (i. e. illumining)-- 'making manifest or evident. ' 
Praccbädayisyati (used in the verse) is the simple future tense of the verb pra- cchad, 
whereas cbädayet(used in the commentary) is the optative mode of the verb chad, both of 
which mean 'to cover, hide, conceal, keep secret'. 45 Thus, the point is that the opposite of 
illuminating or making manifest/evident, is concealing, making secret, hiding. 
However, Nägärjuna says, the concealing by darkness of itself is not seen or 
experienced (drsta). I take this to mean that there is in fact plenty of observable evidence 
that darkness does not conceal itself. For there are many occasions on which darkness is 
perceived (for example, the darkness of the night-sky). If darkness concealed itself, there 
would always and on every occasion simply be light (for darkness, as always hidden, would 
never be experienced! ). Hence, it cannot make sense to say that light illuminates 
itself/makes itself manifest. ' If xcan doythen the opposite of xmust do the opposite ofy. 
If the opposite of xcannot do the opposite ofy, then xcannot do y. 
However, it seems to me that this argument relies on the assumption that darkness 
is 
in fact the opposite substance to fire/light. But the Naiyäyikas maintain-- sensibly. 
I 
think-- that whereas fire/light (tejas) is a substance (dravya), darkness 
(camas) is an 
"See here the Chung-lun, commenting on MMK III, 2. The opponent seems to 
be aware of this point. He 
notices that, although fire illuminates other things and illuminates itself, 
fire can burn other things without 
burning itself (He then argues that, similar to the fire which does not 
burn itself although it burns other 
things, the eye is able to see other things without being able to see 
itself). See Bocking (1995) (trans), p. 
134. 
"See Monier-Williams (1899), p. 404,657. 
'PT 36, yadi ca svapardtmanau tvadvacanena prakds`ayatyagnih pracchddayisvad 
tamab svapardanänau 
hutdia iva// VVC 36, yadi ca bhavato matena svaparätznänau prakdsavatyagnih, 
nanvidsnfm 




absence (abhäva). 4' Darkness is the absence of illumination or making manifest. The 
point is that not illuminating ornot manifesting is not equivalent to concealing orhidin. 
'Concealing' means not just the absence of manifestation, but the active prevention of 
manifestation. That darkness lacks the capacity to make manifest does not entail that it 
prevents manifestation. If, for example, I lack the ability to speak Mongolian, this does not 
mean that I actively prevent myself from learning Mongolian. I do not, for instance, burn 
any Mongolian-English dictionaries which come into my possession, or leave the room 
whenever my Mongolian friends speak in their native tongue. 
Thus Nägärjuna's argument fails: If light can illuminate itself, i. e. be self-evident. 
then the opposite of light might do the opposite of being self-evident, i. e. it might conceal 
itself. But darkness is not the opposite of light. Rather it is the mere absence of light. It is 
incorrect, therefore, to argue that because darkness cannot conceal itself, therefore light 
cannot be self-evident. 
(4) Illumination is by definition the removal or destruction of darkness 
(andhakäravadha). If the removal of darkness by fire requires contact (präpnotl) between 
them, this cannot occur because contact requires co-existence whereas fire and darkness 
are opposites. As Nagärjuna expresses this point, there can be no darkness in fire or in a 
place in which fire occurs. The idea is, I suppose, that x and the opposite of x cannot 
occupy an identical spatio-temporal location. Contact here entails that the two entities that 
have contact do occupy an identical spatio-temporal location, if only very briefly. But 
illumination and darkness are opposed to one another, i. e. they are contradictories, hence 
they cannot have contact. At no point in the process (utpadyamäne) of illumination, 
Nägärjuna says, can the two opposite entities have contact, because they cannot, being 
contradictories, be at the same place at the same time. " 
The alternative is, Nägärjuna says, that fire destroys darkness without contact 
(apräpta). This would entail, however, that a particular fire would destroy all darkness in 
See, for example VS, V, 2,21-22, summarized by Hattori in Potter (1977), p. 217. See also Potter 
(1977), 
pp. 110-111. 
VV 3 7-3 8, nästi tamasca j valane yatra ca ti sthati parähmani j valanab/ kurute katham prakäsam sa 
hi prak3§o 
ndbakära vadhah// utpadyamäna eva prakäs`ayatyagnirityasadvädah/utpadyamäna eva präpnoti tamo na 
hihutäs`ah//WC 3 7-3 8, iba cägnau nästi tamo näpi ca yaträgnistaträsti tamah/ pra"s`asca näma tamasah 
pratigbätah/ yasmäccägnau nästi tamo näpi ca yatrignistatrYsti tamah, tats 
kasya tamasah 
pratighätamagnib karoti yasya pratigbätädagnih svaparatmänau prakäsayatiti/ aträha. nanu 
yasmädevam nägnau tamo 'sti näpi yatragnlstatra tamo 'sti, tasmädet3 svaparätrnänau na 




tamo sti, yasmädutpadyamäna evobhayam prakäsayatyagnih svätmänam 
parätmänam cetil atrocyate/ ayamagnirutpadyamäna eva prairäsayati svätmänam parätmänam 
ceti 
näyamupapadyate vädah/ kasmät/ na byutpadyamäna evägnistamah präpnoti, apräptatvän- 
naivopahanti tamasas`cänupagbätännästiprakäs`ah/ 
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all parts of the world (sarvecu lokadhätusu), because no contact would be required for the 
destruction to occur. There would be no reason why a particular darkness is destroyed by a 
particular fire, for all darknesses are alike in being out of contact with fire. 4 
Once again, this argument does not work as a refutation of self-illumination. 
Self-illumination, which is a metaphor for self-evidence, is not by definition 'the removal 
or destruction of darkness'. On the contrary, self-illumination (understood 
metaphorically) has nothing to do with darkness and its removal. Self-illumination mean', 
that a fire/light is made evident, i. e. its existence is proved, simply by the fact that its object 
is illumined by it. As I have said already, it does not mean that the light actually lights itself 
up. To take self-illumination literally, as Nägärjuna does in his argument, is to miss the 
point of the metaphor. 
Nevertheless, it might be argued that Ndgärjuna's argument works as a refutation, 
not of self-illumination, but of the illumination of objects in the normal, non-metaphorical 
sense, i. e., the illumination of other objects by light. 
But this raises the question, why would Nägärjuna want to refute this normal form 
of illumination? For the purpose of his critique is surely to refute the example of 
self-illumination, for it is this which is said by the opponent to support the argument that 
pramäna-s are validated, because they are self-evident. A critique of illumination in its 
normal sense would seem to be irrelevant (such a critique would bear no relation to the 
issue of self-evident pramäna-s) and, in fact, rather bizarre. Is Nägärjuna seriously arguing 
that fire does not illuminate objects? This would seem to be a very peculiar position to 
assert. (Perhaps he is refuting illumination with svabhäva of darkness with svabhäva, but 
he gives no indication that this is the case. ). 
But even if he is (for some reason) making this point, his argument is unsuccessful. 
The problem with this argument is that it depends on the assumption that fire, i. e. light, and 
darkness are two discrete things, which are diametrically opposed to one another. But, as I 
have explained, the Naiyäyikas (sensibly) considered darkness to be an absence of light. 
rather than a contradictory substance. 
Thus, light and darkness are, one might say, actually two poles of a single 
phenomenon, which one might call 'the level of illumination'. In this case, there can 
be 
degrees of illumination or degrees of darkness. Darkness thus understood 
is simply the 
`°W 39, apräpto pi jvalano yadi vä punarandbakäramupahanilät% sarvesu 
lokadhätusu tamo 'vamiha 
samsthito hanyät// WC 39, athäpi manyase präpto pyagnirandl2akaramuPahanhti/ 
nanti-id3nimiha 
samsthito gnih sarvalokadhätusthamupahanisyati/ na caitadevam 
drstam/ tasm3dapräpyaitägnir- 
andhakäramupahantiti yadistam tanna 
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relative lack of light, rather than being an opposing substance which contradicts the nature 
of light. If there is no light whatsoever, then this is simply the complete absence of light. 
i. e. the very lowest possible level of illumination, rather than being a case of the removal of 
light by an opposing substance, darkness. The point is, then, that light and darkness need 
not be seen as a battle between two contradictory, discrete entities. The problem of contact 
only arises if they are viewed in this way. 
7.3.3. Some Further Reflections on Self-Validation. 
All the arguments, therefore, which Nägärjuna presents in refutation of the 
example of the fire appear to me to fail. This is not to say, however, that it is true that 
therefore pramäna-s are self-evident. It simply means that the attempt which Nägärjuna 
makes to refute this position, by attacking the example which supports the position of 
self-evidence, is unsuccessful. 
How, then, might one mount a more successful attack on the argument that the 
pramana-s are self-evident? Surely a problem with the self-evidence theory of validation 
is that it fails to explain the phenomenon of error. If knowledge-episodes are self-evident, 
how is it, then, that one sometimes thinks that one's cognition is correct, i. e. in accord with a 
mind-independent reality, and yet one is mistaken? And also, it might be argued, if it is 
sometimes the case that our supposedly self-evident knowledge-episodes are not in fact 
knowledge-episodes, then might it not be the case that none of our seemingly self-evident 
knowledge-episodes are in fact correct? That is, they might seem to mirror a 
mind-independent reality, but in fact they do not. Clearly, if a self-evidence theory of the 
validation of knowledge-episodes is to be refuted, this is the fracture-point. 
Obviously, any successful reply to this objection will have to modify the naive 
theory that knowledge-episodes are simply self-evident. For if knowledge-episodes were 
simply self-evident, there would be no errors at all, which seems an impossible position to 
defend. 
Perhaps one might attempt to defend the theory of self-evidence by appeal to some 
sort of internal characteristic, which distinguishes knowledge-episodes 
from 
non-knowledge-episodes. I have in mind here a theory like that of the Stoic criterion. 
' 
"The Stoic theory of the criterion, expressed briefly, is that there is a certain 
form of correct cognition, the 
'apprehensive cognition' (kataleptike phantasia) which has the characteristics of clarity 
(enarges) and 
distinctness (ektupos), which mark it off from all other cognitions, including erroneous cognitions. 
An 
apprehensive cognition, for example, of a red chair is more vivid and well-defined 
than the red chair 
cognized in a dream. The appeal, then, is to an experientially detectable 
internal standard which indicates 
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The knowledge-episode has, it might be claimed, some essential characteristic or 
characteristics, such as clarity and distinctness, which mark it off from erroneous 
cognitions. A correct perception, for example, of a red chair, is more vivid and 
well-defined than the red chair cognized in a dream. The appeal, then, would be to an 
experientially detectable criterion which indicates that the cognition in question is correct. 
Error occurs because one does not pay sufficient attention to the nature of the cognition in 
question. As such, one thinks that the criterion is there when in fact it isn't or vice versa. I 
may perceive, for example, a tree-stump where in fact there is a man. But, the proponent of 
the criterion theory might argue, if I examine carefully my perception, it will be evident 
that in fact the cognition lacks some characteristic (such as clarity and distinctness) which 
knowledge-episodes have. 
However, it seems that, if the proponent of the theory of self-evidence appeals to 
criteria which indicate the correctness of his cognitions, then he has actually abandoned the 
theory of self-evidence. If a knowledge-episode has a detectable distinguishing 
characteristic, and yet one is not immediately aware of its presence, then the 
knowledge-episode is not self-evident. Self-evidence means'not requiring any proof, but 
an appeal to criteria to distinguish a knowledge-episode from a non-knowledge-episode 
would appear to be a form ofproof. That is, becausethis cognition has the criterion, it must 
be a knowledge-episode. 
At any rate, the criterion theory is highly vulnerable to sceptical attacks, for the 
onus must be on its proponent to show that there is indeed some characteristic of 
knowledge-episodes which cannot be re-duplicated by erroneous cognitions. And it is 
difficult to argue convincingly for the existence of such a characteristic, for erroneous 
cognitions can be, it would seem, remarkably similar in all respects (including clarity and 
distinctness) to knowledge-episodes. It as at least doubtful, then, that the search for such a 
criterion can be successful. " 
that the cognition in question is true. If in a given instance this criterion cannot be found, then the cognition 
is not an apprehensive cognition, and therefore its correctness is not guaranteed. 
There are, of course, 
cognitions which are correct but which do not have the criteria of clarity and 
distinctness, but such 
cognitions cannot be internally distinguished from erroneous cognitions. Apprehensive cognitions, which 
are necessarily correct, are qualitatively distinguishable from all other cognitions. 
See Frede (1983), pp. 
65-93. Frede writes that 'the Stoics... seem to assume that cognitive 
impressions [i. e. apprehensive 
cognitions] by themselves differ from all other impressions, that there is some 
internal characteristic that 
serves to mark them off from other kinds of impressions and allows the mind to 
discriminate between 
cognitive and noncognitive impressions without having to consider their relation to 
the world. Cognitive 
impressions are supposed to differ from noncognitive impressions 
in the way in which horned serpents 
differ from all other kinds of snakes, that is, by some internal differentiating mark. 
' 
"The Stoics attempted to identify some essential characteristic of veridical cognitions which would 
indubitably 
distinguish them from the non-veridical. The sceptics, such as Arcesilaus, criticized this attempt, 
arguing 
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Another tactic would be to say that it is self-evident that most of our cognitions. 
most of the time, are correct. Erroneous cognitions occur due to abnormal conditions, such 
as intoxication, diseased sense-organs, or unusual external circumstances such as poor 
lighting, etc. Erroneous cognitions are the exceptions which prove the rule. The theory of 
self-evidence would then be a species of epistemological optimism, rather than 
epistemological infallibility. 
This qualification certainly makes the theory more palatable, but surely it can be 
objected that if some cognitions are erroneous, all of them might be. The proponent of 
self-evidence will of course object that this possibility is highly unlikely, and thus such 
doubts are unreasonable. 
But a Mädhyamika will respond that such doubts are not unreasonable, because 
there is a real sense in which all of our supposedly correct cognitions are in fact erroneous; 
for they are taken to mirror a mind-independent reality when in fact they do not. It may 
seem self-evident that most of our cognitions are correct, i. e. they are undistorted 
apprehensions of objects as they exist apart from the mind, but this is in fact a mistake. 
(Still, it seems to me that here the onus must be on the Mädhyamika to prove what is after 
all an extremely counter-intuitive position). 
At any rate, note that this modified theory of self-evidence entails that any 
particular knowledge-episode is not, in fact, self-evidently correct. For it is always 
possible that one is under the influence of an abnormal condition, which makes what is not 
a knowledge-episode appear as a knowledge-episode. Thus, if one were to demonstrate 
that a particular knowledge-episode is in fact a knowledge-episode, there would have to be 
some test to ensure that no abnormal conditions were at play. 
In conclusion, it is obvious that a naive theory of self-evident knowledge-episodes 
is easily refutable. It seems that a qualified theory of self-evident knowledge-episodes 
might be philosophically defensible; whether it is correct is a moot point. What is certain, 
however, is that Nägärjuna's critique of a theory of self-evident knowledge-episodes-- 
relying as it does on a series of fallacious arguments against self-illumination-- is a 
complete failure. 
that a non-veridical cognition can have all the characteristics of a veridical cognition. 
Hence, there is no 
way to distinguish between the two. See Hankinson (1995 ), pp. 81-82 
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7.4. An Argument Against Both Intrinsic Establishment 
(1) and (2). 
In verses 40-41, Nägärjuna gives a general refutation of intrinsic establishment, 
applicable both to the position that pramäna-s are self-evident and the position that 
pramäna-s are established by other pramäna-s. 5' He says that if pramäna-s were 
intrinsically established, then they would be established independently (anapeksva) of the 
prameya-s which they themselves establish. This follows analytically, because the 
definition of intrinsic establishment is establishment without relying upon the prameya-s. 
But, Nägärjuna argues, if the pramäna-s are established independently of the prameva-s, 
then they would be independent of the prameya-s, i. e. they would not exist in dependence 
upon the prameya-s. They would not be the pramäna-s of anything (kasyacit). However, 
given that the pramäna-s are the pramäna-s of something, viz the prameya-s, the position 
that the pramäna-s are intrinsically established is untenable. " 
Nägärjuna's argument is not, however, valid, because he equivocates in his use of 
the term ? independence' (aaapeksya). Let me explain. 
In the first part of his argument, Nägärjuna reasons that intrinsically established 
pramäna-s are independent in the sense that they are able to prove that they are 
knowledge-episodes without reliance upon prameya-s. This, as I have pointed out, follows 
analytically from the definition of intrinsic establishment. 
"It is not entirely clear from the text, it should be noted, whether Nägärjuna intends this argument to be a 
refutation of just the position that the pramäna-s are self-established, i. e. self-evident, or more generally 
as a refutation of both the positions which assert the intrinsic establishment of the pramäna-s. Verse 40 
seems to treat the argument as a refutation of self-evidence for this verse states that the thesis to be refuted 
is that 'the establishment of the knowledge-episodes is through themselves' (svatah pramänasiddhiriti). 
Furthermore, the commentary explicitly mentions the fire example as supportive of the position to be 
refuted. The fire example, as I have explained, is employed by Nägärjuna's opponent in order to defend the 
self-evidence of the pramäna-s. By contrast, verse 41 seems to treat the argument as a refutation of both 
positions which assert the intrinsic establishment of the pramäna-s, for it states that 'if for you there is 
establishment of the knowledge-episodes indeed without dependence on the objects to be 
known.. 
. 
'(anapeksyabiprameyänarth, nyadi tepramänasiddhirib). It appears, then, that Nägärjuna was 
not clear about how broadly he intended the criticism to apply. In agreement with both Lindtner (1982), p. 
74, and Siderits (1980), p. 315, I take the argument to be directed against both positions which assert the 
intrinsic establishment of the pramäna-s. This interpretation is both supported by the text (at least. verse 
41), and makes better philosophical sense, for Nägärjuna's argument applies equally well as a refutation 
of both positions which assert the intrinsic establishment of the pramäna-s, so why treat it as a refutation 
of only self-evidence? 
53VV 40-41, yadi svata§ca pramdnasiddbiranapeksya tava prameyäpi/ bhavati pramänasiddhirna paräpeksa 
svatab siddhih// anapeksya bi prameyänarth nyadi to pramäaasiddhiriti/ na 
bbavanti 
kasyacidevamimäni täni pramanäni// VVC 40-41, yadi cägnivatsvatab pramänasiddhiriti man vase, 
anapeksyäpi prameyänarthanpramänänäm prasiddbirbhavisyati/ kim käranam/ na 
hi svatab siddhih 
paramapeksate/athäpeksate na svatah siddhih/ atr ba/ yadi näpeksante pramevänarthanpramipini 
ko 
doso bhavisyatfti/ atrocyate/ yadi prameyanartbananapeksya prasiddhirbbavat, praminämitvevam 
tänrmäni pramä. p ni na kasyacitpramäp ni bbavanti/ evam doiah/ atha kasyacidbhavanti pramapäni 
nai vedänlmanapeksya prameyanarthanpramänäni bba vanti/ 
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However, in the second part of his argument, Nägärjuna reasons that the 
independence of the self-established pramäna-s would mean that they are independent in 
the sense that they can existwithout prameya-s. However, a pramäna is by definition the 
pramänaof, i. e. exists in dependence upon, aprameya. Therefore. Nägärjuna concludes, a 
pramänacannot be intrinsically established. 
But, one may retort, surely something can be independent in the first sense without 
being independent in the second sense? The problem is that it is not clear why beinz 
independently validated should entail that the pramäna-s do not exist in dependence upon 
the prameya-s. 
I shall give this objection a more systematic formulation. Nägärjuna wants to 
argue as follows: 
Premiss,. If there were intrinsically established pramäna-s, they would be 
independent. 
Definition,. Intrinsically established = validated without relying on 
prameya-s. 
Premiss. A pramäna is not independent of its prameya. 
Definition,. Pramäna= a cognition which depends for its existence upon 
having a prameya. 
Conclusion. There are not intrinsically established pramäna-s. 
This argument states that intrinsically established pramäna-s require that the 
pramäna-s be independent of the prameya-s. The pramäna-s are not, however. 
independent of the prameya-s. Therefore, pramäna-s are not intrinsically established. 
Apparently, this follows directly from the law of non-contradiction. x is -(Y and -v). x is Y 
[=dependent]. 
. '. x 
is -(-y). This argument is superficially persuasive. 
But consider the 
following analysis ofNägärjuna's argument: 
Premiss,. If there were intrinsically established pramäna-s, they, would 
be 
(independent, ). 
Definition,,. (Intrinsically established)= validated without dependence on 
prameya-s. 
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Definition, b. (Independent, )= validated without dependence on 
prameya-s. 
Premiss.. A pramäna is (independent, ) of its prameya. 
Definition, 
a. 
(Independent, ) =exists without dependence on prameya-s. 
Definition. 
-b' 
(Pramäna) =a cognition which always exists with an object. 
i. e. a prameya. 
Conclusion. There are - (intrinsically established pramäna-s). 
This analysis makes it clear that Nägärjuna employs two distinct senses of the term 
'independent'. Which is to say that (independent; ) and (independent, ) are not 
contradictories. Thus, it does not follow that a pramänacannot be both (independent, ) and 
(independent, ). The conclusion, therefore, is not entailed. In order to make the argument 
valid, Nägärjuna would have to demonstrate that, though (independence) and 
-(independence, ) are not contradictories, they are incompatible, and this he does not do. 
In other words, Nägärjuna has here conflated (not for the last time, I think) two 
separate issues, which I shall call 'ontological establishment' and 'epistemological 
establishment' respectively. 
It is undeniably true that a pramapa exists in dependence upon its prameya. This 
follows from the intentionality of consciousness. A knowledge-episode is always and 
necessarily a knowledge-episode of an object. Thus, a knowledge-episode cannot exist 
apart from the object of knowledge which it knows. The object which it knows is its 
prameya. My correct perceptual apprehension of the copper-beech tree, for example, 
simply cannot occur without a copper-beech tree to be correctly perceptually apprehended. 
Thus, the pramänahas ontological dependence upon the object. 
However, that a knowledge-episode exists always as a knowledge-episode of an 
object does not in itself entail epistemological dependence, i. e. that the object validates the 
knowledge-episode, i. e. proves that the knowledge-episode accurately apprehends the 
object. It is logically possible that the knowledge-episode, though ontologically 
dependent upon its object, is self-evident, is validated by other knowledge-episodes, or 
even cannot be validated at all (which would mean that there are knowledge-episodes. 
but 
there is no way ofproving that there are knowledge-episodes). 
Take, for example, the perceptual knowledge-episode of a tree. 
One might 
plausibly hold that, though the perception cannot exist independently of the tree perceived. 
174 
the perception is proved to be correct because (i) the perception is self-evidently correct, or 
(ii) the perception has been confirmed by other perceptions. Alternatively, one may hold 
that, though the correct perception of the tree cannot exist independently of the tree, there is 
actually no way of proving that this knowledge-episode of the tree is in fact correct. I do 
not mean to suggest that any of these positions are correct (for that is a separate issue). My 
point is rather that the fact that these positions are logically possible demonstrates that one 
cannot successfully argue, as Nägärjuna attempts, that because a pramäna is dependent 
upon its prameya for its existence, therefore it is not validated independently of the 
prameya. 
7.5. Extrinsic Establishment (1). The pramäna-s are 
Validated by the prameya-s. 
Having (supposedly) refuted all the possible ways in which pramäna-s might be 
intrinsically established, Nagärjuna now criticizes the alternative that the pramäna-s are 
validated by means of the prameya-s. (But see below for Nägärjuna's possible conflation, 
once again, of validation-- i. e. epistemological establishment-- and ontological 
establishment). It became, as shown in the previous chapter, the most commonly accepted 
explanation among later Naiyäyikas of the validation of the pramäna-s. A 
knowledge-episode is proved to be correct, i. e. to mirror the mind-independent state of 
affairs, by the fact that its object actually behaves in accord with its nature. If the object 
does not behave in accord with its nature, then the cognition is incorrect. A perceptual 
cognition of a distant person, for example, is proved to be valid if the object cognized 
waves its hand, moves, speaks, etc, whereas the cognition is proved invalid if the object 
remains immobile, grows leaves in the spring, and is the home ofa variety ofbirds' nests! 
Nägärjuna says that if the pramäna-s were established by prameya-s, this might 
occur through: (i) objects of the same type or'sphere of activity' ( vrsaya)- e. g. a perceptual 
pramäna being established by a perceptual prameya, etc, (ii) a prameya of a different type, 
e. g. a perceptual pramanamight be established by a prameyaof an inference, an inferential 
pramänamight be established by a perceptual prameya, etc, etc. 
Ndgärjuna also states that it might be that the prameya-s either 
individually 
(vyasta) or in an aggregate (samasta) could establish the pramäna-s. 
" For example. in the 
case of perceptual pramäna-s, it might be that: (i) one perceptual prameya establishes a 
"I 'il ' 51, näpi pramevaih samasta vyastaih sva visayapara visa-vasamgrhitaih- 
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perceptual pramäna, (ii) an aggregate of perceptual prameya-s establishes a perceptual 
pramäna, (iii) a perceptual pramäna is established by an aggregate of prameva-s some of 
which are of the same type as itself, some of which are not of the same type as itself (e. g. 
some perceptual prameya-s, and some inferential prameya-s), or all ofwhich are of a single 
different type from itself (e. g. a group of inferential prameya-s), or all of which are from a 
number of different types than it (e. g. a group of prameya-sconsisting of inferential 
prameya-s, prameya-s of verbal testimony, and prameya-s of comparison, used to establish 
a perceptual knowledge-episode). And mutatismutandlsfor the other pram-dpa-s. 
The purpose of this list seems to be to cover all the conceivable possibilities. In fact, 
as I explained in the previous chapter, the later Naiyäyikas at least appear to have thought 
that the final validation of all pramäna-s is by way of perceptual prameya-s. That a 
perception, inference, comparison, or verbal testimony is correct is attested when the 
object cognized, i. e. the prameya, is perceived (via any of the senses) to behave in 
accordance with its nature. The correct inferential cognition, for example, that'there is fire 
on the hill because there is smoke' is proved to be correct when, on approaching the hill, it is 
seen, felt, etc that the object of the cognition behaves in other ways like a fire (e. g. it is hot, 
burns, etc). 
Of course, the issue here is how one proves that a knowledge-episode is in fact a 
knowledge-episode. It must be reiterated that the knowledge-episodes which have not 
been proved by way of the confirmatory behaviour are, according to the Naiyäyikas, 
knowledge-episodes, i. e. correct cognitions, nonetheless. How one comes to know that a 
correct cognition is correct is not the same as the cognition's correctness. One might (and 
often does) have a correct cognition which has not yet (and may never actually be) 
validated. But in order to be validated, of course, the cognition must be correct. 
7.5.1. Nagarjuna's Refutation of Extrinsic Establishment (1): 
Interpretation (A). 
Nägärjuna's argument is here particularly obscure. But I shall suggest an 
interpretation. His criticism is essentially that the theory that the pramäna-s are 
established by the prameya-s commits the fallacy (dosa) of the establishment of 
the 
[already] established (siddhasya sädhana). 55 
"VI' 42 atha matamapeksya siddhistesämityatra bhavati ko dosah siddhasY 3 sädhanam 
sý ýnnäsiddho 
peksate hyanyat//Vi'C42, atbäpi matamapeksya prameyänarthänpram3n3n3m siddhirbhat, 
atiti; eVam 
siddhasya pramänacatustayasya sädhanam bbavati/ kim k3ranam/ na 
hvasiddhasvärthasti'ýipeksanam 
bhavati/ na hyasiddbo devadattah kamcidarthamapeksate/ na ca siddhasya sadbananistam 
knastia 
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The fallacy of establishing what is [already] established is also stated by Nägärjuna 
at MMK X, 9 with respect to the issue of the relationship of fire (agni) and fuel (indhana). 
Nägärjuna argues that, if fire were dependent upon (apeksya) fuel, then there would be the 
establishment of what is [already] established (siddhasya sädhana). The point appears to 
be that fuel (in the sense of a combustible material which is already burning) cannot be fuel 
without a fire which is burning it, so in order for fire to be dependent on the fuel, the fuel 
must already have been established. i. e. exist, in dependence upon the fire. Otherwise. 
Nägärjuna says, one would be left with the absurd conclusion that there can be fuel which 
exists without fire. 56 
Now, Nägärjuna seems to be saying much the same about pramäna-s and 
prameya-s. The prameya cannot be a prameya without a pramäna which apprehends it, so 
in order for the pramäna to be dependent on the prameya, the prameya must already have 
been established, i. e. exist, in dependence upon the pramäna. Otherwise, Nägärjuna seems 
to be saying, one would be left with the absurd conclusion that there can be a prameya 
which exists without a pramäna. 57 
However, if this is what Nägärjuna means, then he has slipped again from the 
epistemological to the ontological sense of establishment. He is arguing, according to this 
interpretation, that the existence of the pramäna dependent upon the prameya presupposes 
the existence of the prameya dependent upon the pramäna. Otherwise, the prameya would 
exist without a pramäna, which is contrary to the very notion of what aprameya is. He is 
not arguing, according to this interpretation, the following: The proof of the pramäna 
dependent upon the prameya presupposes the proofof the prameya dependent upon the 
pramäna. Otherwise, the prameya would be proved without a pramäna, which is contrary 
to the very notion ofwhat a prameya is. 
I wonder, however, what exactly Nägärjuna thinks that he has demonstrated if he is 
claiming that the prameya depends for its existence upon the pramäna. It is clear that an 
entity can only be known if it can be an object of knowledge. But this does not entail that 
the entity itself is dependent upon the knowledge-episode for its existence. For 
it might be 
karananupapatteriti/ 
`MMK X 9, yadlndbanamapeksyägniragneh siddbasya sädhanam/ exam satindhanam capi 
bhavrsvati 
niragnikam// 
"See NS and NSBh H, 10 in which the objection is raised (by an opponent) that 
if the pramäna were to come into 
existence after the prameya, then the prameya would not exist 
dependent upon the pramäpa But the 
prameya cannot exist independently of its being known (pramiyamäna) 
by the pramäna. NS 11,1,10, 
pascätsiddbau na pramäpebbyah prameyasiddbih// NSBh II, 
1,10, asati pram3ne kena prami vamäno 
'rtbah prameyab syäd pramänenakhalupramiyamäno 'rtbahprameyamityetatsidhatl,, 
%'(Quoted in Tola 
and Dragonetti (I 995a), p. 99. ) 
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objected that 'being known' is a non-essential relational attribute of the entity. . all that Nägärjuna is entitled to conclude is that the non-essential relational attribute of the entit\ , 
viz. 'being known', is dependent upon the knowledge-episode for its existence. The 
copper-beech tree outside my window, for example, might exist independently of the 
knowledge of it. It is only when conjoined with its non-essential relational attribute, 'being 
known', that the copper-beech tree becomes dependent for its existence upon the 
knowledge of it. But then, it is not really the copper-beech tree which is dependent for its 
existence upon the knowledge-episode, but rather its non-essential relational attribute, viz. 
'being known'. 58 If Nägärjuna thinks that he has established anything more than this, 
however, he is mistaken. 
I suspect that Nägärjuna does want to claim more than this, however. It is, after all, 
a rather unspectacular tautology to claim that the object qua object of knowledge is 
dependent on the knowledge of it. It hardly seems worth saying at all. I suspect that 
Nägärjuna thinks that the entity which is known is dependent upon the knowledge-episode, 
not only for its non-essential attribute of'being known' but for its existence as well. In 
other words, the entity which is known is a product of the mind which knows it. This 
would certainly be in accordance with Nägärjuna's position of prajnaptimätra. I suggest, 
then, that Nägärjuna does think that the copper-beech tree itself, and not simply its being 
known, is dependent for its existence upon the knowledge-episode of it. My point is that so 
far he has given no argument to substantiate this claim. And his position is surely in need 
of a convincing argument, for it seems highly unlikely that all objects of knowledge are 
entirely conceptual constructs. If I am to be convinced that, for example, the natural world 
of trees, mountains, etc (not to mention their atomic constituents) is entirely conceptually 
constructed, then the Mädhyamika has some hard philosophical work to do. 
58Raghüttama's Bhäsyachandra, commenting on NS II, 1,10, states that '... 'pram3nastands 
for the instrument 
along with its operation; and 'prameya' for the object as bearing the operation. 
Hence... unless the 
instrument, along with the operation of cognition exists beforehand, there can 
be no possibility of the 
'object' bearing the operation. ' Trans by Jhd (1984) (vol 2), p. 609. 
Ad explains that'though the existence 
of a thing, by itself, does not depend upon pramäna-s, yet its existence as object 
of cognition, as prameva. 
depends entirely upon the operation of the pramäna-s... ' 
See also Nagel (1997), p. 35, 'if there were nonsubjective thoughts, someone 
would still have to think 
them. So the formula that simply notes this cannot be used to demonstrate that everything 
is based on our 
responses. A tautology with which all parties to a dispute must agree cannot 
show that one of them r, 
right. ' 
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7.5.2. Nägarjuna's Refutation of Extrinsic Establishment (1): 
Interpretation (B). 
Interpretation (A) appears to me to be the most plausible interpretation of 
Nägdrjuna's argument. However, perhaps the argument could alternatively be construed 
as a critique of the notion that the prameya can prove that the pramäna« hick apprehends it 
is in fact a pramäna. In other words, Nägärjuna's argument might be read alternatively as 
an attack on the validation, rather than the existence, of the pramäna dependent upon the 
prameya. Let me suggest an interpretation in this manner. 
As I have already emphasized, the Naiydyika position is that a knowledge-episode 
mirrors a mind-independent state of affairs. The theory of extrinsic validation of 
pramäna-s means, then, that the correctness of a cognition is proved by the 
mind-independent state of affairs. When the mind-independent state of affairs behaves in 
accord with the cognition of it, then the cognition is confirmed to be correct. I have a 
cognition of fire. The fire actually, i. e. mind-independently, behaves like fire, i. e. it burns, 
smokes, etc. Therefore my cognition of it is correct. Here the prameya, the object of 
knowledge, proves that the pramäna is a pramäna. 
There is, however, an obvious problem with this theory, which perhaps Nägärjuna 
is pointing out. The confirmatory behaviour of the object, which supposedly proves that 
my cognition of the object is correct, i. e. a pramäna, must itself be apprehended by a 
cognition. But how, then, does one prove that this cognition which apprehends the 
confirmatory behaviour is itself correct? I cognize that the fire behaves like fire, i. e. it 
burns, smokes, etc. How do I prove that the cognition of the fire's confirmatory behaviour 
is correct, i. e. actually mirrors a mind-independent state of affairs? If the cognition is 
proved to be correct by the confirmatory behaviour, then this is circular. If the cognition is 
proved by further cognitions of confirmatory behaviour, then an infinite regress is entailed. 
One ends up, in other words, in the same position as the proponent of the theory that 
pramäna-s are validated by other pramäna-s. 
Thus, perhaps one can understand Nägärjuna to be saying that the appeal to the 
prameya to validate the pramäna does not work. That the object of cognition is in 
fact a 
prameya, i. e. has been apprehended as it is mind-independently, is precisely what 
is at 
issue. That is, if one attempts to prove that a cognition is in fact a knowledge-episode, 
i. e. 
that it does mirror the mind-independent state of affairs, then it is futile to turn to the object 
cognized, either by that cognition or by another cognition, as the means of proving 
the 
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correctness of the cognition. For such a proof always relies on an object as mediated by 
cognition. There is always the problem of whether the mediation is a distortion rather than 
a mirroring. Ifa cognition mediates the object, then this cognition might always contribute 
something to the object of cognition. In fact, if Nägärjuna's position is that prameva-s. as 
lacking svabhäva, are entirely conceptual constructs, then for him objects of cognition are 
totally the products of conceptualization. It is not simply that cognitions distort the 
objects cognized. Rather, the objects of cognition are creations of the cognitions which 
cognize them. 
This is what Nägärjuna means, perhaps (and I should emphasize the 'perhaps'), 
when he says that the theory that the prameya-s establish the pramäna-s entails the fault of 
establishment of the [already] established. If a prameya is to validate the pramäna, i. e. 
prove that the pramäna apprehends its object as it is mind-independently, it must itself 
already have been proven to be a prameya, understood as an object which has been 
correctly cognized, i. e. cognized as it is mind-independently. But this means that there 
must be a cognition which has been proven already to cognize the object as it is 
mind-independently. To suggest otherwise would involve an absurd inversion (iyatyava) 
of the theory of pramäna-s, which would render pramäna-s superfluous (for the prameya-s 
would be said to be known without a knowledge-episode! ). " But how is it proved that this 
cognition has in fact cognized the object as it is mind-independently? The theory that a 
pramäna is validated by the prameya therefore presupposes, rather than proves, that the 
prameya is itelf already correctly cognized, and, therefore, that there is a cognition which 
is correct (a pramäna), i. e. which mirrors the prameyaas it exists mind-independently. 
(But-- as in the case of Nagärjuna's criticism of the position that pramäna-s are 
validated by other pramäna-s-- Nägärjuna's argument does not seem convincing. It seems 
highly improbable that, generally speaking, the cognitions of the confirmatory behaviour 
of the object do not apprehend the confirmatory behaviour as it is mind-independently. 
Surely it can be argued that it is up to Nagarjuna to prove his improbable thesis that these 
cognitions are always of objects which are just conceptual constructs. Until such a proof 
is 
forthcoming, it seems reasonable to believe that, generally speaking, the cognitions of 
confirmatory behaviour, and therefore the initial cognitions which these cognitions of 
confirmatory behaviour corroborate, are correct, i. e. are apprehensions of a mind- 
independent reality. It is possible that all cognitions create their objects 
(by analogy with 
"See Wand WC 43-45. 
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the dream), but Nägärjuna has not given us any reason to take this possibility very 
seriously). 
I give this interpretation very aware that it seems to go far beyond what Nägärjuna 
actually says in the text. Though this reading seems possible, I am doubtful that it actually 
represents his point. I think that it is perhaps more likely that Nägärjuna is here claiming, as 
I have already suggested, that the prameya which establishes, i. e. causes the existence, of 
the pramäna must itself be established, i. e. have its existence caused. by the pramäna. 
(Then again perhaps Nägärjuna was not very clear about what it was he was trying to say . 
In which case both interpretations are extrapolations from a philosophically undeveloped 
assertion). 
7.6. Extrinsic Establishment (2). Pramapa-s and 
prameya-s are Mutually Established. 
7.6.1. Nagdrjuna's Refutation of Extrinsic Establishment (2). 
The final theory which Nägärjuna considers is that the pramäna-s and the 
pmmeya-s are established in mutual dependence. Nägärjuna says, if the pramäna-s 
establish the prameya-s and the prameya-s establish the pramäna-s, then in effect neither 
pramäna-s nor prameya-s are established, because they both rely on something 
unestablished for their own establishment. There is a vicious circle of unestablished 
entities depending upon one another for their establishment. " 
Such mutual establishment would be like saying, Nägärjuna argues by analogy, 
that a father (pltr) is to be produced (utpädya) by a son (putra) and that the son himself also 
is to be produced by the father. In this case both the son and the father would have both the 
characteristic (Iaksana) of the father, i. e. producing, and the son, i. e. being produced. Such 
a situation, Nägärjuna says, would raise a doubt (samdeba) about, i. e. leave the question 
unanswered, which of the two is the father and which the son. For something which is 
60 Vl' 46-48, atba te pramänasiddhyä prameyasiddhib prameyasiddhyä ca% bha vati 
pramänasiddhirnästyubbayasyäpi te siddhib// sidbyanti hi pramänairyadi prameväni täni taireva 
sädhyäni ca prameyaistäni katham sädbayisyanti// sidhyanti ca prameyairyadi pramänäni t3ni taireva 
sädbyäni ca pramänaistäni katbam sädhayisyanti// VVC 46-48, atha man vase pramänasiddhyä 
prameyasiddhirbhavati pramänäpeksatvätprameyasiddbyä ca pramänasiddhirbhavati pramev3peksa- 
tväditi, evam te satyubbayasyäpi siddbirna bhavati/ kim käranarn/ yadi hi pramänaih prameº 
äni 
sidhyanti täni ca pramänäni taireva prameyaih sädbayitavy3ni nanvasiddhesu pramevesu 
käranasyäsiddhatvädasiddhäni, katham sädhayisyanti prameyänil yadi ca prameyaih pramänäni 
sidhyanti täni ca prameyäni taireva pramänaih sädbayitavyäni nanvasiddhesu pramänesu 
käranasyäsiddhatvädasiddhäni, katbam sddbayisyanti pramänäni 
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produced cannot really also be the producer of what produces it. Similarly, if both the 
pramäna and the prameya have the characteristic of establishing the other and being 
established by the other, then the question of establishment remains unanswered. For 
something which is established cannot really also be the establisher of what establishes it. ' 
I understand Nagärjuna to mean here that the position that the pramäna validates 
the prameya and that the prameya validates the pramäna is obviously circular. (But 
compare here the Vaid/VaidC, explained in the next chapter, in which Nägarjuna appears 
to advocate (rather than criticize)-- not the position that the pramäna and prameya validate 
one another but rather-- that the pramäna and prameya exist in mutual dependence). If 
pramäna, validates prameya, and prameya, validates pramäna, then neither pramäna, nor 
prameya, has in fact been validated. For example, take my perception of the copper-beech 
tree. If I am asked to prove that this perception is correct, I might say that it is correct 
because there is a copper beech-tree. If I am asked to prove that there is a copper beech tree, 
and I reply that there is a copper beech-tree because I have a perception of it then I have 
very obviously begged the question. 
7.6.2. A Reply to Nagarjuna's Refutation. 
One might, however, imagine a more sophisticated version of the theory of mutual 
validation. Such a theory might state that pramäna-s and prameya-s gain their 
trustworthiness through their interaction over time and with experience. The cognitions 
are attested by the repeated confirmatory behaviour of the objects cognized, and the 
objects cognized are attested by the fact that they are repeatedly objects of (increasingly) 
reliable forms of cognitions. 
This is, in fact, a position which appeals to common-sense, and which seems to 
describe how cognition actually evolves in experience. One gradually builds up a sense 
that certain cognitions and types ofcognition are correct, because they have been proved so 
by their object's confirmatory behaviour in the past. And one gradually builds up a sense 
°' VV49-50, piträ yadyutpädyah putro yadi tena caiva putrena/ utpädyah sa yadi pitä vada tatrotpädavati 
kah 
kam/ kai`ca pit! kah putrastatra tvam brrihi tä vubhä vapi ca/ pitrputralaksanadharau yato 
bha l ati no 'tra 
samdehah/ VVC 49-50, yathäpi nlma ka§cidbrdyätpiträ putra utp3danfy ah sa ca pitä 
tenai va 
putrenotpldanlya iti, tatredlnlm brrrhi kena ka utpädayita vya Ili tathaiva 
khalu bha i snbra viti pram3naih 
prameyäni sädhayitavyäni tänyeva ca punah pramänäni taireva prameyairiti, tatredlnim 
to katamaih 
katamani sldhayitavyäni/ tayos`ca pürvopadistayoh pitrputrayob kutarah putrah 
katarah pits ubhä ý api 
tävutpldakatvätpitrlaksanadharävutpädyatväcca putralaksanadharau/ atra nah samdeho 
bhavati 
katarastatra pitd katarah putra iti/ evameva yänyetäni bhavatah pramänaprameväni 
tatra katar3ni 
praminäni kataräni prameyäni/ ubhayänyapi hyetäni sädhakatvätpramänäni s3dh vatvätprame 
v3ni/ atra 
nah samdeho bha vati kataränyatra pramänäni kataräniprameyäniti/ 
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that certain objects exist as they are cognized, because similar cognitions of them have 
been correct in the past. The pramäna-s and prameya-s are mutually assisting components 
of the epistemological process. Take, for example, the following scenario. 
I perceive from a distance a pool of water. I may confirm that it is a pool of water 
when it quenches my thirst. Here the initial perception of the pool of water is validated by 
the confirmatory behaviour of the pool of water. If at a later date I again perceive at some 
distance a pool of water I will perhaps trust my perception. The perception is now a means 
of validating the object itself. I again may confirm that it is a pool of water when it 
quenches my thirst. The confirmatory behaviour again reinforces the validity of the 
perception, and the perception can be trusted even more to be a means of validating a 
similar perceived object in the future. If I perceive at a distance a pool of water I shall be 
justified in believing that it is in fact a pool of water because I have perceived it thus. I 
may judge that the perceived pool of water is in fact a pool of water, simply on the basis that 
I know my perception to be reliable in this matter. The object is validated by the cognition 
and the cognition has itself been validated on the basis of the previous confirmatory 
behaviour of the object. Pramäna and prameya are mutually establishing. Pramäna, at t, is 
validated by prameya, at t,. Pramäna, at t, validates prameya, at t. Prameya, at t further 
validates pramäna, at A. And so on. 
I want to suggest that experience in general develops in this manner. One gradually 
becomes accustomed to trusting one's cognitions on the basis of their repeated success at 
apprehending objects. Their success is measured by the fact that the object cognized 
behaves as one would expect such an object to behave. 
But it can be objected that this explanation remains hopelessly circular. That one 
gradually becomes accustomed to trusting one's cognitions in this way does not prove that 
the objects apprehended exist independently of the mind. For it might be that, although one 
comes to trustthat one's cognitions are reliable in apprehending mind-independent objects, 
in fact the objects which are apprehended do not exist independently of one's mind. The 
perception of the pool of water might be attested by the fact that it can quench one's thirst, 
etc, and one will subsequently trust one's perceptions of pools of water as reliable, 
but 
perhaps the pool of water, and its thirst-quenching capacity are fabrications of the 
cognition which apprehends them. 
Once again, however, I must repeat my objection to this sort of criticism. 
It is 
admittedly theoretically possible that all the objects of cognitions are 
in fact conceptual 
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constructs. In this sense, the circularity of the above explanation cannot be denied. That is, 
the explanation does not disprove the theoretical possibility that the whole process of 
mutual validation of knowledge-episodes and objects of knowledge depends on objects 
which are in reality simply products of the mind. But this theoretical possibility seems so 
unlikely, I contend, that it is the (Mädhyamika) opponent who must prove that this 
theoretical possibility is an actuality. Until such a proof is forthcoming, the thesis that, 
generally speaking, the objects of cognitions have a mind-independent nature can be safely 
assumed to be correct. 
7.7. Conclusion. 
The critique of pramäna-s and prameya-s in the VV/VVC is, I conclude, a 
philosophical failure. This is for two reasons. 
First, in many ways (which I have outlined above) the arguments which Nägärjuna 
presents in order to refute the Naiyäyika theory of validation of the pramäna-s are simply 
untenable. Nägärjuna's arguments do not establish even that there is no proof that 
knowledge-episodes apprehend mind-independent objects, let alone that prameya-s do not 
existin a mind-independent manner. 
Second, the position which underlies Nägärjuna's arguments, namely, that objects 
of knowledge (prameya) exist without svabbäva, i. e. are one and all entirely conceptual 
constructs, would seem-- regardless of the fact that his arguments are so often fallacious-- 
to be a highly implausible account of the way things really are. It seems much more 
likely-- as the Naiyäyikas maintain-- that, in many cases at least, the objects which one 
apprehends by means of pramäna-s actually exist independently of the apprehension of 
them. Nägärjuna's critique of pramäna-s and prameya-s in the VV/VVC has certainly 
given us no good reasons to think otherwise. 
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8. The Critique of Pramäna-s and 
Prameya-s in the Vaidalyaprakarana. 
8.1. Introduction. 
As I have already explained, although the Vaidalyaprakarana and its commentary 
are traditionally attributed to Nagärjuna (an attribution which has been accepted by man,. 
scholars'), Tola and Dragonetti have recently given a complex argument which casts some 
doubt on the correctness of the attribution. ' Nevertheless, as Tola and Dragonetti also 
argue, it seems pretty clear that the Vaid and the VaidC are Mädhyamika texts, though 
perhaps of somewhat later provenance than the authentic writings of Nägärjuna. 
Now, I do not want to become pre-occupied with the issue of authorship here. At 
any rate, I have nothing more to add to the argument provided by Tola and Dragonetti. The 
fact is that the Vaidand VaidC are almost certainly early Indian Mädhyamika texts, and 
they contain an extensive critique of pramäna-s and prameya-s. Given that I am presently 
interested in early Indian Madhyamaka responses to the pramäna theory, a study of this 
critique is necessary. I shall refer to the author of the Vaid/VaidCas'Nägärjuna', but one 
must bear in mind that our author may in fact be some other early (though perhaps 
somewhat later than Nägärjuna) Indian Mädhyamika. 
From a philosophical perspective, the Vaid/VaidCis an especially obscure text. I 
must stress that in the following analysis I interpret what Nägärjuna says. I think that my 
explanations take account of what the text actually states. But I am not content to simply 
repeat the words. In many cases, unfortunately, the points which Nägärjuna is attempting 
to communicate are far from clear (often even more unclear than in his other works. I 
suggest). My intention is to make some philosophical sense (and, in many cases, to show 
the lack of sense) ofNägärjuna's arguments. In so doing I necessarily explore beyond what 
is actually said to what it might mean. 
8.2. Nagarjuna's Advocacy of Mutual Establishment. 
The critique of pramäna-s and prameya-s in the Vaid/VaidCbegins with a passage 
in which Nägärjuna advocates that the pramana-s and the prameya-s are 
mutually 
'For example, Ruegg (1981), pp. 19,21, Lindtner (1982), pp. 11,87, and 
Williams (1978 ). 
, See Tola and Dragonetti (1995a), pp. 7-17. 




bya yod na tshad ma ni tshad ma nyid du gyur zhing/ tshad ma yod na 
yang gzhal bya ni gzhal bya nyid du gyur ro/ 
... when the object of 
knowledge exists, the knowledge-episode occurs as the knowledge-episode, and, also, when the knowledge-episode exists, the object of 
the knowledge occurs as the object of knowledge. (VaidC2 ). 
Nägärjuna's point, it seems, is that pramäna and prameya cannot exist 
independently of one another. The VaidC states here that the pramäna (tshad ma) can 
only exist (yod) when it has a prameya (gzbal bya) to know. Likewise, the object of 
knowledge can only exist when it is known by a knowledge-episode. VaidC2 goes on to 
say that the pramäna and prameya thus establish (grub pa) one another's existence. They 
'acquire their nature in mutual dependence' (pban tsbun ltos nas bdag nyid thob pavur 
pa), Nägä. rjuna says. ' 
8.2.1. Ontological Versus Epistemological Establishment. 
Note that in this passage Nägarjuna seems to be writing pretty unambiguously 
about the ontological establishment of the pramäna-s and the prameya-s. He does not 
appear to be concerned with their epistemological establishment. His argument is 
expressed in terms of the mutually dependent existence (yod) of the pramäna-s. This is by 
contrast with the Wand VVC in which, I have argued (see 7.6.1), Nägärjuna critique is to 
be interpreted as an attack on the mutual validation of the pramäna-s and prameya-s. 
In other words, rather than pointing out, as in the VV/VVC, the circularity of the 
position that, 
(i) the establishment, i. e. validation, of the knowledge-episode is by means of the 
object of knowledge. The establishment, i. e. validation, of the object of knowledge 
is by 
means of the knowledge-episode. The pramäna and prameya are epistemologically 
mutually dependent. Which is to say that the proof that the pramäna is in 
fact a pramäna is 
by means of the prameya, and the proof that the prameya is in fact a prameya 
is by means of 
the pramäna; 
Nägarjuna, in the quoted passage of the Vaid/VaidC, advocates that, 
(ii) a knowledge-episode requires an object in order to exist. 
A knowledge-episode 
is intentional. There is no knowledge-episode independent of an object of which 
it is the 
'See passage quoted in next note. 
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knowledge-episode. Similarly, the object of knowledge depends upon the 
knowledge-episode which apprehends it, for, otherwise, it would not be an object of knowledge. (But note the ambiguity of this latter statement. Does Nägärjuna mean that (i) 
the 'being known' of the object or (ii) the object which is known is dependent on the 
knowledge-episode? (i) is surely true, but (ii) is not obviously true). The pramäna and the 
prameya are ontologically mutually dependent. Which is to say that the existence of the 
pramäna is by means of the prameya, and the existence of the prameya is by means of the 
pramäna. They are mutually established in the sense that they cannot exist without one 
another! 
8.2.2. Critical Analysis of Nägärjuna's Position. 
But what precisely is being claimed in this case? It seems unproblematic that the 
pramäna and prameya are mutually dependent in one sense. A knowledge-episode is 
always intentional, i. e. it is always knowledge of something, and an object insofar as it is 
known is always the object of a knowledge-episode. It makes no sense to speak of 
knowledge without something known, and something known without knowledge of it! 
But, I am inclined to ask, so what? This observation on the part ofNägärjuna seems to be 
an unremarkable truism. 
Presumably, Nägärjuna intends to establish something more remarkable than this. 
Thus, at Vaid/Va1dC 3, Nägärjuna argues that the mutually dependent existence of the 
pramäna-s and prameya-s is incompatible with their possession of svabbäva (ranggr ngo 
bo). Pramäna-s and prameya-s are, Nägärjuna also says, not self-established (ranglasgrub 
'There is a complication, however. In the rest of the Vaid/VaidC2, Nägärjuna says that, because the pramäna 
exists in dependence on the prameya (and not just vice versa), therefore the prameya is the pramäna (here 
best understood as the 'means of knowledge') of the pramäna, and the pramäna is the prameya (i. e. the 
object known by means) of the pramäna. Hence, their natures are mixed (dyes). But this appears to me to 
be bizarre reasoning. The fact that a pramäna exists in dependence on the object of knowledge does not 
entail that the object of knowledge is the means of knowledge of the pramäna, and that the pramäna is the 
object known by means of the object of knowledge. The ontological mutual dependence of pramäna and 
prameya entails only that the prameya is the means of existence of the pramäna (and, of course, t /cc 
versa). Nägärjuna has once again conflated the issue of the existence of the pramäna-s and prarneva-s 
with the issue of their validation. It would follow that, if the pramänawere validated in dependence upon 
the prameya, then the object of knowledge would be the means by which the pramäna is known to be a 
pramäna In this sense, then, the prameya would become the pramäna (here meaning the 'means of 
knowledge') of the pramäna, and the pramäna would become the prameva (i. e. the object known by 
means) of the prameya But this 'mixing' of 
the 
natures of the pramäna and the prameya, I must stress, 
would not follow from their mutually dependent existence, as Ndgärjuna claims, but from their mutually 
dependent validation. Vaid 2 tshad ma danggzbal bya daggnyi ga dres so/% t aid C2. 
dir tshad ma 
clang gzhal bya gnyi ga dres parmthong ste/.. /zhesgzhal bya las tshad ma grub pa 
Bang/ tshad ma las 
kyanggzbal bya grub par byas nas/ tshadma ni gzhal bya'igzhal byar g vur la' gzhal 
bya yang tshad ma i 
(shad mar gyur bas phan tsh un Itos nas bdagnyid thob par kyur ba de'' phyir tshad ma yanggn vi gar 
'g %'ur 
la/gzhal bya yanggnyigar kyurbasnagnyiska 'drespa'o/ 
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pa ma yin), 6 which is here, presumably, the same as saying that they are nihsc abhä ta. 
Nägärjuna makes what appears to be the same point, although employing the terms 
'jnäna' and'jeya' (which I translate here as'knowledge' and 'object of knowledte' (they 
might also be translated as 'cognition' and 'object of cognition', however)) rather than 
'pramäna' and'prameya', in the LS, 
ajnäyamänam na jneyam vijnanam tadvinä na cal 
tasmätsvabhävato na sto jänajeye tvamüclvän// 
There is no object of knowledge without [it] being known, and there is not 
knowledge without that [object of knowledge]. 
Therefore, you have said that knowledge and the object of knowledge do not 
exist with svabbäva. ' (LS 10)8 
One finds the same claim-- this time using the terms'pramäna and'prameyd-- also 
stated by Candrakirti: 
6 VaidC2, de'i phyir/ Vaid 3, rang las grub pa ma yin no// VaidC, 3, gal to tshadma danggzhal bya dag ranggi 
ngo bosgrub par gyurna nil tshadma danggzhal bya dag tu gyur na/ ganggi phyir ltos nas grub pa ni' 
phan tsh un skyed par byed pa/zhes bya ba i don yin pa/ de'i pbyirrang lasgrub pa ma yin no... 
'Nägärjuna goes on to argue, at VaidlVaidC4, that an entity which exists cannot possess dependence. I take 
Nägärjuna's point to be that an entity which exists with svabhäva cannot be dependent. He gives the 
example of the pot (bum pa) which, if it existed (with svabhäva), could not be dependent on the clay ('jim 
pa) and so on for its existence. Nagärjuna then says that an entity which does not exist cannot be 
dependent. It is ridiculous to claim that a non-existent, like the hare's horn (ri bong gi rwa), can be 
dependent on anything! Finally, an entity which both exists (with svabhäva) and does not exist could not 
be dependent because both faults (nyes pa gnyiga) previously mentioned would apply to it. (Compare 
here the different argument against the entity which exists (with svabhäva) and does not exist given at 
SS 
4c, chosmi mthun phyiryod med min... 'What exists and does not exist does not [arise], because of the 
heterogeneity [of existence and non-existence]... ' As Lindtner (1982), p. 37 notes, 'chos mi mthun' is a 
translation of'vaidharmya'. Monier-Williams (1899), p. 1023 says that vaidbumya means 'difference, 
heterogeneity'. Nägärjuna's point seems to be, then, that existence and non-existence are different in the 
sense that they are incompatible. That is, they cannot exist at the same time in the same place. An entity 
which both exists and does not exist would be a contradictory phenomenon. ) 
I take it that the point of this (rather obscure) argument is to emphasize that entities which exist 
dependently neither exist with svabhäva nor are totally non-existent. But Nägärjuna's reasoning seems 
pretty doubtful to me. One must remember that existence without svabhäva means conceptuall\ 
constructed existence (prajnaptisaO. I see no reason why an entity might not exist in 
dependence upon 
either other entities or its own parts, and yet have a more-than-conceptually constructed existence. 
For 
more discussion of this point, see chapter 4. 
Vaid4, yodpa dang med pa dang gnyi ga i dngos po dag ni l tos pa can ma yin no// 
VaidC 4; gal to 
yang ltos pa can du grub par gyur na yod pa am/med pa am gnyi ga gang zhig yin gaang na/ 
de la re zhig 
yodpa nyid kyi phyir yod pa ni Jtos pa ma yin te/ yodpa i bum pa ni gzhan 
jim pa la sogs pa la Itos pa ma 
yin no/ med pa nyid kyi phyir med pa yang ltos pa ma yin te/ ri bong gi rwa 
la sogs pa yang itos par that 
ba'iphyirro/ nyespagnyiga yod pa i phyir gnyiga yang itospa ma yin no/ 
'See also AS 50, 'Just as when there is knowledge [there is] the object of knowledge, so also when 
there is the 
object of knowledge [there is] knowledge. When it is understood that 
both do not arise [with svabhäva? ], 
then what exists [with svabhäva? ]? ' (jibe sati yathä 
jneyam jneve jngnam tathi sati' 
yatrobhayamanutpannamiti"buddham tadästikim//). 
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täni ca parasparapeksyä sidhyanti-- satsu pramänesu pramevärthäh. 
satsu prameyesvarthesu pramänäni/ no tu khalu sväbhä iikl 
pramänaprameyayoh siddhiriti/ 
And those [pramäna-s and prameya-s] are established by means of mutual dependence. When there are pramäna-s there are objects which are 
prameya-s [and] when there are objects which are prameya-s there are 
pramäna-s. But certainly there is not establishment by way of svabh va 
of the pramäna and prameya. (PP 75). 
One must recollect that, seen in the Abhidharma context, the absence of st-abhit a 
of entities means that they have conceptually constructed existence (prajaptisat). 
Perhaps, then, Nägärjuna means that the object which is known (and not simply its being 
known) and the knowledge-episode of it have conceptually constructed existence-- i. e. 
they exist without svabbäva-- because of their mutual dependence. 
But, if this is Nagärjuna's intention, then surely his argument is faulty. He has 
given no justification for the claim that the object which is known (as opposed to its being 
known) is dependent upon the knowledge-episode. It seems quite plausible, in fact, that 
objects of knowledge are (in many cases at least) mind-independent entities, i. e. entities 
which exist with svabbäva. Simply to assert that objects of knowledge (trees, tables, etc) 
are conceptual constructs-- i. e. exist without svabbäva, because they are mind-dependent-- 
is in no way to establish that they are conceptual constructs. The prameya-- understood as 
the object of knowledge (rather than its being known)-- is quite possibly (in many cases) 
not dependent for its existence upon the knowing mind. 
Furthermore, if a knowledge-episode is dependent upon the object which is known 
(prameya), in the sense that the pramana must have an intentional object, it does not follow 
that the knowledge-episode is a conceptual construct, i. e. exists without svabbäva. It is 
one thing to say that a knowledge-episode exists in dependence upon its object (which 
does 
seem to be true, in the sense that a knowledge-episode, in order to exist, must be 
knowledge 
of something); it is quite another thing to say that the knowledge-episode 
is a conceptual 
construct. But Nägärjuna appears to argue that because the knowledge-episode 
is 
dependent for its existence upon its object, therefore the knowledge-episode 
is a 
conceptual construct, i. e. does not have svabbäva! The fallacy 
here, I think, is the move 
from dependently originating existence to existence without svabbäva. 
It does not follow 
that an entity which dependently originates is therefore prajnaptisat. 
9 
"See here also SS56-57a-b 'Depending on inner and outer sense-bases 
(3vatana) [i. e. the sense organs and the 
sensed objects], consciousness arises. Therefore, consciousness 
does not exist. It is empty 
like a mirage. 
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At any rate, what could it possibly mean to say that a knowledge-episode is a 
conceptual construct? I think that I can at least make sense of the notion that objects of 
knowledge are conceptual constructs (although it seems like a pretty implausible theory to 
me). But how can a pramäna be a conceptual construct? 1 accept that a 
knowledge-episode which spans some time might be made up of a number of momentary 
knowledge-episodes (As the Naiyäyikas themselves admit, see 6.2.1), and might, perhaps, 
be described as conceptually constructed out of these momentary knowledge-episodes. 
(Though I am not sure that one needs even to accept this. The whole knowledge-episode 
might exist in dependence upon its parts-- i. e. the momentary knowledge-episodes-- 
without necessarily being a conceptual construction on the basis of these parts). But what 
might it mean to say that these momentary knowledge-episodes are themselves 
conceptually constructed? Conceptually constructed out of what and by whom? So, I find 
the notion that pramäna-s lack svabhäva, i. e. have conceptually constructed existence, 
ratherpuzzling. 
There is, however, one way, by employing the notion of'conceptual construct' in a 
different sense, in which I can perhaps make sense ofNägärjuna's claim that the pramänais 
a conceptual construct. If, as Nägärjuna claims, the object of knowledge (and not just its 
being known) is a mind-dependent entity, i. e. is nibsvabhäva, then it is not in fact the case 
that there are any knowledge-episodes which apprehend mind-independent entities. But 
the Naiyäyika position is that knowledge-episodes do apprehend entities as they exist 
mind-independently. In which case, given the dependence of the object of knowledge on 
the knowledge-episode which apprehends it, the pramäna-- understood as a cognition 
which correctly apprehends a mind-independent state of affairs-- is, according to 
Nägärjuna, a fiction (i. e. a conceptual construct). There are in fact no such 
knowledge-episodes which apprehend mind-independent objects, because the objects of 
knowledge-episodes are dependent for their existence upon the knowledge-episodes of 
which they are the objects. Thus, it is not simply that the object of knowledge-- construed 
as a mind-independent entity-- does not exist, i. e. is a fiction, also the knowledge-episode-- 
construed as apprehending such a mind-independent entity-- is equally 
fictitious. 
The problem with this explanation is, however, as I have already explained, 
that 
an illusion. Consciousness does not exist, because it arises depending on the object of 
consciousness. ' 
(hang dangphyi yi skye mched la/ brten nas ream parsbes pa byung/ 
delta bas na rnam shes med sm'g 
rgyu sgyu ma bzbin du stong// ream shes rnam shes by,? brten nas 
'byung bas yod min shes pa dang... ) 
Again, however, I fail to see why the fact that consciousness (ream par shes pa) 
depends on its objects 
(and sense organs) in order to exist should entail that consciousness 
is empty (of svabhäý3), i. e. a 
conceptual construct. 
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Nägärjuna has given us no good reason to accept that objects ofknowledge actually are not 
mind-independent entities. In which case, Nägärjuna has given us no good reason to 
accept that knowledge-episodes which are thought to apprehend such mind-independent 
objects are simply fictions. 
So, in summary, it is true that a pramäna is dependent for its existence upon the 
prameya (given that, in order to exist, the pramäna must have an object of which it is the 
knowledge-episode). But this certainly does not establish that the pramäna does not have 
svabhäva, i. e. has conceptually constructed existence (prajnaptisa f). It is true that the 
prameya is dependent upon the pramäna, in the uninteresting sense that an object which is 
known is necessarily dependent for its being known upon the knowledge of it! But (in 
many cases) it is far from clear that the object which is known (by contrast with its being 
known) is dependent for its existence upon the knowledge-episode of it. Nägärjuna has not 
demonstrated his highly counter-intuitive claim that an object of knowledge lacks 
svabhäva, i. e. arises as a conceptual construct created by the mind. He has thus not 
demonstrated either that the knowledge-episode, construed (with the Naiyäyikas) as a 
cognition which correctly apprehends a mind-independent object, is a fiction. 
8.3. From Mutually Dependent Existence to 
Intrinsic Validation. 
It is perhaps surprising that, immediately after his advocacy of the mutually 
dependent existence of the pramäna and prameya, Nägärjuna presents the case against the 
possibility of the intrinsic validation (not existence) of the pramäna-s. This seems to be a 
strange shift in the course of the argument. It indicates, I think, that the author of the 
Vaid/VaidChas again (see note 5) not clearly distinguished the issues of ontological and 
epistemological establishment. I have shown that Nägärjuna, in the VV/VVC, is prone to 
confuse or conflate these two separate issues. It seems that in the Vaid/VaidChe commits 
the same error. He thus moves rather fluidly from the one issue to the other. 
The change to 
the refutation of the intrinsic validation of the pramäna-s would seem 
for him to be a 
natural progression. In fact, however, it is an illogical jump in the argument. 
Nevertheless, 
the critique in the Vaid/VaidCof intrinsic establishment, i. e. intrinsic validation, 
is worthy 




8.4. Intrinsic Establishment (1). The Validation of the 
pramäna-s by Other pra? n na-s. 
The Naiyäyika opponent presents the analogy of the balance (srang. Just as the 
balance weighs its objects, so too the pramäna-s apprehend their objects. In the ASthe 
pramäna is also compared to the balance. " It is a natural comparison to make in Sanskrit, 
given that the verbal root pra- mä , 
from which the terms 'pramäna' and 'prameya' are 
derived, means both'to measure' and'to know'" The Tibetan translation of pramäna (tshad 
ma, 'measure') and prameya (gzbal bya, 'what is to be weighed') is obviously intended to 
preserve the Sanskrit etymology. " Further, as Tola and Dragonetti note, the Sanskrit root 
tul, from which the word 'tula1, i. e. 'balance', is derived means both 'to weigh' and 'to 
ponder' or'to examine'. ' There is, then, a strong semantic affinity between the words 'tuld 
and 'pramäna'. Furthermore, it is evident that there is a definite similarity between the 
activity of weighing and that of knowing. In both cases there is an assessment of an object, 
and the issue of accuracy is of vital importance. The analogy is appealing in this respect as 
well. 
The opponent's point appears to be, then, that there are knowledge-episodes which 
accurately apprehend their objects, just as there are balances which accurately weigh their 
objects. I take this again as an assertion of the Naiyäyika position that 
knowledge-episodes mirror a mind independent state of affairs. 
If the pramäna apprehends the prameya, like a balance weighs its object, then how 
is the accuracy of the knowledge-episode to be proved? How is it to be shown that the 
knowledge-episode is in fact a knowledge-episode? A balance which cannot itself be 
proved to be accurate is not a measuring instrument one would rely upon. One will not 
know whether or not such a balance is accurate. Similarly, a knowledge-episode which 
cannot be proved to accurately apprehend its object is not a cognition one would rely upon. 
One will not know whether or not the knowledge-episode does actually correctly 
apprehend its object. (I stress once more, however, that the knowledge-episode, like the 
balance, can be accurate without being validated. However, without validation, one will 
not know whether or not the knowledge-episode is accurate). 
How, then, is the pramäna to be validated? A balance, it might 
be argued, is shown 
`° VaidC 5, smras pa/ ji Itar srang la sogspa med na gzhal bya gzung ba med pa 
de bzhin du tshad ma med na 
yang gzhal byagzung ba med do/ 
"NS II, 1,16, prameyatý ca tuläprämanyavad/ See also NSBh II, 1,16. 
Jhä (trans) (1984), pp. 632 633. 
'2 See Monier-Williams (1899), p. 685. 
"See Chandra Das (1970), p. 1023,1079. 
"See Tola and Dragonetti (1995a), p. 181. 
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to be accurate if its measuring is in accord with the measurements of other balances. Ni" 
balance weighs the sack of potatoes as 10 lbs. My balance is proved to be accurate if other 
balances also weigh the sack of potatoes as 10 lbs. It is the accord of the measurements of 
my balance with those of other balances which proves the reliability of my balance. If the 
pramäna-s are to be validated, then, by analogy with the balance, perhaps they are 
validated by other pramäna-s. I perceive the sack of potatoes. My perception is validated 
by other perceptions, etc. of the sack ofpotatoes. 
8.4.1. Nägarjuna's Refutation of Intrinsic Establishment (1). 
The Vaid/VaidC presents a refutation of this position that the pramäna-s are 
established by other pramäna-s which is in content identical to that contained in the 
VV/VVC(see 7.2.1). The position that the pramäna-s are established by further pramäna-s 
produces, Ndgärjuna argues, the fallacy (tbal ba) of an infinite regress (thug pa med pa). 
The pramana-s which establish the pramäna-s would themselves require establishment, 
etc, etc. The consequence is that, given the endless requirement for further establishment 
of the pramäna-s which establish the pramäna-s, none of the pramäna-s would in fact be 
established. " The unestablished cannot be the cause of establishment. 
The balance analogy might be used here to illustrate Ndgärjuna's point (as I 
understand it). The balance is said to be proved to be accurate because, as I have explained, 
it records the weight of the sack of potatoes similarly to other balances. However, one 
cannot know in this way that any of the balances which weigh the sack of potatoes 
apprehend its weight as it is independent of the balances themselves. They might all be 
inaccurate, it might be argued, if accuracy is to be understood as a matter of apprehending 
how much the sack of potatoes actually weighs, independently of the weighing of them! 
All that one can prove by means of other balances is that the balances are 
in accord with 
one another. This does not show, however, that any of the balances apprehend the 
balance-independent weight of the sack of potatoes. So too with 
knowledge-episodes. 
That a knowledge-episode is corroborated by other knowledge-episodes can never 
demonstrate that the knowledge-episode apprehends a mind-independent state of affairs. 
All that one can prove in this way is that the knowledge-episodes are 
in accord with one 
" VaidC 5, smras pa. ji ltar srang la cogs pa med na gzhal bya gzung ba med pa 
de bzbin du tshad ma med na 
yang gzhal bya gztmg ba med do zbes smra na brjod par bya ste/ 
Vaid5, ma yin to thug pa med par thal bar 
gyur ba'i phyir ro// VaidC5, ... gal to yang 
don thaws cad tshad was grub Pa yin no zhe na 
" tshad ma 
reams de las gzban pa' tshad masgrub bo zbes bya bar Mal bar 
gvur te/ tsbad ma rnams ni don thams cad 
kyinang dugtogspa i phyirro... 
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another. 
I have argued in the previous chapter that Nägarjuna's refutation of the position that 
pramäpa-s are validated by other pramäna-s is unconvincing. I refer the reader to this 
discussion (see 7.2.2), rather than needlessly repeating myself here. 
8.5. Intrinsic Establishment (2). The pramäna-s are Self- 
Validating. 
The argument here is very similar to that found in the VV/VVC (see 7.31). 
objects other than pramäna-s are, Nagärjuna claims, established by means of the 
pramäna-s. If the pramäna-s themselves are to be excepted from this rule (and they must 
be, for otherwise (according to Nägärjuna) the infinite regress would result) the special 
reason (khyad pargyi gtan tsbigs) or the difference (mi 'dra ba nyid) which excepts the 
pramäna-s from the general rule must be stated. " 
The special reason, the Naiyäyika opponent replies, is that the pramäna-s are 
self-established, i. e. self-evident. As in the VV/VVC, the opponent proceeds to support the 
theory that the pramäna-s are self-evident by means of an analogy. The analogy given is 
that of a lamp (marme), as opposed to a fire in the VV/VVC, which illumines both itself 
and others. Just as (ji ltar) the lamp illumines itself and others, likewise (de bzhin du) the 
knowledge-episode validates itself and its prameya. Thus, the infinite regress of further 
lamps being required to illumine lamps, or further pramäna-s being required to validate 
pramäna-s, does not occur. " 
My comments in the previous chapter about the fire analogy (see 7.3.1) apply here 
too. The main point is that the notion of'self-illumination' is a metaphor for self-evidence. 
A lamplight is self-evident in the very act of lighting up its object. No further proof of its 
existence is necessary. Similarly, the knowledge-episode is self-evident in the 
apprehension of its object. No further proof of its existence is necessary. Note that, 
like the 
the causatives of the Sanskrit verbal forms pra- käs, pra- sad, and 
dyut, the Tibetan 
translation, viz. gsal bar byedpa, in addition to meaning (i) 'to make 
bright, illuminate, 
"VaidC5, gal to tshad ma med pasgzbal bya grub pa ma yin par dod na ganggis na 
tshad ma rnarns med par 
tshad ma rnamsgrub par 'dodpa yin te/ kbyad pargyi gtan tshigs sam nil 
'dra ba nyid brjod dgos so.. _ ga 
l 
to tshad ma rnamsni tshad ma rnamskyis grub pa ma yin na ni don tharns cad 
tshad mas bsgrub par h ya ba 
yin no zhes bya'i dam bca'nyams pa yin no/ 
" VaidC 5, smras pa. Vaid 6, tshad ma reams la ni tshad ma med 
del 'dir mar me bzhin tshad ma ni rang 
dang 
zban sgrub par byed pa yin no/' VaidC 6, ji Aar mar me ni rang 
dang gzban nab tu gsal bar b ved pa g 
mthong ba de bzhin du tshad ma reams kyang rang dang gzhan sgrub par 
b ved pa yin no ' de Ito has na 
thug pa med pa marme la sogspa t skyon sridpa ma yin no/ 
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irradiate', can also mean (ii) 'to make clear, evident, manifest'. " Thus, the etymological 
basis of the metaphor is preserved in the Tibetan translation. 
Order 
text 
W VIVO Vaid/VaidC 
. 
11. t 1h" \-I I 
(1) Argument (A) Argument (D) Argument (D) 
(2) Argument (B) Argument (E) Argument (C) 
(3) Argument (C) Argument (A) ------- 
(4) Argument (D) Argument (C) ------- 
Argument (A): Fire/a lamp cannot illuminate itself, because illumination is of what is previously 
unilluminated. 
Argument (B): Fire cannot illuminate itself, because it would also burn itself. 
Argument (C): Fire/a lamp cannot illuminate itself, because darkness would also conceal itself. 
Argument (D): Fire/a lamp cannot illuminate darkness either: (i) through contact, because fire/light and 
darkness are contradictories, or (ii) without contact, because fire/a lamp would illumine anything anywhere. 
Argument (E): A lamp cannot illuminate darkness because darkness is a mere absence. Therefore, there is no 
darkness for a lamp to remove. 
Argument (C) and argument (D) occur in all three texts. Argument (A) occurs in the VV VVC and in the 
VaidlVaidC, but not in theMMK VII. Argument (B) occurs only in the VV VVC. Argument (E) occurs only 
in the Vaid/VaidC. 
Table 3. Nägärjuna's Refutations of the Self-Illuminating Lamp/fire. 
8.5.1 Nägärjuna's Refutation of Intrinsic Establishment (2). 
The strategy in the Vaid/VardC of refuting the theory that the pramäna-s are 
self-evident is the same as in the VV/VVC. Nägärjuna presents a series of arguments 
intended to refute the example of the lamp as self-illuminating. 
The lamp is not 
self-illuminating. It cannot, therefore, serve as the basis of an analogy which supports 
the 
position that the pralnäna-s are self-evident. For a fuller explanation of 
these points, the 
18See Chandra Das (1970), p. 1305. 
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reader is referred to the discussion in the previous chapter. 
The arguments given in the Vaid/VaidC to refute the example of the lamp are, 
however, somewhat different, both in content and order, from those found in the VV ''VC. 
The basic differences and similarities are expressed in the accompanying chart (table 3 ). It 
must be stressed that, where the chart expresses an equivalence between arguments, the 
equivalence is approximate rather than precise. As the detailed analysis will show, none of 
the arguments in the Vaid/VaidCis exactly the same as those contained in the V1/4 'V( 
The lamp (pradipa) example is also employed by an opponent at MMKVII 8-12, in 
support of the notion of origination (utpäda)-- the first of the three stages of the existence of 
a dharma-- which produces both itself and others. (For the text, see chapter 7, note 41). For 
the sake of completeness, I include in the chart the arguments employed by Nägärjuna to 
refute the light analogy in this context as well. 
The refutation in the Vaid/VaidCof self-evident pramäna-s suffers from the same 
faults which I described in relation to the refutation of self-evidence of the pramäna-s in the 
VV/VVC. Nägärjuna's arguments are all invalid and/or unsound. Further, it seems that it 
would be far more philosophically interesting to criticize, not the example of the lamplight, 
but rather the various philosophical problems which confront the theory of self-evident 
pramäna-s. Most importantly here is the difficulty of providing an adequate account of 
error. I refer the reader to the discussion of these points in the previous chapter (See 7.3.2 
and 7.3.3). I shall examine now, in more detail, the arguments which appear in the 
Vaid/VaidC. 
(1) The Vaid/VaidCstates that the lamp might either illuminate (gsal bar byed pa) 
darkness (mun pa) through contact (phrad) or without contact. However, lamplight cannot 
contact darkness, because light and darkness are contradictory ( gal ba). Contact requires 
simultaneous occupation of the same location, and contradictory entities cannot 
be in the 
same place at the same time. Lamplight cannot, however, illuminate 
darkness without 
contact. Otherwise, the author says, a light in a single location would 
be able to illumine 
even the most remote of places, such as the darkness contained within the caves of all 
mountains (ri thams cad kyiphuggi pang dugtogspa i mun pa), 
because no contact would 
be required in order for the illumination to occur. But this 
is manifestly absurd. '' 
19 Vaid 7 mar me ni mun pa long phrad pa am ma phrad kyang rung stegsal 
bar b ved pa ma yin no a idC 7, 
mar me ni m un pa dang phrad nas gsal bar byed dam/ ma phrad Par yang gsal 
bar b ved grang ns' re zhig 
marme nimun pa dangphradnasgsal bar byed parmi gyur to phrad pa med 
pa i phyir ro ' ganggi Ph %'ir 
marme dangmun pa ni phrad pa yod pa ma yin te/ gal ba'i phyirro/gang na 
marme yod pa de na mun Pa 
med na ji ltarmarme 'di m un pa sei bar byed pa am gsal bar 
byed par m'ar' t aýdC 8 .... gal te yang 
mar me 
ni ma phrad pargsal bar byedpar gyur na ni di na gnas pa 
kho nas n thams cad kyi ph ug gi nang 
dugtogs 
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(Nägärjuna also gives the analogy of the sword (ralgl). Just as a sword cannot cut w ithout 
contact, likewise light cannot illuminate without contact with what it illuminates). 
This argument is essentially the same as the one found in the VV4' «I have 
already criticized it in the previous chapter. The reader is referred to this analvsis. = 
(2) Nägärjuna says it is accepted both by ordinary men (jig rten pa) and b} 
investigators (dpyodpapo), i. e. philosophers, respected by the Nyäya tradition (ofwwhich 
he gives a long list) that darkness is the mere absence of light ('odmedpa tsam). Darkness 
pa'i mun pa sel bar byed pa am gsal bar byed par gyur ba zhig na de Isar ni jig rten na ma mthong ba am dod pa yang ma yin no/ 
20VaidC7, 
... maphradpayinnayangmaphradpa'iralgrinigcodparmibyedpabzhinno'Theanalogý ofthe 
sword is also used in Mädhyamika texts in the refutation of svasamvedana That is, just as a sword cuts 
others but cannot cut itself, so too cognition is not self-aware in the act of being aware of its object. See, for example, Säntideva's BC IX, 18. 
"There follows in the Vaid/VaidC a strange defence by an opponent of the notion that light illuminates 
darkness, together with an equally strange refutation by Nägärjuna. The opponent gives the analogy of 
the planets' (gza) harmful influence (good pa) on people, such as (the much-maligned) Devadatta. Just as 
the planets exert an evil influence on such people, likewise the light is able to illuminate darkness. The 
point is, presumably, that light relates to darkness in the same way, i. e. over a distance, as the planets 
relate to the people upon whom they exert a harmful influence. It is (allegedly) established that the 
planets do exert a harmful influence upon people. Therefore, light illuminates darkness. 
Nagärjuna's response is that this analogy does not work because of the discordance (: gal ba) between 
the two phenomena compared, viz. the planets' harmful influence on people and the illumination of 
darkness by light. (Vaid 8, gza i good pa bzhin du 'di yang gyur ro zbe na ma yin to dpe dang gal ba'i 
phyirro/I). Contrary to the opponent's opinion, light does not illuminate darkness at a distance, like the 
planets exert their harmful influence on people. Therefore, it is not possible to argue correctly that, just as 
the planets exert a harmful influence on people, likewise light illuminates darkness at a distance. 
Nagärjuna proceeds to explain why the two phenomena are actually dissimilar. The passage is obscure, 
but I offer the following interpretation. 
First of all, Nägärjuna states, if the opponent claims that light illuminates darkness at a distance 
without contact, this is dissimilar to the harmful influence of the planets upon people, which occurs at a 
distance but through contact nevertheless. What does Nägärjuna mean here? It is impossible to know. 
Perhaps one must assume an unstated astrological theory, viz. that the planets emit some sort of subtle 
matter which travels to the unfortunate Devadatta and causes him harm! 
If, however, the opponent claims that the light illuminates darkness, like the planets' harmful 
influence on people, through contact, the analogy still does not work. This is for two reasons: (a) the 
harmful influence of the planets on people is possible because people are corporeal (]us dang Ilan pa). 
The harmful influence of the planets only occurs when the entity influenced has a body which can be 
harmed, just as, for example, fire, a snake, illness, etc can only have a harmful influence upon the 
corporeal. Perhaps, again, the notion is that the subtle matter emitted by the planets can only affect an 
entity which, similarly, is material. By contrast, darkness is a mere absence of light( bdmedpa tram). A 
mere absence cannot have a body, because, if it did have a body, insofar as it has the positive quality of 
corporeality, it would not be a mere absence. (b) the planets are able to exert their influence on peoples' 
bodies at a great distance (thag ring po na), unlike a lamplight, which cannot illuminate very 
distant 
objects. The point appears to be, then, that, if the lamplight were like a planet, it would 
be able to affect 
darkness at a great distance. But it is clear that lamplight does not have this ability. Therefore, the planet 
analogy cannot be used to support the notion that light removes darkness at a distance. 
(b) is surely incorrect, however. The opponent need only reply that he 
does not claim that the 
planets and light are alike in operating at great distances. All he claims is that they are alike 
in operating at 
a distance. Entities which are compared in a certain respect need not be alike 
in all respects or to the same 
degree. A light might be like a planet in operating at a distance, without being 
like the planet in operating 
at a great distance. I might compare the heat in my oven with the heat in the sun, 
in their quality of being 
hot, without claiming that they are equally hot. 
At any rate, the Nägärjuna's argument is, from the point of view of modern science, rather 
debatable. 
Light does travel at great distances (and travels from much further away than the 
locations of planets) and 
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is an example (dpe) of a mere absence. 
Nägarjuna is here referring explicitly to the NS, which states that. 
laukikaparlksakänäm yasminnarthe buddhisämyarn sa drstjntahü" 
The drstänta is the matter with regards which ordinary men (laukika) and 
investigators (päriksaka) have the same opinion . (NS I, 1,25). 
As Vätsyäyana explains in his commentary, the distinction between the ordinary 
man (laukika) and the investigator (päriksaka) is a distinction of intelligence, either innate 
or through training. Thus, the investigator has examined and understood the nature of the 
object in question more thoroughly and meticulously than the average man. An object is 
usable as a dretäntawhen the careful examination has revealed the ordinary understanding 
at terrific speed. 
This is, however, not the only problem with the planet analogy and its refutation from a modern, 
scientific perspective. Both the opponent and Nägärjuna maintain, it would appear, that the planets 
harmfully influence people. Their disagreement is about whether or not this harmful influence is similar 
or dissimilar to the alleged illumination of darkness by light. The difficulty is, however, that neither 
party provides any proof for the harmful influence of the planets upon people. No doubt it was a cultural 
assumption that such harmful influence occurs, and thus the point was taken as axiomatic. But this is a 
mistake, for the harmful influence of the planets upon people is not a self-evident truth. It is therefore an 
unproven premiss rather than an axiom. Insofar as it may be that the planets do not actually harmfully 
influence people, the reasoning of both the opponent and of Nägärjuna may be unsound (and, astrology 
notwithstanding, probably is unsound). 
And both parties, it would appear, thus in effect commit the informal fallacy of complex question. 
The question 'is the harmful influence of the planets similar or dissimilar to the alleged illumination of 
darkness by light? ' actually conflates two distinct questions: (a) do the planets harmfully influence 
people? (b) is the harmful influence by planets on people similar or dissimilar to the alleged illumination 
of darkness by light? An answer to question (b) only makes sense if an affirmative answer can be 
established for question (a). Both the opponent and the author answer question (b), in the affirmative and 
the negative respectively, without asking question (a) at all. They assume rather than establish an 
affirmative answer to question (a). 
However, Nägärjuna would perhaps retort that he does notacceptthe position that planets harmfull y, 
influence people. He is a Mädhyamika, and is engaging here in prasariga. That is, Nägärjuna is using the 
position accepted by the opponentas a means of undermining the opponent himself. Nägärjunais simply 
pointing out the unacceptable consequences which follow for the opponent from the opponent's own 
position. Nägärjuna himself is not commited to the opponent's position. 
The pre-occupation, especially evident in this passage, with light and its power to 
illuminate 
darkness strikes me as rather peculiar. I suppose that in the Ancient Indian context, 
light must have 
appeared as a very mysterious and even magical phenomenon. Given the intangible quality of 
light, it 
was perhaps natural to wonder whether or not light is real. It may also have thus seemed natural 
to 
compare light with other mysterious phenomena-- such as the (supposed) evil 
influence of planets upon 
people, and consciousness. 
VaidC8, 'di/ha sbyin la cogs pa la gzas pa i skyon phrad nasgnod pa 
byed pa 'am rang gi l us la Sogs 
pa reams 'dzin par byed pa de Itarni marmes byas paigood pa m un pa 
la yod pa ma yin Pa j ltar rzas b ýýaS 
pa i skyon dang mtshungs pa yin/ gza' la Sogs pa his Bang Idan pas skyes 
bu la sogs pa reams lab ved par 
gyur ba me dang/ thagpa dang/chu dang/nad dang/sbrul dang rims 
Ja cogs pa lus can roams kho nas 
good par byed pa de Ita bu ni mar me la cungzadkyang yod pa ma yin to 
We nas chos mthun pa nvid ma 
yin no/ gzban yang thag ring po na yodpa i mar me ni mun pa'i lus 
dang dbangpo la sogs pa la gnod par 
byedpa ma yin to de dag med pa i phyir ro/ de 1 to bas Da gza i dpe ni ma phradpar sgrub 
par b ved pa 13 rigs 
pa ma_yin no... 
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of the entity in question to be correct. 22 
So, Nägarjuna is claiming that darkness is a drstänta-- i. e. a commonly and 
correctly understood instance-- of an absence. In which case, Nägärjuna argues, darkness 
is not accepted as an entity (dngos po) of any kind. Therefore, darkness is not anything 
which can be removed (sel bar byed pa) by light. So there can be no illumination, i. e. 
removal, of darkness by light., ' 
But Nägärjuna has certainly gone astray here. He has, I think, confused two 
distinct meanings/uses of the term'remove'. 
First, 'remove' can mean 'relocate/eliminate'. One removes, i. e. relocates, the cup 
and one removes, i. e. eliminates, the spelling mistakes from the essay. In order to remove 
in this sense, there must be an entltywhich is relocated/eliminated. It would be wrong to 
say that in placing the cup on the table, I have relocated an entity called 'the absence of a 
cup', from the table (where do I put it, I wonder? ) or that in inserting spelling-mistakes into 
my essay (surely a perverse activity), I have eliminated an entity called 'the absence of 
spelling mistakes' from my essay! It is true, as Nagärjuna says, that an absence is not an 
entity which can be relocated/eliminated. 
But, second, 'remove' can be used in a different sense, in relation to absences. To 
remove an absence means, I suggest, that an entity x exists where it did not exist/it was 
absent, before (rather than that there is an entity called'absence of entity Y which must be 
relocated or eliminated in order for entity x to exist). If I were to say that I remove the 
absence of a cup (admittedly, a rather unusual way of speaking), I would mean-- not that 
there is an entity called 'absence of cup' which I relocate/eliminate in order for the cup to 
exist but rather-- that the cup exists where previously it did not exist/it was absent. 
Similarly, the removal of darkness, an absence of light, by light means-- not that there is an 
entity called 'darkness' which is relocated/eliminated by light but rather-- that 
light exists 
where previously it did not exist/it was absent. So, when 'removal' is understood 
in this 
22NSBh 1,1,25, Jhä (trans) (1984), pp. 340-341 
23 VaidC 9, de la jig rten pa ni byis pa la sogs pa nas ba lang rdzi'i bar du'o/ 
dpyod pa po ni khyab jug dang 
dbang phyug dang tsbangs pa dang serskya dang 'ug pa dang rgyas pa 
danggnas jog dang b v'a ghra Bang 
¶byor ldan dang/gaga ra dang/ ma tha ra la cogs pa ste/de dag don gang 
la No mthun pa de ni dper rab tu 
grub payin no/ de la kbyab jug la cogs pa ni 'od med pa tram 
la mun par dod de/ ji lta zbe na ' 'od med pa 
ni mun pa'o zbes brjod pa i phyir ro/ 'di na mun pa yin te/snang 
ba med pa zhes h va ba'i don to%" 
de /tar 
gzhan dag dpyod pa po la mun pa zhes bya ba i dngos po ci 'dra 
ba zhig yod pa ym te/ su zhig 
Ia }ans. yod 
pa ma yin no/ de bas na mar mes mun pa bsal ba zhes bya ba 
di magrub pa yin no/ de'i phyirgang mar me 
ni m un pa sel bar byed pa'o/ zhes bya ba i dpe ni 'di rigs pa ma yin no/ 
de mi rigs pas dpe can Fi 
don tshad 
ma zhes bya ba ma grub pa yin no/de i phyir rang dang gzhan sgrub par 
byed pa'i tshad ma zhes ht i 
ba 
yod pa ma yin no/ As Tola and Dragonetti (1995a), p. 185 note, 
Vaid 9, the verse to which this 
commentary corresponds, appears to be a corruption of the 
Sanskrit. They offer a possible reconstruction 
of it. I have chosen to rely on the commentary, without reference to the verse. 
199 
second sense, illumination, i. e. the removal of darkness by light, is unproblematic. 
Nägarjuna's argument is therefore unsuccessful. 
At any rate, Nägärjuna's argument is irrelevant because, as I have argued already-, 
the language of self-illumination is metaphorical. It is not that light 'lights itself ' up', as it 
were. Rather, the real point of the metaphorof self-illumination is that light is self-C% ident. 
It is proved that there is light simply by the fact that an object has been illuminated. No 
further proof is necessary. In the case of self-illumination, the issue of whether or not 
illumination involves the removal of darkness is spurious, for the phenomenon which is 
being referred to, i. e. self-evidence, is not really a case of illumination at all. 
(3) Darkness and light are contradictories (gal ba). Thus, lamplight is without 
darkness (munpa medpa). But then, Nägärjuna asks, what is illuminated by lamplight 
when it illuminates itself? The point is, I think, that illumination only occurs if there is 
something previously unilluminated. As lamplight does not contain any darkness, i. e. 
anything previously unilluminated, it cannot illuminate itself. " 
(4) If light is a thing with the quality of self-luminosity, then darkness, as its 
opposite (phyin cilogpa), should have the opposite quality, i. e. the ability to conceal (sgrib 
pa) itself. Which is to say, just as light illuminates itself, darkness would conceal itself. In 
this case, the author says, darkness would be imperceptible (mi dmigs pa). Furthermore, 
Nägärjuna argues, a darkness which is conceals itself could not be illuminated by light, 
presumably because the light would not be able to find it! 
However, Nägärjuna contends, this is an absurd consequence (thal ba), because it is 
contradicted by common experience. Darkness is often perceived (as, for example, the 
darkness of the night-sky), and light is experienced as illuminating darkness. Therefore, it 
makes no sense to speak of darkness concealing itself; hence it cannot make sense to say 
that light is self-luminous. If xcan doythen the opposite of x must do the opposite ofy. If 
the opposite of x cannot do the opposite ofy, then x cannot do y. " 
Though expressed slightly differently, arguments (3) and (4) are in substance the 
Vaid 10, mar me ni bdag nyidgsal bar byedpa ma yin te/ mun pa med pa'i ph vir" 
VaidC 10, mar me ni rang 
gi bdag nyid kyanggsal bar byed pa ma yin no/ marme la nimun pa yod pa ma vin na ci zhig 
gsa/ bar bved 
de/ marme danggsal ba zhes bya ba don gcigpa yin no/de la mun pa yod pa ma yin 
to ýgal ba'i ph vir ro 
=` Vaid 11, phyin ci log tu thal bar gyur ba 1 phyir/ mun pa yang bdag nyid 
la sgrib par bved par :p -ur ro 
VaidC 11, gal te mar me rang dang gzhan gsal bar byedpa yin na 
dpe ci zhig la thob par gvur zhe na 
phyin ci log pa'i phyir m un pa yang bdag nyid la sgrib par byed par 
gyur ro/ gal to yang mun pa rang gi 
bdag nyid la sgrib par byed pa yin na de la m un pa mi dmigs pa thob par 
gyur ro su zhig /a brjod par b va 
zhe na/ mar mes bdag nyid danggzhan gsal bar byed par rang gis 
khas b/angs pai de'i 'dod pa la /tos nas 
gal to zhes bya ba'i sgra smos so/ mun pa yang Mag nyid kho nas 
bdag n yid sgnb pa na mar me de la gsal 
bar byedpar mi gyurro 
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same as arguments (1) and (3) respectively in the VV VV('. As such, the criticisms in the 
previous chapter which I have made of the arguments in the VV VVC apply here too. Note 
just how strange argument (4) is, however. It would entail that if one can talk of the speed 
of light one should be able to speak of the slowness of darkness. However, it is absurd to 
speak ofthe slowness of darkness, therefore one cannot speak ofthe speed of light! 
8.6. From The Critique of Intrinsic Establishment to 
Further Arguments. 
Verses 2-11, examined above, then, constitute a demonstration that pramäna-s and 
prameya-s are mutually established, in the sense that they exist in dependence upon one 
another (and thus, according to Nägärjuna, lack svabhäva), and that they are not 
intrinsically established, i. e. they are not validated independently of the prameya-s. 
Having concluded his examination of the issue of the intrinsic validation of the 
pramäna-s, in verses 12-20 of the Vaid/Va1dC Nägärjuna presents a series of general 
arguments which criticize the Nyäya theory of pramäna-s and prameya-s. I shall examine 
these arguments, and attempt to evaluate them. (A task which, I might add, is not aided by 
the laconic and obscure nature ofNägärjuna'spresentation of his points). 
8.7. Thepramana-s andprameya-s are Not Established in 
the ThreeTimes (dusgsum du tshad madanggzhal bya 
dag magrub pa ). 
This is an argument which is presented, in a somewhat different form, by a 
(possibly Mädhyamika) opponent in the NS. 27 It also appears, in a very similar form to the 
argument in the Vaid/VaidC, in the *Dvädasanikäyasästra, attributed to Nägärjuna. 28 
The argument, as it occurs in the Vaid/VaidC, is as follows. If there are pramäna-s 
and the prameya-s, they must be mutually dependent. Mutual dependence is a form of 
causation. Causation occurs in time. Which is to say that the pramäna must occur: 
(i) 
prior to (saga rol) the prameya, (ii) subsequent to (phyis) the prameya, or (iii) at the same 
time as (cigcardu) the prameya. But (i), (ii), and (iii) are all impossible. 29 (Impossible 
if the 
"Thanks are due to Dr. P Williams for pointing this out to me. 
"SeeNSH, 1,8-11. 
'See Cheng (1982) (trans), pp. 101-103. Lindtner (1982), p. 11 argues that the 
* Dvädasanik vasasýa, which 
survives only in Chinese, is 'decidedly spurious' 
19 Vaid 12, tshad ma danggzhal bya dagni dusgsum du magrub po// VaidC 
12, tshad ma nigzbal bva i don las 
saga rol du äm phyis sam/ tshad ma dang gzhal bya dag cig car 




pramäna-s and prameya-s have svabbäva? See my discussion below). Therefore, the 
pramäna-s and prameya-s do not exist (with svabbävP). 
How does Nagärjuna argue that (i), (ii) and (iii) are impossible? 
(i) If the pramäna occurs prior to its prameya it would not in fact be a pramäna. 
Knowledge-episodes are intentional, i. e. they must have objects of which the` are the 
knowledge-episodes. But there would be no object of which the pramäna would be the 
pramäna. As the opponent in the NSexpresses this point, if the pramäna existed before the 
prameya, then perception (pratyaksa), for example, would not be produced by connection 
(sannikarsa) of the sense-organ (indriya) with the object (artha). That is, the pramäna 
would exist without its object, which is absurd. 30 
(ii) If the pramäna occurs after the prameya, then the pramäna would be unarisen at 
the time that the prameya is arisen. But a pramäna which has not yet arisen cannot be the 
pramäna of an arisen prameya. What is unarisen simply cannot abide together with (than 
cigmignaspa), i. e. be in relation to, what is arisen. Only things which have arisen already 
can be in relation to one another. Nägarjuna says that if an unarisen pramäna were asserted 
to be the pramäna of an arisen prameya, then a horn of a rabbit could be a pramäna! 3' This 
analogy seems to be making the (rather obvious) point that an unarisen pramäna is actually 
non-existent, and it is absurd that a non-existent could be the pramäna of a prameya. 
Thus, the consequence of the position that the pramäna occurs after the prameya is 
that the prameya exists without a pramäna. But this is impossible, because, the intended 
object relies on the intentional cognition just as much as the intentional cognition relies on 
the intended object. There is no such thing as an object of knowledge without a 
knowledge-episode which cognizes it . 
I stress here, once again, the ambiguity of this assertion. Does it mean (i) that the 
object in its quality of'being known' is dependent upon the knowledge-episode or (ii) that 
the knowledge-episode itself is constitutive of the object known? Surely Nägärjuna's 
argument only establishes (i), which is a trivial finding. One suspects that 
Nägärjuna 
actually means that (ii) is the case. But his argument does not in fact prove this point. 
Nägärjuna is either stating something so obvious as to be uninteresting 
(viz. that the'being 
'0 VaidC 12, de la gal te tshad ma gzhal bya i don las snga rol du yin na ni gang gis na 
de tsbad mar briod par býa 
ba gzhal bya i don yodpa ma yin pa ganggis tshad ma yin zhing cizhig tsbad mas ages 
par by ed/ S ee a Iso 
NS 1 11,9 purvam hi pramänasiddhau nendrryärthasannikarsä1Pratyaksotpattih/i 
" VaidC 12, 
ý'on 
te pltyis nas yin na gzhal bya yod pa la ci zhig tshad mar 
gyur/ ma skves pa ni sk ý es pa 'i tshad 
mar 'thad pa ma yin te/ ri bonggi rva la sogs pa yang tshad ma nyid 
du thal bar gyur pai ph vir dang ma 
skyes pa dang skyespa dag Than cig mi gnas pa'i yang pbyir ro, 
"See also NS U. 1,10, pascätsiddhau na 
pramanebbyah prameyasiddhih// 
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known' of an object requires and cannot exist prior to the knowing of this object) or 
something neither obvious nor at all substantiated by Nägärjuna's argument (viz. that an 
object which is known cannot exist prior to the knowing of this object). 
At any rate, positions (i) and (ii) are (according to Nägärjuna) impossible because, 
on account of their mutual dependence, the pramäna cannot exist prior to, i. e. without, the 
prameya, and the prameya cannot exist prior to, i. e. without, the pramäna. This Would 
seem to imply, therefore, that they are simultaneous. But Nägärjuna explains that this 
cannot be the case either: 
(iii) If the pramänaand the prameya were to exist at the same time, then they would 
not be mutually dependent, because mutual dependence is a relation of causation, and 
simultaneous entities cannot cause one another. Nägärjuna gives the analogy of the two 
horns of the ox, which arise together but do not cause one another.,, In order for one entity 
to cause another entity, it must exist prior to the caused entity. (This certainly rules out 
certain notions of causation, such as, for example, Aristotle's final cause). A is the cause of 
ywhen yis a result of x. But results necessarily follow, i. e. exist at a later time than, that of 
which they are the results. But, as we have seen, a pramäna cannot exist at a later time than 
aprameya, and neither can a prameyaexist at a later time than a pramäna. 
The most obvious weakness in this argument against the simultaneity of pramäna 
and prameya is that it employs a very restrictive notion of causation, viz. as a temporal 
series. A cause must be prior to the effect which it produces. Thus a cause must not be 
simultaneous with its effect. But this argument is unconvincing, because it may well be 
that causation can in fact occur in some cases without temporal succession. Some entities 
may be effects, i. e. depend upon their causes, without those causes preceding them. That 
this is the case is certainly recognized by the Abdhidharma. According to the AKBh, for 
example, simultaneous mutual causation (sahabbühetu) is one of the six types of causes 
(hetu). The Päli Abhidhamma also accepts the sahajäta paccaya (the simultaneous 
condition) and says that it has a reciprocal (annamarý' a) form. According to 
both the 
32 VaidC 12, 'on to cig car ba yin na de yang srid pa ma yin te/ dper na ba langgi rva cig car sk es pa 
da` rsý vu 
dang 'bras burmi 'tbadpa bzhin no/Compare the Chung-lunonMMK XI, 5, which uses the same analog 
(in a different context) of the horns of the ox. 'For there to be death in the moment of 
birth is not correct It 
they arose simultaneously they would be independent of each other, 
just as an ox's horns growing 
simultaneously are independent of each other. ' (Translation in Bocking (1995), p. 
215). 
Compare also NS 11,1,11, yugapatsiddhau pratyarthaniyatah' tkramavrttitv-, 
bhävo buddhinäm 
Here, the opponent says that, if the pramäna and prameya were established simultaneously 
Uugapar). 
cognitions (buddhi) would not be successive (kramavrttitva), 
because there would be 
connection/restriction to every object (pratyarthaniyatva, see Monier-Williams 
(1899, p 552 664). 1 am 
not sure how to understand this passage. Clearly, however, this argument against 
the simultaneity of the 
pramäna and prameya is different than that presented in the I aid/VaidCby 
Nägariuna. 
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Vaibhäsika and Theravdda traditions, such simultaneous mutual causation is typified b\ 
the four great elements (mahäbhüta), which cannot exist apart from one another. Thou. h 
the Sautrdntikas did not accept reciprocal causation, they did admit that non-reciprocal, 
simultaneous causation occurs (as between, for example, the sense organ and its 
corresponding consciousness). 
" 
-- Nägärjuna is, then, out on a limb when he says that 
simultaneous causation is impossible. But he provides no justification (other than the 
implausible analogy of cows' horns) for his unusual and far from self-evident assertion. 
In fact, it appears to me to be entirely plausible that the pramäna and prameva do 
exist, in one sense at least, in mutual dependence and simultaneously. For the 
knowledge-episode must have an object of knowledge in order to be known, and an object, 
in order to bean object of knowledge, must be the object of a knowledge-episode. (Which 
does not, I stress, prove that there is no object which exists independently of its being an 
object of knowledge. I would argue that the prameya, understood as the object which is 
known (as opposed to its being known) can (in many cases) exist before, simultaneously 
with, and after the knowledge-episode. A tree, for example, can exist before, 
simultaneously with, and after the knowledge of it. ). It seems, then, that the notion of 
simultaneous causation in this respect is quite unproblematic. It certainly is not refuted by 
simply pointing out that cows' horns exist simultaneously and are not causes of one 
another! 
Nägärjuna's argument thus seems very dubious indeed. But what precisely does 
Nägärjuna intend to demonstrate by means of this argument? It would seem that his 
position is that the pramäna-s and the prameya-s do not exist at all. For he appears to have 
denied even the possibility of simultaneous, mutually dependent pramäna-s and 
prameya-s. He seems to claim that pramäna-s and prameya-s cannot exist, even in mutual 
dependence. Nägärjuna appears to argue that the occurrence of pramäna-s and prameya-s 
is impossible. 
This is certainly how the Mädhyamika argument that the pramäna-s and prameva-s 
are not established in the three times is understood by the opponent in the Vaid4'aidC 
The Naiyäyika opponent in the Vaid/Va1dC gives two refutation', which I shall now 
"See AKBh II, 49-50. Karunadasa (1967), pp. 131-132. 
'41fthe Naiydyika rejects the argument that the pramäna-s and prameya-s are not established 
in the three times, 
does he think that the pramäna is before, after or simultaneous with the prameya. 
Vätsväyana, in the 
NSBfi, gives an interesting answer. He says that there is'no restriction' on whether 
the pramäna comes 
into existence before, after or simultaneously with the prameya Whether the pramäna 
is before, after. or 
simultaneous with the prameya varies from case to case. Thus, (i) the pramäna can 
be before the 
prameya. The sun shines and subsequently things (e. g. flowers) come 
into existence. Here, Vätsväyana 
claims, the sun is the means, i. e. the pramäna, by which the flowers, 
i. e. the prameya, can be appehended 
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examine. 
8.7.1. The First Naiyayika Objection. 
If the pramäna-s and the prameya-s are non-existent, because they cannot be 
established in relation to one another in the three times, then surely, the opponent contends, 
Nägärjuna must claim that he has a knowledge-episode that this is the case. But then. 
Nägärjuna contradicts himself, because he has claimed both that knowledge-episodes and 
their objects do not exist, and that he has a knowledge-episode, arrived at by a correct 
inference, that there are no knowledge-episodes and objects of knowledge-episodes. As 
the Naiyäyika says, Nägärjuna's negation of the pramäna-s, which itself has the character 
of a pramäna, should itself be impossible in the three times. " 
I think that this objection is sound, if Nägärjuna is indeed claiming that the 
pramäna-s and prameya-s do not exist. The assertion that there is a knowledge-episode 
that there are no knowledge-episodes is self-contradictory. If, as is suggested in the NS". 
the Mädhyamika will attempt to avoid the problem by excepting this one 
knowledge-episode from the general rule, then this is arbitrary. Why should the 
knowledge-episode that there are no knowledge-episodes be excepted by the Mädhyamika 
from the general impossibility of temporal relation between the knowledge-episode and its 
object? It is incumbent upon the Mädhyamika to explain how this temporal relation is 
by a knowledge-episode, e. g. a perception. I can see the flowers because the sun shines. The sun, which 
here is a pramäna, exists prior to its prameya, i. e. the flowers. (ii) the pramana can be after the prameya. 
A newly lit lamp is the means, i. e. the pramäna, by which things already existent become perceptible. For 
example, the table exists and then is lit up, enabling a perceptual knowledge-episode to occur. (iii) the 
pramäna and the prameya can be simultaneous. For example, the smoke is the means, the pramäna by 
which, in an inference, one apprehends the fire, i. e. the prameya. Here the means of knowledge exists at 
the same time as the object known. The smoke does not exist before the fire, nor does the fire exist before 
the smoke. 
Vätsyäyana's argument here is intriguing. He obviously construes the terms'pramänd and'pramevd 
in a very broad sense. He does not mean by 'pramäna' the knowledge-episode itself. Rather, 
he means 
any factor, such as the light of the sun, which causes a knowledge-episode to occur. He 
does not mean by 
'prameya' the 'being known' of an entity. Rather, the prameya is the entity itself irrespective of whether 
it 
is presently being known. Vätsyäyana seems happy to call the table, for example, a prameya, . khich 
exists before its pramäna (the newly lit lamp), even though the table cannot 
be apprehended by a 
knowledge-episode, e. g. a perception, until the pramana occurs. The table is a prameya when 
it has not yet 
been apprehended, when it is being apprehended, and when it is no longer being apprehended 
See 4VSBh 
11,1,11, Jhä (trans) (1984), pp. 610-613. 
Vaid 13, dusgsum du tshadma danggzhal bya dagma grub pas gagpa mi 'thad do// t'aidC13, 
dusgsum du 
tshad ma dang gzhal bya dag ma grub par 'dodpa de i phyir khyod kyis 
brood pa' tshad ma dang gzhal 
bya'i 'gag pa gang yin pa de yang dgagpar bya ba i don las saga rol du'am ph vis nas sam 
cirj caryln , 'rang 
na gag pa de yang dus gsum du mi grub ste... See also 
11,1,12-13, traikäh'3siddheh 
pratisedhänupapatiih// sarvapramänapratisedhäcca pratisedhäsiddhifi// 
See also NSBh 11,1,12-1 ', and 
NSVII, 1,12-13, Jhä (trans) (1984), pp. 619-626. 
16See NS II, 1,14, tatprämänye vä na sarvapramänapratisedhah// See also NSBh 
11,1,14 and VSV 11,1.14. Ad 
(trans) (1984), pp. 627-628. 
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possible in this special case, and this he cannot do, of course, without contradicting hi; own 
reasoning that the pramdpa-s and prameya-s are not established in the three times. 
The unconvincing response given to this problem by Nägarjuna in the Vaid [ aidC 
is that the opponent's objection commits the fallacy (skyon) of previous acceptance (: ngar 
khas blangspa). In other words, according to Nägärjuna, the opponent argues: 
Premiss,: The pramäna-s and prameya-s cannot be established in the three 
times. 
Premiss2: The cognition (the pramäna-s and the prameya-s cannot be 
established in the three times) is itself a pramäna. 
Conclusion: Therefore, the cognition (the pramäna-s and the prameya-s cannot 
be established in the three times) cannot itself be established in the three times. 
Thus, if the cognition (the pramdna-s and the prameya-s cannot be established 
in the three times) is true, it is false. 
Nägärjuna claims that the opponent first accepts premiss i. e. that the pramäna-s 
and prameya-s cannot be established in the three times, before proceeding to refute it. And, 
Nägärjuna says, in that the Naiyäyika first accepts premiss the debate is finished (rtsodpa 
rdzogspa)! Which is to say that Nägärjuna's position, i. e. that the pramäna-s and the 
prameya-s cannot be established in the three times, is established. " 
But this argument is pure sophistry. The Naiyäyika does not acceptpremiss,, i. e. 
that the pramäna-s and prameya-s are not established in the three times. On the contrary, 
the Naiyäyika argument is intended to point out the undesirable consequences for 
Nägärjuna of Nägärjuna's own acceptance of this premiss. The Naiyäyika is engaging 
here in tarka, i. e. in a reductlo adabsurdum. (See 6.2.2 fora discussion of tarka). That is, If 
one were to accept, as (apparently) does Nägärjuna (and as certainly the Naiyäyika himself 
does not), that the pramäna-s and prameya-s are not established in the three times, then the 
" Vaid 14-15, dgagpa grub na tshad ma danggzbal bya yanggrub po zer ba ni ma yin to/sngar 
khas blangs p3'i 
phyirro//gal te tshadma danggzhal bya dagmagrub parkbas blangspa yin na ni khas blangs pa 
dang dus 
mnyam pa kho nar rtsod pa rdzogs pa yin no// VaidC 14-15, dus gsum gyi brtag pas 
dgag pas na tshad ma 
dang gzbal bya dag go zhes smras pa de ni ma yin no/ gang las she na/ sngar 
khas blangs pa'i ph. vir te 
sngar nyid kbyod kyis tsbad ma danggzbal bya dag dus gsum du ma grub po'zhes 
khas blangs p. 7, phI " 
nasni di skyon byung ba mthongnas/ de jigpas gagpa yangmi grub po zhes yongs su 
brtag s te smras pa 
ma yin no/ ji Ita zbe na/ yongs su tshim pa lba rnams dga' ba kbyod kyisgang 91' tshe 
kho nar tshad ma 
danggzbal bya dag dusgsum du ma grub pa yin na dgag pa dang gog par byed pa'i tshig 
k. i'ang ma gru b po 
zhes smras par byed pa de'i tshekbo narranggi skyon spang bar dod pa 
khyod k vis tshad ma danggzhal 
bya dag med parkhas blangs pa ma yin nam/ tshad ma danggzhal bya 
dag med pa'i ph ti 'ir gag pa di i: anL! 
yin zbes smra bar byed/ ganggi pbyir tshadma danggzhal bya dag med pa 
de kbas blangs nas ph vi na, 
gagpa gogparbyed pa i phyirdangpo khas blangspa na rtsodpa rdzogs pa vin no, 
I 
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knowledge-episode, i. e. pramäna, that the pramäna-s and the prameý a-s are not 
established in the three times would be impossible. But Na-gärjuna claims that he knoýti s, 
i. e. has a pramäna, that the pramäna-s and the prameya-s are not established in the three 
times. Nägärjuna's position entails that Nagarjuna is caught in a paradox. i. e. a 
contradiction. " The Naiyäyika is surely right here, ifNagärjuna is in fact claiming that he 
knows that there are no pramäna-s and prameya-s. 
Nägarjuna might, I suppose, try to solve this problem by claiming that he does not 
in fact deny that the pramäna-s and prameya-s exist. Rather, he negates a particular notion 
of how it is that they exist. He might say, then, that he negates only the notion that 
pramäna-s and prameya-s exist with svabhäva. Thus, the knowledge-episode that 
knowledge-episodes and their objects are not established in the three times is possible 
because it is in fact a knowledge-episode without svabhäva (but a knowledge-episode 
nonetheless) that knowledge-episodes with svabhäva and their objects with svabhäva do 
not exist in the three times. His refutation that pramäna-s and prameya-s can be 
established in the three times is not a refutation of pramäna-s and prameya-s perse, but of 
the compatibility of their mutual dependence with the possession of svabhäva. This is, of 
course, an attractive solution; it appears to get the Mädhyamika out of his paradox. 
However, this explanation is far from unproblematic. In the Vaid 'ti'aidC 
Nägärjuna does not make explicit that the argument that the pramäna-s and prameya-s are 
not established in the three times is intended to refute the existence with svabhäva of 
pramäna-s and prameya-s. Instead he resorts to the previously mentioned and completely 
sophistical accustation that the Naiyäyika objection commits the fallacy of previous 
acceptance. If the author of the Vaid/VaidCthinks that he refutes only the existence with 
svabhäva of pramäna-s and prameya-s by means of the argument from the three times why 
does he not say so? 
Nevertheless, earlier in the Vaid/VaidC, as I have explained, Nägärjuna advocates 
that the pramäna-s and prameya-s are mutually dependent, and that this mutual 
dependence entails that they do not have svabhäva. Perhaps, then, the argument that the 
18SeeNSVII, 1,12, Ad (trans) (1984), pp. 620-621. Uddyotakara's opponent states that, 
'by urging that'denial 
is not possible, as it cannot be connected with any of the three points of time, ' you admit 
(the force of our 
argument and contention) that'as they cannot be connected with any of the three points of 
time, perception 
and the rest cannot be regarded as pramina' This is essentially the fallacy of previous acceptance, 
of 
which Nägärjuna, in the Vaidand VaidC, accuses the Naiyäyika. Uddyotakara responds 
that, 'This does 
not affect our position, we reply; as all that we mean by urging this argument 
is to show that sour view 
involves a self-contradiction on your part; what we are urging is that you are open 
to the charge that the 
reasoning that you have put forward goes directly against your own view; and we 
do not admit the 
validity of that reasoning... '. I am strongly inclined to agree with Uddyotakara 
here. 
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pramäna-s and prameya-s are not established in the three times' s simply meant to support 
this position. " 
But there is a further problem. Why would the pramäna-s and pramey a-s which 
exist without svabhäva escape Nägärjuna's argument from the three times, whereas the 
pramäpa-s and prameya-s which exist with svabhäva are (supposedly) refuted by this same 
argument? It would appear that, if Nägärjuna's argument from the three times ere 
successful, it would apply equally to pramäna-s and prameya-s which have st-abhäta. and 
to pramäna-s and prameya-s which do not have svabhäva. That is to say, even a pramana 
without svabhäva would not-- according to Ndgärjuna's argument-- be able to exist prior 
to, after, or at the same time as a prameya without svabhäva. Thus, even pramäna-s and 
prameya-s which exist without svabhäva would not be established in the three times. Must 
not Nagarjuna's arguments apply equally well (or badly) to pramäna-s and prameva-s 
which exist with svabhäva and pramäna-s and prameya-s which exist without sv abadc a? 
In which case, either his argument from the three times is unsuccessful and refutes neither 
pramäna-s and prameya-s which exist with svabhäva nor pramäna-s and prameya-s which 
exist without svabbäva, or else his argument from the three times is successful and refutes 
both pramana-s and prameya. s which exist with svabhäva and pramana-s and prameya-s 
which exist without svabbäva. The exception of pramana-s and prameya-s without 
svabhäva from the refutation would be arbitrary. 
Even if an explanation were possible of why, unlike pramäna-s and prameya-s with 
svabbäva, pramäna-s and prameya-s without svabbäva escape the argument from the three 
times, I suspect that the notion that there are pramäna-s and prameya-s without svabhä va 
is untenable. As I have already explained (see chapter 4), Nägärjuna's philosophy of 
prajnaptimatra, according to which everything is a conceptual construct, reduces to 
nihilism. Nägärjuna may want to avoid nihilism by refuting only the existence "it 
h 
svabbavaof knowledge-episodes and their objects. But if everything lacks svabhä c a, i. e. 
is 
prajnaptisat, this would seem to entail nihilism nevertheless, i. e. despite 
Nägärjuna's 
intentions. 
In which case, the opponent's objection still stands. If no knowledge-episodes exist 
Mention should also be made of VVC 69. Nägärjuna makes it clear here that the negation 
in the three times 
negates the svabhäva of all entities. yastrikälapratisedhaväcl heturesa eva 
srlnyatävädinäm praptah 
sarvabhävasvabhävapratisedbakatvänna bhavatah... etena kramena svabhävapratisedho 
'pi siddhah It 
seems, then, that Nägärjuna (here at least) thinks that he is able to negate 
because he negates only the 
svabhäva of all entities, not their existence per se. That is, his negation negates 
the svabhäva of all 
entities, and is itself without svabhäva. It is not that his negation negates 
the existence per se of all 
entities, and is itself without existence perse(which would obviously 
be incoherent). 
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(because everything lacks svabbäva, i. e. is prajdaptisat), it is impossible that ti'agärjuna 
should have the knowledge-episode that no knowledge-episodes (and objects of 
knowledge) exist. It just will not work to say that Nägarjuna refutes-- not the existence of 
pramäna-s and prameya-s but rather-- only the existence with svabhäva of prarnana-s and 
prameya-s. 
8.7.2. The Second Naiyäyika Objection. 
It is impossible to negate the non-existent, the opponent claims. This is a statement 
of the Naiyäyika position that negation (pratisedha) is never absolute, but is al\iavs 
parasitical upon the existence of what is negated. Negation is always negation of an entity 
at a particular time and/or place, and always implies that the entity negated (or at least, in 
the case of fictional entities, its components) exists somewhere else and/or at some other 
time (see 6.4.2). 
Thus, the opponent claims, in order to negate (by the argument from the three 
times) the pramäna-s and prameya-s, Nägärjuna must accept their existence. The claim 
that the pramäna and prameya do not exist is always a limited and implicative negation: It 
is limited to a specific place and/or time, and implies that pramäna-s and prameya-s do 
exist at some other place and/or time. 40 
However, Nägärjuna rejects this account. He argues, in effect, that there is a 
non-implicative negation of (the svabhäva of? ) pramäna-s and prameya-s. It is, in other 
words, possible, according to Nägärjuna, to negate without the entailment that the object 
of negation exists somewhere else and/or at some other time. He says that this. is possible 
because the negation (gagpa) of the (svabhäva of? ) pramäna-s and prameya-s is simply of 
a concept (rtogpa). 
Nägärjuna gives the analogy of a man who becomes afraid (jigs par gyur 
ba) 
because he wrongly thinks that a river(cbu) is deep (gtingring). This concept 
(b/o) that the 
river is deep maybe negated when he is informed that the river is in fact not 
deep. There is 
not a deep river, yet the negation is still possible, because it removes a misunderstanding, 
a 
misconception. Similarly, it is the concept of the (svabhäva of') pramäna-s and 
the 
w VaidC 13, 
... 
dgag par bya ba med pa'i phyirji /tarkhyod kyi tshig 
kyang gag par bved par 'gý'ur zhinr. ý 
ji 1t. 1 r 
na de 'i dgagpagrubpar gyur/ VaidC15, ... 
dgagparbyedpamed na gagpazhes bva ha med.... 
also the opponent's statement in the VVthat there is no absolute negation, i. e. 
that the negation of an object 
implies the existence of the object negated. VV 11, sata ev a pratisedho nästi ghatogeha 
it1 avam yasm3t 
drsta/i pratisedho yam satah svabhävasya to tasmät// VVC 11, ... pratisedhah 
knvate näsatah See also 
NSV II, 1,12, Ad (trans) (1984), p. 623. 
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prameya-s which Nägärjuna negates. ' 
The point appears to be that there is a wrong idea that there are pramäna-s ind 
prameya-s (with svabhäva? ). Nägärjuna simply makes it known that this concept is wrong. 
Nägärjuna is, by contrast with the Naiyäyika theory, presenting an account of negation, 
according to which a negation does not imply that the entity negated occurs as anything 
more than a concept. The purpose of the negation is simply to dispel the concept, i. e. to 
make known that the concept does not refer at any time or place. '' 
However, the question arises again, does Nägärjuna intend that the negation is of 
the pramäna-s and prameya-s perse? In this case, as I have already explained, Nägärjuna is 
left with a paradox, viz. that he has a pramäna that there are not pramäna-s and prameya-s. 
It would also contradict Nägärjuna's earlier assertion that the pramäna-s and prameti a-s 
are established, i. e. exist, through mutual dependence. 
Perhaps, then, Nägärjuna negates the false conception of the svabhäva of the 
pramäna-s and prameya-s, rather than the very existence of the pramäna-s and prarneya-s. 
It is, then, the negation of the concept of svabhäva which Nägärjuna claims is 
non-implicative. That is, there is nothing whatsoever to which this concept of svabhäl a 
refers. (However, even this interpetation does not work finally, I think, because, as I have 
already emphasized, universal existence without svabhäva, i. e. universal conceptually 
constructed existence, reduces to complete non-existence. The paradox re-appears). 
Nevertheless, Nägärjuna does not in fact state here that he intends to negate totally only the 
svabhäva of pramäna-s and prameya-s. Where intentions are not explicit, the interpreter 
can do no more than offer plausible explanations. 
41 VaidC16, dgagparbyedpamedna gagpazhesbyabameddozhena/denimayinte/Vaid16, ma grubpa'i 
rtog pa spong ba yin no//VaidC 16, 'di Ita ste dperna chu skiing tugting ring ba ma yin pa la' gong ring 
ha i 
blo dang mngon par ldan zhing jigs par gyur ba la de i jigs pa'i dogs pa spang bai 
don du gzhan de shes 
pas Vila ch ugting ring ba yod pa ma yin no/ zhes smra ba ni de med pa lade 'i blo gsal 
ba'i don du ' had pa 
yin pa i phyir dgag bya med pa la yang dgag bya brjod pa las dgagpa byedpa yin no/ gzhan yang gal 
to 
mtshungs pa'i skyon khas len na mtshungs pa'i skyon khas blangspa nyidkyis rtsodpa rdzogs pa yin no, 
zheskhas blangs nassmra bar'dod par bya'o/ 
'See the analogy given at VVC 64, in which Nägdrjuna compares his negation, 'the svabhäva of entities 
does 
not exist' (nästi svabhävo bhavänam), to the negation, stated to someone who thinks that'Devadatta 
is in 
the house', that'Devadatta is not in the house. ' The negation'Devadatta 
is not in the house' makes known 
(jfapayat) that Devadatta is not in the house (asambhavamgrhe devadattasaya). 
Similarly, the negation 
'the svabhävaof entities does not exist' makes known that entities do not 
in fact have st ahhd va. Thus the 
negation of the non-existent is possible. That is, there is no svabbävawhatsoever of 
any entities. yet the 
negation is necessary in order to remove the misunderstanding 
in people's minds that entities 
do have 
svabhäva. The occurrence of this similar argument and analogy in the 
V[C which states explicit' that it 
is the svabhävaof entities which Nagärjuna negates, might support the 
interpretation that'A hat the author 
of the Vaid/VaidC intends to negate the concept of the svabhäva of pramäna-s 
and prame1 a-s. rather 
than pramäna-s and prameya-s perse. 
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8.8. The Analysis of the Perception of a Pot. 
The Naiyäyika opponent argues that the pramäna apprehends the prame< <i. and this 
is consequently attested by the confirmatory behaviour of the prameva. Thus, there is a 
prameya which is correctly cognized by, and which consequently attests the accurac\ of', 
the pramäna. This is, then, a statement of the Naiyäyika theory of pramär, a-s and 
prameya-s, according to which the pramäna ascertains the prameya as it exists 
independently of the mind. That it does so is demonstrated when the object cognized acts 
in accordance with the way in which it has been apprehended. ' 
Nagärjuna's response is that although (kyang) the pramäna-s, perceptions, etc 
might exist, the object of knowledge (prameya) cannot be admitted ('thadpa ma yin). He 
then says, in the commentary, that if the pramäna-s existed (tshad ma rnams ni grub na), 
there would have to be an object of knowledge! ' The point appears to be, that, given that 
the object of knowledge cannot be admitted, therefore, there are no knowledge-episodes. 
That is, even if one were to admit the existence of pramäna-s, their corresponding 
prameya-s could not occur. Thus, in fact, there are no pramäna-s. I think that what 
Nägärjuna means is that there is no mind-independent object of knowledge, i. e. no object 
of knowledge with svabhäva, and thus it is wrong to claim, as do the Naiyäyikas, that there 
are knowledge-episodes which mirror a mind-independent state of affairs. But what is 
Nägärj una's argument? 
Nägärjuna gives the example of the perception (mngon sum) of the pot (bum pa). 
There is, Nägärjuna says, a perception of a pot, it is true. However, the perception of the 
pot is not of a mind-independent entity. What are initially perceived, he claims, are the 
various sense-objects (don). They are apprehended by means of their corresponding 
sense-organs (dbang po). Thus, for example, the sight sense-organ (mig gi dbang po) 
perceives the colour sense-object. Furthermore, this perception of the colour sense-object 
itself depends on conditions (rkyen la Itos pa), such as light (snang ba). 
" Redness. for 
example, is only perceived if there is light by means of which the sense-organ can 
"Vaid 17, mngon sum la Sogs pa ni yod pa yin te/ gang las zhe na/ yang 
dag pa rtogs pa'i phyir ro// t 'aidC 17, 
'dirningon sum gyi don la dmigs nas bya ba dang bya ba ma yin pa'i yon tan sties pa yang 
dag par rto !s par 
gyurro/ Ihagma rnamskyang, de bzhin no/ de t phyir tshad ma danggzbal 
bya yod do... 
Vaid 18, mngon sum la cogs pa grub kyanggzhal bya ni 'thad pa ma yin no// 
VaidC 18, de ni khas blangs na 
brjod par bya ste/ mngon sum la cogs pa' tshad ma reams nigrub na gzban gzbal 
bya'i don gang zhig yin 
pa smroszhig/ 
VaidC 18, ganggiPbYit bum Pa nYid mitgon sum yin gYi bumPa ni ma yin todbang 
po la rab tu ph vt s! s P3 i 
don gang yin pa de ni mngon sum yin par byas nas/ miggi dbang po 
la dbangpoibrda hº 3s la de la rah tu 
phyogs pa t don gang yin pa de ni mngon sum yin zhing de yang snang 
ba la sogs pa r rkti en la ltos pa ste 
dephyir bum pa la sogspa nyidmngon sum duyongs su grub pa yin na 
tshad ma de gang gi. in p,? 
don,. 
[don ? ]gzhal byargyurpa de gangzhigyin par gyur/ 
? 11 
apprehend it. (The point here seems to be that the perception of a sense-object requires 
further conditions in addition to the sense-organ and the sense-object). 
Ndgärjuna seems to be making a distinction between two types or stages of 
perception. First, there is the perception of various sense-objects, such as colour, by means 
of the respective sense-organs (along with certain other conditions, such as light, in the 
case of vision). Second, there is the perception of the pot. This second stage is a sv'nthesi s 
or construction by the mind on the basis of the sensed objects. thus. the 
knowledge-episode of the pot does not mirror a mind-independent state of affairs. The 
same is true about inferences, comparisons and verbal testimony about the pot. The,, will, 
like the perception of the pot, be inferences, comparisons, and verbal testimonies about a 
pot which is conceptually constructed on the basis of sense-objects. "This 
appears to be a re-statement of the basic Abhidharma position. What is 
initially apprehended are various aggregations of rzlpadharma-s. For example, 
aggregations of colour dharma-s, aggegations of tactile dharma-s, etc. These 
rüpadharma-s are apprehended by their respective sense-organs, which produces the 
corresponding sense-consciousness. An aggregation of colour dharma-s, for example, is 
apprehended by a visual sense-organ, which produces a visual sense-consciousness. An 
aggregation of sound dbarma-s is apprehended by a hearing organ, which produces an 
instance of auditory consciousness. And so on. 
The sense-organs and their respective objects are called the twelve äyatana-s 
(visual organ and colour (and, according to some, shape)", hearing organ and sound, nasal 
organ and smell, taste organ and taste, touch organ and touch, and mental organ and mental 
objects), whereas these twelve äyatana-s together with their six corresponding 
consciousnesses (visual consciousness, auditory consciousness, olfactory consciousness, 
gustatory consciousness, tactile consciousness, and mental consciousness) are named the 
eighteen dhätu-s. 48 
This is how I interpret the following cryptic comment, at any rate. VaidC 18, 
de bzhin du me danc du ba la 
a 'brel pa las mngon sum sngon du gro ba can des su dpagpa yin no/ de na rjes su 
dpag paishes pa sk ,e SP 
nayangganggiderjessudpagpargyur/rjessudpagparbyaba'idongzhangangzhigyinpar'g 
urnlhag 
ma layangde bzltin no/For an alternative reading, see Tola and Dragonetti 
(1995a), pp. 112-113 
"The Vaibhäsika Abhidharma claims that the visual organ apprehends 
both colour and shape. The 
Sauträntikas and Theravädins, by contrast, say that the visual organ apprehends only 
colour. Shape or 
figure (samsthäna) has, according to the Sautrdntikas, a conceptuall", constructed 
existence 
(prajfaptisat). This is because, otherwise, shape would be apprehended 
by both the visual and the tactile 
organ, which would violate the principle that each sense-organ 
has an exclusive objective 
domain. (For 
example, the visual organ cannot apprehend a sound, the nasal organ cannot 
apprehend a colour, etc). 
SeeAKBh IV, 3a-3c, Karunadasa (1967), pp. 49-52, Matilal (1986), pp. 
250-254 
/BFor the dh3tu-s and äyatana-s see AKBh I. See also Karunadasa (1967), p. 
34-55. Matilal (1986). P 241 
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The Abhidharma position states that perceptions of the mind-independent ýý orld 
are of aggregations of atomic particles. Thus, there is a mind-independent world, but it is 
not the world of pots, mountains, and trees which one ordinarily experiences. Rather, it is 
the world of imperceptible atomic particles which, in aggregation, may be perceived as 
colours, sounds, smells, etc. The world of tables, mountains, and trees, etc is constructed 
by the mind on the basis of the apprehended aggregations of dharma-s. One has 
perceptions of pots, mountains, and trees, but such perceptions are a product, not onl\ of 
the aggregates of dbarma-s, but also of the mind's constructive activity on the basis of the 
aggregates of dbarma-s. The world of ordinary perception is built-up by the mind on the 
basis of these irreducible particles. 49 
Thus, the pot is not an object of knowledge in the sense in which the Naiyäyikas use 
the term object of knowledge. That is, it is not an entity which exists mind-independently. 
Consequently, there can not be a knowledge-episode of it, if one means by a 
knowledge-episode, as do the Naiyäyikas, a mirroring of a mind-independent state of 
affairs. 
(The Naiyäyika will of course object to this explanation. For him the 
mind-independent world is a much richer place than that envisaged by the Abhidharmika. 
The mind-independent world includes, not only atomic particles which cluster together 
(which, the Naiyäyika does, however, accept) but also the whole entities (avayavin), which 
are not simply aggregates of parts (desa). Pots, mountains and trees do exist 
mind-independently. They are said to exist in their parts through the relation of inherence 
(samaväya). Consequently, a perception of a pot, for example, is a perception of a 
mind-independent entity. Because the pot inheres in its parts, one may have a perception of 
the whole pot simply by perceiving a part of the pot. 50 ) 
One would expect here, I think, that Nägärjuna would make the further point that 
even the Abhidharma dbarma-s, which form in aggregation the sense-objects, are 
themselves conceptually constructed. In this case-- not only would knowledge-episodes 
of ordinary entities, such as pots, not mirror a mind-independent reality 
but also-- there 
would be no mind-independent reality upon which knowledge-episodes are 
based. One 
cannot have knowledge-episodes which apprehend a mind-independent reality even 
in the 
case of the sense-objects out of which pots, etc are conceptually constructed. 
The 
"See Williams (1981), p. 238. Cox (1995), pp. 138-139. 
`°See NS II, 1,32, na caikadetopalabdbiravayavisadbbä, iät ' See also 
NSBh and \: ý i' 11,1,3'. Jhä (trans) 
(1984), p. 697-706. See also Matilal (1986), pp. 255-291. 
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sense-objects themselves are prajaptisat. This is a point which is made explicitl%, for 
example, in the SS, where Nägärjuna argues that the äyatana-s are themsel< es empty 
(stongpa). That is, they are empty of svabhäva, which is to say that they are prajriapti, at. 
It seems surprising to me that Nägärjuna, here in the Vaid/Vaid( does not make a similar 
point. As his argument stands, it appears to be an explication of Abhidharma position, and 
it does not (clearly, at any rate) take the further distinctively Mädhyamika step of deny in<2 
even the svabhäva of the sense-objects themselves. (Ndgärjuna's argument is \ erti. 
obscure, however. One cannot be sure ofwhat point he intends to make). 
8.9. Refutation of the pramäna as a Cognition which 
Corresponds to the Object as prameya. 
The opponent asserts once again his realist thesis. The prameya is the object, such 
as a pot, to which corresponds a cognition (blo= buddhl), e. g. the perception of the pot, 
which is the pramaua. 52 The point is, it would appear, that a knowledge-episode is a mental 
mirroring of the mind-independent state of affairs. The pot exists and is there to be 
contacted, as it were, by the cognition. Nägärjuna presents two arguments in refutation of 
this position: 
8.9.1. The Object Cognized is Just a Condition of the 
Knowledge-episode. 
Nägärjuna writes, 
de rkyen du gyurpa nyid yin pa 'i phyir sties pa yang ma yin zhing shes bya yang 
ma yin no// 
Because the [pot] only occurs as a condition, it is neither the knowledge nor 
the object of knowledge. (Vaid 19) 
gang gi pbyir dbang po dang don phrad pa las blo skye bar 
dod pa de 'i ph vir 
bum pa ni rkyen du gyur pa nyid yin pa de'i pbyir blo ni tsbad ma ma yin 
/a hung 
pa yang gzbal bya ma yin no/ 
Because it is accepted that the cognition [of the pot] arises as a result of 
the 
contact of the sense-organ and the object, therefore the pot only occurs as 
a 
condition [of the knowledge-episode]. Therefore, the cognition 
[of the pot] is 
not the knowledge-episode and the pot is not the object of 
knowledge. ('aid(' 
`'SS 52-54. 
s2 VaidC 19, smras pal bum pa la bum pa 'i NO ni tshad ma yin la 




What does Nägärjuna mean when he states that the pot is a only a condition (rk% ýýn) 
of the knowledge-episode? It would seem that he means that the pot is the object of the 
sense-organ. The sense-organ and the pot are both required in order for a 
knowledge-episode to occur. They are both conditions required for the production o1'a 
knowledge-episode. But why should it follow from this that the pot is not the object of 
knowledge, and the cognition of the pot is not the knowledge-episode? I do not understand 
Nägärjuna's reasoning here. (One is tempted, perhaps, to find a'Kantian' sort of argument 
here. Because the sense-organ, as well as the pot, is a condition for the possibility of 
knowledge, what is actually known is not the pot as it is in itself, but rather the pot as 
mediated by the sense-organ. The pot as it is in itself is just a cause of the cognition, and Iles 
behind the'veil of ideas'. But perhaps this interpretation is rather far-fetched). 
At any rate, it seems that Nägärjuna is being very inconsistent. As I have explained, 
in the previous verse Nägärjuna says that the sense-organs apprehend the sense-objects, 
such as colour, smell, etc, on the basis of which the object, such as a pot, is conceptually 
constructed. Now, at Vaid/VaidC 19, Nägärjuna appears to say that the object which is 
contacted by the sense-organ is the pot. Therefore the pot is only one of the conditions 
(along with the sense-organ) which produces the knowledge-episode. But, surely, 
Nägärjuna should say, rather, that the the contact of the sense-organ with the sense-object 
(such as colour) is the condition in dependence upon which the mind constructs the 
cognition of the pot. The pot is not a condition for the production of the 
knowledge-episode, it is, rather, the object of knowledge which occurs dependent upon 
conditions such as the contact of the sense-organ and the sense-object, and the constructi\ e 
activity of the mind. I suspect that Nägärjuna is guilty here of (very) confused thinking. 
(It 
is hard to know, however, exactly what Nägärjuna has in mind. His argument 
is so 
undeveloped that it is difficult confidently to make much philosophical sense of 
it). 
8.9.2. The Cognition is aprameya, According to the Naiya 
ikas 
Themselves. 
Nägärjuna's final point is that the Naiyäyikas claim, at 
NS I, 1 , 
9, that cognitions 
(buddhi) are in fact a class ofprameya-s. 53 But the Naiyäyika also wants 
to claim, he notes. 
"NS, I, 1,9, ätcnasarirendrivirthabuddhimanahpravrttidosapretti'abhavaphaladuhýlhäpa, 
1r°3stuPr. ýme<<ým 
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that the pramäna is a cognition. How then can the cognition be both a prame%'a and a 
pramäna 4 Nägärjuna clearly means that the Naiyäyikas are inconsistent in claiming that 
one thing, viz. a cognition (blo), can be both a knowledge-episode and the object of 
knowledge. However, Nägärjuna's point is obviously fallacious, and this is for two 
reasons: 
(i) It does not follow that, because pramäna-s are cognitions, all cognitions are 
pramäna-s. In fact, this is obviously not the case (there are plenty of erroneous cognitions. 
cognitions characterized by doubt, etc. See 6.2.2). Thus, cognitions which are not 
knowledge-episodes might become the object (prameya) of a knowledge -episode. As. for 
example, when I have the introspective knowledge-episode which apprehends an 
erroneous cognition. I might have the correct cognition of my erroneous cognition. I know 
that my cognition of the twelve-headed ogre in my back garden (for instance) is incorrect. 
There is no contradiction, then, in the claim that pramäna-s are cognitions, and that other 
non-pramäna cognitions might become the prameya-s of these pramäna-s. 
(ii) It is true that it is contradictory to assert that a cognition which is a pramäna 
might simultaneously be a prameya. However, there is no contradiction in the position 
(advanced by the Naiyäyikas) which asserts that a cognition which is a pramäna might 
become subsequently the prameya of another pramapa. This might occur when the 
pramäna is itself validated. For then the correct cognition itself becomes the object 
attested. There is a knowledge-episode of a knowledge-episode. Vätsyäyana likens this to 
the balance (tula) which is tested for its own abiltiy to weigh properly. 55 
Take, for example, my correct cognition of the pot. A subsequent correct cognition 
might take the correct cognition of the pot as its object (prameya). For example, as a result 
of validation, I might have the knowledge-episode that my earlier cognition of the pot Was 
a knowledge-episode. I have a knowledge-episode of a knowledge-episode (which 
is thus, 
in this context, aprameya). 
So, Nägärjuna's claim that it is inconsistent to assert that pramäna-s and 
(some) 
prameya-s are both cognitions fails both because cognitions which are not pramäna-s 
can 
be prameya-s, and because cognitions which are pramäna-s can 
be prame a-s of 
subsequent pramäna-s. There is thus no contradiction in the 
Naiyäyika assertion that 
/ äi 
1h20, 
ý. ýanr, ý ph s' t aid 20, blo ni tshad ma ma yin to/gzhal bya yin parmngon par 
brjod pa'i pbyirro, ' 
d on 
khyod kyi blo gzhal bya yin parrjod par byed de ji Ita zhe na/ 
bdag dang/ Jus dang'' ang po dani' don 
dang/ blo dang/ yid dang/ jug pa dang/ skyon dang/ srid pa pbyi ma 
dang. "bras bu dang sdug bnal 
dangbyanggrolrnamsnigzhalbyayinnozhesbrjodpa'iphyirro/de'iphtiit . nyi-'3yangmedPa 
ýn no 
"NSBh, 11,1,16, Ad (trans) (1984), pp. 632-633. 
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pramäna-s are cognitions, and that one class ofprameya-s is cognitions. 
8.10 Conclusion. 
The critique of the pramäna-s and the prameya-s in the raid ti äidC'is, it is fair to 
say, less systematic than the critique in the VV/VVG It is also at times even more obscure. 
Perhaps the most striking general difference between the two critiques is that the 
Vaid/VaidCdoes not focus so much on the issue of the validation of the pramäna-s (except 
in the section concerning intrinsic establishment) as does the VV/VVC. 
As with the critique in the VV/VVC, the critique in the Vaid/l ardC is, I have 
argued, intended to refute the Naiyäyika theory that knowledge-episodes mirror 
mind-independent objects. For Nägärjuna, all objects of knowledge lack sti-ahhäva, i. e. 
have conceptually constructed existence (prajnaptisaf, though-- as in the t'V-1 "VC-- in 
the Vaid/VaidChe gives us no good reasons to accept this implausible theory. 
The critique of the pramäpa-s and prameya-s in the Vaid/VaidC employs many 
arguments which are fallacious. The fallacies are, I suggest, in many cases even more 
blatant than those which occur in the VV/VVC. One often gets the impression that the 
critique in the Vaid/VaidCis designed, not to establish the truth, but to defeat opponents by 
whatever means, fair or foul (i. e., in Nyäya terms, our author is engaging in jalpa`h). Either 
that or its author was a very poor logician! Many of the arguments which Nägärjuna uses 
for the pulverization (vaidalya) of the Nyäya categories of pramäna and prameya are 
themselves easily obliterated. Nägärjuna engages in what appears to be shameless 
sophistry57, but I think that in identifying the fallacies which he commits some light is 
"On jalpa, see See NS 1,2,2, yathoktopapannaschalajätinigrahasthänasädhanopälambho ja/pall, ' See also 
Potter (1977), p. 208. Of course, the author of the Vaid/VaidCrefutes jalpa itself, as it is one of the 
Nyäya padärtha-s. See Vaid/VaidC57. 
"As Lindtner (1982), p. 87 comments, the Vaid/VaidCis'without compare the most lively and amusing of all 
texts ascribed to Nagärjuna, full of sophistries as it is... ' It should be noted that the sophistries are not 
confined to the critique of the pramäna-s and the prameya-s. Many of the Nägärjuna's criticisms of other 
Nyäya padärtha-s are humourously foolish (are they intended to be so? ). 
Take for example Nägärjuna's etymologically-based refutation of the 
Nyäya category of the 
drstänta. The word drstgnta is, Nägärjuna says, a compound of drsta and anz'a meaning 
'something N hose 
end is seen'. But, Nägärjuna argues, such a compound is incoherent, because 
it only mentions the end 
being seen, without the beginning or the middle being seen. And something with an existent 
end but no 
beginning or middle is impossible. 
But it seems to me that this argument is pure sophistry. At 
best it is pointing out that the word 
'drstänta' is not a good word with which to label the phenomenon which the 
Nai yäyikas are talking about. 
It does nothing to refute the category of the example, just the literal meaning of 
the name which the 
Naiyäyikas give to it. I am not sure that it even accomplishes this much, 
hoýý ever. It does not seem 
logical tome to argue that, because a name only mentions the end 
being seen, therefore it implies that the 
beginning and middle are neither observable or existent. If I say only that 
I have seen the end of the film, 
this does not imply either that I have not observed the beginning and the middle 
of the film or that the 
beginning and the middle of the film do not exist! In short, Nägärjuna's argument 
is very peculiar For i 
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thrown on the philosophical issues at stake. 
useful explanation of the argument, see Tola and Dragonetti (1995a), pp. 119-120. 
Vaid 27, thog ma dang dbus med pa'ipbyir mtba' yang mthong ba ma yin not t aid(; 27, g311 g :Is 
don gyi thog ma dang dbus ma mthong ba desji Aar mthar mthong ba yin to thog ma long dbus med na 
mtha'yodpa ma yin no/ de'phyirdpe[ drsta-anta-'something whose end is seen'] med pa yin no 
? 18 
9. Conclusion. 
I have answered the questions which I raised at the beginning of the introduct Ion to 
these studies in early Indian Madhvamaka epistemology. (See 1.1). Is \ä:; ärjuna a 
sceptic? Despite some striking formal parallels between Nägarjuna's arguments and the 
arguments of the classical sceptics, Nägärjuna is not a sceptic. Whereas the sceptic claims 
not to have knowledge, Nägärjuna emphatically says that he has knowledge ofemptiness 
(sünyataj, i. e. the absence of svabhäva of entities. In what sense is knowledge of the 
ultimate truth (paramärthasatya) or reality (tattva) non-conceptual for Nägärjuna" I have 
investigated and assessed in detail two interpretations. Non-conceptual knowledge might 
be, for Nägärjuna, (1) a trans-rational gnosis of an unconceptualizable reality or (2) a 
focussed, not explictly conceptual, meditative knowledge by acquaintance (as opposed to 
a merely theoretical knowledge) of a conceptualizable reality (the emptiness, i. e. the 
absence of svabhäva, of entities). I have favoured the latter interpretation as perhaps 
closer to Nägärjuna's intentions, though I found that both interpretations entail serious 
philosophical problems. Does Nagärjuna's understanding of the ultimate truth/reality as 
emptiness (sunyata) condemn him to nihilism? Understood in the Abhidharma context in 
which Nägärjuna was functioning, Nägärjuna's philosophy of emptiness, i. e. universal 
absence of svabhäva, probably does entail nihilism, despite Nägarjuna's claim to tread the 
Middle Path. These were the principal issues which I discussed at length in the first part of 
the thesis. In the second part of the thesis, I considered Nägärjuna's critiques, in the 
VV/VVCand the Vaid/VaidC, of the Nyäya theory of knowledge (pramäna). What is the 
Nyäya pramäna theory which Nägärjuna attacks? I have explained in some detail the main 
features of this pramäna theory. The Nyäya pramäna theory is, most fundamentally, a 
form 
of philosophical realism, according to which knowledge is the apprehension of a mind- 
independent state-of-affairs. What is the precise purpose of Nägärjuna's critiques? 
Nägärjuna's critiques are intended to refute this Nyäya realism. 
According to Nägärjuna, 
there can be no knowledge (pramäna) of mind-independent entities, 
because there arc no 
mind-independent entities. Are Nägärjuna's criticisms successful, 
from a philosophical 
perspective? I think that I must answer with a resounding 'no'. 
Nägärjuna's arguments 
definitely fail to establish that there there are no mind-independent entities 
and that there 
can be no knowledge of mind-independent entities. 
It is not uncommon for Buddhists, particularly perhaps those 
Buddhists influenced 
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by Madhyamaka, to quote the scriptural passage to the effect Buddhist teachimg mint be 
tested by reason, i.. e. it must be analyzed, like gold is tested by melting. cutting. and 
polishing. It should not be accepted out of devotion or respect. The present stud% in early 
Indian Madhyamaka epistemology, and some related ontological issues, has been an 
attempt to conduct such a test with regard to Nägärjuna's thought. at least. The results oi' 
this test have not been entirely complimentary to Nägärjuna. Nägärjuna's reasoning, is erv 
often flawed, and the basic philosophical position which underlies his thinking namely, 
that all entities lack svabhäva=have conceptually consructed existence (prajr)apri.. rr) 
seems to me to be untenable. 
Nevertheless, as I hope that my thesis has made clear, study of Nägärjuna's thought 
raises important philosophical questions-- about the way things really are, and the nature of 
knowledge-claims about the way things really are. His thinking has certainly provided the 
present author with an opportunity to reflect on, and grapple with, these issues. In mý 
opinion, Nägärjuna does not provide convincing answers to the questions'how are things 
actually? ' and' how is this actual nature of things to be known? ' . 
but critical engagement 
with his thought does seem to lead one to a deeper questioning. From a philosopher's 
perspective, at any rate, this is salutary. Nägärjuna's philosophy may not pass the test of 
reason, but it is certainly not fool's gold. 
'For a translation of this passage see Lopez (1988), p. 5. Lopez (1988), p. 
10 says that this passage is cited by- 
Tsong kha pa in his Drang ages legs bshad saying po, and that 
R. Thurman has found it also in 
§dntaraksita's Tattvasamgraha. Williams (1991), p. 511 says that the present Dalai 
Lama is fond of 
quoting this passage. 
2Which is certainly not to say, I must stress, that Buddhism as a whole 
is flawed. Nagärjuna's philosoph- 
represents only one among many Buddhist expressions of 
how things really are. Perhaps, then, there are 
more satisfactory explanations given by other Buddhist thinkers. 
I must also add that I do not think that 
anything which I have said in this thesis disproves what 
I consider to be basic Buddhist teachings. such as 
dependent origination, the four noble truths, the eightfold path, 
the teaching of the importance of 
compassion, etc. What I have perhaps proved, however, 
is that Nägarjuna's philosoph' of emptiness, 
despite his claims to the contrary, is incompatible with these 
basic Buddhist teachings. If everything is 
empty the Buddhist path would be destroyed (regardless ofNägdrjuna's 
protestations) (ln oer dohs. 
the opponent in MMK XXIV is right). But I suggest that 
the problem lies. not with the 
basic 
teachings, but with Nägärjuna's philosophy of emptiness. 
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12. Appendix. Some Further Reflections 
on svabhava in Indian Madh yamaka. 
12.1. Candrakirti's Claim that the Actual svabha-a of 
Entities is Their Lack of svabhava. 
I have explained in chapter 4 that for Nägärjuna svabhäva is uncreated (aAiiritna) 
and independent of another (nirapeksah paratra). I have also said that Nägärjuna claims 
that all entities lack, i. e. are empty of, svabhäva. I have argued that, seen in the context of 
Abhidharma philosophy, this denial of svabhäva must mean, not just that all entities 
dependently originate but also that all entities are prajaptisat. That is to say.,, no entity 
exists independently of/uncreated by conceptual construction. 
The situation is actually more complicated, however. According to Candrakirti, 
for example, although in the sense which I have just explained all entities lack svabhä i , a, 
there is another special sense in which entities actually have svabhäva. ' 
In the PP, Candrakirti comments on Nägärjuna's statement, at MMKXV 2c-d, that 
svabhäva is uncreated and independent of another. He takes this as an affirmation that 
there is such an uncreated and independent nature of entities. This svabhäva is uncreated 
and independent in the special sense that it does not come into and go out of existence. 
Candrakirti describes it as having 'the state of not changing' (avikär tva) and as 
'invariableness always' (sadaiva stbäyita). It is, in other words, what is invariably the case 
about all entities. Candrakirti equates this svabbäva with the dharmatä, svarzipa, prakrti, 
tatbatä, and tatbäbbäva. But what is this uncreated, independent nature of all entities? It is, 
Candrakirti says, sunyatä, which is the state of absence of svabbäva (naihsvabhäLya). = In 
'Ames (1982), pp. 161-177 has made a careful study of Candrakirti's position. 
'PP 264-265. yä sä dbarmänäm dharmatä nama saiva tatsvarüpam/ atha 
keyam dharm3näm dharmatä, 
dharmänäm svabhävah/ ko yam svabhävab, prakrtib/ ksceyam prakrtih, yevam 
stünvati keyam 
iunyata, naisvabh vyam/ kimidam naihsväbbävyam, tathatä/ 
keyam tathati, tathäbhä vo 'vikärin am 
sadaiva sthäyitV The various appellations, dbarmatI, svarüpa, svabhäva, prakrti, etc are, of course, 
synonyms for the real nature of things. See Scherrer-Schaub 
(1991), p. 132,238. See also YS 1' 30, 
... 
dngos po ni ranggi ago bo ste/ ganggi rang gi ngo 
bo gang yin pa de aide 'i dngos po ste' de kho na o 
ranggi ngo bolo/ ngo bo nyid/ de bzbin nyid do/gzban ma yin pa nyid 
do... 
mKhas grub rje makes two important points about the 
independent nature of an entity's actual 
svabAdva, i. e. its emptiness of svabbäva. First, although emptiness 
is always the case about entities. i. e. 
independent of circumstances, emptiness is nevertheless 
dependent in the specific sense that emptiness is 
always the emptiness ofentities. There is no emptiness, 
i. e. no actual svabhäva, without entities of which 
it is the emptiness. Second, mKhas grub rje says that emptiness 
is also independent in the special sense 
that it does not depend on a standard (ltossa) for its existence. mKhas 
grub rje contrasts emptiness with 
'long' and 'short' in this respect. A rope which 
is the length of a lower arm span is'long' when measured 
according to the standard of a rope which is the 
length of a finger span. But the same rope 
is 'short' ti hen 
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other words, Candrakirti claims that the lack of svabhäva is siabb-i a because it is what i1 
invariably the case about all entities. ' The essential nature of all entities is their lack of 
essential nature. Emptiness-- i. e. the absence of existence independent of conceptual 
construction-- without exception characterizes entities, and in this special sense this 
emptiness may be called the svabhäva of entities. 
Candrakirti in the MA: 
gang phyir de yi rang bzbin de/ 
yin phyir mig nj mig gi stong/ 
de bzhin ma ba sna dang Ice/ 
lus dang yid kyang bsnyad par bya// 
ther zug gnas pa ma yin dang/ 
jig pa ma yin nyid kyi phyir/ 
mig la sogs pa drug po yi/ 
rang bzhin med nyid gang yin pal 
de ni nang stong nyid du 'dod// 
gang phyir de yi rang bzhin de/ 
yin pbyirgzugs nigzugs kyis stong/ 
sgra dang dri ro reg bya dang/ 
chos roams nyid kyang de bzbin no// 
This position is also stated by 
The eye is empty of the eye, because that is its svabhäva. 
Likewise the ear, nose, tongue, body and mind also should be explained. 
The absence of svabhäva of the six [sense capacities], the eye, etc, 
since they are neither unchanging not annihilated, 
is stated to be internal emptiness. 
Form is empty of form because that is its svabhäva. 
Sound, smell, taste, touch, and mental objects also are the same. 
(MA VI, 181-183) 
Candrakirti makes the same point, in a particularly clear and succinct 
fashion, in 
the YSV. " 
measured according to the standard of a rope which 
is a full arm span in length. Thus, whether the rope is 
long or short depends upon with what it is compared. 
By contrast with long and short, emptiness exist 
independent of such comparison. The rope is simply empty. whether 
it be the length of a lower arm span, 
the length of a finger span, or the length of a 
full arm span. All ropes are equally empty. All entities, 
for 
that matter, are equally empty. All entities possess emptiness 
to the same degree as one another. 
Emptiness does not admit of degrees of quantity or quality. 
See sTong 128-129, (Cabezön (trans) 
(1992), pp. 125-126). 
'Actually, Candrakirti says that the absence of svabbä va 
is the svabhä ra of all dharma-s. He does not say that 
the absence of svabbäva is the svabhäva of all entities. 
See PP 264. But it follows that, if the dharma-s 
have absence of svabhävaas their svabhä%'a. so too will all 
entities which are constructed out of them. 
Compare here Bhävaviveka's similar statement that 
his position (paksa) is that the svvabhsva of all 
dbarma-s is svabbavakinyatä. 7Jv (96,28,1-1) 
(I ida (1980), p. 88), kho bo cag ph yogs la ni ngo 
bo mid 
stag pa nyid yin tel cbos reams kvi ngo 
bo q yid de vin pa... 
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... 
dngos po'i rang bzbin ni ngo bo nyid I med pa yin... 
... the svabhäva of entities is the absence of svabhäv-a... (Y SV? 5 ). 
(Whether this position makes sense I am not sure. however. As I have explained in 
the chapter 4, the lack of svabhäva of all entities would seem to entail-- despite the 
Mädhyamika claim that Madhyamaka thought is not nihilism-- that entities do not exist at 
all. In which case, what sense can be made ofCandrakirti's position that all entities (which, 
it turns out, do not exist at all) have the essential characteristic, the svabhäva, which is 
emptiness, i. e. the lack of svabhäva? How can a non-existent entity have a characteristic? ) 
12.2. Adumbrations of Candrakirti's View in 
Nagdrjuna's Writings. 
Candrakirti does not regard his interpretation of svabhäva here as an innovation. 
He contends that Nägärjuna himself accepts that absence of svabhäva is the actual 
svabhäva of entities. This is, Candrakirti claims, the intended meaning of the statement 
describing svabhäva at MMKX V, 2c-d. ' 
However, Nägärjuna does not say here (at MMK XV, 2c-d) that he accepts that 
anything exists which satisfies his description of svabhäva. And, in fact, there are many 
passages in which he simply denies that there is any svabhäva of entities. In other words, 
Nägärjuna usually seems to claim that there is nothing which satisfies his definition of 
svabhäva. b The category 'entities with svabhäva' would appear to be simply an empty set 
for Nägärjuna. He at no point clearly takes the position that the absence of svabhäva is the 
actual svabhä va of entities. It appears that Candrakirti (and, indeed, Bhävaviveka (see note 
3)) is not simply a faithful commentator in this regard. There is an element of innovation in 
his explanation. (Unless, of course, Candrakirti was party to no longer extant texts or an 
oral tradition about this matter). 
I have, however, located four passages in texts attributed to Nägärjuna which might 
'As Williams (1992a), p. 34, points out, the Tibetan translators have here attempted to make a 
distinction 
between svabhäva as inherent existence, translated as ngo 
bo nvid which entities do not ha, e. and 
svabhäva as'true/actual nature', translated as rang bzhin. Thus the rang 
bzhin of entities is their lack of 
ngo bo nyid Note that rang bzhin also translates svarüpa Also, ngo 
bo nvidshould not be confused with 
. ranggingo bo, which translates prakrh. SeeScherrer-Schaub 
(1991), pp. 108,132,387-388 
`See PP 262. mKhas grub rie also sees this interpretation, i. e. that the absence of svabhäva 
is the sv abh. i to of 
entities, as Nägärjuna's intended meaning at MMKX\' 2c-d. 
See sTong 128 (Cabezön (trans) (1992), p 
125. ) 
6MMK XXIV is replete with references to the absence of svabhäva of entities. 
See also AIMK X1II, 3, YS 10. 
SS3,12,16,35. 
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imply that the actual svabb vaofentities is their lack of scahha a. I shall consider them in 
turn: 
(i) Nägärjuna says, atMMKXVIII, 7c-d that the dharmatä(like nm Jna) is without 
origination (anutpanna) and without cessation (aniruddha). ' In his comrnentar-v on this 
verse, Candrakirti says that this dharmatä is the siabhä 'a of dhar na--s. As I have 
explained, for Candrakirti the actual svabhäva of dharnia-s, and hence of entities in 
general, is their absence of svabhäva. It does seem reasonable to infer, as Candrakirti Im 
done, that the dharmatä is sünyatä, i. e. the absence of svabhäva in entities. The absence of 
svabbäva does not originate or cease, i. e. it is what is always the case about entities. 
Nevertheless, Nägärjuna does not actually state either that the dharmatä is sünyata. i. e. the 
absence of svabbäva, or that the dbarrnatä is the svabhäva of entities. Candrakirti's 
extrapolation from MMKXVIII 7c-d seems acceptable philosophically, but this does not 
necessarily mean that it is an extrapolation made by Nägärjuna himself. 
(ii) In the YS, Nägärjuna states that: 
bälä rajyanti rdpesu vairägyarn yärrti madbyamäh/ 
svabhä vajvä vimucyante rclpasyottamabuddbayah// 
Fools are attracted to forms, the middling reach freedom from all worldly 
desires. 
Those with the best intellects, knowing the svabhäva of form, are liberated. 
(YS55). 
The idea here might be, then, that those with the best intellects, i. e. the äryan-s, 
know that the svabhäva, i. e. the invariable nature, of form (rüpa) is its lack of svabhä va, i. e. 
its conceptually constructed existence. It is this knowledge which liberates them from 
samsära. Candrakirti certainly thinks so, for his commentary on this verse states that: 
gang dag gzugs kyang ngo bo nyid kyis med de/ gzugs bmyan 
bzhin du 
khong du chudpa de dag ni gzugs la sogs pa'i rnam par flog pa rnams 
las gdon 
mi za bar/ gzugs kyi rang bzhin shes pa yi/ blo mchog rnams ni rnam par 
groll/ 
Also, whoever comprehends that form is without svabhäha. 
like a reflection, 
they, the best intellects who know the svabb va of form, are 
liberated 
'MMK XVIII, 7c-d. ... anutpannäniruddhä 
hi nirvänami v "a dbarmat i 
BSee PP 364. yasmädanutpannäniruddhä nlrvanam1 'a 
dharmatä dharmast abhäv ah dharmaprakrtih 
vyavastbäpitä... Compare also the Tibetan translation, gang gi 
ph vir ma ski es pa dang ma gags pa chos 
nyidde choskyingo bo dang chos ki i rang 
bzbin m va ngan las das pa dang mtshungs par 
bzhag pa.. . 
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undoubtedly as a result of the understanding of form, etc. ( }' L' 5; ). 
Note the addition of the 'etcetera' (la sods pa). Candrakirti clearly thinks that 
Nägärjuna intends that form (rzrpa) here is merely illustrative. In fact, it is byrknmving the 
svabhäva (which is the absence of svabhäva) of all entities, and not just form, that those 
with the best intellects are liberated. 
It is evident, I think, that Candrakirti has explored the implications of Nägärjuna's 
statement here quite convincingly. Nevertheless, this does not mean that Nägärjuna 
himself was necessarily aware of these implications. Nägärjuna simply says, after all, that 
liberation is by means of knowing the svabbäva of form. One might protest that the 
implications which Candrakirti states are obvious. However, one should not assume that 
what seems obvious was in fact obvious to Nägärjuna. There is, after all, no evidence here 
to suggest that Nägärjuna had thought the matter through. Candrakirti is, then, cleverly 
developing the implications of Nägärjuna's statement, implications of which Nägärjuna 
himself might or might not have been aware. ' 
(iii) In the MMK, Nägärjuna writes that, 
tatbägato yatsvabbävastatsvabbävamidamjagat/ 
tathägato nihsvabbävo nihsvabbävamidam jagat//"' 
That which is the svabhäva of the tathägata is the svabhäva of the world. 
'In other words, one must beware here of what R. Robinson calls 'misinterpretation by inference. ' As he writes, 
concerning the interpretation of Plato, "Plato says p, and p implies q; therefore Plato meant q. ' The 
conclusion does not follow; for Plato may have thought that p did not imply q, or, more probably, the 
suggestion that 'p implies q' may never had occurred to him at all, or, most probably of all, even the 
proposition q itself may never had occurred to him. ' See Robinson (1953), p. 2. 
Robinson's statement can be applied mutatismutandisto the interpretation that, because Nägärjuna 
says, at YS 55, that form (rüpa) has svabhäva, therefore he must have intended (as Candrakirti makes 
explicit) that the svabhävaof form and all other entities is their lack of svabhäva. Thus: Nägärjuna says 
(form has svabhäva). (Form has svabhäva) implies (the svabhävaof form and all other entities is their 
lack of svabhäva); therefore, Nägärjuna meant (the svabhävaof form and all other entities 
is their lack of 
svabhäva)'. The conclusion does not follow, for Nägärjuna may have thought that (form 
has svabhäva) 
does not imply (the svabhäva of form and all other entities is their 
lack of svabhä ia), or, more probably, 
the suggestion that'(form has svabhäva) implies (the svabhävaof 
form and all other entities is their lack 
of svabhäva)' may never have occurred to him at all; or, most probably of all, even 
the proposition (the 
svabhävaof form and all other entities is their lack of svabhäva) 
itself may never had occurred to him. 
It would, however, be overly cautious to infer that, because 
Nägärjuna does not state in any extant 
text that the actual svabhäva of entities is their lack of svabhäva therefore 
he did not think that this was 
the case. It might be that Nägärjuna said that the actual svabhävaof entities 
is their lack of svabhäva in 
some text not now available, or in his oral commentaries. 
My point is that one cannot know whether or 
not Nägärjuna himself thought that the actual svabhävaof entities 
is there lack of svabhäva My point is 
not that one can know that Nägärjuna did not think that the actual sv abhäva 
of entities is their lack of 
svabhäva. 
'°Compare here the Tibetan translation, de bzhingshegspa'i rang bzhin gang/de ni 
gro ba'i rang bzhin via de 
bzhin gshegspa rang bzhin med/ gro ba 'di virang bzhin med 
? 3; 
The svabhäva of the tatbägata does not exist. The svabhäva of this world does not exist. (MMK XXII, 16. ) 
Again, Nägärjuna does not actually say here that: (a) the svabhä% a of the tamii ,, ata 
is his absence of svabhäva, (b) because the svabhävaof the tathägata is the st ahh3 a of the 
world, (c) therefore the svabhä va of the world is its absence of svabhäca. Ho%ever, one is 
certainly tempted to make this unstated inference. 
(iv) In the AS, Nägärjuna states: 
hetupratyayasambhzjtä paratanträ ca samvrtih/ 
paratantra iti proktah paramärthastvakrtrimah// 
svabhävah prakrtistattvarn dravyam vastu sadityapii 
Convention arises from causes and conditions and is dependent. 
The dependent is thus proclaimed [by you]. 
But the ultimate is uncreated. 
Also it is called, svabbäva, nature, reality, substance, essence, 
[and] true being. (AS44-45a-b) 
Clearly convention (samvrtr), which is dependently originating, is here contrasted 
with the ultimate (paramärtha), which is uncreated, i. e. independent. It seems that a list of 
synonyms is given for this ultimate, including svabhäva. It is difficult to know, however, 
quite what Nägärjuna has in mind. Does he mean that the ultimate, i. e. the svabhäva, 
prakrti, etc is the absence of svabhäva of entities? Is it'uncreated' in the sense that it is the 
invariable nature of all entities? This is certainly a plausible inference to make, especially 
given that many other passages of the AS assert the absence of svabhäva of entities. 
Again, however, one cannot be sure that this is an inference which Nägärjuna himself 
intended. 
This interpretation is, however, strongly supported by the following passage: 
yap pratltyasamutpädah sünyatä saiva te ma tä/ 
tatbi vidbasca saddharrnastatsamasca tatbägatab// 
tattattvam paramärtbo pi tathatä dravyamisyate/ 
bbütam tadavisamvädi tadbodbädbuddba ucyate// 
Dependent origination is just what you [i. e. the Buddha] understand to 
be 
emptiness, and so too is the true doctrine, and identical to that 
is the tathägata. 
"In fact, the entire AS seems to focus on this theme. 
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That is regarded [by you to be] the truth, and the ultimate. 
suchness [i. e. the true nature of things], the substance [of things]. That is the incontrovertible truth. 
On account of [one's] knowing that, a buddha is proclaimed. (Ah' 40-41). 
Here, Nägärjuna says that dependent origination is precisely (eva) what is meant by 
emptiness. This seems to imply that emptiness is the absence of a nature which is 
independent (of conceptual construction). That is, because entities originate as conceptual 
constructs, therefore they are empty of svabhäva. In the passage, Nagarjuna describes this 
emptiness as, among other things, the paramärtha and the dravya of entities. (Which. 
would seem to imply incidentally, that Nägärjuna thinks that the dravya of entities is their 
lack of dravyasatt! ). It seems reasonable to infer that, if. (a) the paramärthaand the drati-% ýa 
are emptiness, (b) emptiness is the absence of a nature independent (of conceptual 
construction), and (c) svabhäva is given in AS44-45a-b as a synonym of pararri rtha and 
dravya, (d) therefore the actual svabhäva of entities is emptiness, i. e. the absence of 
svabhäva (naihsvabhäva). This would entail that the actual svabhäva of entities is their 
lack of svabhäva. Again, a reasonable inference, but one which Nägärjuna himself does 
not make in the text. 
12.3. A gzhan stong Interpretation of AS 44-45a-b. 
There is an alternative reading of AS 44-45a-b. It is sometimes said in the Tibetan 
Jo nang pa school, which advocates a gzhan stong interpretation of emptiness, that 
Nägärjuna's highest teaching, the so-called 'Great Madhyamaka', can be found in the 
collection of his verses of praise (bstod tsbogs), which includes the AS 'ý These verses of 
praise are said to communicate that there is an Ultimate Reality which is eternal. This 
Ultimate Reality is not itself empty, i. e. it does not lack svabbäva. The Ultimate Reality is 
"See Williams (1989) pp. 107-108. Hookham (1991), pp. 82,154-155. It should be noted, however, that the 
gzhan stong interpretation of Nägärjuna relies primarily, not on the AS, but on the Dharmadhstusta va, 
which is extant in Tibetan and Chinese. Lindtner (1982), p. 17 says, however, that this work 
is probably 
not actually by Nägärjuna. Lindtner argues that it would be a 'glaring 
inconsistency' for Nägärjuna to 
assert, as the ultimate truth, the 'positive ontology' which is 
found in the DS. Nevertheless, Lindtner 
contends, one cannot rule out the possiblity that this work 
is written by Nägärjuna from a conventional or 
non-definitive (neyärtba) perspective. In other words, 
Nägärjuna might have written the DS for those 
without the spiritual maturity to hear the highest truth, 
i. e. the universal emptiness (absence of sv ahhs va). 
However, it should be noted that a gzban stong interpretation would argue 
the exact opposite. The 
works written from a conventional or non-definitive perspective are 
the MMK. etc, which teach 
universal absence of svabbäva, whereas the 'positive ontology' of 
the DS is the highest truth, i. e. the 
definitive (nitärtha) teaching. 
One thing is certain here. One cannot argue simply that the 
DS is not by Nägärjuna because it 
contains apparent gzban stongtype teachings. This would 
be, of course, to beg the question. 
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empty only in the sense that it is devoid of what is other than it. viz. the dependently 
originating, conceptually constructed world. 
According to this interpretation, then, the quoted passaLe from the AS does not 
mean that the svabhäva, i. e. the invariable nature, of entities is their lack of sºahhas a. Rather, it communicates that there is an ultimate (pararnärtha), an Ultimate Reality. 
which, by contrast with the conditioned (samskrta) world, has a substantial 
(more-than-conceptually-constructed) 
existence (draiyasat) and is permanent. This 
would then be a very different Mädhyamika attitude to svahhäi a than I have so far 
considered. 
However, I suspect that such a gzhan stonginterpretation of the term 'siahha v a', if 
applied to AS44-45a-b, does not pay sufficient attention to the text as a whole in ýN hich the 
passage in question is embedded. The AS is replete with declarations that entities lack 
svabhäva. It seems, in fact, to be the main message of the text. Thus, in the opening verse, 
Nägärjuna makes obeisance to the Buddha who, he says, spoke of the absence of svabhä 1a 
of dependently originating entities. " He does not say that he makes obeisance to the 
Buddha for speaking of an Ultimate Reality which exists permanently, independently of 
causes and conditions! 
Of course, the gzban stonginterpreter might still object that it is not contradictory 
for Nägärjuna to teach in most verses of the ASthat dependently originating entities lack 
svabhäva, and also, at AS44-45a-b, that there is an Ultimate Reality which is empty of 
such dependently originating entities. However, one wonders how this gzhan stong 
interpretation ofAS44-45a-b might be reconciled with, for example, the following verse: 
"Versions ofthisgzban stongposition appear to be advocated by, for example, Dol po pa Shes rab rgyal mtshan 
(1292-1361) and also Mi bskyod rdo rje (1507-1554). More recent proponents have included members of 
the Ris med movement. See Hookham (1991), p. 4,53. Cabezön (1992), pp. 6,424,508. One should 
note, however, that this reading of Nägärjuna's verses of praise is influenced by the tathagatagarbha 
doctrine of the Ratnagotravibhäga, etc. Tathägatagarbha-influenced süitra-s undeniably sometimes refer 
to a permanent Absolute, e. g. the dbarmakaya, which is concealed by the adventitious defilements of the 
unenlightened person. (Of course, the interpretative issue becomes whether or not to take these 
references literally. See Ruegg (1989), pp. 26-28). Even the earliest of the tathagatagarbha sütrra-s 
probably post-dates Nägärjuna. See Williams (1989), pp. 96-109. 
"See also Ruegg (1981), p. 31 who writes of a 'positive conception of absolute reality (paramärtiia) and a 
cataphatic approach to it' which 'distinguish these hymns philosophically from the apophaticism which 
characterizes the theoretical scholastic treatises of Ndgärjuna's Yukti-corpus. ' However. I shall argue 
that, in the AS at least, the approach remains predominantly 'apophatic' and even the 'cataphatic' 
elements, i. e. the references to paramärtba as svabhäva, prakrti, drav. va etc, probably 
do not indicate a 
substantially different philosophical position than Nägärjunapresents in, 
for example, the. 11MK. 
'SAS 1, 'I make obeisance to him whose knowledge is unequalled, who is 
inconceivable. incomparable, who 





etattat paramam tattvam nibsvabbä värtbadesanä/ 
bhävagrabagrhitänäm cikitseyamanutttarä// 
This indeed is the ultimate truth 16: The teaching that objects are without 
svabbä va. 
This is the best medicine for those trapped through grasping at 
entities. (AS 52). 
Here Nägärjuna does not say only that dependently originating entities are without 
svabhäva. He says that the teaching (desana) of this absence of svabhäva is the ultimate 
truth (paramam tattvam). He does not say that the ultimate truth is that there is an Ultimate 
Reality which, by contrast with dependently originating entities, has svabhäva. And 
surely, if the ultimate truth were for Nägärjuna that there is an Ultimate Reality, existing 
with svabhäva-- i. e. an Ultimate Reality which is dravyasat and permanent-- then 
Nägärjuna would not declare that the ultimate truth is simply that entities lack svabad va. 
Surely Nägärjuna would be clearer than this about such an important point. Surely he 
would at least say that the ultimate truth is that entities (other than the Ultimate Reality) 
lack svabhäva, and that there is an Ultimate Reality, existing with svabhäva. It seems, 
then, that a gzhan stonginterpretation of Nägarjuna's assertion of svabhäva atAS44-45a-b 
is rather implausible. " 
`6'tattva' is often best translated by 'reality'. However, 
in this context the appropriate translation seems to 
be 
'truth', given that it is a teaching (de§ana) (rather than 
the reality to which the teaching refers) which is 
described as (paramam) tattvam. 
"This is not to say that the gzban stong or Great 
Madhayamaka position is therefore wrong. Nor have I 
established in this essay that the gzhan stongor 
Great Madhyamaka interpretation of\'3gacjuna is wrong. 
All that I have argued here is that it is highly unlikely that at 
AS44-45a-b Nägärjuna advocates %k hat came 
to be known as a gzban stongor Great Madhyamaka position. 
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